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PREFACE 
This study is the result of extensive research at four universi-
ties and a research institution. The collection of the Daily Report of 
the U. S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service held at Edmon Low 
Library, Oklahoma State University, was of great value in providing 
first-hand information on African countries and the PRC. The Center 
for Chinese Studies, at the University of California at Berkeley (UCB), 
provided most of the Chinese-language primary sources on the PRC used 
in this study. Its collection of Peking Review was also valuable. The 
Institute of International Studies, also at UCB, provided some general 
materials on Africa while the collection of microfilms of the U. S. 
Joint Publications Research Service's Tra~slations on Africa held by 
UCR's mai_n library gave an immense amount of the information used in 
this study. 
The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace offered great 
help during my research there and its African Files were of great help. 
The East Asian Library at Stanford University helped in locating some 
Chinese-language primary and secondary sources on both PRC and ROC. The 
African Studies Center at the University of California at Los Angeles 
kindly let me use its collection of the BBC's Summary of World Broad-
casts, which is extensively quoted in this study. I owe sincere 
gratitude to the staffs of these institutions for their assistance, and 
especially to Dr. Frederick Wakeman, Director of the Center for Chinese 
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Studies at UCB; Mr. C. P. Chen, Curator of the Center for Chinese Stud-
ies; Miss Karen Fung, Assistant Curator of the African Section at the 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace; and Patricia Boyle 
Eaton, Librarian at the African Studies Center at UCLA, for the as-
sistance they gave me during my research at their respective institu-
tions. 
Gratitude is also due to His Excellency Yang Hsi-k'un, Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, and His Excellency 
Ting Mao-shih, Director of the Government Information Office of the Re-
public of China, for providing me with some primary sources on Taipei's 
relations with African countries. 
I owe a great deal to Dr. Robert M. Spaulding, chairman of my ad-
visory committee, whose scholarship has been a source of inspiration to 
me during the past eight years. Dr. Spaulding is responsible for much 
of the improvement made in the manuscript and many of the tables used 
1n this study are results of his insight. I also want to extend my 
gratitude to Dr. Theodore L. Agnew, Dr. John A. Sylvester, and Profes-
sor Harold V. Sare, for the guidance and help they have offered me in 
all these years. Thanks are also extended to all the other faculty and 
sLarf members in the Department of History for the friendship and help 
they have given me during the past twelve years. A note of thanks is 
given to Mrs. Molly Reid, who did an excellent job in typing the manus-
cript. 
I want to thank my parents, who have sacrificed so much for so 
many years for my education, a debt I do not think I will ever be able 
to repay. Appreciation also goes to my sister Liang-yun, whose 
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optimism has been a source of encouragement and strength during my many 
hours of depression and frustration. 
Last but not least, I want to express my deep gratitude to the late 
Or. Homer L. Knight, emeritus head of the Department of History, and 
his wife Naomi, for the consistent encouragement and help they have 
given me during my many years in this country as a rootless foreign 
student. It is my great regret that Dr. Knight, a member of my original 
advisory committee and the first American scholar who taught me to ap-
preciate the history of other people, was unable to see the completion 
of this study. To his memory, I humbly dedicate this work. 
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Throughout history, China has had a strong influence on other coun-
tries in Central, East, and Southeast Asia. For the past hundred years, 
China has also been deeply involved in relations with the United States 
and most of the European powers. But until very recently, the Chinese 
have had almost no interest in or connections with Africa, either of-
ficially or privately. In the fifteenth century, both the Chinese and 
the Portuguese made voyages to Africa, but for complex reasons the 
Portuguese's interest in Africa continued and the Chinese did not. 1 By 
the nineteenth century, when China was drawn involuntarily into a new 
world order designed and created by Europeans, Africa was being par-
titioned into European colonies. Preoccupied with efforts to escape a 
similar fate, China had neither opportunity nor incentive for involve-
ment in Africa. 
That has changed dramatically in the last quarter-century. An op-
portunity for Chinese involvement was created by events in Africa: the 
gradual conversion of European colonies into independent countries ur-
gently needing technical and financial aid. Incentives for Chinese 
involvement were created by events outside Africa: the struggle be-
tween Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, and the struggle 
between the Chinese Communists and their former Soviet allies. 
A long civil war ending in 1949 left China divided between the 
1 
2 
People's Hepublic of China (PHC) with its capital at Peking, and the 
Republic of China (ROC) with its provisional capital at Taipei, Tai-
2 
wan. The PRC controlled the vast territory and population of mainland 
China, while the ROC held only Taiwan and a few smaller islands but un-
til 1971 retained China's seat in the United Nations. In two decades 
(1949-1971) of controversy over Chinese representation in the United 
Nations, the number of African states in the United Nations grew from 
four to forty-one. Competition for African votes in the United Nations 
General Assembly therefore became a maJor incentive for both the PRC 
and the ROC to take an active interest in African affairs. 
Similarly, a bitter ideological dispute between the PRC and the 
Soviet Union, beginning in 1956 and escalating rapidly from 1960 on, 
led to rivalry between these two largest Communist nations that in-
valved Africa as well as many other regions of the world. The PRC 
quest for African votes in the Unifed Nations was intensified by sus-
picion that the Soviet Union was not trying very hard to win United 
Nations' acceplence of the PllC. Hut Sino-Soviet disagreement went far 
beyond this issue, and produced growing competition between the PRC 
and the Soviet Union for influence and ideological leadership through-
out the world. Both countries saw Africa as an important area for 
this competition. 
Chinese (especially PRC) relations with African countries have 
been discussed in numerous articles and books by Western, African, and 
Chinese writers. 3 Since 1965, five general works on PRC activities 1n 
Africa have appeared. The first, by .John K. Cooley, a Christian 
Science Monitor correspondent in North Africa, was entitled East Wind 
over Africa; Red China's African Offensive (New York, 1965). It covers 
3 
the first decade of the PRC's diplomatic penetration into Africa, be-
ginning with the Bandung Conference 1n 1955. The account as a whole is 
well balanced and wide-ranging. It is one of the most readable books 
on lhc subject yet published, and -j ncludes useful appendixes. Except 
for two pages dealing with ROC activities in Africa, Cooley concentrated 
on Peking's attempts to replace bolh Washington and Moscow in Africa. 
He made the unique suggestion that prior to the 1960 Sino-Soviet rift, 
Moscow and Peking had agreed to divide Africa into spheres of influence 
with the former concentrating on East Africa while the latter worked 
mainly in West Africa. The book 1s a factual report instead of a 
scholarly study, and lacks footnotes and other documentation. 
A second book appeared soon after Cooley's: Emmanuel John Hevi 's 
The Dragon's Embrace: the Chinese Communists and Africa (New York, 
]966). Hevi, a Ghanaian, went to China in late 1960 to study medicine 
under a scholarship granted by the PHC. While in China, Hevi became 
so disillusioned with Communism, particularly the Chinese variety, that 
he left China in April, 1962, without finishing his training. Shortly 
afterwards, he wrote An African Student in China (New York, 1963), an 
account of his stay in China. Three years later, in The Dragon's Em-
brace, he discussed with unusual insight the theoretical basis of the 
Chinese Communist revolution and its applicability to Africa. The 
Dragon's Embrace is an African's bitter yet revealing book about PRC 
ambitions and subversive activities in Africa. The author warned that 
in order for Africa to advance progressively, Africans must reject Pe-
king's call for indiscriminate revolution. Covering the years from the 
Bandung Conference to the early part of the Cultural Revolution 
4 
(mid-1966), the book is generally well written but, like Cooley's, 
weak in documentation. 
A thir·d study appeared 1n 1968 as a monograph of the East Asian 
ltesearch Center al Harvard University. Charles Neuhauser's Third World 
Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1968), dealt with the origin and development of the 
Afro-Asian "people's solidarity movement," Peking's role in the move-
ment, and the Sino-Soviet rift which was largely responsible for the 
decline of the movement. The book began with the Asian Nations Con-
ference at New Delhi in April, 1955, from which the idea of "solidarity" 
emerged, and ended with the anti-Peking meeting of the executive com-
mittee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Cyprus 1n 
February, 1967, which marked the end of Peking's relations with the 
AAPSO. According to Neuhauser, Peking's failure in Africa during the 
late 1960s can be attributed to PRC leaders' ignorance of regional an-
tagonisms and cultural and historical differences between various coun-
tries while trying to apply a general model of revolution to all African 
"liberation" movements. Though much shorter than the two earlier books, 
Neuhauser's work has more detailed notes and is more suitable for re-
search purposes. 
Early in the 1970s, two scholarly studies on Sino-African relations 
appeared. Bruce D. Larkin's China and Africa, 1949-1970; the Foreign 
Policy of the People's Republic of China (Berkeley, 1971) was the first 
scholarly work to cover Peking's foreign policy in Africa during the 
second half of the 1960s. Larkin suggested that Peking's Africa)1 
policy had both short-term and long-term goals. The book was heavily 
loaded with theoretical discussion of Peking's revolutionary model and 
II .. 
its application to "liberation" movements in Africa. The arrangement 
of the book, mixing topical and chronological chapters, made it some-
times difficult to follow. However, with its useful appendixes and 
lengthy bibliography, Larkin's book was the best and most detailed 
study on the subject thus far. 
5 
Three years later, another account of China's Policy in Africa, 
1958-71 (London, 1974) was published by a Nigerian scholar, Alaba 
Ogunsanwo. This was the first account published after the admission of 
the PRC to the United Nations in late 1971, and provided another African 
perspective of Sino-African relations. However, Ogunsanwo's knowledge 
of China and of Peking's foreign policy was so superficial that his ex-
planation of the PRC diplomatic activities in Africa is often uncon-
vincing and sometimes self-contradictory. Nevertheless, the book had 
some value because it analyzed the issue from an African point of view, 
and contained some useful appendixes. 
All five books mentioned above dealt almost exclusively with the 
PRC. None really considered the Peking-Taipei competition in Africa. 4 
Without an adequate understanding of this competition since 1960, one 
cannot comprehend the reasons why some African countries responded to 
Peking's overtures as they did. The purpose of the present study is 
to add that dimension, and to consider the following aspects of the 
Chinese presence in Africa: 
l. What were the origins of the Peking-Taipei competition ln 
Africa? 
2. What were the long-range and short-range goals of Peking and 
of Taipei in Africa? 
3. What advantages and disadvantages were felt by Peking and 
Taipei respectively in their competition in Africa? How did 
these affect the struggle? 
4. What tactics were used by Peking and Taipei respectively in 
their competition in Africa? How substantial an effort did 
they make in Africa? 
5. How and to what extent did the "Great Proleterian Cultural 
Hevolution" in China affect Peking's maneuvers in Africa? 
6. How did African nations respond to the Peking-Taipei compe-
tition? 
7. In its African policies and undertakings, has Peking regarded 
Taipei or Moscow as its principal competitor?· 
8. How has the resolution of the long dispute over China's UN 
seat affected the policies and activities of Peking and 
Taipei in Africa? 
6 
Serious Chinese interest 1n Africa, by either the PRC or ROC, can 
be dated from the 1955 Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in 
which the PRC participated and the ROC did not. Major Chinese activity 
in Africa, however, dates largely from 1960, when the number of inde-
pendent African nations suddenly jumped from ten to twenty-seven and 
the simmering dispute between Peking and Moscow became clear-cut with 
the recall of Soviet technicians from China and of Chinese students 
[rom the Soviet Union. The latter development made three governments--
Soviet, PRC, and ROC--much more aware of the importance of Africa as an 
arena for their respective rivalries. The present study therefore dis-
cusses the 1955 conference and other early developments, but concen-
trates on events of 1960 and later. 
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Chapters II and III provide an overview of PRC policies and ac-
tivities in Africa. Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII look in more detail at 
PRC activities in four parts of Africa: western, central, eastern, and 
southern. Chapters VIII and IX discuss ROC policies and activities 1n 
Africa. Chapter X reviews African aspects of the PRC-ROC competition 
for United Nalions membership, and Chapter XI summarizes the conclusions 
o£' the study. 
"Africa" ts here defined as including the continent and the nearly 
independent insular states of the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome e 
Principe, Madagascar, and the Comoros, but excluding the independent 
islands in the Indian Ocean (Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives) 
and the dependent Canary (Spanish) and Madeira (Portuguese) islands off 
the Atlantic coast of Africa. The emphasis is on sub-Saharan Africa. 
Only brief attention is g1ven to the Mediterranean littoral states, 
since they are racially and geopolitically linked to the Arah Middle 
East rather than to hlack Afr:ica. 
'· To avoid confusion, all African states are referred to by the names 
f d f . 5 they bear today, regardless o ates o adopt1on. On the following 
pages are alphabetic lists of the present names, the last colonial 
names, and names abandoned subsequent to independence; a chronological 
list in order of independence; and a geographic list and a map showing 
the regional groupings used in later chapters (Tables I through V, 
Figure 1). 
TABLE I 
ALPHABETIC LIST OF AFRICAN NATIONS 









8, Cape Verde Islands 




























37. Sao Tome & Principe 
38. Senegal 
39. Sierra Leone 
40. Somalia 








49. Upper Volta 
50. Zaire 
51. Zambia 
Former Names (if different} 
Dahomey 
[part of South Africa] 
Bechuanaland 
Urundi 
Ubangi-Shari, Central African Republic 
French Congo, Congo (Brazzaville) 
French Somaliland, Afars and Issas 











[part of Mali Federation] 
British & Italian Somaliland 
Union.of South Africa 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar 
[part of South Africa] 





ALPHABETIC INDEX OF AFRICAN NATIONS 
BY FINAL COLONIAL NAME 
Final Colonial Name 






































Somalia (part of) 
Djibouti 
Somalia (part of) 
Sudan 
Mali 
Tanzania (part of) 
CAR 
Burundi 
Tanzania (part of) 
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TABLE III 
ALPHABETIC INDEX OF AFRICAN NAME CHANGES 
SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Former Independent Name 

















































CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF AFRICAN NATIONS 
IN ORDER OF INDEPENDENCE 
Date Name 
1847. 7.26 Mauritania 
1910. 5.31 Sierra Leone 
1922. 2.28 Tanzania 
1941. 5. 5 Burundi 
1951.12.24 Rwanda 
1956. 1. 1 Algeria 
1956. 3. 2 Uganda 
1956. 3.20 Kenya 
1957. 3. 6 Malawi 
1958.10. 2 Zambia 
1960. 1. 1 Gambia 
1960. 4.27 Rhodesia 
1960. 6.26 Botswana 
1960. 6.30 Lesotho 
1960. 7. 1 Swaziland 
1960. 8. 1 Equatorial Guinea 
1960. 8. 3 Guinea-Bissau 
1960. 8. 5 Mozambique 
1960. 8. 7 Cape Verde 
1960. 8.11 Comoros 
R. 1960. 8.13 Sao Tome e Principe 
1960. 8.15 Angola 
1960. 8.17 Transkei 
1960. 8.20 Djibouti 







1962. 7. 1 
1962. 7. 1 
1962. 7~ 5 
1962.10. 9 
1963.12.12 










1975. 7. 5 





































































































































































































Figure l. Map of African Regions 
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1chinese records indicate a few commercial contacts between China 
and Africa as early as the third century, continuing intermittently un-
til the Ming dynasty. The Ming admiral Cheng Ho and his fleet visited 
East Africa four times (1413-1415, 1417-1419, 1421-1422, 1431-1433). 
However, China's official contact with Africa ended with Cheng Ho's last 
voyage, and by the end of the fifteenth century Chinese ships were sel-
dom seen in the Indian Ocean. Chang Tieh-sheng gave a concise descrip-
tion of early Sino-African relations in Chung-fei chiao-tung-shih tsu-
tang [A study of early Sino-African relations] (Peking, 1973). 
2 . Slnce it will be necessary to mention one or both of the Chinese 
governments on almost every page of this study, they will be referred 
to by their official English acronyms, PRC and ROC, or by the names of 
their capitals, Peking and Taipei, used symbolically, for the sake of 
brevity. 
3The most important articles are listed in the Bibliography. In 
addition to the books discussed here, there are two early works: Peter 
S.H. Tang, Communist China as a Development Model for Underdeveloped 
Countries (Washington, 1960), and Ming Chen-hua, Fei-chou hsien-shih yu 
Chung-kung ti shen-t'ou [The current situation in Africa and Chinese 
Communist penetration] (Taipei, 1961). A few case studies have appeared 
recently: George T. Yu, China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative 
Interaction (Berkeley, 1970); the same author's China's African: Policy: 
A Study of Tanzania (New York, 1975); Richard Hall and Hugh Peyinan, The 
Great Uhuru Railway, China's Showpiece in Africa (London, 1976); and--
Martin Bailey, Freedom Railway (London, 1976). 
4Among the.few articles dealing with the Peking-Taipei competition 
in Africa are Ann P. Munro, "Taiwan's Objectives in Africa," Africa Re-
port, 8, 7 (July, 1963), 7-11; George T. Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in 
the World Arena: Chinese Competition in Africa," Asian Survey, 3 
(1963), 439-453; and "Two Chinas in Africa," Bulletin of the Africa 
Institute of South Africa, 8 (1970), 382-396. The first two of these 
are outdated; the third is too generalized. In addition there are two 
short works cin ROC agricultural aid in Africa: a pamphlet by David 
Nelson Rowe, The New Diplomacy: International Technical Cooperation 
Projects of the Hepublic of China in African Countries (Washington, 
1969) and· an :arb c] e by Yang Feng-t' ai, "Fei.:..chou nung-yeh chi-shu jen-
yuan chiang-hsi-pan chih yen-chiu" [A study of the "seminar of African 
agricultural technicians"], Tung-ya chi-kan, 4 (1972), 100-122. 
5This means the distinctive portion of the official English name, 
not the generic portions. Thus the Kingdom of Libya (1951), the Libyan 
14 
15 
Arab Republic (1969), and the People's Socialist Libyan Arab Public 
[sic] (1977) are all here called simply "Libya." However, the Central 
African Republic (1960) and Central African Empire (1976) are here 
called "CAR," because omission of the generic term would be misleading 
and the country is much better known by its former acronym. The Re-
public of South Africa (HSA), however, is best known simply as "South 
Africa," and is so referred to here. 
CHAPTER II 
PRC POLICY IN AFRICA 
Stages 1n PRC Foreign Policy 
1949-1955 
Before the 1955 Bandung Conference, Peking appeared on the world 
stage infrequently, and as one of Moscow's proteges. During the first 
s~x years of its existence, the PRC showed little interest in the out-
side world. Its main goals were domestic: to tighten control over the 
Chinese people, to strengthen the new regime, and finally to conquer 
Taiwan, the last refuge of the rival ROC government. PRC involvement 
in external affairs was confined largely to its closest neighbors, ln-
cluding large-scale participation in the Korean war and much more 
limited involvement in the Vietnamese wars. 
As the PRC consolidated its domestic position and acquired more 
self-confidence at home, there were signs that its passive attitude in 
foreign policy would change. Doubts about the suitability of Soviet 
economic policies as models for China's economic development were 
paralleled by incipient doubts about the congruity of Soviet and 
Chinese national interests in foreign policy. Peking's prestige 
abroad was increased significantly by participation in the Korean ar-
mistice negotiations at Panmunjom in 1951-1953 and in the Geneva Con-
ference that ended French colonial rule in Indo-China in 1954. This 
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soon led to a new era in which Peking became actjve1y involved 1n events 
Jn various parts of the world. More significant, this new era was also 
characterized by a marked increase in PRC interest in Africa. 
1955-1960 
Unlike the conferences on Korea and Indo-China, the 1955 conference 
at Bandung, Indonesia, gave clear indications that the PRC's interest 
in more distant countries was expanding and might eventually conflict 
w-ith Soviet interests. The Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Asian and 
African nations, meeting from April 18 to April 24, 1955, was organized 
by Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan to oppose colonialism 
in Asia and Africa. 
Since all five sponsor1ng governments had recognized the PRC, al-
most from the date of its establishment, as the only legitimate govern-
ment of China, they invited the PRC but not the ROC to the conference, 
even lhough many other participants did not recognize the PRC. Although 
there were only five independent countries in Africa at the time, people 
from nine African states took part in the conference: delegates from 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Ghana, and Sudan, and observers from 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. None of these then had diplomatic re-
lations with the PRC, and the last five had not even achieved inde-
pendence yet. One independent African country (South Africa) and the 
( . ) . . d 1 Soviet Union by far the largest As1an country were not 1nv1te . 
The PRC made the most of the Bandung opportunity, sending a dele-
gation headed by its ~ecopd highest official, Premier Chou En-lai, 
whose moderate and conciliatory attitude enabled him not only to 
eclipse India's Jawaharlai Nehru as a leader of the conference, but 
; 
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also to allay apprehensions of non-Communist delegations about PRC am-
bitions in other countries. Chou presented the PRC as a reasonable and 
peace-loving nation, and later reported to his colleagues in Peking 
that "China and many Asian and African countries have established pre-
liminary mutual understandings as a result of direct contacts during 
the Asian,.-African Conference." 2 Although Egypt then actually had diplo-
matic relations with the ROC, E:gypt' s President Gamal Abdel Nasser was 
among the African leaders most favorably impressed by Chou's perform-
ance at Bandung, and in 1956 Egypt became the first African state to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
In retrospect, Bandung can be seen as an early hint of a PRC at-
titude not clearly developed until much later: that the "developing" 
nations of Africa and other continents had a greater community of 
interests with the PRC (the largest and most populous of the developing 
nations) than with the industrially advanced Soviet Union (or the United 
States). But during the first five years after Bandung, the PRC con-
tinued to be more concerned with its own development than with activi-
ties in Africa or elsewhere. These were years in which deep-seated 
conflicts gradually emerged between two factions of senior PRC of-
ficials and between the PRC and the Soviet Union. 
The internal dispute was basically between ideologues (led by Mao 
Tse-tung) and pragmatists over the methods and rapidity of collectivi-
zation 1n agriculture, and over the relative importance of ideological 
purity ("redress") and pragmatic competence ("expertness") in econom1c 
planning, training, and development. The ideologically motivated 
Second Five Year 'Plan, inaugurated by Mao in 1958 under the grandilo-
quent slogan of a "Great Leap Forward" to surpass the Soviet Union, was 
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a disastrous failure. Soviet criticism of Mao's economic blunders and 
pretensions to ideological leadership of the Communist world was matched 
by Chinese criticism of the Soviet repudiation of Stalinist policies and 
Soviet advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. This disagree-
ment had been building since 1956, and though it was not publicized in 
open polemics until 1961, events of 1960 symbolized the rift. Soviet 
technical advisers were withdrawn from China, Soviet economic assistance 
to the PRC was almost entirely ended, and Chinese students were recalled 
from the Soviet Union. 3 
1960-1969 
Soviet unwillingness to share with the PRC the role of leading the 
Communist world and guiding the developing nations propelled the PRC 
toward a much more assertive and independent foreign policy. Opportuni-
ties for such a policy in Africa were greatly increased by the "rush to 
independence" which began in Africa in 1960 just as the Sino-Soviet 
dispute was hardening into an open split. Between the end of World War 
II and 1959, only six African countries had achieved independence, and 
only three of these were in sub-Saharan Africa: Sudan (1956), Ghana 
(1957), and Guinea (1958). 4 Suddenly in 1960 independence was granted 
to seventeen states in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter I, Table IV). 
As will be shown later, Peking was quick to explore the possibili-
ties of this radical alteration of the African political situation, and 
Premier Chou En-lai's two-month tour of ten African nations in 1963-
1964 was only the most conspicuous sign of a new PRC policy of active 
involvement in African affairs, in competition both with the ROC and 
with the Soviet Union. However, from 1966 to 1969, PRC activities 
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throughout the world were decelerated and complicated by an unpreced-
ented political convulsion within China, the so-called Cultural Revolu-
tion discussed in Chapter III. 
Since 1969 
Termination of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 left the political 
situation within China very murky, with no clear resolution of the dis-
pute within the top leadership, but did enable the PRC to reinvigorate 
its African policies (with some changes in geographic emphasis), as 
well as its activities in other parts of the world. By the end of 
1971, it had achieved one major objective that had been very elusive: 
recognition by the United Nations as the only government representing 
China. African votes contributed significantly to the PRC victory in 
the United Nations, as will be shown ln Chapter X. Subsequent PRC ac-
tivities would shed light on whether Peking's interest in Africa had 
been tactical or strategic, temporary or permanent. 
"The First Intermediate Zone" 
The remainder of this chapter deals with PRC strategy and tactics 
ln Africa as a whole, beginning in the second of the four stages out-
lined above but developing chiefly in the third stage, and continuing 
in the fourth after the interlude of the Cultural Revolution. A basic 
component cf PRC foreign policy has been t;he concept of the "inter-
mediate zone," first mentioned by Mao Tse-tung in August, 1946, in an 
interview with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong, a Communist 
herself. In answ~r to Strong's question about the possibility that the 
United states might start a war against the Soviet Union, Mao said: 
The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by 
a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial, 
and semi-colonial countries .in Europe, 1\sia, and Africa. 
Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these 
countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the 
question ••• I believe it won't be long before these 
countries come to realize who is really oppressing them, 
t;he Soviet Union or the United States. The day will 
come when the u.s. reactionaries find themselves op-
posed by the people of the whole world.5 
The exclusively anti-American interpretation of the concept was 
maintained by the PRC (in the Bandung Conference, for example) until 
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the Sino-Soviet split developed. The "intermediate zone" was then re-
defined in an important editcrid in the Jen-min jih-pao [People's 
Daily], official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, on January 
21, 1964: 
This vast intermediate zone is composed of two parts. 
One part consists of the independent countries and 
those striving for independence in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, and may be called the first intermediate 
zone. The second part consists of the whole of Western 
F.urope, Australia, Canada, and other capitalist coun-
tries, and may be called the second intermediate zone. 6 
According to the reinterpr·etation, countries in the "second inter-
mediate zone" were said to have a dual character, exploiting and op-
pressing colonial peoples but being themselves exploited and bullied by 
the United States, and wanting, like the colonial states, to free them-
selves from u.s. control. This became tlte Uewe of a new Peking policy 
towards countries in the "intermediate zone." 
But the more striking part of the 1964 reinterpretation was the 
portrayal of .the Soviet Union not as head of. the socialist camp and 
protector of "intermediate zone" countries but as a sinister co-
conspirator with the United States in the crime of oppressing and ex-
ploiti_ng all countries in the two "intermediate zones." As the JM.JP 
expressed it: 
The Soviet leaders' hopes for U.S.-Soviet cooperation to 
dominant the world are but idle dreams. By undermining 
the unity of the socialist camp, the Soviet leader·s violate 
the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and all 
other socialist countries and cater to the needs of U.S. 
imperialism.? 
In other words, the "intermediate zone" is no longer a buffer between 
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the Soviet Union and the United States but an area where a united front 
could be formed between various socialist countries and countries in 
the two intermediate zones, led by Peking in a struggle against both 
"U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism." Nevertheless, in Peking's 
strategic plan for revolution in the two intermediate zones, priority 
was given to Africa, a part of tte first intermediate zone, since it 
was "both the center of the anticolonial struggle and the center for 
East and West to fight for control" of the Third World. 8 
Peking's African policy in the 1960s had three goals: 
(1) to gain recognition from African countries as the sole 
legitimate government of China and take over the ROC 
seat in the United Nations; 
(2) to break through the isolation imposed upon the PRC 
( 3) 
by the U.S. "containment" policy, by linking the two 
intermediate zones into a united front led by Peking; 
and 
to replace Moscow as leader of anq spokesman for the 
l 
socialist countries. 9 
Since these goals reflected the national interests of China rather 
than those of African states, there was always the danger that Africans 
might feel they were being asked merely to accept Chinese domination in 
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lieu of Soviet or American domination. Peking's defense against this 
reasoning was constant reiteration of the "Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence," first expounded in a 1954 treaty with India and repeated 
at the 1955 Bandung Conference and incessantly thereafter. The formula 
for relations between China and African countries was to be (1) mutual 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) 
mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's in-
ternal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-
. t 10 ex1s ence. 
Behind these bland and soothing slogans, Peking used a variety of 
formal and informal means to achieve its own goals in Africa. These 
may be classified into seven categories: (1) negotiations for diplo-
matic recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations, (2) par-
ticipation in multi-national conferences, (3) negotiation of bilateral 
treaties and agreements, (4) information and propaganda, (5) exchanges 
of visits, (6) student scholarships, and (7) covert activities. 
Establishing Diplomatic Relations 
Communist victory 1n the civil war ending 1n 1949 left little 
doubt that the PRC was 1n effective control of mainland China, and in 
view of China's immense size and population, this fact would in normal 
circumstances have been enough to persuade most other governments to 
extend diplomatic recognition regardless of ideological differences 
with Peking. But the question was complicated by the survival of the 
ROC government, despite loss of all its territory except Taiwan and a 
few minor islands, and complicated even more by the adamant insistence 
of both the PRC and the ROC that no other government could maintain 
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relations simultaneously with both Chinese governments. The existence 
of "two Chinas" was a manifest reality, but it was steadfastly denied 
by both Chinese governments, each insisting that it was the only legiti-
mate government for all the territory of China, and that foreign govern-
ments must choose between the PRC and the ROC. The argument over which 
government should represent China in the United Nations was a specific 
variation of the basic argument over legitimacy, but a variation which 
made PRC-ROC competition in Africa more important to both than it would 
otherwise have been. 
When the PRC was established on October 1, 1949, there were only 
four independent nations in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South 
Africa. South Africa and Egypt had established diplomatic relations 
with the ROC in 1931 and 1942, respectively. Liberia signed an amity 
treaty with the ROC in 1937, but neither Liberia nor Ethiopia hades-
tablished diplomatic relations with the ROC. In the e~rly years after 
1949, the PRC had numerous contacts of various types with various 
African leaders, but no diplomatic relations with any African state un-
til after, and as a direct consequence of, the 1955 Bandung Conference. 
On May 16, 1956, Egypt abandoned its ties with the ROC and became the 
first African nation to recognize the PRC; diplomatic relations be-
tween the two were established two weeks later (May 30, 1956). 11 Li-
beria established relations with the ROC in 1957, and did not transfer 
recognition to Peking until twenty years later. Ethiopia, for reasons 
that remain unclear, ignored both the ROC and the PRC until 1970, when 
it established relations with Peking. South Africa continued to recog-
nize the ROC, even in 1978. 
All other African countries gained their independence subsequent 
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to creation of the PRC, and therefore had to seek diplomatic recognition 
at the same time they were bestowing recognition on other nations. This 
sometimes added a comic dimension to PRC-ROC rivalry. Both Peking and 
Taipei often tried the gambit of quickly recognizing a newly independent 
African state in hope that it would reciprocate. Sometimes one would 
succeed, sometimes the other, occasionally neither. Conversely, on 
several occasions a new African state invited both Peking and Taipei to 
send representatives to its independence ceremonies. One always de-
clined the invitation after learning that the other would be repre-
sented in the African ceremony; there was no instance when both sent 
representatives to the same independence ceremony. But whether such 
tactics were initiated by a Chinese or an African government, they were 
less effective than quiet negotiations by the PRC or ROC to win recog-
nition by promising economic or technical assistance to an African 
nation. 
As long as Chinese representation in the United Nations remained 
1n dispute, an African government's recognition of the PRC or ROC was 
more valuable than either PRC or ROC recognition of the African state, 
and this was clear to all parties. No matter how small or impoverished 
the African country might be, the PRC-ROC rivalry tended to cast the 
Chinese and not the Africans in the role of supplicants. As will be 
shown in Chapter X, having diplomatic relations with African states did 
not mean that either Chinese government could always count on their 
votes in the United Nations, s1nce many abstained or were conveniently 
absent when the issue of Chinese representation was debated. But until 
1971, the search.for votes in the United Nations was an inescapable 
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dimension of PRC-ROC competition for diplomatic relations with African 
states. 
The course of this competition 1s shown 1n Tables VI and VII and 
Figure 1. In independent Africa as a whole, the PRC and ROC were fair-
ly evenly matched in diplomatic recognition from 1956 through 1965. 
Fr·om 1966 through 1969, the PRC withdrew into self-imposed isolation 
(because of the domestic upheaval called the Cultural Revolution), re-
calling all its ambassadors except the one in Egypt. During this 
three-year interlude, the number of African countries recognizing the 
ROC reached its all-time high, and the number recognizing the PRC de-
clined. From 1970 on, following the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
the tide was reversed. By 1978, forty of the forty-six African states 
recognizing a Chinese government had chosen the one in Peking. 
In addition to this chronological pattern of three phases, there 
is a striking regjonal pattern. From the beginning, Pekjng was much 
more successful than Taipei 1n establishing diplomatic relations with 
countries m North and East Africa. But until 1970, it was much less 
successful than Taipei in Central, West, and South Africa. The large 
gains by the PRC after 1970 were achieved chiefly in Central and West 
Africa. Of the six African countries still having diplomatic relations 
with Taipei in 1978, four are in South Africa, one each in North and 
West Africa. Among these is Libya, a very peculiar case. The royal 
government of Libya established diplomatic relations with Taipei in 
1959. The socialist government ruling Libya since 1969 has maintained 
relations with Taipei, but in 1971 extended diplomatic recognition to 
Peking without establishing diplomatic relations (see Chapter X). 
TABLE VI 
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6 llcnin 
7 Cameroon 
8 Cape Verde Islands 
9 Conr,o 
10 f:qu::.torial Guinea 
11 Gabon 
17. Cnmhi n 
lJ Ghana 
14 Gu:i nca 
15 Guinea-Bissau 
· 16 · Ivory Coast 
17 !.iberia 
18 14ali 
19 ~1auri tania 
20 Nigeria 
21 Sao Tome & Principe 
22 Scnep,a1 
23 Si P.rra Leone 
24 Togo 
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42 Comoro Islands 
43 J.esotho 
~~ f·L1.d:tgascar 
45 ~ln lawi 
~6 J.lozamhiquc 
47 Hholft"~i a 
48 ~onlh AfJ'ica 























Sources: 1-nan-piao (HOC); .1\HB, PSC Scricsj Kccsinc's Cont.cmporary Archives. 
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TABLE VII 
AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE 
TWO CHINAS: STATISTICS 
Number of Di~1omatic Relations Number Recognizing PRC/ROC* 
Year Nations Ne1ther Pl'ic ~0~ NortFi East soutli \\est ~entrai 
1949 4 2 0 2 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 
-·- - -- - -- - ------ --- --- ---- - - - --- ------ - - - --- - -- - -
1956 8 6 1 1/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 
1957 9 6 1 2 l/0 0/0 0/1 0/1 0/0 
1958 10 3 2 2/0 1/0 0/l 0/l 0/0 
1959 10 3 4 3 2/l l/0 0/l 1/1 0/0 
1960 27 9 7 11 2/1 2/0 0/2 3/7 0/1 
1961 29 9 8 12 2/1 3/0 0/2 3/8 0/1 
1962 33 7 10 16 3/l 4/0 0/2 3/9 0/4 
1963 35 3 13 19 3/1 6/0 0/2 3/11 l/5 
l964 36 4 17 15 4/1 5/0 1/2 5/8 2/4 
!9~5- ____ ~s- ______ z ____ !7 ____ 1~ ____ 4L1 __ _ sLo _ _ ll~ __ ~IZ __ !I~_ 
1966 40 8 14 18 4/1 5/0 1/5 4/8 0/4 
1967 40 9 13 18 3/l 5/0 1/5 4/8 0/4 
1968 42 8 13 21 3/1 5/0 1/6 4/9 0/5 
!9~9- ____ ~2- ______ z ____ !3 ____ 2~ ____ 3L1 __ _ sLo __ !I~ __ ~/!O __ ~~~ _ 
1970 42 15 22 3/l 6/0 l/6 5/10 0/5 
1971 42 2 22 18 4/1 6/0 1/6 9/7 2/4 
19.72 42 1 27 14 4/1 6/0 2/5 ll/6 4/2 
1973 42 1 29 12 4/1 6/0 2/5 13/4 4/2 
1974 43 1 34 8 4/l 6/0 3/4 16/2 5/1 
1975 48 3 37 8 4/1 6/0 5/4 17/2 5/1 
1976 49 3 39 7 4/1 6/0 5/4 18/2 6/0 
1977 50 4 40 6 4/1 6/0 5/4 19/l 6/0 
1978 51 5 40 4/l 6/0 5/4 19/l 6/0 
'•The number of nations having diplomatic relations with the PRC are shown to the left of the 
virgule /, those having relations with the ROC to the right. 
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In the period 1965-1967, five African nations broke diplomatic re-
Jations with Peking for several years: Benin from 1966 to 1973, Burundi 
from 1965 to 1971, the Central African Republic (CAR) from 1966 to 1976, 
Ghana fr-om 1966 to 1972, and Tunisia from 1967 to 1971. Two of these, 
Benin and the CAR, had previously had diplomatic relations with Taipei, 
and resumed these relations during their break with Peking. The circum-
stances of these actions are described individually in the regional 
chapters of this study, along with other changes in diplomatic relations 
not related to the general patterns discussed above. 
Multi-National Conferences 
As noted above, Peking's first important contacts with African 
leaders came at a multi-national conference attended by delegations 
from nine African states, none of which then had diplomatic relations 
with Peking, and five of which were not even independent countries. 
Mutual willingness to ignore these technicalities illustrated the 1m-
portance which both the Africans and the Chinese attached to such 
gatherings, and their indifference to distinctions between "govern-
mental" and "non-governmental" meetings. Peking made·considerable 
effort to perpetuate the "Bandung spirit" in a later series of con-
ferences with "first intermediate zone" countries under the slogan of 
"Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity." Four were held, all in Africa: 1n 
Egypt (1957), Guinea (1960), Tanzania (1963), and Ghana (1965). From 
1960 on, the meetings were dominated by rivalry between Moscow and 
k . f . fl . f . 12 Pe 1ng or ln uence ln A rlca. 
The April 11-15, 1960, conference in Conakry, capital of Guinea, 
was attended by about 500 people, including delegates from 49 countries 
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13 
and territories, observers, journalists, and guests. This was the 
first international meeting of such size held in a sub-Saharan country, 
a fact which encourag~d black Africans to feel pride and a sense of 
identity with Asians. 
The importance which the Chinese attached to the Conakry confer-
ence was obvious. Peking sent the largest delegation, 25 members led by 
Liao Cheng-chi and Liu Ning-i. 14 On April 9, Premier Chou En-lai sent 
15 
a message of greetings to the conference. On April 11, the Chinese 
Communist Party's official newspaper published a long editorial con-
eluding that: 
The Asian and African peoples have common interests in 
fighting for and, preserving independence, in defending 
peace, and in developing their national economy. We 
shall live in un
1
i ty and friendship ••. It is our con-
viction that the 1 grand manifestation of solidarity among 
Asian and Africar peoples now underway in Conakry will 
still more brigh
1
tly light the path of the advancing 
Asian and African peoples who are certain to win ever 
greater victories in their fight for independence, 
freedom, and peace.l6 
In a speech to the conference on April 13, the head of the Chinese 
i 
delegation paid special homage to the Algerians for their struggle 
against France for independence, and emphasized the relevance of the 
Chinese revolutionary model to national "liberation" movements in 
Africa: 
The experience of long years of struggle of the Chinese 
people has proved that millet plus rifles can defeat 
airplanes plus tanks. The decisive factor in the 
struggle against imperialism is the people, and so 
long as the people are determined and persist' in their 
heroic fight they are invincible.l7 
These words paraphrased a statement by Mao Tse-tung on "protracted war" 
' more than two decades earlier, and they became the keynote of a PRC 
h f . l t l t. . f. . 18 t eory o v1o en revo u 1on 1n A r1ca. 
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The 1960 Conakry conference established a permanent "Afro-Asian 
Peoples' Solidarity Organization" (AAPSO), and witnessed an open Sino-
Soviet conflict over the direction in which the AAPSO should move. The 
Soviet delegation proposed a resolution saying that economic develop-
ment of the new Afro-Asian countries could progress more speedily "the 
sooner the cold war is ended and international tension is reduced." 
The PRC delegates objected that this would "create illusions among 
Afro-Asian countries that the imperialists want our economic develop-
19 ment and seriously believe in disarmament and world peace." Finally, 
the conference adopted a compromise resolution saying that "elimination 
of imperialist exploitation is the prerequisite of peaceful coexistence 
d d . 20 an 1sarmament." . 
Sino-Soviet comp~tition was intensified at the Third Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Conference~ held February 4-11, 1963, in Moshi, Tanzania. 21 
As in the 1960 conference, PRC delegates took a much harsher line 
I 
toward the United stares than did the Soviet delegates. In a speech 
! 
on February 4, Liu Nipg-i, the Chinese chief delegate, reiterated Mao's 
theory that "the decikive factor in the development of history is 
always the people. what 1s really powerful is the strength of the 
masses of the people, and not that of the decadent imperialists and 
reactionaries, nor any kind of modern weapons." Liu also introduced a 
six-p~int proposal to. accelerate the national "liberation" movements in 
. f . d t .. . 22 As1a, A r1ca an La 1n Amer1ca. In sharp contrast, the head of the 
Soviet delegation, Mirzo Tursun-Zade, emphasized that only'peaceful 
coexistence and full disarmament could bring about successful "economic 
f . f . f. d t• . ' 23 development o the co~ntr1es o As1a, A r1ca, an La 1n Amer1ca. ' 
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With many parts of Africa still under colonial rule and the bit-
terness of anit-colonial conflicts still fresh in the minds of leaders 
of many newly independent African states, the delegates at Moshi in 
1963 liked the militant language of the PRC better than the more cau-
tl.ous Sov1'et l1'ne. 24 M th 1 t d P k' t oreover, ey now open y suppor e e 1ng no 
only against Moscow but also against Taipei. In a general report to 
the conference, Yusuf as-Sabai, the Egyptian general secretary of the 
AAPSO permanent secretariat, condemned U.S. "imperialists" because: 
They continue to occupy the Chinese territory of Taiwan. 
After failing in its scheme to instigate the Chiang Kai-
shek gang to invade the mainland of China, the U.S. 
imperialists are now actively supporting the Chiang Kai-
shek gang to carry out harassment and sabotage along 
China's southeastern coastal region.25 
On February 11, the full conference adopted a resolution backing 
the PRC even more explicitly: 
The Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference 
strongly condemns the occupation of Chinese territory of 
Taiwan by the u.s. imperialists, who actively support 
the Chiang Kai-shek clique in carrying out harassment 
and sabotage in China's southeastern coastal region. 
The Chinese people have full right to liberate 
Taiwan, the sacred soil of the People's Republic of 
China, any time, by whatever means the Chinese people 
may choose. 
The Conference demands the restoration of the le-
gitimate right of the People's Republic of China in the 
United Nations.26 
This 1963 conference constituted the high point of Chinese in-
fluence within the AAPSO. Already there were signs that Africans, 
though willing to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute to their own advan-
tage, were becoming weary with the dispute itself. The Nairobi Sunday 
Nation in Kenya commented caustically on February 17, 1963, that "if 
the conference at Moshi has achieved anything apart from the usual 
resolutions, it is in revealing that even brothers can cut each other's 
throats. 1127 
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But at the fourth AAPSO conference, held May 9-16, 1965, in Win-
neba, Ghana (about thirty miles from Accra), the rhetoric was changed 
very little. In his routine report to the conference on May 11, AAPSO 
general secretary Yusuf as-Sabai reaffirmed the AAPSO position on the 
Peking-Taipei issue as initiated in Moshi two years earlier. 28 In a 
long speech on the same day, PRC chief delegate Liao Cheng-chi condemned 
"U.s. imperialism" as "the arch-enemy of the national liberation move-
. t . f . 29 men 1n A r1ca." In extremely vitriolic language, Liao also attacked 
the United Nations as "a tool of u.s. imperialism for undermining and 
suppressing the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America." The UN flag, he said, was "dripping with the blood of 
the peoples of Asia and Africa." Liao added a threat: 
The United Nations should forthwith correct its mis-
takes, be thoroughly reorganized, and free itself 
from U.S. imperialist control. Otherwise it may be 
necessary to consider the establishment of a revolu-
tionary United Nations as a rival drama in competition 
with the United Nations which is now controlled b~ 
u.s. imperialism and does nothing but evil deeds. 0 
On the other hand, the torrent of Sino-Soviet conflict was also 
running unchecked. On the eve of the conference, the Soviet delegation 
had staged an exhibition of anti-Peking propaganda at the entrance of 
the African Hall of the Nkrumah Ideological Institute, where the con-
ference was to meet. One pamphlet accused PRC leaders of attempting 
"to detach the national liberation movement from the peoples of the 
socialist countries, to undermine the solidarity with the world revo-
31 lutionary movement." The Chinese countered this Soviet activity by 
offering African and Arab delegates "cash presents" and invitations to 
. ·t· h" 32 v1s1 C 1na. The reason for this relative restraint appears to have 
been a desire to have the next AAPSO conference held in Peking. The 
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AAPSO council, meeting in Algiers 1n March, 1964, had unanimously recom~ 
mended that a fifth conference be held in Peking in 1967, and this de-
d b th d 1 t t . b . 1 33 c1s1on was approve y e e ega es a W1nne a 1n 965. 
The May, 1965, AAPSO conference in Ghana was supposed to have been 
followed 1n late June by another meeting to which the PRC attached even 
greater importance. Officially known as the Second Asian-African Con-
ference but usually referred to as "second Bandung," this had been 
34 proposed as early as 1960 at the Second AAPSO Conference in Conakry. 
Premier Chou En-lai's trip to thirteen African and Asian countries be-
tween late 1963 and early 1964 was undertaken partially for recruiting 
35 participants for a second Bandung conference. 
PRC Foreign Minister Chen I led a Chinese delegation to a prepara-
tory meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, from April 10 to 15, 1964, where it 
was unanimously agreed that a "second Bandung" should be held on March 
10, 1965, at a place in Africa to be chosen by the participating Afri-
t . 36 can coun r1es. 
participation. 
But almost immediately, a dispute arose over Soviet 
Having been excluded from the first Bandung conference 
in 1955, the Soviet Union was determined to attend the proposed second 
Bandung. The PRC objected on the peculiar ground that the Soviet Union 
was not an Afro-Asian country (despite its role in the AAPSO Afro-
Asian conferences). Indonesia, Pakistan, and Guinea supported the 
Chinese view; India and Ceylon supported the Soviet. 37 
Meanwhile, at the urging of the moderate and anti-Communist Presi-
dent of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, most of the former 
French colonies which had formed the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM) decided 
not to participate in the second Bandung. By then, Algiers had been 
chosen as the site, but the conference was formally postponed to June 
36 
29, 1965, with the issue of Soviet participation still unresolved. 
Ten days before the conference was to convene in Algiers, Algerian 
President A.hmad Ben-Bella was overthrown by his Defense Minister Houari 
Boumedienne. To avoid another postponement, Peking immediately ex-
pressed its support for the new regime, thus angering marty pro-Ben-
Bella African leaders. 38 A mysterious bomb explosion on June 26 inside 
the hall where the second Bandung was to meet gave reluctant African 
participants an excuse to have the conference postponed to November 
4.39 
By October, steady Soviet pressure had persuaded most delegates to 
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agree that Moscow should attend the conference. This caused P'eking, 
long the most steadfast proponent of a second Bandung, to call for can-
cellation of the conference rather than permit Soviet participation. 
PRC Premier Chou En-lai sent a letter to governments of the Afro-African 
countries on October 22 asserting that: 
To convene the conference at present will inevitably em-
broil Afro-Asian countries in serious disputes . • • and 
••. do harm to Afro-Asian solidarity and the friendly 
relations among Afro-Asian countries and lead to a split 
among them. After repeated and careful consideration, 
the Chinese Government has come to the conclusion that 
••• it would be better to refrain from holding the 
conference for the time being • • • If the conference 
should be forcibly convened as scheduled •.• in spite 
of the opposition of China, the Kingdom of Cambodia and 
other countries, the Chinese Government will be compelled 
to absent itself from such a conference which will lead 
to a split. 41 
Despite this statement, the new Algerian government announced on 
October 25 that the conference would be held as scheduled. This caused 
Peking to reiterate a day later that "China will not take part in such 
f . f 42 an A ro-As1an cdh erence." On November 2, a conference of Afro~Asian 
foreign ministers, unwilling to antagonize Peking, agreed to postpone 
the second Bandung conference indefinitely. It was in fact never 
held. 43 
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The same fate awaited the fifth AAPSO conference which had been 
scheduled for Peking in 1967. Despite preoccupation with internal 
problems during the Cultural Revolution and unilateral recall of Chinese 
ambassadors from around the world, the PRC apparently intended the AAPSO 
conference to be held as planned. But the Soviet Union brought strong 
pressure to have the meeting moved to Algiers, and this change was ap-
proved by an AAPSO executive committee meeting in February, 1967, in 
Nicosia, Cyprus. The PRC refused either to attend the Nicosia meeting 
or to accept the Algiers site, and the fifth conference was eventually 
cancelled altogether. After this, Peking lost interest in the AAPSO 
and turned to other activities in Africa. 
In retrospect, the strengths and weaknesses of Peking's position 
in the multi-national Afro-Asian conferences are worth noting because 
they relate also to Sino-Soviet competition in other areas. In the 
1960s, Peking's exclusion from the United Nations and its lack of dip-
lomatic relations with a majority of the nations of Africa made it 
somewhat easier for Peking than for Moscow to support dissident move-
ments against unfriendly African governments or against the surviving 
colonial regimes. The PRC could (and did) also appeal to Africans on 
racial and historical grounds: that the Chinese, being non-white and 
having themselves suffered from imperialist oppression and exploitation 
in the past, have deep compassion towards Africans which the Soviets, 
being white, do not have. The PRC then argued that this common ex-
perience shared by Chinese and Africans made Peking's revolutionary 
model relevant in Africa, and that Africans would find the Chinese 
example of economic development more suitable to their needs than the 
Soviet model. 
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Offsetting these Chinese advantages were some undeniable weak-
nesses. Still an underdeveloped country itself, China could ill afford 
to spend on foreign aid what it urgently needed to spend on its own de-
velopment. Despite the ability and willingness of a totalitarian 
government to conduct a foreign aid program regardless of the cost at 
home, China could not hope to match the Soviet bloc or the Western 
powers in either financial or technological aid to Africa, except in 
very limited areas. Moreover, despite having the world's largest army 
and achieving some industrial growth, China was clearly weaker than 
either the Soviet Union or the West in military and industrial power. 
African leaders looking not only for aid but also for security and the 
reflected prestige of association with the powerful were likely to find 




Between 1960 and 1965, the PRC signed treaties of friendship with 
five sub-Saharan African nations: Guinea (September 13, 1960), Ghana 
(August 18, 1961), Congo (October 2, 1964), Mali (November 3, 1964), 
and Tanzania (February 20, 1965). 44 Each was signed during a visit to 
Peking by the head of state of the African country and all incorporated 
the "five principles of peaceful coexistence," mentioned previously. 
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Peking apparently regarded the signingof a friendship treaty as a 
"privilege" granted only to countries that had the closest relations 
with Peking. The treaty was usually devoid of substance and evidently 
much less important than agreements oh cultural, trade, ecortomic, and 
technical cooperation. Information about such agreements is sketchy 
and inadequate, because of Peking's obsession with secrecy even about 
innocuous matters. So few official documents on PRC-African relations 
have been published that it is impossible to be certain even of the 
number of agreements signed, much less their content. The following 
account is based on the limited materials presently available. 
Cultural Agreements 
During the 1960s, Peking signed "cultural cooperation" agreements 
with at least seven sub-Saharan African countries: Guinea (1959 and 
1965), Ghana (1961), Tanzania (1962), Somalia (1963), Mali (1963), CAR 
(1964), and Mauritania (1967). Most of these cited either the "five 
principles of peaceful coexistence" or the "spirit of Afro-Asian 
solidarity" as the basis of the agreement. The agreements covered a 
variety of subjects, including education (exchange of students, 
scholars, and educational delegations), literature and the arts (ex-
change of publications, films, slides, news broadcasts), science and 
medicine (exchange of experience and cooperation), and athletics (ex-
change of visiting teams and athletes). 
The cultural cooperation agreements usually had a fixed term of 
three to five years but could be renewed. Their chief importance to 
Peking appears to have been as a cover for the propaganda operations 
described below, which were sometimes ruthless and unscrupulous. 
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Trade Agreements 
The PRC openly admits that it regards foreign trade as "a weapon 
for international political struggle."45 Trade with Africa has been 
used both to support an aid program to various African countries and to 
get strategic commodities from Africa. Although the potential market 
of several hundred million consumers in China has long been written off 
by some Western experts as a myth (because of severe restrictions on 
imports), many African countries were attracted to the possibilities of 
trade with China. 
The PRC had trade relations with several African countries, notably 
Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and the Sudan, as early as 1950. However, 
trade relations with most sub-Saharan countries were not established 
until a decade later and the total amount was small. Among Peking's 
trading partners, Africa occupied only an unimportant place, chiefly 
because both China and Africa were less developed areas, and both had 
an economy that was basically agricultural; thus their products were 
competitive rather than complementary in the world market. 46 
Nevertheless, PRC-African trade has increased slowly but continu-
ously since 1960, and the balance of PRC-African trade has been con-
sistently in favor of China (see Table VIII). Peking signed a trade 
agreement with Egypt in 1955, its first with an African government, and 
by 1974 had signed trade agreements with twenty-four African countries, 
including twenty in sub-Saharan Africa. 47 However, a trade agreement 
was not essential to trade relations. For example, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Zambia had no trade agreements with Peking, but played more important 
roles in PRC-African trade than Burundi and Rwanda, both of which did 
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have trade agreements with Peking. The PRC has traded with more than 
thirty African countries. Its major trading partners in Africa have 
been Egypt, Tanzania, Morocco, the Sudan, Mali, Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Ghana, and Uganda. The bulk of Chinese imports from Africa came fr·om 
the first four of these countries. 48 
In Table VITI, several facts stand out: (1) Trade with Africa has 
never exceeded 8.2 percent of total PRC trade. (2) Although Peking's 
total foreign trade has increased significantly since 1970, the per-
centage with Africa has declined consistently since 1971. ( 3) In the 
1970s, the PRC suffered serious foreign trade deficits, which were 
partially offset by a surplus from its trade with Africa. Thus, al-
though it is generally agreed that Peking maintained a double standard 
in foreign trade, stressing political motives in trade with underde-
veloped countries and profit in trade with industrialized states, it 
achieved both in Africa. 
Economic and Technical 
Agreements 
In its two-front diplomatic war against both the Soviet Union and 
the Western bloc (of which the ROC was a component), the PRC often made 
effective use of economic and technical cooperation agreements. Be-
tween 1960 and 1975 Peking signed such agreements with at least thirty-
three African countries, including thirty in sub-Saharan Africa. 49 See 
Table IX for a recapitulation of the lists of known agreements of the 
types mentioned thus far. 
''Eight Principles Governing China's Economic and Technical Aid to 
Other Countries" were set forth by PRC Premier Chou En-lai in an 
TABLE VIII 
PRC-AFRICAN TRADE, 1960-1975 
(in millions of u.s. dollars) 
PRC Balance Turnover Balance Afl'ican Tl'ade 
PRC Impol'tl of PRC- of PRC of PRC as % of Total 
Expor~s from African Foreign Foreign PP.C Foreign 
Yenr to Africa• Africa* Tr:=.dc** Trade** Trnde"'.., Trade••• 
1960 44.8 78.9 -34.1 3990 -iO 3.1 
1961 54.6 38.6 16 3025 35 3.1 
1962 54.1 36.9 17:2 2575 375 3.4 
1963 58.2 57 1.2 2770 370 4.2 
1964 72.5 63.7 8.8 3220 280 4.2 
1965 130.2 120.5 9.7 3880 190 5.5 
1966 169 79.8 89.2 4245 175 5.9 
1967 161.4 68.5 92.9 3895 - 5 5.9 
1~68 137.1 52.4 84.7 3765 125 s.o 
1959 106 88 18 3850 200 5.0 
1970 138 91 47 4290 -190 5.3 
1971 200 186 14 4720 llO 8.2 
1972 221 200 21 5920 250 7.1 
1973 310 200 110 9870 -so 5.2 
1974 420 190 230 13975 -855 4.4 
1975 14090 -400 
•1960-1968 figures are from Alexander Eckstein, ed., China Trade Prospects and United States Policy, 
table B-2 (pp. 21-22). Those figures were adjusted by including Egypt and the Sudan. 1969-1970 figures 
arc from Joint Economic Com:nittce of U.s. Congress, Peo?le 's Repu'blic of China: An Economic Assessrr.ent, 
table 10, adjusted to include Egypt. 1971-1973 figures are from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
People's Rcpublj c of' China: International Trade Handbook (t\'A.shington, DC, 1974), table 2 (p. 10) ~ 
These figures 'wc.:·c ~\djustcd by including C:gypt. 1974 fi~urcs·are fro~ .Ioir.t Econor.tic Committee of the 
u.s·. Congress, China.: A He:tSSCSS:T)Cnt of the Economy (i·:ashington, DC, l9i5), table A-6 (p. 650). 
**1 ~50-1973 fi~urcs arc from Poop lc' s Rcpub lie of China: Intcr~ati onal Trade Hn~dhook, table 1 (p. 9). 
1874 and l9i5 figures are from "Cluna's forc:gn 'iradc in 1975, l't. ! 1 " Ct:rrcnt Scene, XIV, 9 {Septerl-
ber, ]976), table I (p. 3). 
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"-"Benin 1972 1972 
Cameroon 1972 1972 
Cape Verde 
Congo 1964 1964 1964 
Equatorial Guinea 1971 1971 
Gabon 1974 1974 
Gambia 
Ghana 1961 1961 1961 1961 
Guinea 1960 1959-1965 1960 1960 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 1977 
Mali 1964 1963 1961 1961 
Mauritania 1967 1967 1967 
Nigeria 1972 1972 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Senegal 1973 1973 
Sierra Leona 1971 1971 
Togo 1972 
Upper Volta 1973 1972 
CENTRAL 
Burundi 1972 1972 
Central Afr. H. 1964 1964 1964 
Chad 1973 1973 
Niger 1974 
Rwanda 1972 1972 
Zaire 1973 1973 
EAST 
-n}ibouti 1971 1971 
Ethiopia 1970 
Kenya 1963 1963 1963 
Somalia 1962 1970 





Madagascar 1974 1974 
Mo:~.ambiquc 
Zambia 1966 1967 
interview with the Ghana News Agency on January 15, 1964: 
(1) The Chinese Government always bases itself on the 
principle of equaiity and mutual benefit in providing 
aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as 
a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. 
(2) In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese 
Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the 
recipient countries, and never asks for any privileges 
or attaches any conditions. (3) The Chinese Government 
provides economic aid in the form of inter~st-free or 
low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the 
repayment so as to lighten the burden of the recipient 
countries as far 1as possible. (4) In prov~ding aid to 
other countries, 'the purpose of the Chines.e Government 
is not to make the recipient countries dep/endent on 
China but to help them embark on the road of self-
reliance step by step. (5) The Chinese Government 
tries its best to help the recipient countries build 
projects which require less investment while yielding 
quicker results, so that the recipient governments may 
increase their income and accumulate capital. (6) The 
Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment 
and mater·ial of its own manufacture at international 
market prices. If the equipment and material provided 
by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed 
specifications and quality, the Chinese Government 
undertakes to replace them. (7) In giving any partic-
ular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will 
see to it that the personnel of the recipient country 
fully master such techniques. (8) The experts dis-
patched by the Chinese Government to help in construc-
tion in the recipient countries will have the same 
standard of living as the experts of the recipient 
country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make 
any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.50 
The carefully pragmatic, non-political, non-ideological language 
44 
of Chou's "eight principles" is 1n striking contrast with the militant 
Marxist jargon that is required 1n all PRC statements about its own 
economic development (even when the speaker is more pragmatist than 
ideologue). This, of course, was partly because the PRC hoped to con-
elude aid agreements with non-Marxist as well as Marxist government in 
Africa. The second principle, prpfessing that Peking wanted no privi-
leges and attached no conditions to its aid, can hardly have been 
45 
taken seriously by the reci pj ent governments. The eighth principle '"las 
undouht:edly meant to invite favorable compari.son with Soviet and 
Western foreign aid officials and advisors. 
Another PRC spokesman summarized the eight principles by saying 
that "the alm of China's economic and technic'al aid for foreign coun-
tries is to help them gradually build and develop their independent 
national economies by relying on their own efforts." 51 This emphasis 
on self-reliance was based as much on necessity as on idealism: the 
PRC simply lacked the resources and the technicians to undertake more 
than this. 
Peking's African aid program consisted chiefly of financial credits 
and technical assistance. Though in the early years outright grants 
were given to some African countries for disaster relief or budget sub-
s.idies, PRC financial aid to Africa generally took the form of interest-
free or low-interest loans, usually repayable in goods over a period of 
ten to thirty years, beginning five to ten years after the aid was 
given. These conditions were so lenient that it was said in Africa 
that "a Chinese loan is a gift loan. 1152 
Between 1959 and 1974 Peking loaned a total of U.S. $1206.4 mil-
lion to twenty-five sub-Saharan African countries. This constituted 
41.1 percent of total PRC aid to less developed countries during this 
period (see Table X). If the cost of the monumental Tanzam Railway, 
estimated at U.S. $529.2 million, is added, the total percentage is 
50.1. In other words, during these fifteen years, more than half of 
Peking's foreign aid went to sub-Saharan Africa. This "checkbook di-
plomacy," as the ROC called it, showed that one advantage of Peking 





































PRC AID COMMITMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICAN NATIONS 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 




Ghana (19.2), Mali (19.2) 
CAR (4), Congo (25,2), Ghana (22,4), 
Kenya (18), Tanzania (45. 5) 
Uganda 
Guinea (30), Mali (3), Tanzania (8) 
Zambia (17), Muurllanin (~) 
Guinea (10), Sudan (42) 
Ethiopia (84), ~lauritania (20), Sierra 
Leone (30), Somalia (110), Sudan (40), 
Tanzania (1) 
Burundi ( 20), Benin ( 44), Madagascar ( 11), 
Rnnnda (22), 'fogo (45) 
Cameroon (71), Chad (50), Mali (2), 
Mauritania (2), Niger (1), Senegal (119), 
Upper Volta (50), Zambia (10), Zaire (100) 
Guinea (1), Mauritania (37), !'(iger (5), 
Somalia (1), Tanzania (75), Upper Volta 






































*1959-1964 figures arc fr·om Alexander Eckstein, Communist Chinn's Economic Growth and Foreign 
Trade, p. 307, 1965 figures arc from U.S. Dcpnrtment of State, Cornmuriisl GovcPnmcnts and llc-
'VClCi[i inr. Nations: Aid and Trade in 1965, Research Memorandum, HSIJ-50, June 17, 1966, p •. 2. 1966-
1969 fjgurcs ~rc from "China 1 s Foreign TPade :in 1972 1 11 Current Scene, XI, 12 (December, 1973), 5. 
1970-1974 figures arc !'rom Join L Economic Comm i ttec or the u.s. Congl'CSS. China: A Heasscssmcnl 
of Econnm:t• table 2 (p. 732). The 1970 figures were adjusted by excluding the Tanznm Hailway aid 
to '!'anz:1nia and Zambia. 
**The 1959-19711 total excludes the Tanzam Hallway aid; The total cost of the 'fanzam Railway, com-
pleted i11 early .June, 1975, amounted to u.s. ·$529,2 million. Sec All!!, EFT Series, Vol. 12, no. 
10, p. 367:1. Jncludin~; the Tanzam Hailway, the total aid committ;:;;Jto e.ub-saharan Africa by Pe-
king between 1959-19711 was $1735.6 million, or 50.1% of all PHC aid, to less developed countries 
during this pcdod ($3,~66.8 million). 
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In the field of technical assistance, the capacities of the two 
Chinese governments were more evenly matched. PHC aid focused on 
enterprises producing daily necessities and requiring little investment 
or construction but yielding quick results, such as projects in tex-
tiles, food, machinery, metallurgy, chemicals, electric power, and 
building materials, as well as highway and transportation facilities. 54 
Later, the PRC emulated their ROC competitors by undertaking agricul-
tural aid projects in rice production, sugar refineries, tea planta-
tions and factori_es, and edible seed-oil plants. Here too the PRC 
gradually outmaneuvered the ROC in most of the sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
In the technical aid program in Africa, the PRC spared no efforts 
to overcome the limitations of its resources and underdeveloped tech-
nology in order to win African confidence. Although living in self-
imposed isolation from people of the host countries, PRC technicians 
and experts were generally commended for their willingness to work under 
less favorable conditions and for lower salaries than their Soviet or 
55 
Western counterparts. 
Before 1960 there were fewer than 1,000 Chinese technicians abroad 
and most were stationed in Asian countries. The number increased sig-
nificantly after that, reaching 8,110 in 1970, and 18,700 1n 1971. 56 
of these, 17,200 were in Africa, including 14,000 working on the Tanzam 
"1 57 Ral way. In 1972 there were 22,165 PRC technicians abroad and more 
( ) . f . 58 than 91 percent 20,275 were 1n A r1ca. Though no later statistics 
are available, the figure should have increased between 1972 and 1975 
as construction of the Tanzam Railway accelerated. Some reports· es-
timated that in Tanzania alone there were about 20,000 Chinese,· 
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including 13,000 technicians working on the Tanzam. 59 One more recent 
estimate is that about 30,000 Chinese and 20,000 Africans worked on 
this project; the number of Chinese should have decreased substantially 
60 after completion of the railroad in June, 1975. 
The PRC did extremely well in the aid competition with the Soviet 
Union in Africa through hard work and a more discreet manner. Even 
the handicap of limited resources and technology became in some ways an 
asset, as suggested by two African comments which mention visits to 
China but apply also to Chinese work in Africa. The first is by a 
Somali in the early 1960s: 
When we [Somalis] visit China we feel at home. When we go 
to Moscow we see many splendid things, but they are far 
removed from African realities. They are the same sort of 
things we see in London or New York. We are simply over-
awed. In China we can see conditions almost similar to 
what we have at home, and we can see the progress which we, 
too, can make by following China's example.61 
The second is by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania during the 
construction of the Tanzam Railway: 
Perhaps the Western countries (and the Soviet Union) are 
too sophisticated in every way for us to draw much in-
spiration from their techniques. They went through all 
our present troubles too long ago. When my young men go 
over and see an advanced production technique in the 
West, they are not really impressed or stirred. It is 
too far beyond their needs. But when they see more 
easily applicable experiments in China . then these 
young people come back with glowing eyes and hearts.62 
Generally speaking, PRC technicians were well received and admired 
in most of the African countries where they were stationed, particular-
ly in the more militant countries such as Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Somalia, 
and Tanzania. The Malian foreign minister spoke for many Africans 
when he said: 
China is advancing at a dizzy pace. Her experience 
in economic construction is the most remarkable test 
of the capacity for development of under-developed 
countries.63 
PRC technicians won the friendship of Guinean workers by shrewd 
49 
use of psychology. Unlike Soviet and Czech technicians concerned with 
supervising the Guineans, the Chinese liked to stage a "socialist com-
petition" with Guineans on a project and make sure that the Guineans 
always won. An American reporter commented that this was "rather like 
64 
playing golf with the boss." Another comparison between the Chinese 
and the Russians came from Ghana: 
When the Chinese say they will give you glass, they 
will not change their word. The Russians are not 
like that, they can change their minds. By the way 
they behaved, you would think they were building the 
whole of Ghana.65 
Propaganda 
The PRC's ambitious program of diplomacy and foreign aid was sup-
ported also by informal tactics, and among these, the most important 
was the massive use of propaganda media. This was also the field in 
which the rival ROC was least able and least willing to challenge the 
PRC. Referring to the Chinese Communist propaganda machine, Mao Tse-
tung once said: 
What is a propagandist? Not only is the teacher a 
propagandist, the newspaper reporter a propagandist, 
the literary writer a propagandist, but all our 
cadres in all kinds of work are also propagandists 
.•• Anyone engaged in talking with another person 
1s engaged in propaganda work. 66 
Despite Mao's theory that e~ery Communist Chinese ought to regard him-
self as a propagandist, most Chinese propaganda, especially abroad, is 
carried out by specialists, but many agencies are involved. 
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As in any Communist country, alJ propaganda Js a governmental 
CuncLion, and J ilw all governmental functions is carTicd out under the 
sLr·icl: control of' the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to the of-
ficial news agency and official broadcasting service, and such govern-
mental units as the Foreign Ministry's African Affairs Department, PRC 
propaganda in Africa was conducted by such agencies as the Commission 
on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Commission on Eco-
nomic Relations with Foreign Countries, and "semi-official" groups such 
as the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Liaison Committee 
with Permanent Bureau of the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference, China-
. f . . t d h" f . 1 . d h" . . 67 As1a-A r:tca Soc1e y, an C 1na-A r1ca Peop e' s Fr1en s 1p Assoc1at1on. 
Only the most extensive of these propaganda operations can be dis-
cussed here. 
New China News Agency (NCNA) 
The New China News Agency opened its first African branch office 
1.n Egypt (Cairo) in 1958. Shortly after this,, offices were opened in 
Morocco (Rabat), Guinea (Conakry), and Ghana (Accra). From 1960 on, 
NCNA correspondents were usually sent to African countries even before 
diplomatic relations were established, a clear sign of the NCNA's im-
portance to Peking. By 1966, NCNA had branch offices in twenty African 
countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia in North Africa; Benin, 
Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal in West Africa; 
Burundi and CAR in Central Africa; Ethiopia, Kenya, Somali, Sudan, 
Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa; and Zambia in Southern Africa. 
Those in Benin, Burundi, and the CAR went underground when those coun-
tries severed diplomatic relations with Peking. NCNA reportedly also 
had a correspondent in Madagascar while that country still maintained 
diplomatic relations with Taipei (1960-1972). 68 
51 
NCNA dispatches were always highly politica1 in tone, filled with 
stock phra.ses endlessly repeating PRC epithets about "U.S. imperialism," 
"Soviet revisionism," and the like. One Western observer commented that 
the NCNA "news" service was so repetitive and monotonous that it would 
''make a normal Western reader all but scream with boredom. " 69 Whether 
Africans felt that way is much harder to determine. 
Evidence indicates that in Africa NCNA bureaus were also intelli-
gence and agitation centers whose agents were assigned to collect_po-
litical, military and economic information vital to Peking's diplomacy 
in Africa. These agents, disguised as journalists, also worked as 
intermediaries through whom Peking distributed cash, propaganda ma-
terials and even weapons to corrupt politicians, dissident elements, 
and guerrillas for subversion in various African countries. 70 Among 
the NCNA agents in Africa, two were notorious for subversive activities 
--Kao Liang in Central and East Africa, and Wang Teh-ming in Kenya. 
Despite their seemingly prestigious position in Africa, these NCNA 
agents were under constant and strict control by supervisors in Peking. 
NCNA headquarters conducted annual inspections of its bureaus abroad, 
and any agent who failed the screening would be recalled to China to 
face an uncertain and usually miserable future. 71 
Radio Broadcasts 
The extremely high rate of illiteracy in Africa makes radio broad~ 
casting an important medium for reaching mass audiences, though limited 
by a shortage of receiving sets in many poor countries. The PRC was 
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the first Communist country to broadcast to Africa. Radio Peking began 
beaming broadcasts to the continent in September, 1956, followed by 
. . "1 1 72 Rad~o Moscow ~n Apr1 , 958. Over the years, Radio Peking substan-
tially increased its broadcasting hours to Africa, though as shown in 
Table XI, published statistics disagree widely on the total time. At 
first, English was the only language used, but later Portuguese, French, 
Italian, and Arabic were added, along with two major African languages, 
Swahili (important in East Africa) and Hausa (important in West Africa). 
Transmissions in Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese), also added in 1960, 
are intended for permanent Chinese residents as well as temporary 
visitors. 
Radio Peking also strengthened its beaming power. A Chinese stu-
dent of African affairs, George T. Yu, reported that in 1962 "Radio 
Peking could be heard more clearly in Africa south of the Sahara than 
the 'Voice of America•.n 73 British African expert Pieter Lessing tes-
tified in the same year that "no other radio programmes can be heard as 
1 1 . 11 t f f . th f k" d" 74 c ear y 1n a . par s o A r1ca as ose o Pe ~ng Ra 10." By 1971, 
Radio Peking reportedly had the most powerful of all the transmitters 
then broadcasting to Africa from outside. 75 
The effectiveness of this radio propaganda is uncertain. Quali-
tative evaluations range from "irrelevant to African interests" and "of 
doubtful efficacy" to "excellent, entertaining, instructive, and inter-
esting, well worth any listener's attention." 76 An unusual observation 
in 1965 from John K. Cooley, Christian Science. Monitor correspondent in 
Casablanca, was that Radio Peking was playing Somali battle hymns in a 
Somali language program but so softly that "a listener would never sus-








TA.HI,JO: X I 
HADIO PI·:KINC J)IWA.JJCASTS TO AFHICJ\ 
Languages Used (11eekly Hours) 
~:nglish 
English (t19), Portuguese (7), Mandarin (7), Cantonese (~) 
English (28), French (ltl), Portuguese (7), Italian (3~), 
Mandarin (7), Cantonese (7), Swahili (10~), llausa (7) 
~nglish (28), French (14), Portuguese (14), Italian (3~), 
Mandarin (7), Cantonese (7), Swahili (10~), llausa (7) 
English (28), French (14), Arabic (14), Portuguese (14), 
Italian (3~), Mandarin (14), Cantonese (7), Swahili (lOY,), 
Hausa (7) 
1961(1) English, Arabic, French, Portuguese (105 total), 
Mandarin (15), Cantonese (7) 
l96t1(2) English, French, Portuguese, Cantonese, Mandarin, 
Swahili, l!ausa 
1965(3) 
l956(t1) English (28), French (14), llausa (7), Italian 3~), 
Portuguese (7), Swahili (loY,), Arabic (14), 











*Sources (A): The 1956 figure is from "Communist China Increases International 
Broadcasts," in Current Scene (October, 1959-April, 1961), p. 47. 1960, 
1965, and 1970 figures are from the BBC monitoring service, cited in 
Brent Button-Williams, "Communism in Africa: Words as Weapons," Bulletin of 
the Africa Institute of South Afl'ica, IX, no. 5 (June, 1971), p. 221. The 
1971 figures arc from "Communist Broadcasting to Africa," ibid., X, no. 4 
(May, 1972), p. 138. The figures were originally in daily minutes. 
*''Sources (B): (1) Yu, "Peking Vers~s Taipei in World Arena," p. 443. (2) 
Yu, "Sino-African Relations: A Survey," p. 329. (3) See "Note on French 
Study of Communist Chinese Policies in Africa," a translation of an un-
signed article, originally entitled "Political Life--Black Africa," in 
the French-language periodical Bulletin de L'Afrique Noire [Bulletin· of 
Black Africa), Paris, no. 467 (June 14, 1967), p. 9423, in JPRS, Trans-
lations on Africa, no. 68 (41785), no. 598, p. 2. (4) Christian Roll, 
"Communist China's Program in Africa," a translation from the German-
language biweekly Afrika lleutc, Bonn, no. 8 (April 15, 1966), pp. ll2-
ll6, in JPHS, Translations on Africa, no. 44 (35759), no. 376, p. 3. 
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de Villiers, Director of Programs of the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, commented in 1966 that "Radio Peking has penetrated Africa 
to such an extent that it has a representative music library containing 
indigenous music from even the most primitive outposts of Africa." 78 
A second factor, in addition to quality, is competition. In 
Africa, Radio Peking faced strong challenges from Radio Moscow and 
"Radio Peace and Progress" of the Soviet Union, "Voice of America" of 
the United States, and the BBC of Great Britain, the latter being par-
ticularly popular in East Africa. For example, surveys conducted in 
three East African capitals in 1964 and 1966 showed that among those 
interviewed who were over seventeen years of age and had at least six 
years of education, 51 percent to 70 percent preferred the BBC and only 
one percent to eight percent listened to Radio Peking. 79 
A third factor is the availability of radio receivers. Most Afri-
cans are still too poor to own radios. One writer commented in 1968 
that "radio ownership continues to be a relative luxury; given the fact 
that the average daily wage of a nonskilled worker in East Africa cur-
rently is the equivalent of U.S. $1.00, the purchase of a radio must be 
seen as a major investment. Indeed radio ownership and listening have 
. h h 1" 80 been limited to urban dwellers wlt some sc oo lng." Statistics re-
ported to the United Nations suggest that only 19 of every 1,000 Afri-
cans owned a radio in 1960, 25 per 1,000 in 1965, 41 per 1,000 in 1970, 
1 . 1 81 and 71 per ,000 ln 974. Even the last figure lS extremely low, es-
pecially since short-wave receivers probably constitute only a small 
percentage of the total, and a disproportionate share of all receivers 
is undoubtedly ~oncentrated in the more developed urban areas of North 
and South Africa rather than among black Africans. On the other hand, 
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those Africans who do own receivers are likely to be in some sense mem-
bers of an elite whose influence is mtich greater than :its numericaJ 
:-; tr·cngth. 
In addition to its own broadcasts, the PRC took an active interest 
in building radio broadcasting stations at strategic locations 1n 
friendly African countries, including Guinea, Mali, Congo, Zambia, and 
Tanzania, making a broad band across Africa. In most instances, Peking 
. 82 donated the transmitter and all other necessary equ1pment. Peking is 
known to have signed "broadcast cooperation" agreements with two of its 
closest African supporters, Guinea and Mali. The official text pro-
vides for an "exchange" of broadcasting materials "on history, political 
affairs, economy, literature, drama, arts, programs, and recorded tapes 
83 that reflect the life of the people." It is not clear whether "ex-
change" includes action by Guinea and Mali to rebroadcast transmissions 
84 
received from Radio Peking by short wave. 
Printed Material 
Books, periodicals, and pamphlets also constituted an important 
instrument of PRC propaganda among educated Africans. Mao's Selected 
Works, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, and Quotations from 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung in English, French, Spanish, and some African 
languages wer~ offered for sale at very low prices in many African 
countries. Translations of some more general works such as Chinese 
poems for children and Lu Hsun's novels were also available. 85 
Peking published numerous periodicals in several non-Chinese lan-
guages and distributed them among African readers at only a fraction of 
the normal price. These include Revolution, a Peking-supported monthly 
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edited by Africans and published in Paris; Peking Review, the authori-
tative biweekly magazine of the Chinese Communist Party; and Evergreen, 
a biweekly directed at African students. 86 Periodicals with excellent 
pictures such as China Pictorial (monthly, :ln English and French), China 
Reconstructs (monthly, in English and French), and Women of China (bi-
monthly in English) were well received by Africans. 87 
Motion Pictures 
Motion pictures played an even more important role than printed rna-
terials in Peking's propaganda because of illiteracy in Africa. Under 
the various cultural cooperation agreements with African countries, the 
PRC exported to the continent African dialect-dubbed films of drama, 
science education, newsreels, and art appreciation. A "Chinese film 
week" was also frequently held in African capitals. Militant African 
countries like Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were the main targets of this 
"film propaganda." 88 
Sometimes Peking also sent Chinese cameramen to Africa to shoot 
documentary films on African subjects, alway::> heavily revolutionary in 
tone. After being processed in China, these films were shipped back to 
Africa and shown to African audiences. Some were highly acclaimed. 89 
Visits To and From China 
The PRC also sought out and invited numerous African politicians, 
labor leaders, journalists, youth leaders, and athletes to visit China. 
The importance of this "personal diplomacy" exceeds statistical meas-
ures because it involved the political elite of actual and potential 
leaders in various African countries. Usually the PRC embassy in an 
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African country would select the guest, whether an individual or a 
group; a formal i.nvitation was sent out by the Chinese counterpart of 
the African guest. 
Highest on the lists of desirable guests were of course the Afri-
can heads of state. Between 1960 and 1978, there were forty-one state 
visits to the PRC by heads of African nations (see Table XII), an aver-
age of two a year--even during the isolationist period of the Cultural 
Revolution. These involved thirty heads of state, from a total of 
twenty-seven countries: Algeria in North Africa; Zaire, CAR, Niger, 
and Rwanda in Central Africa; Mozambique and Zambia in Southern Africa; 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa; and 
Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Equa-
torial Guinea in West Africa. While in China, African 0eads of state 
were treated royally, welcomed by massed thousands of cheering Chinese, 
honored at lavish banquets, taken on sight-seeing tours, and until June, 
1976, usually accorded the supreme privilege of an audience with Mao 
Tse-tung. 
Although these visits by African heads of state were obviously 
considered highly desirable, they were never reciprocated by the PRC. 
But neither were visits to China by heads of state from other parts of 
90 the world. For Africa, the PRC provided at least a high-level sub-
stitute for a state visit on one occasion: PRC Premier Chou En-lai's 
fifty-four day tour of ten African countries in 1963-1964. Accompanied 
by an impressive entourage of more than fifty, including Foreign Minis-
ter Chen I and ten other high-ranking officials, Chou visited Egypt 
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(December 14-21, 1963), Algeria (December 21-27), Morocco (December 27-
30), Tunisia (January 9-10, 1964, after a side trip to Albania), Ghana 
(January 11-16), Mali (January 16-21), Guinea (January 21-26), Sudan 
(January 27-30), Ethiopia (January 30-February 1), and Somalia (Febru-
ary 1-4). 
Chou's trip has been dealt with extensively. by other writers. 91 
Here it is sufficient to note that the trip came at a time when PRC 
invective against the United States, the United Nations, and the Soviet 
Union was approaching its worst extreme, and it was not a courtesy trip 
but ohe with important political objectives: (1) to solicit African 
support for a second Bandung conference, (2) to improve the tarnished 
image of the PRC presented to Africans by Soviet and Western propaganda, 
(3) to remind Africans that China was a major power which it would be 
dangerous and unwise to ignore., and ( 4) to discredit and weaken the ROC 
position in Africa and thus in the United Nations. 92 More progress in 
reaching these objectives was achieved in black Africa than in North 
Africa, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Although Chou En-lai was the only senior PRC official to visit 
Africa, the PRC showed somewhat greater willingness to reciprocate 
lower-level goodwill visits. Two early ex~ples were tours of several 
African countries in 1961 by the chairman of the China-Africa People's 
Friendship Association, Liu Chang-sheng, and in 1965 by the Vice 
Chairman of the PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee, Liu 
Ning-i. The former spent four months (March to July, 1961) in Guinea, 
. . d l' 93 Mali, Ghana, Niger, Togo, Benin, Upper Volta, Eth1op1a, an Soma 1a. 
The latter spent two months (March and April, 1965) in Guinea, Mali, 
94 
the CAR, Congo, and Ghana. 
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Among lower-ranking personnel, visits by African delegations to 
China and Chinese delegations to Africa were so numerous that reliable 
figures are unobtainable. Those in Table XIII were assembled from 
several sources and appear to be conservative. A French African expert, 
Philippe Schneyder, reported 270 African delegations visiting China in 
95 1959, while Ogunsanwo listed only 50 for that year. Ogunsanwo dis-
puted his own figure for 1960, citing 105 African delegations in one 
place (page 84), but only 98 in another (page 270). For 1962-1964, an-
other French source counted a total of 318 African delegations visiting 
China and 156 PRC delegations visiting Africa. 96 Ogunsanwo's figures 
for these three years total 253 and 189, respectively. 
Student Scholarships 
The PRC also hoped to attract African youth leaders by granting 
scholarships to study in China. This may have started as early as the 
1950s, since the Prague-based International Union of students is re-
ported to have established a "sanatorium" near Peking in January, 1958, 
for African and Asian students. 97 However, most of Africa was then 
still under colonial rule~ and a systematic PRC scholarship program for 
African students does not seem to have started until 1960, directed 
mainly towards students from newly independent countries such as Zaire 
d 1 . 98 an Soma 1a. Few statistics are available, but one account states 
that in 1962, when the Soviet bloc granted nearly 1,200 scholarships to 
twenty-six African countries, the PRC offered only about 40o. 99 Ac-
cording to Emmanuel John Hevi, a Ghanaian who studied in Peking from 
1960 to 1962, there were only 118 African stqdents in China in April, 
1962. 100 
TABLE XIII 
EXCHANGE OF VISITING DELEGATIONS BY AFRICAN 
NATIONS AND THE PRC 
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Year From Africa to PRC From PRC to Africa 
1959 50 10 
1960 98 25 
1961 58 39 
1962 37 52 
1963 113 50 
1964 103 87 
1965 114 69 
1966 114 47 
1967 57 17 
1968 12 14 
1969 12 19 
1970 15 33 
1971 15 9 
1972 51 14 
1973 65 25 
1974 15 9 
1975 19 8 
Total 948 527 
Sources: The 1959-1970 figures are from Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's 
Policy in Africa, 1958-1971, Appendix I, tables 1 and 2 (pp. 
269-270). The 1971-1975 figures are based on information in 
African Research Bulletin (1971-1975); Daily Report (1971-
1974) of FBIS; Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (1973) and 
1351-1352 (1974); and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
(1971-1975). These figures are probably incomplete. 
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As mentioned 1n Chapter I, Hevi became very disillusioned with 
Chinese Communism, and wrote two books crit:ici:dng PHC ambitions in 
Af'r.ica, academic standards i!l China, and what he regarded as a PHC 
racist attitude towards African students. The latter charge was dis-
pute<.l by another Ghanaian student, Kojo Amoo-Gottfried, who studied in 
d b t "d 1 . 't t h' 101 . b k 't" .. Lon on u pa1 severa v1s1 s o C 1na. Hev1's oo s cr1 1c1z1ng 
the PRC were translated into Chinese by Nationalist Chinese. Both the 
PRC and the Soviet Union appear to have had difficulty in attracting 
and satisfying African students, for both academic and ideological 
reasons. Some African students went home from both Communist countries 
alienated rather than indoctrinated, and charged their Corrimunist hosts 
with the same racist attitude the hosts had imputed to Western coun-
tries. Although it would be unwise to assume that these reactions were 
typical, or to discount the influence in their home 90untries of Afri-
cans who studied in China, it is curious that after the Cultural Revol-
ution caused the PRC to suspend the scholarship program and to order 
I 
i 
all foreign students' to leave China in 1966, student exchanges did n·ot 
resume until 1973. 
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Covert Activities 
Although it was mentioned above that PRC "journalists" with the 
NCNA were often involved in covert activities unrelated to their sup-
posed function, the PRC tactics described thus far were essentially 
overt and most were publicized lavishly if not always accurately. Even 
so, the information available about them is often fragmentary. It 1s 
therefore under~tandable that verifiable information about Peking's 
truly clandestine or semi-clandestine operations in Africa will always 
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be very scarce except perhaps 1n the secret films of other countries. 
It may well be that the PRC's covert operations in Africa were more im-
portant than any of its overt activities, but this is impossible either 
to prove or disprove. 
Aside from bribing influential politicians and officials in various 
African countries, and collecting intelligence, the PRC's covert opera-
tions appear to have consisted chiefly of financing and sometimes giving 
military training to African rebels of various types. On the basis of 
his experience in the Chinese civil war, Mao Tse-tung was considered 
(by himself and others) the world's foremost innovator of guerrilla 
tactics and strategy, and African guerrillas were tr11ined near Nanking 
and elsewhere in China during the early 1960s and perhaps before that. 
Later, such training was conducted in Africa at secret camps financed 
and operated by Chinese. Such camp.s are known in at least five coun-
tries--Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia--and Chinese arms 
for African rebels were shipped not only through Burundi and Tanzania 
103 
but also through Uganda. 
Some guerrilla forces were trained for attacks on areas that were 
then either still colonial, such as Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, 
or still under white rule, such as South Africa, Southwest Africa 
(Namibia), and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). But others were aided or trained 
by the PRC for the purpose of overthrowing independent black governments 
in Africa. Peking 1s said to have given support of one kind or another 
(more than propaganda support) to dissident or rebellious elements in 
at least thirteen African countries. Available information about these 
covert operations is discussed in the regional chapters which follow. 
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At this point, it need only be noted that Peking's constant militant 
rhetoric about "revolution" disquieted many African leaders because of 
evidence that Peking was interested in overthrowing not only colonial 
regimes but some independent black governments as well. 
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103nocumentation for this section on covert operations will be 
presented with more detailed discussions in the regional chapters which 
follow. It is worth mentioning at this point that some of the most re-
vealing evidence of PRC involvement in training guerrillas in Africa 
was made public as a result of the overthrow of African rulers who had 
cooperated most closely with Peking, such as Ghana's Nkrumah. 
CHAPTER III 
EXTERNAL ISSUES AFFECTING PRC-
AFRICAN RELATIONS 
The policy framework described in Chapter II was affected by a 
number of issues external to Africa. From 1949 to 1971, the most per-
vasive of these was the non-African controversy over Chinese represen-
tation 1n the United Nations, as will be described in Chapter X. 
Several other external issues need to be examined here, before atten-
tion is turned to a regional survey of Peking's relations with indi-
vidual countries in Africa. 
The Sino-Soviet Dispute 
As early as January 25, 1960, the idea that Africa might profit 
from big power disputes was openly stated by Tunisian President Habib 
Bourguiba in his opening address to the second All-African Peoples Con-
ference of African Nations: 
The fact that Africa today excites the appetites of cer-
tain great powers, that it is the focus of international 
intrigues and covetous desires, is not a matter for con-
cern. It is even a good thing, because it em~hasizes the 
interest felt towards Africa and shows the ad~antage 
which we must derive therefrom ••. The most important 
thing [for Africans] is to have a feel for events and 
know how to exploit them.l 
Bourg~iba was evidently referring to the cold war between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. In January, 1960, few people out-
side the inner circles of Soviet and PRC leadership realized that the 
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two largeRt Communist Rtates were on the verge of a vitriolic public 
feud. Moreover, Tunisia did not then have diplomatic relations with 
either the PRC or ROC, and perhaps did not yet think of the PRC as a 
"great power." Four years later, Bourguiba received Chou En-lai and 
agreed to recognize Peking, but reportedly spoke very bluntly to Chou 
about the PRC's militance: 
You come to Africa as the enemy of the capitalist 
states, of the West, of the neutralists and the non-
aligned, of India, of Tito, of Khrushchev, of every-
body. You have not chosen an easy policy. I'll say 
that. Don't expect to score much in Africa. Others 
won't tell you straight; I will--you won't get far 
ln this continent.2 
In the four years between these two statements by Bourguiba, the 
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number of independent African nations had grown from eleven to thirty-
£,. 3 lVe. The outside powers vying for African favor could no longer be 
simply divided into two camps, East and West, because the Soviet Union 
and the PRC had become open enemies. Peking's influence in Africa was 
tested on three interrelated external issues: the Sino-Soviet rift 
itself, the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, and the 1963 Moscow nuclear 
test-ban treaty. The background and development of these issues have 
been treated extensively and need not be reviewed here. The study in-
tends only to analyze African reaction to the Chinese stand on these 
LSSUCS. 
Despite the fact that most African leaders tried to keep the 
Sino-Soviet conflict away from their continent, their efforts failed 
because African governments were already political~y and ideologically 
diverse, and since both Peking and Moscow were determined to gain Afri-
can support for 'their own point of view on such important issues as the 
test-ban treaty, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence. As the Sino-
Soviet dispute became intensified, African leaders, irritated and 
worried, asked Moscow and Peking to patch up their differences. On 
Scptcmhcr 30, 1963, jn a message to an AAPSO conference in Nicosia, 
Ghana's Nkrumah argued that: 
Our goal should be to seek the unity of the socialist 
countries, for it is only through this unity that they 
can support us in our struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism . • • [We should] appeal most strongly to 
China and the Soviet· Union to eliminate their differ-
ence and to come together again without delay.4 
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However, by then, the dispute had already reached the point where 
not even fraternal parties within the Communist camp could repair the 
breach. As the Sino-Soviet conflict dragged on, many Africans became 
impatient and disgusted with both. Commenting on the·confusion caused 
by the mutual slandering of the Soviet and Chinese delegations at an 
AAPSO conference in Algiers in March, 1964, a Kenyan delegate ex-
pressed his resentment: 
We are not Marxist-Leninists. Most of us have not read a 
line of Das Kapital, so what interest do you expect us to 
show in your doctrinal quarrels? I am tired of being 
asked what I think of the Soviet position when I am eat-
ing a sandwich, and _what I think of the Chinese arguments 
when I am drinking my tea.5 
In May, 1967, after a heated confrontation between the Chinese Embassy 
1n Lusaka and a visiting Soviet delegation, the Zambia News commented 
critic ally: 
Who do those Russians and Chinese think they are to fight 
their wordy ideological battles in Zambia? . . . This 
recent show of arrogance by the Russians and Chinese in 
Lusaka is an example of boorishness, particularly since 
President Kaunda had just asked, courteously fuut firmly, 
that Zambia not be drawn into the Sino-Soviet East-West 
conflict.P 
Though the Sino-Soviet dispute stirred up African resentment 
against both Peking and Moscow, most African leaders seemed to find 
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Peking more blameworthy. They attributed the deterioration of Sino-
Soviet relations to Peking's bellicose attitude toward Moscow and its 
extreme and uncompromising position on the nuclear test-ban trcaly, 
disarmament, and the United Nations. The conflict between Peking and 
Moscow has been a handicap to both the Chinese and the Russians 1n 
winning influence in Africa and the rest of the Third World. 
The PRC-India Border War 
PRC influence 1n Africa faced another test when a long-standing 
Sino-Indian border dispute erupted into a full-fledged border war in 
7 October, 1962. The war went badly for India and complicated both the 
Sino-Soviet dispute and Western relations with India, but caused sur-
prisingly little reaction in Africa. Even though all twelve member 
states of the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), then the most anti-
Peking international political organization in Africa, sent messages of 
sympathy to India, only Niger openly condemned "Chinese aggression." 8 
There was no active support for India. In the rest of Africa, the most 
explicit denunciation of Peking came from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and to a 
d . . 9 lesser egree, Tun1s1a. From the Indian viewpoint, the most disap-
pointing reaction came from Ghana, a fellow Commonwealth member; 
President Nkrumah sent strong notes to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 
protesting Britain's decision to provide India with military aid. 10 
The UAM and Ghana then occupied opposite ends of the political 
spectrum in Africa. Other African governments, regardless of political 
coloration, seemed little concerned by the war. One reason was that 
Peking argued its case more cogently in Africa than India did. For ex-
ample, when the Tanzanian government asked the Chinese and Indian 
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embassies to present information on the dispute, the Chinese submitted 
well-documented evidence, including maps, photostatic copies of treat-
ies, illustrations showing the territory disputed, etc., while the 
d . bl t d l"k . 11 In lans were una e o o l ewlse. Even in New Delhi, the Indian 
government's embarrassing lack of information about the disputed ter-
ritory made the Chinese claim to ownership more plausible. (For ex-
ample, India was unaware that the Chinese had built a military road in 
the area several years earlier.) 
Beyond uncertainty as to who was at fault in the Sino-Indian war, 
some Africans were prepared to give the PRC the benefit of the doubt 
because they disliked India. This was partly because of African jeal-
ousy of relatively prosperous Indian communities in East Africa, but 
among more militant Africans there was also dissatisfaction wi t,h Indian 
Prime Minister Nehru's moderate attitude on Third World .issues. India 
and the PRC had been rivals for Third World leadership since the 1955 
Bandung conference. Among Third World leaders, Nehru was the most 
realistic and his pragmatism became more apparent in the 1960s. He 
was more concerned with world peace than with armed revolution against 
colonialism, and he believed that only cooperation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union could solve world problems, viewpoints un-
acceptable to the PRC and such militant African leaders as Nkrumah of. 
Ghana, Toure of Guinea, and Keita of Mali. 
The Sino-Indian crisis therefore had consequ~nces beyond its im~ 
mediate context. It not only intensified the already deteriorating 
Sino-Soviet; relations by making Moscow openly pro..-India, but also ended 
the myth of "Afro-Asian solidarity." By 1964, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and 
India were promoting a "second Belgrade confer.ence" of "non-aligned" 
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nations, which was held in Cairo without PRC participation, while the 
PRC was trying unsuccessfully to organize a rival "second Bandung con-
ference" of Afro-Asiannations, to be held 1n Algiers, as noted in 
Chapter II. Some African nations friendly to Peking supported both 
types of conferences, but clearly the Sino-Indian war had created a new 
line of cleavage among the Third World countries. 
The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
Another issue over which the PRC fared less well in Africa was the 
nuclear test-ban treaty signed in Moscow in 1963. Since the founding of 
the PRC in 1949, China had been protected by the Soviet nuclear umbrel-
la. Before the Sino-Soviet rift came into the open in 1960, Moscow had 
promised to help develop PRC atomic technology. An agreement on new 
technology for national defense was reportedly signed between China and 
the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957. Under this agreement, Moscow was 
to provide Peking "with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data 
concerning its manufacture."12 
However, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Soviets un1-
laterally repudiated the agreement on June 20, 1959. The PRC later 
charged that this was done by Khrushchev "as a presentation gift at the 
time the Soviet leader went to the United states for talks with Eisen-
howcr" in September, 1959, creating what the United States called the 
. . f "d 13 "sp1_r1 t o · Camp Davl . " Four years later, when the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and Great Britain signed a nuclear test-ban treaty in 
Moscow on July 25, 1963, Peking bitterly denounced it as "a big fraud 
to fool the people of the world," in which the three nuclear powers 
were attempting "to consolidate their nuclear monopoly and bind the 
hands of all the peace-loving countries subjected to the nuclear 
14 
threat." Behind this bitter denunciation lay Peking's fear of 
Soviet-American encirclement of China with nuclear weapons or even a 
"pre-emptive" attack upon China by the Soviets. The PRC response was 
an intense drive to develop its own nuclear technology rapidly; this 
. 15 
led to the first PRC atomic explosion on October 16, 1964. 
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In Africa, the PRC spared no effort in attacking the Moscow treaty 
in propaganda and through diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, most 
African countries, with the notable exception of the PRC's close friend 
. b . t . f th t t d'd t' 1' t h' 16 Gu1nea, ecame s1gna or1es o e rea y, as 1 Na 1ona 1s C 1na. 
ROC accession to the treaty added fuel to PRC attacks both on the 
treaty and on the Soviet Union, which had not immediately objected to 
the ROC as a signatory. On August 30, 1963, one week after the ROC 
signing, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper Jen-min jih-pao, 1n a 
long editorial entitled "Further Exposure of the Soviet Leaders' Act 
of Betrayal," called Soviet silence: 
• • • another iron-clad proof that in order to meet 
the needs of the 'two Chinas' scheme engineered by 
U.S. imperialism, the Soviet leaders do not hesitate 
to betray their ally, and the interests of the so-
cialist camp and of the world's people.l7 
Two days later, Peking issued an official statement charging that the 
Soviet Union had conspired with the United States in creating "a situa-
. f t h. 18 t1on o wo C 1nas." Only then did the Soviet government deliver a 
note to the U.S. Department of state (September 6), declaring that it 
"does not recognize" the signature of Nationalist China on the treaty. 
The Soviet objection was rejected by Washington and the issue remained 
unresolved. 
Generally speaking, the test-ban treaty was well received 1n 
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Africa. Peking's denunciation of it irritated African leaders and con-
vi need them tha L the PHC wou] d carry i L~; mil i Lant rcvo lutionary ideology 
and opposition to peaceful coexistence to the extreme. During his 1963-
1964 African tour, Chou En-lai was asked in several African capitals to 
explain Peking's stubborn attitude. For example, PRC opposition to the 
test-ban treaty was criticized both by Bourguiba of Tunisia, and by 
19 Ethiopia's Haile Selassie at a banquet in Chou's honor. 
The French Connection 
In the same month, however, another external development brought 
Peking new prestige 1n a part of Africa--the West--where it had pre-
viously not enjoyed much influence except in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. 
This was France's decision, after fourteen years' delay, to recognize 
the PRC. On January 27, 1964, France and the PRC established diplomatic 
relations and agreed "to appoint their ambassadors within three 
20 
months." Two days later, a Jen-min jih-pao editorial acclaimed this 
as "another major achievement of China's foreign policy" proving that 
"the scheme of U.S. imperialism and its followers to isolate China 1s 
d d 1 f "1 21 oome to comp ete a1 ure." As expected, the French action was 
bitterly denounced by the ROC, which broke off diplomatic relations 
22 
with Paris on February 10. 
The complex reasons for France's decision are extraneous to this 
t d d h 1 d b . d b th "t 23 s u y, an ave a rea y een exam1ne y o er wr1 ers. For the PRC, 
French recognition was important not only because France was a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council but also because France 
under Charles De Gaulle was trying to establish its credentials as a 
"non-aligned" power and because France still had close relations with 
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numerous French-speaking nations in Africa which had not recognized 
Peking. The PRC concluded that French recognition would increase Pe-
king's prestige in the countries of the Third World in general and in 
former French Africa in particular. The results were favorable but 
much more limited than Peking expected. 
The Paris-Peking rapproachement produced mixed reactions in black 
Africa. Generally speaking, De Gaulle's decision was less well re-
ceived in former French Africa than in the rest of the continent. There 
were then fifteen former French colonies in black Africa. Two of these, 
Guinea and Mali, had been unfriendly to France since independence, and 
had recognized Peking since 1959 and 1960, respectively. As expected, 
they openly praised De Gaulle's action in 1964. The other thirteen 
Francophone African countries all had diplomatic relations with Taipei, 
and only three followed France's example in switching to recognize Pe-
king: Congo, the CAR, and Benin. Mauritania did so a year later, 
bringing to seventeen the total of African states recognizing the PRC. 
But the other nine countries rejected the French example and maintained 
relations with the ROC, partly because of apprehension over PRC's co-
vert support of dissident groups in various African countries. Three 
of these--Madagascar, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta--sharply criticized 
. t. 24 France's ac lon. 
The PRC's "Cultural Revolution" 
Except for the Sino-Soviet split, none of the external issues dis-
cussed above had such a profound effect on PRC relations with Africa as 
the domestic upheaval in China from 1966 to 1969, known euphemistically 
in the PRC as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Hevolution." The scars 
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of this peculiar and traumatic chapter of Chinese history will be felt 
for years to come, and there is a large body of literature attempting 
to describe and explain the Cultural Revolution. 25 This is relevant to 
the present study insofar as relations with Africa were affected, but 
such external consequences cannot be understood without some explana-
tion of the astonishing events inside China in those years. 
The problem of describing the Cultural Revolution calls to mind 
the parable of six blind men who felt an elephant's tusk, trunk, ears, 
body, legs, and tail, and reached six very different conclusions as to 
what an elephant looked like. Although the Cultural Revolution had 
little connection with "culture" in any normal sense, it did begin with 
a November 10, 1965, newspaper article denouncing an historical play 
containing veiled criticism of Mao Tse-tung. 26 It ended with the April 
1-24, 1969, congress of the Chinese Communist Party (the first held 
since 1958), and publication of a 24,000 word report by Marshal Lin 
Piao on the Cultural Revolution. 
By far the most visible part of the violent Cultural Revolution 
was the two-year rampage of ten million teenage students called "Red 
Guards," first mobilized by Mao himself on August 18, 1966, given rail-
way passes, and told to fan out over China and "make revolution," which 
they proceeded to do with a vengeance until gradually sent home or to 
manual labor on farms in the fall of 1968. 27 During this two-year 
period, the Red Guards spread over the whole country like a prairie 
fire, invading private homes (often going door-to-door from one end of 
the street to the other) to destroy or confiscate anything they con-
sidered "old" or "Western" (clothing, books, works of art), and ln-
vading public buildings to single out teachers, Communist Party 
officials, PRC government officials, and even military officials for 
verbal and physical abuse, humiliating them without m,ercy in public 
criticism, forced "confessions" and self-criticism, and "trials." 
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Accompanying all this was a "cult of personality" apotheosizing 
Mao to an extent far exceeding anything in the earlier Soviet adula-
tion of Lenin after death or Stalin before death. A sonorous anthem 
proclaimed that "red is the east, rises the sun: China has brought 
forth a Mao Tse-tung." Portraits of Mao were hung in every home and 
apartment; thousands of life-size statues of him were erected through-
out the country, even in hotels. Mao was·officially declared "the 
greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time," and Marxism-Leninism itself 
was renamed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao-tse-tung-thought." A pocket-sized 
summary of "Mao thought" was published as Quotations from Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung, carefully selected, lifted out of context, and arranged 
topically between red plastic covers. Millions of copies of this 
"little red book" were published 1n Chinese (and numerous other lan-
guages), to be carried 1n public at all times by everyone from kinder-
garten children to the highest officials and the oldest citizens, and 
consulted religiously for solutions to every conceivable problem. 
As a wholesale verbal and physical attack promoted by a nation's 
highest Jeader against his own party and government, the Cultural Revo-
lution i~s unique in world history, and therefore tends to elude rational 
explanation. In calling it a "revolution," Mao did not imply either of 
the usual Marxist or non-Marxist definitions of "revolution;".he did 
not seek either to overthrow a ruling social class or to change the 
PRC's political or social system. Since China had already had its 
"socialist revolution" in 1949, the Cultural Revolution was supposed 
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to be part of what Mao called the "continuing" or "permanent" revolu-
tion that would propel China from socialism to the utopia of com-
munism.28 An important aspect of this was Mao's belief that many mem-
bers of the immense parallel bureaucracies of the Communist Party and 
the PRC government, from highest to lowest levels, had become com-
fortable, complacent, and "bureaucratic-minded," that is, "unrevolu-
tionary" or even "counterrevolutionary," and must be "re-educated" to 
reinvigorate their "revolutionary spirit." 
Given Mao's obsession with the ability of "revolutionary spirit" 
to overcome material problems, there is no reason to doubt that ideo-
logical renewal was one objective of the Cultural Revolution. But it 
is equally clear that real or imagined opposition to Mao's views was 
the sole criterion for judging whether an individual needed ideological 
renewal. Thus the Cultural Revolution was also an old-fashioned power 
struggle, thinly camouflaged with Marxist rhetoric. Anyone accused of 
being more "pragmatic" than "ideological," of stressing results rather 
than methods, was now classified as an opponent of Mao. The teenage 
Red Guards were permitted to carry out a wholesale purge of such 
people at every level within the party and the government, including 
Mao's hand-picked heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i, Cha{rman of the PRC, 
and Communist Party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing (both close 
associates of Mao for more than forty years), as well as hundreds of 
thousands of lesser officials throughout China. 
The resulting state of near anarchy encouraged widespread abuses. 
Many people were falsely accused, hounded out of office, and often 
physically abuses or even killed simply because of personal grudges, 
jealousy, or the removal of all restraints (including the police, 
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which were quickly demoralized and under attack themselves). Some of 
these excesses met with Mao's approval, some did not. A major ob-
stacle to understanding the Cultural Revolution has been a tendency to 
assume that it proceeded according to a master plan, that everything 
had been ordered or anticipated by an infallible Mao. 
Though the Red Guards were under the overall supervision of a 17-
member "Central Cultural Revolution Group" headed by Ch'en Po-ta and 
Mao's fourth wife Chiang Ch'ing, as the movement grew, different Red 
Guard factions emerged and fought each other for official endorsement 
. 29 . 
by the Commun1st Party. Between late 1966 and mld-1968, violence 
spread over China as competing Red Guard factions intensified their 
struggle. Besides fighting among themselves, the Red Guards locked 
horns with almost every other group, including educators, government 
officials, party leaders, foreign service personnel, industrial workers, 
and even the army. 
As the Red Guard movement gradually got out of control, even the 
radicals within the CCP Central Committee, such as the Central Cul-
tural Revolution Group, found it necessary to suppress the most radical 
elements within the movement 1n order to save the already partially 
destroyed political system. In the end, it took the intervention of 
the army to quell the rampaging Red Guards. 30 Tens of thousands of 
Red Guards died in their· own intrafaction fighting or in confronta-
tions with soldiers. 
The chaotic Cultural Revolution affected every aspect of life in 
the PRC: the educational and political systems were paralyzed, eco-
nomic develop~emt interrupted, foreign policy hindered, and relations 
with many countries deteriorated. 31 Peking's foreign policy during the 
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Cultural Revolution was affected by a wave of strong xenophobia, na-
tionalism, and ethnocentrism reminiscent of the short-lived Boxer Re-
hellion in 1900. Normal and appropriate functions of the foreign 
affairs system were disrupted and paralyzed by Red Guards as they at-
tempted to seize the decision-making power of the Foreign Ministry. 
The Ordeal of the PRC Foreign Ministry 
One of the first high-ranking targets of the Red Guards was Ch'en 
I, a sixty-five year old field marshal who had been foreign minister 
since 1958. The first attacks on Ch'en I were verbal, and appeared in 
"big-character posters" (ta tze pao) in Peking in October, 1966. Ch'en 
was accused of numerous "crimes," including suppressing the Cultural 
Revolution in the Foreign Ministry and nurturing a "special privileged 
stratum of high ranking foreign service officers, ••. a stratum which 
consists of agents of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the Foreign 
.. t 32 M1n1s ry." At first, Ch'en I seemed able to stand firm but his po-
sition gradually became more vulnerable. 
Early in 1967, Red Guards gained a foothold inside the Foreign 
Ministry through the establishment of a "Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Revolutionary Hebel Liaison Station" (wai-chiao-pu ke-rning tsao-fan 
lien-lo-chan) on January 18, to "lead revolution and to inspect work" 
. . . t 33 
1n the IDlnlS ry. Six days later, at a mass rally of 10,000, report-
edly presided over by his friend Premier Chou En-lai, Ch'en I was 
forced to make a public "confession." Between late March and early 
April, as extremist Red Guard factions criticized the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission, Ch'en was again under fire. On April 4 the General 
34 
Command of the Red Guards sponsored a mass rally against Ch'en. Four 
days later, a "Criticize Ch'en I Liaison Station" (p'i-p'an Ch'en I 
lien-lo-chan) was set up within the Foreign Ministry to attack the 
foreign minister himself. 
By early May, the attack upon Ch'en I was broadened to include 
two of his vice-ministers, Chi P'eng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-hua. 35 On 
May 13, the first of a series of violent incidents occurred in the 
Foreign Ministry building as hundreds of rampaging Red Guards oc-
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cupied the building for six hours. The Red Guards completely paralyzed 
the regular operations of the ministry by beating up guards, breaking 
open files, and ransacking documents. 36 
After this incident, Premier Chou En-lai held a four-hour meeting 
with the young rebels. Chou agreed that he would attend criticize-
Ch'cn meetings organized by the Red Guards but he refused to submit to 
their other demand that Ch'en I, Chi P'eng-fei, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua be 
removed from office. Unsatisfied with Chou's answers, the young rebels 
again raided the Foreign Ministry on May 29 and stole classified rna-
. l 37 ter1a s. In August, two more rallies were organized in Peking by 
Red Guards to criticize Ch'en I; Premier Chou attended both. During 
the ordeal, Ch'en was so roughly handled by the Red Guards that it 
took soldiers to protect him. However, leading members of the CCP 
Central Committee were still against the ouster of Ch'en. 
In the early stages of his long ordeal, Ch'en fought back with 
dry wit and a sharp tongue. One story, repeated even by writers sympa-
thetic to Mao, is that on one occasion when Red Guards invaded his of-
fice and for¢ed him to wear a dunce cap while they harangued him for 
an hour, Ch'en finally "looked at his watch and said, 'Please excuse 
me. I have to go to the airport to welcome the President of 
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Guinea.•n 38 (The last detail must be garbled, s1nce there is no record 
of a visit by Toure of Guinea during the Cultural Revolution.) Even-
tually, however, Ch'en was physically broken by the harassment, lost 
twenty-seven pounds, and had to be hospitalized. Mao is said to have 
complained that "I cannot show him to foreign guests in this con-
d ·t· .,39 1 1on. 
Disarray 1n Foreign Relations 
There were not very many foreign guests to see. Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana arrived for a state visit on February 24, 1966, at the very begin-
1 
ning of the Cultural'Revolution--and was overthrown by a military coup 
in Ghana during 
African leaders 
his flight to Peking. 
I 
I 
from • leaving home; the 
i 
That may have discouraged some 
isolationist and xenophobic at-
titude of China during the Cultural Revolution discouraged others. 
Only three other African heads of state visited China during the Cul-
l 
tural Revolution: in October, 1967, Ould Daddah of Mauritania (the 
latest African state to recognize Peking), and in June, 1967, and June, 
1968, respectively, the leaders of Zambia and Tanzania, where the PRC 
was financing construction of a Zamtan or Tanzam railway. 
On September 20, 1966, the PRC ordered all foreign students in 
China, numbering approximately 1,000 and mostly from Afro-Asian coun-
40 
tries and Albania, to leave the country. In December, Peking began 
calljng its ambassadors home to be "re-educated" and to answer charges 
levied against them by Red Guards. Some senior diplomats were accused 
of living a capitalistic and rotten life and being sedf(c;ed by Western 
luxuries. One Red Guard article charges that PRC "ambassadors, coun-
selors and their wives were [sic] nothing but stuff made in the United 
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41 States, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan." By late 1967, forty-
five of the forty-six PRC ambassadors had returned home. Only Huang 
Hua, ambassador to Cairo, remained at his post. All other PRC em-
b . d th ld h d d b h d ff . 42 assles aroun e wor were ea e y c arges 'a alres. 
The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath had very negative ef-
fects on PRC relations with many countries of the Third World. Peking's 
relations with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Algeria, Kenya, and Tunisia deteriorated rapidly. 
By September, 1967, Peking had been involved in incidents of various 
degrees with thirty-two nations. 43 
Despite this, the PRC maintained cordial relations during the Cul-
tural Revolution with a few African countries, notably Congo, Mali, 
Mauritania, Tanzania, and Zambia. Relations with others deteriorated, 
sometimes because of events in Africa unrelated to the Cultural Revolu-
tion, sometimes because of Peking's domestic preoccupation, and some-
times because of attempts to "export" Cultural Revolution ideology and 
·fanaticism, as noted ~below. Whatever the circumstances in individual 
cases, the pattern is one of general decline in PRC relations with 
Africa during the Cultural Revolution years, as summarized in Table 
XIV. 
On January 3 and 6, 1966, new governments in Benin and the CAR 
broke diplomatic Pelations with Peking, and on October 30, 1966, the 
PRC broke relations with the new government of Ghana. In 1967 there 
were protracted disputes between the PRC and two other African coun-
tries, Kenya and Tunisia, leading to mutual expulsion of diplomats. 
Tunisia suspended diplomatic relations with Peking on September 24. 
Kenya did not, even though its embassy in Peking was attacked by Red 
TABLE XIV 
AFRICAN IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
1966-1969 
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1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
African countries having 
diplomatic relations with the 
PRC 17 14 13 13 13 
African delegations visiting PRC ll4 ll4 57 12 12 
PRC delegations visiting Africa 69 47 17 14 19 
PRC exports to Africa {in 
million $) 130 169 161 137 106 
PRC imports from Africa (in 
million $) 120 80 68 52 88 
PRC loans to Africa (in million 
$) 15 41 22 0 0 
Guards in August, 1967. This was the only major attack on African 
embassies in Peking, but Red Guards invaded and plundered both the 
Soviet and British embassies, and beat up a Soviet diplomat and the 
British charge d'affaires (August 14 and 22, 1467). By the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1969, the number of independent African countries 
had increased to forty-one but the number maintaining diplomatic rela-
tions with Peking fell to thirteen, compared to seventeen in 1965 when 
. 44 
PRC activities in Africa reached a peak. 
As Red Guards intensified their attack on Foreign Minister Ch'en 
I and leaders of various organizations, such as Liao Cheng-chih and 
Liu Ning-i, who were in charge of semi-official and informal relations 
with Africans, the number of African delegations invited to China 
drastically declined, and did not increase significantly until 1972. 45 
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In Sino-African trade, the Cultural Revolution also had negative 
effects. PRC exports to and imports from Africa suffered a continuous 
decline between 1966 and 1969. In 1969 Peking somewhat increased its 
imports from Africa, but even in 1969 the favorable balance of trade 
was only $18 million, the lowest in the period 1966-1969. 
PRC aid to black Africa, though not stopped, was definitely slowed 
down by the Cultural Revolution. In 1966, loans totaling $41 million 
were granted to Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania. In 1967, Peking granted 
only $22 million to two sub-Saharan African countries, Zambia and 
"t . 46 Maur1 an1a. In the next two years, no new loans were made to black 
Africa, although projects undertaken earlier were continued by Chinese 
technicians in countries such as Guinea, Mali, Congo, Tanzania, and 
b . 47 Zam 1a. 
A noteworthy effect was a much narrower concentration of PRC aid 
1n selected areas. The most consp1cuous example was the Zamtan or 
Tanzam Railway to link landlocked Zambia with the sea, via Tanzania. 
Since Peking made the first bid on this project in 1965, negotiations 
continued with enthusiasm throughout the Cultural Revolution, with 
Chinese technicians undertaking surveying work, and state visits by 
the Presidents of Zambia and Tanzania, as mentioned above. Actual 
construction of the railroad began in 1970 just after the Cultural 
Revolution ended. 
African Reaction to China's Upheaval 
Despite numerous NCNA correspondents' reports of warm and en-
thusiastic African reaction to China's Cultural Revolution, many African 
leaders were understandably mystified by the extraordinary events in 
China, and di!::>Lur-hcd by the internal turmoil and particularly by the 
extremely violent xenophobia shown by the Red Guards. These cast doubt 
on Peking's repeated claims of stability and unity in China, brotherly 
love toward foreigners. 
During Zambian President Kaunda's visit in June, 1967, Mao is said 
to have remarked to him that Africa was a continent "overflowing with 
energy" and destined to be "a principal zone of world revolutionary 
storms," a militant echo of Mao's earlier concept of the "intermediate 
zone" (discussed ln Chapter II). 48 Kaunda's reaction lS not recorded. 
Some of Africa's more militant leaders no doubt liked what they heard 
about the PRC in these years. The unpredictable Qaddhafi of Libya, 
though maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei rather than Peking, 
adopted the Maoist term "cultural revolution" for his own use, and it 
has since been a part of the political vocabulary of several African 
. 49 countrces. 
But uncertainty about the meaning of the Cultural Revolution even 
in China gave an incendiary implication to talk about "exporting" it 
to other countries. Soviet spokesmen in Moscow asserted in April, 
1967, that Premier Chou En-lai and Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife and first 
deputy-chairman of the group directing the Cultural Revolution, had 
d h . b . . f . 50 given orders to send Red Guar s to C lnese em assles ln A rlca. The 
PRC denounced these reports as Soviet attempts to sabotage China's 
friendship with African countries by implying an intent to interfere 
in their inter~al affairs. 
The Soviet reports were echoed by at least one ~frican source. 
Afrique Nouvelle [New Africa], published in Dakar, Senegal, reported 
in November, 1969, that in a late February, 1967, Peking meeting of the 
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recalled Chinese diplomats accredited to Africa, Chou En-lai and Chiang 
Ch'ing advocated creating in Africa a "broad united front .•. under 
the glorious banner of the revolutionary principles of Mao Tse-tung," 
to carry out a "cultural revolution in Africa." 51 Chiang Ch'ing re-
porh~dly told the diplomats that they "should do everything within 
their power to help the African organizations to achieve this objec-
t . "52 lve. 
Afrique Nouvelle also asserted that from the outset of the Cultural 
Revolution, young Chinese in Peking had distributed among Africans in 
China pamphlets calling for organization of an international Red Guard 
movement. The Chinese Red Guards set forth five conditions for member-
ship in this "world movement of Red Guards:" (1) to recognize Mao as 
the leader of the world revolution; (2) to recognize Mao's revolutionary 
doctrine as the only guide to Marxism-Leninism; (3) to become ardent 
propagandists of Mao's precepts in their own countries; (4) to organize 
a group of faithful partisans; and (5) to fight for the victory of the 
revolution "without fear of death." 53 
To demonstrate African receptivity to such overtures, a special 
New Year Day's bulletin from the official PRC news agency NCNA in 1967 
reported a fantastic story of four African girls who came to China to 
pay homage to Mao: 
Overwhelmed by their admiration and affection for the great 
Mao Tse-tung, four young girls from Southwest Africa 
crossed, over a period of several mont~s, thousands of 
miles of territory, passing over deserts and forests, and 
finally arrived in China to reach the ~ide\ of Mao Tse-tung. 
During their long trip they were not afraid of lions or 
police searches. They were thrown in jail and lost their 
way. But they did not give up in the face of unbelievable 
difficulties because the name of Mao Tse-tung filled them 
with the courage and strength which they needed.54 
-97 
Such heavy-handed propaganda was surprisingly well received in the 
more militant African countries, and some even initiated their own 
"cultural revolution" on a limited scale. In Guinea, President Toure 
reorganized the Guinean party and government apparatus in 1967 to 
achieve what he called an "economic and cultural revolution" character-
. d b d t . t" 55 1ze y e-Wes ern1za 1on. In Mali, there were youth demonstrations 
against government officials accused of living in a "capitalist and new-
class style." In Tanzania, there was a de-Westernization movement fo-
cusing on education, self-reliance, rural development, and socialism, 
directed against the life-style of people who drove Western cars. All 
of these African de-Westernization movements reflected some influence 
from the PRC Cultural Revolution. 
Among all the African politicians 1n favor of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Mali's Information Minister Mamadou Gologo was undoubtedly its 
staunchest supporter. During the Cultural Revolution, he led a Malian 
delegation to Peking to attend the fifth plenary session of the Secre-
tariat of the Association of Afro-Asian Journalists. On returning to 
Mali, Gologo said: 
There is nothing to condemn [about the Cultural Revolu-
tion]. Democracy rules everywhere .•• I would say that 
the Proletarian Cultural Revolution is essentially demo-
cratic and popular, that on the whole it reflects the 
increased awareness of the whole Chinese people in sup-
port of the correct line of the Chinese Communist Party, 
in the political and ideaological areas as well as in the 
cultural. It is a very lively revolution ••. and in 
my opinion and also that of all objective observers it 
will be crowned with great success that will strengthen 
the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the very ideas 
of democracy and freedom advocated and defended by that 
party.56 
With Gologo in charge of the information ministry in Mali, it is not 
difficult to believe reports that during the Cultural Revolution, four 
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million copies of the "little red book" of Quotations from Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung were distributed ln Mali, which has a population of only four 
million, 75 percent illiterate. 57 
Unfavorable Reaction in Africa 
Cultural Revolution propaganda was not always so well received 
even in countries friendliest to Peking. Congo President Massemba-
Debat is said to have emphatically rejected the PRC embassy's offer to 
show to members of his National Movement of the Revolution and its 
youth organization a film describing the Cultural Revolution in China. 58 
In countries more moderate than Congo, PRC propaganda produced very 
adverse reactions. Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia were notable examples. 
PRC relations with Kenya, never warm, were worsened by Peking's 
support of Oginga Odinga, President Jomo Kenyatta's political enemy. 
During the Cultural Revolution, Kenyan newspapers irritated Peking by 
publishing many reports of disruption and chaos in China. In March, 
1967, a pan:phlet entitled "New Diplomats Will Bring the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution to Africa," allegedly issued in Hong Kong 
by the NCNA, turned up in Kenya. According to the March 14, 1967, 
issue of the Kenya East African Standard, this pamphlet declared that 
1967 would be "a year of great success" during which "the revolutionary 
peoples, especially in Africa and in Asia, would achieve resounding 
victory." The pamphlet also reportedly praised Odinga's opposition 
party as "dedicated to the just demands of all the people of Kenya." 59 
Some Kenyan newspapers also reported that a Chinese ship docked 
at Mombasa with a huge picture of Mao on its smokestack, while its 
crew distributed thousands of copies of his picture to Kenyans. Shortly 
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before the Red Guard attack on the Kenyan embassy in Peking in August, 
1967, Kenyn's Vice President Daniel Moi accused personnel of the PRC 
crnba:::.;y in Nairobi of' interf'c;r·inl', in Kenya's internal affairs hy go1ng 
into a Kenyan school and trying to distribute Mao badges and copies of 
the "little red book" of Mao quotations. 
Nigeria had diplomatic relations with neither Peking nor Taipei 
but traded with both. After the Nigerian civil war broke out in July, 
1967, Peking received a delegation from the new secessionist "Biafra" 
government. Thereafter, federal Nigerian radio broadcasts and news 
media spoke of PRC involvement in the civil war and accused Peking of 
aiding the rebels. Although the government never openly criticized 
the Cultural Revolution, the Nigerian press did. The Morning Star, on 
February 11, 1967, compared Red Guard destruction and vandalism against 
works of art to the barbaric methods used by the Nazis in Europe. 60 
Another Nigerian newspaper, Morning Post, commented on the same day 
that: 
Mao Tse-tung's vainglorious ambition is to see his rule 
established 1n the developing world . • • rather than to 
underwrite, in that world, the victory of freedom and 
prosperity. It is hard to imagine anything more contrary 
to the interests of the developing nations than the 
famous 'cultural revolution' based on the Mao Tse-tung 
formula. 51 
PRC relations with Tunisia also deteriorated during the Cultural 
Revolution. Though diplomatic relations between Peking and Tunis were 
established 1n January, 1964, dur:ing Chou En-lai's visit, the two 
countries were never on cordial terms. In July, 1965, in an interview 
on West German television, Tunisian President Bourguiba described PRC 
. f d "d 1 62 policies in Asia and Africfi as "colonial1sm camou lage as 1 eo ogy." 
~uring the Cutlural Revolution, Sino-Tunisian relations were 
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pushed toward the brink of rupture. In September, 1967, a member of the 
PRC embassy staff and a Chinese ping-pong instructor in Tunis were put 
under detention by the Tunisian government on a charge of attempting to 
recruit University of Tunis students for subversive activities against 
63 the Bourguiba government. On September 15, Peking delivered an ex-
tremely harsh official note protesting the detention of the two Chinese: 
Standing on the side of U.S. imperialism, the Tunisian 
Government has been trying to split and disintegrate 
the Arab people's anti-imperialist front. This has 
greatly enraged the Tunisian and other Arab people and 
encountered their firm opposition. The Tunisian 
Government is finding itself in an increasingly bad 
fix. In trying to use its opposition to China to di-
vert the attention of its people and cover up Lts own 
crime of entering further into the service of u.s. 
imperialism and Soviet revisionism and selling out the 
interests of the Tunisian and other Arab people, the 
Tunisian Government will certainly come to no good 
end.64 
The Tunisian government demanded an apology and threatened to expel all 
Chinese embassy personnel if one was not forthcoming. Refusing to 
apologize, Peking withdrew its embassy staff, formally suspending rela-
tions withTunisia; they were not resumed until 1971. 
The deterioration in Peking's relations with Kenya and Tunisia 
cannot be attributed solely to the Cultural Revolution. Both Kenya and 
Tunisia had long been skeptical of Peking's intentions in Africa, and 
these were intensified by PRC rhetoric in the Cultural Revolution. Rut 
under normal conditions, the problems and differences existing between 
Peking and these African governments could have been solved through 
diplomatic channels. The Cultural Revolution prevented this, by making 
it impossible for the PRC's Foreign Ministry to conduct normal diplomacy 
or to make decisions in a rational way. The PRC recognized this fact, 
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and took steps to repair the damage and to improve relations with 
African countries as soon as the Cultural Revolution ended in 1969. 65 
Ending the Cultural Revolution 
On August 18, 1968, the second anniversary of the Red Guards, an 
editorial in the official Jen-min jih-pao said that "the Red Guards can 
have a sound future and carry the current great proletarian cultural 
revolution through to the end only by integrating themselves with the 
main force, the workers, peasants, and soldiers, armed with Mao Tse-
tung's thought." What this opaque language meant was that the Red 
Guards were actually to be disbanded and sent to do manual labor on 
farms (the schools were still closed), because even Mao now agreed that 
they had gone too far. Two days later, the Soviet invasion of Czechos-
lovakia gave PRC leaders a new and urgent reason to terminate the dis-
orders of the Cultural Revolution. Like the Western powers, the PRC 
denounced the Soviet action, but not for the same reasons. 66 
Peking's strong condemnation of the Soviet invasion reflected its 
fear of a similar invasion. On March 2, 1969, Chinese and Russian 
forces clashed on tiny Chenpao (Damansky) island in the Ussuri River 
between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, with considerable loss of life. 
On April l, the Ninth National Congress of the CCP opened in Peking in 
conditions of strict secrecy. 67 It was at this congress that Lin Piao 
was officially designated as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and suc-
cessor," and delivered a long report acclaiming the Cultural Revolution 
as a great success. He also reaffirmed PRC support for "revolutionary 
struggles" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as the "masses 
of the black people of the United States in their just struggle against 
102 
th 1 . 1" 68 e u.s. ru 1.ng c 1.que." 
Despite this militant rhetoric, the CCP Ninth National Congress in 
fact symbolized the end of the chaotic Cultural Revolution, the end to 
its isolationism, to most of its xenophobia, and to some of its more 
vitriolic language. Peking resumed its "diplomatic offensive" around the 
world, with Africa as a major target, using what the Nationalist Chinese 
sardonically called "smile diplomacy." 69 
the PRC not only resumed but expanded its African aid program. 
More countries became recipients, though most of the aid went to a few 
countries of strategic importance, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, 
and Zambia. Beginning in June, 1969, the Chinese ambassadorships va-
cated by the Cultural Revolution were refilled. By September, 1970, 
Peking had sent new ambassadors to ten African countries. 70 Prior to 
its admission to the United Nations in October, 1971, Peking not only 
resumed relations with Burundi and Tunisia but also succeeded in es-
tablishing diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ni-
geria, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon. 
The Cultural Hevolution was the most violent confrontation to 
date between the rival factions of the Chinese Communist Party, those 
stressing ideology above all else, and those taking a more pragmatic 
interest in results than in methods or ideological purity. The same 
competing lines had been visible in PRC foreign policy--radical "revo-
lutionism" and moderate "pragmatism." Since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, there has been an effort to reconcile these or combine them 
in what one African writer has called "revolutionary pragmatism."71 It 
might also be appropriately called "revolutionary opportunism." 
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Nowhere did this "revolutionary opportunism" become more apparent 
than in Africa during the 1970s. In order to recapture the influence 
lost during the Cultural Revolution, Peking returned to Africa with a 
new "conservative" face in the 1970s. In those countries where it has 
embassies, the PRC has been much more circumspect than in the past, 
dealing with established regimes through appropriate channels, and 
avoiding contact with dissidents or guerrillas--except those planning 
to attack white governments in southern Africa. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PRC AND WEST AFRICA 
The North African Prelude 
When the PRC was created in 1949, most of Africa was still under 
colonial rule. Even if Peking had not been so preoccupied with domestic 
affairs, there would have been few opportunities for involvement in 
Africa. Only four independent countries existed in Africa in 1949, and 
only five in 1955, when Peking's appearance at Bandung signaled a new 
and more aggressive foreign policy. Except for South Africa, all of 
the independent African states were represented at Bandung, but Ethio-
pi.a, Liberia, and Libya were then on good terms with the United States, 
and showed no interest in establishing formal relations with the PRC. 
t th t o 1 Egyp was e excep lon. PRC-Egyptian talks on cultural coopera-
tion were held in May, 1955, a month after Bandung, and on August 10, a 
PRC contract to buy Egyptian cotton was signed in Cairo, followed 
twelve days later by an agreement in Peking for Egyptian purchase of 
Chinese steel. On October 14, the two countries signed a three-year 
trade agreement including a most-favored-nation clause and provision 
for opening a PRC trade office ln Cairo and an Egyptian trade office 
ln Peking. A formal agreement on cultural cooperation was signed on 
April 15, 1956. After all this, there was little surprise when Cairo 
announced on May 16, 1956, that Egypt had withdrawn recognition from 
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Nationalist China and formally recognized Peking, the first African 
country to do so. Full diplomatic relations were established two 
weeks later (May 30). 
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On November 1, 1956, two days after British, French, and Israeli 
forces occupied the Suez Canal, Peking issued a statement strongly con-
demning the action. Nine days later, in a telegram to J·:gyptian Presi-
dent Nasser, Premier Chou ~n-lai offered 20 million Swiss francs 1n 
cash as a gift to Egypt. Thus began the first Chinese aid to an African 
nation. Peking even suggested sending 280,000 Chinese "volunteer" 
soldiers to fight for Egypt. 2 Whether the PRC then had the capability 
of fulfilling this seemingly impressive offer is doubtful, but it was 
never tested. The British, French, and Israeli forces withdrew from 
Suez under United States and Soviet pressure. 
After gaining an operational base in Cairo, Peking became deeply 
involved in the Algerian guerrilla war against France, and seemed more 
interested in supporting Algerians than in cultivating good relations 
with Egypt. When an Algerian provisi.onal government was created on 
September 19, 1958, Peking quickly granted recognition (September 22), 
the first Communist country to do so. Algerian soldiers were trained 
in China, and between 1959 and 1962 (when France agreed to grant inde-
pendence to Algeria), arms worth about $10 million were supplied to the 
Algerians by the PRC. 3 
In 1959, relations between Cairo and the Communist countries de-
teriorated because the latter supported Iraq and Syria against Nasser's 
pan-Africanism. On October 1 Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash 
attacked Nasser in a speech at Peking's national day ceremony. This 
further strained the relations between Cairo and Peking, and made it 
1 I II 
more diL'f'icult for China to support Algerians and contact other Afri.can 
"liberation" movements through Cairo. 4 
Anxious to find another base, Peking looked westward, but neither 
Libya nor Tunisia would have anything to do with the PRC. The only al-
ternative was Morocco, independent since 1956. Trade agreements be-
tween the PRC and Morocco were signed on October 13, 1957, and October 
27, 1958, and full diplomatic relations were established on November 1, 
1958. Thereafter, Morocco became one of Peking's major trading part-
ners in Africa. The PHC set up a consulate at Ouida, a Moroccan town 
bordering Algeria, and used it as a base to support Algerians in fight-
5 
1ng France. 
Although PRC sympathy for the Algerians had not been diminished 
by the setback 1n Egypt, Peking realized by early 1960 that its hopes 
for revolution in the Middle East had faded. In East Africa, the 
Sudan had recognized the PRC on November 30, 1958, but its dominant 
ethnic group was Arab and it remained under the strong influence of 
Egypt. Prospects for a new outlet for PRC revolutionary energy looked 
better 1n sub-Saharan West Africa, where diplomatic relations w-ere es-
tablished with Guinea in late 1959, Ghana and Mali in 1960, just as 
other West African colonies began a "rush to independence." Since 
Peking's subsequent relations with North African countries were 
largely concerned with Arab-Israeli disputei, rather than with black 
Africa, the focus of this study will hereafter be on,sub-Saharan Africa, 
as mentioned in Chapter I. 
The importance that Peking attached to ousting the colonial powers 
from the remainder of Africa was indicated in a confidential document 
published by the General Political Department of the Chinese People's 
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Liberation Army on April 25, 1961: 
Africa is now both the cenLer of the anticolonialist 
struggle and the center for East and West to fight for 
the control of an intermediary zone, so that it has 
become the key point of world interest. The general 
situation is the forced withdrawal of the old colonial-
ism from Asia or at least a large part of Asia and the 
changing of the last battlefield to Africa. The entry 
of America's new colonialism into Africa has resulted 
in the crowding out of old colonialism. The present 
struggle will go on even for one inch of territory. 
We must also develop our relationship with the move-
ment for national independence in various parts of 
Africa.6 
West Africa: An Overview 
In West Africa, nineteen independent countries emerged between 
1957 and 1975; Liberia had been independent since its founding in 
1847. Among these twenty countries, twelve maintained diplomatic 
relations with the ROC during the 1960s and early 1970s, but by 
1977 all West African countries except the Ivory Coast, which still 
maintains an embassy in Taipei, had established diplomatic relations 
with Peking. 
No significant contacts with Peking have yet been reported for 
the three countries which established relations with the PRC most 
recently--Sao Tome e Principe (1975), Cape Verde (1976), and Liberia 
(1977). This chapter therefore discusses the other sixtt?en countries 
in the order in which diplomatic relations were established. This 1s 
the order in which they appear in Table XV, which also shows the 
very different order in which they achieved independence. The hor-
izontal lines of dashes divide the table into three chronological 
stages in opening PRC relations with West Af:r;'ican countries: before 
CAP£ 
y[RD( 
































WEST AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS 
































































































and after the 1966-1969 Cultural Revolution in China, and after the 
October 26, 1971, entry of the PRC int~ the United Nations in place 
of the ROC~ 
When the Cultural Revolution was launched at the end of 1965, 
there were sixteen independent countries in West Africa. Peking had 
diplomatic relations with six--Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Congo, Benin, 
and Mauritania. Taipei had diplomatic relations with seven--Liberia, 
Cameroon, Togo, Gabon, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone. 
Neither Chinese government had diplomatic relations with Nigeria, 
Senegal, or newly independent Gambia (Senegal had broken relations 
with Taipei in November, 1964). 
Despite these statistics, Peking's influence in West Africa at 
the end of 1965 was actually much greater than Taipei's. Three coun-
tries with no official relations with the PRC--Nigeria, Senegal, and 
Sierra Leone--were nevertheless in favor of its admission into the 
United Nations. Moreover, Peking even overshadowed Moscow in this 
portion of Africa because since 1963 the Sovie.t Union had virtually 
disassociated itself from once-active military involvement in Ghana, 
Guinea, and Mali, making it easier for Peking to influence the 
"liberation" and socialist movements in West Africa. 
However, during the Cultural Revolution, Benin and Ghana broke 
relations with the PRC, Benin resumed its earlier recognition of 
Taipei, and Gambia established relations with Taipei. Between the end 
of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 and the UN recognition of the PRC 
in 1971, the trend was reversed: Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and 
" newly independ~nt Equatorial Guinea opened relations with Peking. 
Since the 1971 UN vote, all other West African countries except Ivory 
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Coast have recognized the PRC, some more slowly than others. 
Guinea 
For a dozen years after 1946, France had tried to hold its 
colonies by creating a "French Union," linking them to France in an 
integrated political unit controlled by France. In September, 1958, 
Charles de Gaulle proposed replacing the "union" with a "French 
Community," in which the colonies (except Algeria) could become 
autonomous member states or leave. Among the African colonies, only 
Guinea, under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou Toure, rejected member-
ship in the French Community. As a result, French Guinea became the 
independent Republic of Guinea on October 2, 1958, but not without 
paying a heavy price. France cut off economic aid and withdrew 
almost everything French from Guinea--civil service personnel, office 
equipment, including telephones, typewriters, desks, chairs, and even 
light bulbs. 7 
However, Guinea.'s loss was not without compensation. By chal-
lenging France, Sekou Toure won admiration and support among militant 
and radical nationalists in Africa. At the First Conference on the 
All-African People's Organization, December 5-13, 1958, in Accra, 
Ghana, Guinean delegate Abdoulaye Diallo was elected secretary-general 
of the organization. Guinea and Ghana became centers for supporting 
nationalist movements in sub-Saharan colonial Africa. 8 
Guinea's growing prestige caught the watchful eye of PRC leaders. 
In April, 1959, Peking's first ambassador to Morocco, Pai Jen, visited 
Conakry, capital of Guinea, bringing 5,000 tons of rice as a "gift from 
the Chinese people to the Guinean people." On October 4, 1959, the PRC 
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and Guinea granted mutual recognition and decided to establish dip-
lomatic relations at the ambassadorial leve1. 9 Guinea was the first 
country in West Africa to recognize C~mmunist China. Three days 
later, a ''Cultural Cooperation Agreement" between the two countries 
was signed at Peking, providing for cooperation in education, culture 
10 and arts, news and broadcast, science and medicine, and sports. 
The newly established PRC-Guinea relations ran smoothly and at 
the invitation of Liu Shao-ch'i, then Chairman of the PRC, Guinean 
President Sekou Toure visited China from September 10 to 15, 1960, 
the first African head of state to visit Peking. A treaty of friend-
ship, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and a trade 
and payments agreement between the two countries were signed on Sep-
11 tember 13, 1960. The PRC agreed to grant Guinea a non-interest-
bearing loan of 100 million rubles (about $25 million) without con-
ditions or privileges. 
Within this amount, the PRC would supply Guinea with (1) 
technical assistance. by dispatching experts, technicians and skilled 
workers to Guinea, (2) complete sets of equipment, machinery, materials, 
and other goods, and (3) assistance in training of Guinean technicians 
and skilled workers. The standard of living of Chinese experts and 
technicians working in Guinea was not to "exceed that of personnel of 
the same rank in the Republic of Guinea."12 
The conditions of this Chinese loan were undoubtedly more favor-
able than those attached to a 140 million ruble ($35 million) loan of-
f d b h . t . . 1 13 ere y t e Sov1e Un1on 1n 959. It was in Guinea that both 
Russia and China had their first contacts with black Africa and started 
their competition for black African friendship. 14 In April, 1960, when 
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the second AAPSO conference met in Conakry, Peking sent a 25-member 
delegation (the largest at the meeting) and a 47-mcmber Chinese aero-
bati c troupe. 
The Chinese were more cautious and discreet than the Soviets in 
dealing with the Guineans. In late 1961 when Guinea accused Russia of 
interfering in its internal affairs by stirring up unrest among 
Guinean students and expelled Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod, Sino-
Guinean relations became closer. Between 1959 and 1965, Guinea re-
ceived $26.5 million in aid from the PRC, about 9.8 percent of the 
total Chinese aid commitments to black Africa. After Tanzania ($45~5 
million, or 16.9 percent of the total) and Ghana ($42 million, or 15.6 
percent of the total), Guinea was the third largest recipient of Chi-
nese aid in black Africa in the period 1959-1965. 15 
This implied that by 1965 Peking was shifting its attention to 
East Africa and looking more to Ghana's Nkrumah in West Africa than 
to Guinea's Toure. Before the 1961 dispute, both Moscow and Peking 
seemed to think more highly of Toure than of Nkrumah. ~aving studied 
the Marxist classics and made a commitment to "socialism," Toure 
seemed to both Communist powers a man of principle, while Nkrumah was 
d d 1 . bl t . t 16 regar e as an unre 1a e oppor un1s • This was a miscalculation. 
Nkrumah soon became more radical, and more willing to provide bases 
for subversion in other countries, while Toure, after the 1961 deteri-
oriation of Soviet-Guinean relations, showed increating interest in 
receiving aid from the Western bloc, particularly from the U.S. He 
was even negotiating to resume economic links with France. 17 
Though disappointed by Toure's new attitude toward the Western 
powers, Peking did not criticize him and relations between Conakry and 
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Peking generally remained warm. On November 16, 1966, during a visit 
to Peking by Ismael Toure, half-brother of Sekou Toure and Guinea's 
minister of economic development, the PRC signed four agreements with 
18 Guinea, including an interest-free trade loan of 1.5 million pounds. 
Peking also promised support if Guinea, whose relations with the 
19 United States were then deteriorating, broke with the United States. 
On January 28, 1967, inaugurating the Chinese~built Tinkisso dam 
and hydro-electric power station at Kinkon, President Toure praised 
Peking's aid to Guinea: 
Bombs may destroy the power station as well as the dam. 
But what remains indestructible and imperishable and what 
the Chinese workers have brought to us is the example of 
their great moral qualities, which have enriched the 
spirit and awareness of responsibility of the Guinean 
people. 20 
By February, 1967, several other projects were in progress 1n Guinea 
with Chinese aid: match and cigarette factories, a tea-grading plant, 
21 a groundnut-crushing plant, a sugar refinery and a steel plant. 
During the Cultural Revolution, although Peking's ambassador was 
recalled from Guinea as from every other country (except Egypt), the 
flow of visiting delegations between the PRC and Guinea continued. 
On May 18, 1968, a Joint Guinean-Malian Friendship Delegation led by 
foreign ministers of the two countries arrived in Peking for a week's 
visit, and warmly praised "the great proletarian cultural revolution 
22 
initiated and led by Chairman Mao Tse-tung." The PRC agreed to help 
build a railroad linking Guinea and Mali. 23 
Early in June, 1968, a Guinean trade delegation arrived in Peking, 
followed a week, later by departure of a PRC medical team to Guinea. On 
July 23 a Guinean military delegation arrived in Peking for a two-
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week visit; two months later another PRC delegation left for Guinea. 24 
In JaLe r•cbr'uary, 1969, another <;uincan government delegation visited 
. . . 2!) 
commodiLles to GuLnea. Thus, it was apparent that relations between 
Peking and Conakry were not affected by the Cultural Revolution. When 
Peking began reappointing ambassadors on June 12, 1969, the first three 
for Africa were those accredited to Guinea, Tanzania, and Zambia, an-
other indication of Guinea's high standing in Peking. 
In late September, 1969, Conakry sent a government delegation to 
attend the PRC's twentieth anniversary celebration. Before leaving 
China, the Guinea delegation signed another economic and technical co-
27 operation agreement with the PRC. On November 22, 1970, when Guinea 
was invaded by forces allegedly from Portuguese Guinea, the PRC charged 
that the invasion was a "new monstrous cr1me committed by U.S. imperial-
ism and the Portuguese colonialists against the Guinean people and the 
28 
other African people.'' Mao Tse-tung, his new heir Lin Piao, and 
Premier Chou En-lai sent Guinea a message of solidarity, and the PRC 
d . 29 sent U.S. $10 million and four doctors to treat wounde Gulneans. 
Between early 1969 and late 1972, the PRC signed ten protocols 
30 
and agreements with Guinea, more than with any other African country .. 
However, as far as the PRC's African aid is concerned, Guinea has never 
become a major recipient. The last aid of any significance received by 
Conakry from Peking was U.S. $1 million granted in 1974. During the 
fifteen years, from 1959 through 1974, Guinea received a total of U.S. 
$77 million from the PRC, only 4.1 percent of the total (U.S. $1,878 
million) committed by Peking to Africa during this period. 31 However, 
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since it established diplomatic relations with the PRC almost two 
decades ago, Guinea has been one of Peking's closest allies in West 
Africa, and consistently voted for Peking's admission to the United 
Nations. 
Ghana 
The British Gold Coast colony and British Togoland (then a UN 
trust territory) were unified as the independent Kingdom of Ghana on 
March 6, 1957, renamed the Republic of Ghana on July 1, 1960, with 
. Kwame Nkrumah, then prime minister, becoming president. Despite 
Nkrumah's sympathetic attitude toward Peking, diplomatic relations 
were not established until July 5, 1960. 32 A year later, at the in-
vitation of Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, Nkrumah visited China 
(August 14-19, 1961), and was more explicit than Guinea's Toure ~n 
pledging support for PRC admission to the United Nations. 33 In re-
turn, he was given a treaty of friendship, an economic and technical 
cooperation agreement, and a trade and payments agreement. Peking 
was to grant Ghana a no-interest loan of 7 million pounds ($19.6 
million), without conditions or privileges. 34 
After Nkrumah's Peking visit, Sino-Ghanaian relations grew 
stronger; in July, 1964, the PRC made another interest-free loan of 
$ . 1" 35 22.4 m1l JOn. Nkrumah, who had adopted some of Mao Tse-tung's revo-
lutionary tactics in the early years of his polib cal career, apparent-
ly believed that cooperation with the PRC, a potential superpower, would 
help him realize his own ambition of become sole ruler of a unified 
black Africa. 
According to an official document issued by the Ghanaian military 
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government which overthrew him in 1966, Nkrumah had been building secret 
camps in Ghana since 1961 to train recruits from various African nations 
for the purpose of overthrowing governments unwilling to submit to his 
grandiose plan for a united "Socialist Africa." The first of these 
training camps was opened at Mankrong in November, 1961, and two RUssian 
instructors were sent from Moscow in early 1962. Apparently the Rus-
sians did not get along with the Ghanaian personnel at the camp. The 
head of the camp accused the Russians of "wasting food and drink, of 
being arrogant and of bad behavior," and was glad to see them leave in 
June, 1962. 37 
This camp was moved in late 1962 to Half-Assini, a small village 
close to the Ghana-Ivory Coast border, and in October, 1964, the first 
group of five Chinese guerrilla warfare experts, led by Colonel Yen 
Leng, arrived there. Peking also sent the trainees arms and ammuni-
tion, falsely labelled "medical supplies. 1138 A secret military 
protocol that formalized the stay of the Chinese military experts was 
signed on August 5, 1965, retroactive to September 30, 1964, when 
39 Peking dispatched the first military team to Ghana. 
The Chinese instructors complained that the camp was too close 
to the Ivory Coast border to carry out explosives training secretly. 
It was also too far from Accra, and with a bad road the transport 
cost was too high. Camp Half-Assini was closed down in mid-December, 
1964, and replaced by a new camp at Obenemasi, the site of an 
abandoned gold-mine. On December 30, eight more Chinese instructors 
. d 40 arr1ve • 
By January, 1965, Camp Obenemasi had 210 students and seventeen 
Chinese instructors. The Chinese conducted a three-and-a-half-month 
I 
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training course and did "all the actions in exercises such as rolling, 
creeping, bounding, and fighting together with the students" in order 
to make them master the military skills. When the course ended in 
April, 206 students graduated. 41 
The subversion training program 1n Ghana attracted Africans from 
colonies such as Portuguese Angola, and many independent African coun-
tries, such as Niger, Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Upper Volta, Cameroon, 
Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania. 42 In early May, 1965, a new 
course started with fifty students from Niger. However, Nkrumah had 
to suspend the program because the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Summit meeting was scheduled to meet in Accra in October. Several West 
African governments, aware of the subversion training program, 
threatened to boycott the meeting if the program continued. Therefore, 
it was decided to suspend training until the OAU conference was over. 43 
In August, four Chinese instructors returned to China and nine others 
were on leave in Accra. 
Nkrumah never intended to abandon the subversion training program. 
On February 10, 1966, Camp Obenemasi was made ready for a new session 
of training; the Chinese instructors in Accra returned to prepare the 
camp. ,Just two weeks later, while Nkrumah was flying to Peking, his 
government was ousted by a mi 1 itary coup d'etat. 44 Ousted with the 
Nkrumah regime were 430 Chinese experts and technicians, including the 
guerrilla warfare experts at Camp Obenemasi, who were immediately 
expelled by the new Ghanaian government. Along with the Chinese, 
1,100 Russian experts and technicians were also expelled. The 
Ghanaian military government accused the PRC of clandestine efforts to 
restore Nkrumah to power.45 After a series of acrimonious notes, the 
two governments broke off diplomatic relations and withdrew all their 
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embassy staffs on November 5, 1966. Thus ended the first phase of 
Sino-Ghanaian relations. 
Nkrumah's downfall was one of lhe most serious setbacks suffered 
by lhc PHC in Africa, since he had been one of Peking's staunchest and 
most outspoken supporters. An ROC agricultural demonstration team was 
sent to aid the new Ghanaian government in November, 1968, and remained 
in Ghana until May, 1972. During this period, Ghana also sent agr1-
cultural trainees to Taiwan to attend the ROC "Seminar for African 
Agriculturalists." But Ghana continued to vote for Peking's admission 
to the United Nations, and did not establish diplomatic relations with 
Taipei. Instead, diplomatic relations with Peking were resumed on 
47 
February 29, 1972. 
The PRC immediately renewed two aid projects in Ghana (a pencil 
factory and a tannery) which had been cancelled in 1966 afte+ the 
severance of relations between the two countries. 48 In late March, 
1973, Peking also renewed an interest-free loan made during Nkrumah's 
reign for construction of irrigation facilities, chemical complexes, 
a cotton complex, and a textile factory. 49 Peking also helped in con-
struction of a cement factory (1973), and donated some agricultural 
machines and sports equipment (1974). 50 But the volume of aid since 
restoration of relations has been small, reducing the fifteen-year 
total from 1959 through 1974 to only $42 million, a mere 2.2 percent 
of Peking's total African aid. 51 The cordial relations of the Nkrumah 
era have not been revived. 
Mali 
Unlike Guinea, the other French African colonies accepted autonomy 
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within the French Community in 1958, but by 1960 they too were asking 
for independence, and this time, France was agreeable. Fourteen former 
French colonies (all except Algeria and Djibouti) achieved independence 
during 1960. The Mali Federation, formed by French Sudan and Senegal 
on January 17, 1959, became independent on June 20, 1960. Both Chinese 
governments granted recognition immediately, but President Mod:i bo Kei ta 
at first favored Taipei, whose representatives attended the independence 
ceremony and established diplomatic relations the same day (June 20). 52 
Two months later, Senegal withdrew from the Federation (August 20), 
the remaining territory (the former French Sudan) became the Republic 
of Mali on September 22, and Keita changed his Chinese policy. After 
meeting with Peking's ambassador to Guinea, Ko Hua, in Bamako, the Ma-
lian capital, on October 25, Keita established relations with the PRC 
on October 27, the only one of the fourteen new Francophone nations to 
do so during 1960. From then until he was overthrown by a military coup 
in November, 1968, Keita was as staunch a supporter of Peking as Toure 
and Nkrumah. This was consistent with the close relations Keita had 
with French Communists in the early years of his political career, when 
he was an active member of the Confederation Generale du Travail. His 
initial cordiality to Taipei was intended to reassure France and the 
moderate Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor; when this failed to preserve 
the union with Senegal, Keita turned to Peking. 53 
In early September, 1961, a Mali economic mission led by Maderia 
Keita, Minister of the Interior and Information, visited the PHC, and 
on September 22 signed an agreement on econom1c and technical coopera-
tion, similar to the PRC agreement with Ghana a month earlier. Peking 
was to provide Mali a 7 million-pound ($19.6 million) loan, without 
interest, condition, or pr~vilege, and send Chinese experts and 
technicians to help in Mali's economic development. 54 
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Sino-Malian relations reached a peak in 1964, when President 
Keita and his wife visited Peking to attend celebrations of the 
fifteenth anniversary of the PRC, then flew to Cairo for the second 
Conference of Non-aligned States, and returned to Peking on November 
1 to continue his visit. Two days later, Keita and Liu Shao-ch'i 
issued a joint communique noting "with pleasure that the situation is 
most favorable for revolution throughout the continent of Africa." 
Mali "reaffirmed its support for the restoration of the legitimate 
rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and 
for the just struggle of the Chinese Government and people to liber-
ate their own terri tory,~ Taiwan," and Kei ta warmly congratulated the 
Chinese on "their tremendous scientific, political, and moral success 
in exploding their first atom bomb [on October 16, 1964]."55 
This was the most outspoken communique yet signed by an African 
ruler, and Mali was rewarded on the same day with a treaty of friend-
ship and an agreement to supply industrial equipment. 56 But no new 
loan was granted. In 1965 the PRC built two sugar refineries and a 
cigarette and match factory in Mali, but total PRC aid to this point 
was less than :half of the Soviet aid to Mali. 57 
Nevertheless, Mali remained the most outspoken African supporter 
of Peking. One reason was Keita's desire to use the Chinese to 
counterbalance Russian policies. Another reason was that the Malian 
cabinet included some ministers even more pro-Peking than Keita--
notably the Minister of Information and Tourism, Mamadou Gologo, who 
accompanied Keita to Peking in 1961. Gologo was in Peking again as 
head of a Malian deleg'ation during the Cultural Revolution, when the 
PRC exploded its first hydrogen bomb (June 17, 1967). He praised . 
both the weapon and the Cultural Revolution more ardently than any 
other cabinet-level African leader. 58 
When Keita was overthrown on November 19, 1968, by a military 
coup led by Moussa Traore, a 32-year-old army lieutenant, the PRC 
tried hard to avoid the disruption in relations that had followed 
59 
the ouster of Ghana's Nkrumah two years earlier. To dem.onstrate 
friendship for the new regime in Mali, Peking completed two aid pro-
jects, an entirely Chinese-equipped tanneries unit and a new trans-
mission centre with four 50 kw short-wave transmitters, within two 
60 years after Keita's ouster. A Mali delegation visited Peking, and 
signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement on December 
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21, l97o. 61 In May, 1972, Peking and Bamako even renewed negotiations 
for construction of the Guinea-Mali railway mentioned earlier. 62 The 
project of the railroad has yet to be realized. 
Under an April 4, 1973, medical cooperation agreement, Peking 
sent 45 medical personnel to serve in Mali for two years. 63 On June 
20, 1973, President Traore arrived 1n Peking for a week's visit, and 
praised PRC successes in science and technology as "a source of en-
couragement, assurance, and hope for the peoples of the third world. 1164 
He thanked Peking for its support to Mali since independence, and 
signed a new economic and technical cooperation agreement (June 24). 65 
Since Traore's visit, Peking has financed a small ~ea farm and 
factory at Farako, Mali (inaugurated in August, 1973), 40 percent of 
the cost of a u.s. $500,000 agricultural machine~ repair-shop (1974), 
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and a r1ce mill and sugar refinery (1976). 66 Nevertheless, the total 
amount of PRC aid to Mali has not been impressive. From 1959 through 
1974, Mali received $57 million from Peking, only 3 percent of the 
total PRC commitment to Africa. 67 
Congo 
For four years after Mali recognized the PRC in 1960, no other 
West African country did so. The first to change was the former French 
Congo, which had become the independent Republic of Congo on August 15, 
1960. Congo's first president, Fulbert Youlou, was strongly anti-
Communist, and though both Peking and Taipei granted recognition, Youlou 
chose to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei (September 10, 
1960). 68 This policy changed soon after his ouster three years later 
in a coup by trade union leaders (August, 1963). Public reference to 
establishing relations with Peking was made by the new Prime Minister, 
Pascal Lissouba, on January l, 1964, almost four weeks before France 
recognized Peking, but apparently with advance knowledge of what France 
69 
was about to do. 
On February 22, the new president, Alphonse Massamba-Debat, for-
mally established diplomatic relations with the PRC, making Congo the 
first of four French-speaking countries to follow France'e example. 
The Congolese foreign minister, Charles Ganao, was quoted later as 
saying, "If we can keep diplomatic relations with Taipei at the same 
time as we make links with Peking, and thus bring the two sides to co-
exist in the Congo, we shall have pulled off an exploit here that no 
70 one up to now has managed." However, Nationalist China severed re-
lations with Bra~zaville on April 17, maintaining the view (shared by 
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Peking) that no country could recognize "two Chinas." 71 
Relations between Peking and Brazzaville developed quite rapidly. 
In July, 1964, the PRC granted an interest-free loan of $25.2 million, 
and in August donated five million CFA francs to Congo for refugees 
expelled from Zaire just across the Congo River. 72 A seven-member 
military delegation led by Major Felix Mouzabakani, chief of staff of 
the Congo armed forces, visited Peking in mid-September, and Massamba-
Debat himself altended the October 1 PRC national day celebrations in 
Peking. In the communique issued on October 3, the PRC expressed "firm 
support for the people of the Congo in their heroic struggle against 
the imperialists' threats, interference, and subversion against the 
Congo" from Zaire, while the Congo expressed "support for the restora-
tion of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and the just 
struggle of the Chinese Government and people for the liberation of 
their own territory, Taiwan, as well as its opposition to the imper-
. l f . . . 73 talist p ot o creat1ng two Ch1nas." Four agreements were signed: 
a treaty of friendship, an agreement on economic and technical cooper-
ation, an agreement on navigation, and one on cultural cooperation. 74 
However, Congo continued to depend heavily on French aid for 
economic development, using its relations with Peking for leverage 1n 
dealing with France. Congolese ties with Peking were less economic 
than ideological, and they proved very useful to Peking. From Brazza-
ville, the PRC gave aid to Pierre Mulele's guerrillas in Zaire and to 
rebels in Portuguese Angola. To the north and west, Peking's embassy 
at Brazzaville maintained contacts with Cameroonian insurgents, applied 
pressure on the then pro-Taipei government of Gabon, and made over-
1 f . b . 75 tures to the Centra A r1can Repu l1c. 
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The Chinese set up at least three secret training camps in Congo, 
at Bouanga, Dambona, and Impfonda, under the supervision of Kan Mai. 
Nominally first counselor of the PRC embassy in Brazzaville, Kan Mai 
was actually a colonel in the PHC army and head of a Chinese military 
. . . B "11 76 mlSSJOn 1n razzav1 e. By early 1965, Congo had become, to the 
dismay of its neighbors, one of Peking's most important bases for sub-
version in black Africa. Nevertheless, the Congolese government in-
eluded both pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions, with President 
77 Massamba-Debat leaning toward Moscow. His ouster in July, 1968, by 
a military coup led by a self-styled Marxist, Marien Ngouabi, made 
Congo more pro-Peking than ever. Between September 21 and October 14, 
1968, the new Congolese prime minister, Alfred Raoul, visited China, 
and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement. 
In 1969, Ngouabi changed the country's name from Republic of 
Congo to People's Republic of the Congo. Thereafter, Congo drew even 
closer to Peking ideologically. In June, 1970, a PRC military delega-
tion led by Su Yu, vice-minister of national defense, visited Brazza-
ville. Prime Minister Raoul paid a second visit to Peking in July to 
discuss "military cooperation."78 At the Lusaka non-aligned summit 
conference on October 9, 1970, President Ngouabi reaffirmed Brazza-
ville's support for Peking's admission to the United Nations. 79 
In January, 1971, a Chinese medical mission completed plans for 
h . b b "1 . "th h" "d 80 a 200-bed osp1tal to e u1 t 1n Congo w1 . C 1nese a1 • In March, 
Peking agreed to finance construction of a hydroelectric complex on 
the Bouenza River in southern Congo to produce 130 million kw per 
year~ 81 In September, 1971, and February, 1972, two military 
agreements were signed, by which the PRC was to train the Congolese 
d . d h . 1 . t . 82 army an prov1 e eavy m1 ,_ ary equ1pment. 
In January, 1973, Radio Brazzaville reported a PRC loan of 100 
million CFA francs ($30 million) to finance several projects. 83 
President Ngouabi visited the PRC in July, 1973, and met with Mao. 84 
Another Congolese delegation led by Prime Minister Henri Lopes ar-
rived in Peking on February 27, 1975. But while Congo remained on 
the PRC aid list in 1976, it has never been a major recipient of aid 
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from Peking. Its close relations with the PRC continue to be based on 
ideological attraction rather than economic assistance, although this 
attraction may have diminished since Ngouabi's assassination on March 
18, 1977. 85 Accusing former President Massamba-Debat of responsibility 
for the assassination, a new military government executed him on March 
25, and in June agreed to resume diplomatic relations with the United 
States, broken since 1965. 
Benin 
Another French colon~ Benin, became independent on August 1, 1960, 
under the name of Dahomey (changed on November 30, 1975). Undergoing 
six coups in ten years, Benin was one of the most unstable countries 
in a continent filled with instability. Its first president, Hubert 
Maga, established diplomatic relations with the ROC in January, 1962, 
and was overthrown in October, 1963, while visiting Taiwan. A new 
leftist government headed by Sourou-Migan Apithy established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC on November 12, 1964, although the ROC did not 
sever relations with Benin until April 8, 1965. 86 
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After a second coup in November, 1965, and a third in December, 
a new military government under Christophe Soglo broke off relations 
with Peking on January 3, 1966, and reinstated relations with Taipei 
on April 21, thus ending the PRC's first brief period of official 
contact with Benin. 87 However, after three more coups in December, 
1967, December, 1969, and October, 1972, Benin again reversed its 
China policy and resumed diplomatic relations with the PRC on December 
29, 1972. 88 On the same day the PRC signed with Benin an economic and 
technical cooperation agreement and a trade and payments agreement, and 
granted an interest-free loan of $44 million. 89 Although Benin is one 
of the poorest and most densely populated countries in Africa, subse-
quent PRC aid was dominated by non-essential projects: a Chinese-built 
sports stadium with capacity of.30,000, a sports palace with 5,000 
seats, a 100-bed hotel for athletes, a large parking lot, and two tons 
f t . 90 o spor s equ1pment. 
The 1972 coup brought to power Major (now Colonel) Mathieu Kerekou, 
who said in late 1974 that Benin's "revolution" would follow a Marxist-
Leninist line. In July, 1976, he paid a six-day official visit to 
Peking, and signed a protocol for economic and technical cooperation. 
Commenting that China's aid to Benin was "still limited," the new PRC 
premier Hua Kuo-feng said: "We are against regarding aid as uni-
lateral alms, or using aid as a pretext for exercising control." 
Kerekou praised the PRC as ''a good example • . • in its liberation 
fight against the dark forces, such as imperialism, colonialism, racism, 
and apartheid." 91 During 1976, Benin was on China's aid list for 
agricultural assistance. 92 
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Mauritania 
The sixth and last West African country to recognize Peking 
before the Cultural Revolution was Mauritania, a French colony which 
achieved independence on November 28, 1960, and established relations 
with Taipei on the same day. Unlike chaotic Benin, Mauritania has 
remained under the control of the same leader continuously since in-
dependence, Moktar Ould Daddah. Despite having recognized Taipei, 
Daddah accepted an agricultural mission from Peking in June, 1965, 
and established diplomatic relations with Peking on July 22, 1965. 93 
The PRC mission studied the possibility of growing rice in Mauritania, 
and it was reported in late August, 1966, that the PRC would help 
Mauritania develop rice cultivation in the valley of the Senegal 
. 94 
RJ.ver. 
In February, 1967, a Mauritanian delegation led by Foreign Min-
ister Briane Mamadou Wane visited Peking and signed a trade agreement, 
an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a cultural co-
95 
operation agreement. President Daddah paid a state visit to Peking 
from October 20 to 24, 1967, the first African ruler to come there since 
chana's unlucky Nkrumah at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. 
Daddah proclaimed Mauritania's "firm stand for the restoration of 
China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and the expulsion of 
the Chiang Kai-shek clique from that organization, and against all man-
h . 96 euvers to create 'two C 1nas'." Immediately after his visit, Peking 
granted an interest-free loan of 1 billion CFA francs ($5 million). 97 
In February, 1968, the PRC delivered to Mauritania 200 tons of 
agd cultural machinery, including trucks, tractors, and bulldozers, 
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for use on an experimental farm in the Rosso region, the first sec-
tion of a 4000-hectare Chinese-aid project for stock-breeding and 
. lt. t. 98 r1ce-cu -1va 1on. By late 1970 there were 200 PRC medical, agri-
cultural, and cultural advisors in Mauritania. 99 Mauritanian Foreign 
Minister Hamdi Ould Mouknass signed an economic and technical co-
operation agreement in Peking on April 1, by which Peking granted an 
interest-free loan of $20 million to finance construction of a deep-
water port in Nouakchott and other projects. 100 
An additional Chinese medical team of twenty-six doctors was sent 
to Mauritania in November, 1972, and Mauritania received another $2 
million loan from the PRC in 1973. 101 Daddah paid a second visit to 
Peking in September, 1974, signing an economic and technical coopera-
tion agreement for a $37 million loan for constructing the deep-water 
harbor in Nouakchott, completing a 1000-km highway started with Arab 
aid, and building a 10,000-seat sports stadium, and several agricul-
t 1 . t 102 ura proJeC s. The Chinese also began building a clothing plant 
in Nouakchott and sent additional medical personnel to serve in 
Mauritania during 1976. 103 
EquatorialG'di:nea 
Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony, achieved its inde-
pendence on october 12, 1968, one of the smallest countries on the 
continent, with a population of only 300,000. Under the influence of 
the strongly pro-Peking government of Congo, Equatorial Gu~nea es-
. 1 t" "th th PRC on October 15, 1970. 104 tablished diplomat1c re a 1ons w1 e 
A delegation led by Jesus Alfonso Oyono Alogo, minister of public 
works, housing, and transport, visited Peking and signed agreements on 
- --- ---- ---- - ------ ----
trade and an economic and technical cooperation on January 22, 
1961. 105 In June, Peking sent econom1c and technological special-
ists to Equatorial Guinea to conduct a three-month study of the 
106 country. 
By August, 1973, a Chinese technical road group was reported 
building a road from Mongomo to Neue in the mainland section of 
Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni province). No other aid projects have 
been announced, but in May, 1976, there was discussion of possible 
PRC assistance in building a hydroelectric plant and transmissibn 
1 . 107 1ne. 
Nigeria 
The former British colony of Nigeria achieved independence on 
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October 1, 1960; but unlike other African countries (except Ethiopia), 
it refrained from establishing relations with either Chinese govern-
ment until 1971, when it recognized Peking. As in the case of 
Ethiopia, the reasons for this are complex. One factor was certainly 
that Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is also one of the 
richest, both in petroleum and in the number of educated citizens, and 
therefore had less need of Chinese assistance than poorer and more 
backward countries. Also, in the first years after independence, Ni-
geria seemed to preserve the heritage of British parliamentary 
democracy. 
Nevertheless, when France recognized the PRC in January, 1964, 
Nigeria's official Radio Lagos endorsed the French action and com-
mented that "we in Nigeria do stand for the admission of the Peking 
Government into membership 1n the United Nations General Assembly, 
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d h . '·h . t . l 108 an per nps Hl ( e Secur1 ,y Counc l • " Since this implied that the 
HOC might ruma in a member of the United Nations and perhaps even keep 
the Secud ty Counci1 seat, it was not quite what Peking was demanding, 
but it did suggest a change in Nigerian policy. 
The change was made much more explicit six months later, when Ni-
gerian Foreign Minister Dr. Jaja Wachuku announced on July 2, 1964, 
that Nigeria would establish diplomatic relations with Peking as soon 
as funds for personnel were available. 109 Since Nigeria was much 
wealthier than other countries which had opened embassies 1n Peking, 
this was a rather implausible reason for delay. However, later in 
July, Nigerian Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa called for 
the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, and Radio Lagos made a 
sharper commentary. Blaming the United States for keeping Peking out 
of the United Nations, Radio Lagos removed the ambiguity from its 
earlier commentary by declaring that "the fallacy of the 'two Chinas' 
policy is that two different governments, one in effective control of 
the territory of China and the other not, are representing that coun-
try." It concluded: 
The only path of honor open to Nigeria is thus to recog-
nize the government of China, exchange ambassadors with 
that state, and fight relentlessly for the admission of 
Peking to the United Nations and for the automatic ex-
pulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the Security Council. 
Only by such a policy can Nigeria help to maintain justice 
and show that international peace must override the self-
ish interests of the United States, and the time to effect 
that policy is now.llO 
Encouraged by such remarks, Peking sent a PRC goodwill mission 
headed by Lu Hsu-chang, deputy minister of foreign trade, to visit 
Nigeria in September, 1964, and was told by the new Nigerian Foreign 
Minister, Alhaji Nuhu Bamalli, that Nigeria was seriously considering 
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establishing diplomatic relations with Peking. 111 An official source 
112 indicated that talks on the matter had already been held. 
Despite all these indications of imminent recognition, nothing hap-
pencd for another seven years. 
The initial reason for this appears to have been Nigerian mis-
trust of Peking, based on reports of PRC subversive activities against 
various African governments, and Nigerian sympathy with India in the 
1962 Sino-Indian border war. Later, the domestic upheaval of the Cul-
tural Revolution in China coincided with domestic upheavals in Ni-
geria: two military coups in 1966, and a disastrous civil war from 
1967 to 1971 over the attempted secession of the Biafran province. 
The Nigerian government repeatedly accuse~ Peking of sending aid to 
the Biafran rebels through Tanzania. 113 Nevertheless, within a month 
after the end of the civil war, Nigeria finally established diplomatic 
relations with Peking on February 10, 1971, and voted for the PRC 
. h 1 bl . t b 114 1n t e Genera Assem y 1n Oc o er. 
In August, 1972, a five-man Nigerian trade delegation led by Dr. 
·Adebayo Adedeji, Federal Commissioner for Economic Development andRe-
construction, visited Peking to discuss trade and economic and techni-
cal cooperation. A PRC economic delegation led by Fang I, chairman 
of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, paid 
a reciprocal visit to Lagos and on November 3 signed a five-year 
economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade agreement 
115 with the Nigerian government. Under these agreements, Peking sent 
21 agricultural experts to Nigeria in February, 1973, to study pos-
116 
sible sites for large-scale cultivation of rice, wheat, and cotton. 
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Little has been heard of this kind of cooperation s1nce that time. A 
possible reason is suggested by a 1973 editorial in a Nigerian publica-
Uon saying that the presence of a Chinese agricultural mission implied 
that Nigerian agricultural officials .were incompetent. 117 
Between 1973 and 1975, Peking tried something less sensitive: 
sending table tennis coaches to work in Nigeria, and training Nigerian 
t bl t . 1 . Ch. 118 a e enn1s p ayers 1n 1na. The head of the Nigerian military 
government, General Yakubu Gowon, visited Peking in September, 1974, 
and in a joint communique both countries pledged their "material and 
moral support" for "liberation" movements in Africa. 118 In October, 
1975, a twenty-two member PRC industrial mission, comprising experts 
in metal work, woodwork, leather goods, and automobile engineering, ar-
. d . . . t h 1 d 1 11 1 . d . 119 r1ve 1n N1ger1a o e p eve op sma -sea e 1n ustr1es. No finan-
cial aid has been given to Nigeria by the PRC, and in view of the 
country's petroleum revenue, PRC aid is unlikely. 
Cameroon 
The French trust territory of Cameroon became independent on 
January 1, 1960, the first of seventeen colonial territories to achieve 
independence during that memorable year. On October 1, 1961, after a 
United Nations plebiscite, the country was expanded to include the 
southern half of the former British Cameroon (the northern half joined 
Nigeria). Prior to independence, there had been two major political 
parties in Cameroon, and the more radical party resorted to acts of 
terrorism which did not cease with independence. This insurgent UPC 
(Union des Populations du Cameroun) is said to have been the first 
. . ah f . 120 revolutionary movement supported by Pek1ng 1n sub-S aran A r1ca. 
Before 1960, the UPC also received support from Ghana, Guinea, 
Egypt, and the Soviet Union. When the Russians changed their at-
titude and recognized the Cameroon government under President 
Ahmadow Ahidjo in 1960, UPC leader Dr. Roland-Felix Moumie turned 
even more to Peking for guidance and aid. After he was poisoned in 
Geneva in November, 1960, Peking continued to work with his widow 
121 and other UPC leaders. 
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In these circumstances the government of Cameroon naturally re-
fused to recognize Peking, and instead established diplomatic re-
lations with Taipei on February 9, 1960. In July, 1961, Cameroon 
complained to the United Nations that "many young Cameroonians [are] 
inveigled and led into China on false pretences receive there psycho-
logical and military preparations [for] being sent back to en-
gage in subversive activities and serve as instructors and personnel in 
an eventual effective general revolution. 11122 In July, 1963, President 
Ahidjo accused the PRC of being "one of the Communist countries sup-
porting terrorism in Cameroon," and said that his government had proof 
that Cameroonian terrorists were being trained in China. 123 
In February, 1964, when asked whether Cameroon would follow France 
in recognizing Peking, President Ahidjo replied: 
On several occasions I have said, and I recently repeated 
it, that if we do not recognize People's China it is not 
because it is communist. It is because we have observed 
that it interfered in our internal affairs ••• If we 
have proof that China will no longer interfere in our 
internal affairs, we will not find it inconvenient to 
recognize Communist China and vote for its admission to 
the United Nations.l24 
Referring to Chou En-lai's statement that "revolution is not for· 
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export," Ahidjo added that "if the Peking government acts in accordance 
125 
with what Chou En-lai said, we shall recognize it at once." 
Whether Peking's preoccupation with .lts own Cultural Revolution 
during the late 1960s reduced its support to Cameroonian insurgents is 
unclear, but terrorism in Cameroon was gradually reduced to isolated 
acts of banditry, and the last important rebel leader was captured in 
l97o. 126 By the following year, Cameroon's attitude toward Peking 
had begun to soften, apparently through the mediation of Mauritania 
at the opposite end of West Africa. A,PRC goodwill delegation led by 
the PRC ambassador to Mauritania, Feng Yu-chiu, visited the Cameroonian 
capital of Yaounde from March 22 to 26, 1971, and a joint communique 
was issued establishing diplomatic relations between the two coun-
- 127 trLes. 
On August 17, 1971, Cameroon signed trade and economic and tech-
nical cooperation agreements with the PRc. 128 Between March 25 and 
April 2, 1973, President Ahidjo paid an official visit to Peking. In 
a joint communique, the two governments reaffirmed their "resolute 
support to the just ·struggle of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, 
Angola, Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], Namibia [Southwest Africa], Azania [South 
Africa]" and other regions of Africa. 129 During Ahidjo's .visit, Peking 
granted Cameroon an interest-free loan of 18 billion CFA francs ($75 
million) to construct a hydroelectric dam at Lagdo and a Palace of 
Congress at Yaounde. The loan is repayable over twenty years, begin-
. . 1 130 m.ng 1n 983. Commenting on the Chinese loan, Ahidjo told the 
Cameroonian national assembly on June 20, 1973: 
We appreciate this gesture of the Chinese people not 
only because of the conditions in which it was made 
but also and particularly because it was made by a 
people who are themselves engaged in a gigantic de-
velopment effort.l31 
144 
As of lat:c ]976, Cameroon was still on the PHC's aid list, but 
detailed categories of aid were not announced. 
Sierra Leone 
The British colony of Sierra Leone became independent on April 27, 
1961, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC in late Sep-
tember, 1963, but proved to be one of Taipei's most unreliable friends 
ln Africa. As early as December, 1964, Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister 
C. B. Rogers-Wright told the United Nations General Assembly that his 
country would "strongly support'' seabng the PRC in the United Na-
tions.132 Yet in 1965, while still maintaining diplomatic relations 
with Taipei, Sierra Leone voted for Peking's admission. 
A Sierra Leone delegation led by Finance Minister C. A. Kamara-
Taylor visited Peking on July 29, 1971, and established diplomatic 
1 t . 133 re a 1ons. An economic and technical cooperation agreement and a 
trade and payments agreement were signed on the same day, and Peking 
granted an interest-free loan of $30 million to Sierra Leone later 
in 1971. 134 
In February, 1972, twelve PRC agricultural experts arrived in 
Sierra Leone, and in March, Peking donated two patrol boats and 
135 
trained fifty-two Sierra Leoneans (in China) to operate them. In 
April, 1973, a fifteen-member PRC medical team arrived in Sierra Leone 
136 
to work for two years. 
Sierra Leone President Siaka Stevens visited the PRC between No-
vembcr 6 and 15, 1973, and signed a supplementary protocol to the 
137 
1971 economic and technical cooperation agr~em~nt. Late in 1974, , 
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Sierra Leone signed a contract for PRC aid in constructing a small-
scale hydroelectric power station at Kikina in the Kenema district, 
and by 1975, the Chinese were also helping build a bridge and a 
t d . 138 s a 1um. 
Senegal 
The French colony of Senegal became part of the Mali Federation 
(autonomous in 1959, independent in 1960), but left it to become a 
separate republic on August 20, 1960, as noted above in the section 
on Mali. Leopold Senghor has been president of Senegal continuously 
since independence. His government recognized Taipei in 1960, but 
suspended relations with the ROC late in 1964. During the next five 
years, Senegal advocated admitting Peking to the United Nations, but 
did not establish relations with the PRC, and instead resumed rela-
tions with the ROC in July, 1969. 
Two years later, Senegal's Foreign Minister Dr. Amadou Karim 
Gaye again spoke in favor of admitting Peking, and voted for it in 
139 October, 1971. However, Senegal did not establish diplomatic re-
lations with the PRC until December 7, 1971, after the final United 
N t . t Ch" t t" 140 a 1ons vo e on 1nese represen a 1on. . 
The first result of this late recognition of Peking was an ex-
change of visits more than a year later: a PRC agricultural mission 
visited Dakar in April, 1973, and in November a Senegalese delegation 
led by Ousmane Seck, minister for cooperation and planning, con-
eluded trade and economic and technical cooperation agreements in 
Peking. The PRC made an interest-free loan of 11,268 million CFA 
francs (about $50 million) to Senegal, repayable over twenty-five 
146 
years, beginning in 1983, to finance irrigation and agricultural de-
velopment projects. Shortly afterwards, seventy Chinese agricultural 
141 experts were sent to Senegal. In ~ay, 1974, President Senghor made 
a month-long trip to four Asian countries: the PRC, North Korea, 
India, and Bangladesh. 
Togo 
The French trust territory of Togo became independent on April 
27, 1960, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the 
d 142 same ay. Togo maintained these relations until nearly a year 
after Peking was admitted to the United Nations. Finally, Togolese 
Foreign Minister Joachim Hunlede led a goodwill delegation to Peking, 
and signed a joint communique on September 19, 1972, establishing 
d . 1 t. . . 1 t. 143 . . d t h . 1 t. 1p oma 1c re a 1ons. By an econom1c an ec n1ca coopera 1on 
agreement signed on the same day, Peking granted Togo an interest-
free loan of 11.5 billion CFA francs {$45.6 million) for rural de-
144 development. 
Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema visited Peking two years 
later {September, 1974), and obtained a PRC promise to build a sugar 
refinery in Togo and to send thirty Chinese doctors to Togo with 
drugs and medical equipment. 145 In April, 1975, Peking donated agri~-
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cultural equipment worth 110 million CFA francs to Togo. During 
1976 Togo was still on PRC's aid list and received additional medical 
'd 147 a1 • . 
Upper Volta 
The French colony of Upper Volta became independent on August 
147 
5, 1960, established diplomatic relations with the ROC on December 
14, 1961, and did not switch recognition to the PRC until September 
15, 1973, two years after the admission of Peking to the United Na-
tions. During the decade 1961-1971, Upper Volta was one of the 
ROC's·strongest supporters in the United Nations, and its first 
president, Maurice Yameogo, was outspoken about PRC subversion in 
Africa. 
In March, 1965, referring to Peking's collaboration with Ghana's 
Nkrumah against other African governments, Yameogo said: "If we do 
not inform the masses about the dangers of the Chinese invasion, no 
148 matter what we do, we will always have the Chinese on our hands." 
On September 21, 1965, campaigning for re-election in Leo, Yameogo 
told Upper Voltans: 
If you vote for me I will insure that communism-never 
penetrates our country • • • you also know that where 
communism thrives there is always chaos. I am refer-
ring to certain countries which have hoped to [divide?] 
Africa. I refer principally to the PRC. We have 
nothing against the Chinese; they are people we respect, 
but the moment they enter a country they introduce sub-
version, revolution, suicide, and assassination. We do 
not want to see them come here. We like them better in 
their own home.l49 
Six days later, in Bobodioulasso, Yameogo added a new theme to his 
criticism-of Peking: 
You are aware that Communist China is overpopulated, and 
consequently the Peking regime is now looking for places 
to send its surplus people to live. If we allow Com-
munist Chinese people to enter our country, Upper Volta 
will no longer be Upper Volta but an extension of Peking 
and its regime and we would disappear within a few years.l50 
This rather implausible apprehension was echoed in other Afri-
can countries.151 Upper Volta's anti-Communist policy continued 
after a 1966 military coup ousted President Yameogo. By 1973, 
148 
however, Peking had diplomatic relations with four of the six countries 
bordering on landlocked Upper Volta--Mali, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. When 
a mc:mlt•:; epidemi_c ur·uplcd in tipper Voila in J\pril, 1973, PRC Premier 
Chou !•;n-la i sent President Sangoule Lamizana a message of sympathy and, 
through the PRC Red Cross, 300,000 doses of vaccine and $50,000 worth 
Of t 'b' t' 152 an l lO lCS. 
Five months later, an Upper Volta goodwill delegation visited_Pe-
king and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with 
the PRC government on September 8, 1973. 153 Official diplomatic re-
lations were established a week later. On December 3, by an agreement 
signed in Ouagadougou, capital of Upper Volta, the PRC loaned Upper 
Volta 11.286 billion CFA francs ($50 million), repayable over twenty-
five years, beginning in 1983. This was to be used for rural de-
velopment, irrigation, and construction of the Tambao railway. 154 
six months later, Peking donated 5,000 tons of rice, 300,000 doses of 
. d f 1 . 155 cholera vacclne, and 500,000 oses o meas es vacclne. There is 
one report, not confirmed by other sources, of another $2 million lpan 
in 1974. 156 As of 1976, Upper Volta was still receiving medical aid 
157 from the PRC. 
Guinea-Bissau 
Portuguese Guinea was the last of mainland states of West Africa 
to achieve independence. During the 1960s, as noted ln earlier sec-
tions, Peking supported guerrilla forces against the Portuguese in 
the large colony of Angola, but apparently had little influence with 
rebels in Portuguese Guinea, who were obtaining arms from Moscow. 
When rebel leader Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in neighboring 
149 
Guinea l_n January, 1973, there were reports that Peking was implicated 
. h k.] 1" 158 b 1 b h . 1n t c 1 _ 1ng. Ca ra 's rot er Lu1z took over the leadership, 
and on September 24, 1973, proclaimed the colony an independent state 
under the name Guinea-Bissau. This was quickly recognized by many Com-
munist and Third World states, including Peking, which granted recog-
nition on September 30. Formal diplomatic relations between the PRC 
and Guinea-Bissau were inaugurated on March 15, 1974. 159 Portugal ac-
cepted the independence of the new state on September 10, 1974, making 
possible its admission to the United Nations a week later. 
A Guinea-Bissau delegation led by Victor Saude Maria, Commissioner 
of State for Foreign Affairs, visited Peking and signed an econom1c and 
technical cooperation agreement with the PRC on July 9, 1975. 160 
Guinea-Bissau received some medical assistance from Peking in 1976, but 
relations between the two countries have thus far remained rather 
formal. 
Gabon 
The French colony of Gabon, which achieved independence on August 
17, 1960, had diplomatic relations with Taipei for the next thirteen 
and a half years but finally switched to Peking on April 20, 1974. 
Five months later, its President Omar Bongo visited Peking and ne-:-
gotiated the usual trade, economic and technical cooperation agreements 
161 on October 6, 1974. Two weeks later, Peking granted Gabon an 
interest-free loan of 5.5 billion CFA francs ($25.7 million), repayable 
in twenty years with a ten-year moratorium, to be used for rural de-
velopment and construction of a textile factory. 162 As of late 1976, 
b . . . lt 1 . d f k. 163 Ga on was rece1v1ng agr1cu ura a1 rom Pe 1ng. 
Gambia 
The small British colony of the Gambia became independent on 
February 18, 1965, but did not establish relations with either 
Chinese government until 1968, when it recognized the ROC. This 
policy was maintained until December 14, 1974, when Gambia trans-
ferred recognition to the PRC. Gambian President Dawda Kairaba 
Jawara visited Peking from June 11 to 14, 1975, and during 1976 the 
PRC gave medical assistance and 500 tons of rice to Gambia for dis-
t 1 . f 164 as er re 1e • 
Ivory Coast 
The only West African nation still refusing to establish re-
lations with Peking is the relatively prosperous and economically 
self-sufficient Ivory Coast, a former French colony which became 
independent on August 7, 1960, and has maintained diplomatic rela-
tions with Taipei since July 20, 1963. Since independence, Ivory 
l~O 
Coast has remained under the leadership of President Felix Houphouet-
Boigny, a moderate with considerable prestige in other African 
countries. 
As early as 1959, before the Sino-Soviet split became evident, 
Houphouet-Boigny made the astute prediction that "the Soviet Union 
will one day regret having taught Communis!IJ to the PRC."165 In March, 
1960, he warned leaders of Upper Volta, Niger, and Benin, at a four-
power meeting in Bodo-Dioulasso, Upper Volta, that "for the first 
time in its history, Africa is open to the Communist world, with its 
ideological and economic threat. The presence of the Chinese on 
Africa's flank is a source of great anxiety to us."166 When France 
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l'ecognized Peking in 1964, Houphouet-Boigny was one of the few 
French-speaking African leaders to criticize de Gaulle's decision. 
By then, his previous antipathy to Communism had been greatly rein-
forced by PRC involvement in Nkrumah's subversive activities against 
other African countries, including (as previously mentioned) the 
building of a training base at Half-Assini, close to the Ghana-Ivory 
Coast border. In attacking Nkrumah's activities, Houphouet-Boigny 
never forgot to mention that it was Peking who stood behind Nkrumah. 
In August, 1965, on the fifth anniversary of Ivory Coast inde-
pendence, Houghouet-Boigny accused the Chi~ese Communists of being 
intransigent and inhuman, with "absolute scorn for the individual and 
human dignity. 11167 In September, he told the congress of the ruling 
Ivory Coast Democratic Party (PDCI), that Ivory Coast might revise 
its attitude toward certain East European countries, but would not 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, "whose policy is to 
maintain permanent revolution in other countries through subversion 
and assassination of those leaders who refuse to adopt its ideology 
in the conduct of state affairs."168 A year later, he affirmed that 
"11 0 h" 169 no matter what happened, "we w1 be the last to recogn1ze C 1na." 
He has kept his word. 
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CHJ\PTER V 
THE PRC AND CENTRAL AFRICA 
Central Africa: An Overview 
In the six nations of Central Africa--three former French and 
three former Belgian colonies--the pattern of PRC involvement was 
different in several ways from the pattern ln West Africa described 
in Chapter IV. First, Peking was much more involved in internal 
disputes within the Central African countries, both before and after 
they achieved independence. As a direct consequence of this fact, four 
of the six countries refused to recognize Peking in the 1960s, and 
the other two withdrew recognition only two years after granting 
it. Peking's change to "smile diplomacy" after the Cultural Revolu-
tion produced few results in Central Africa. One country which had 
broken relations with the PRC resumed them only twelve days before 
the final 1971 United Nations vote on China; the other five did not 
have diplomatic relations with the PRC until after that vote. The 
second chronological stage shown in Table XV (West Africa and the 
Two Chinas), is therefore missing from Table XVI, which lists the 
Central African nations in order of establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with Peking, and compares this with the order in which they 
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CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS 
Diplomatic Relations with PRC 
Order Date Country 
1 1963.12.21 Burundi 
2 1964.9.29 CAR 
3 1971.11.12 Rwanda 
4 1972.11.24 Zaire 
5 1972.11.28 Chad 














period before the 1966-1969 Cu] tura1 Hevolutlon f'rom the one after the 
1971 United Nations vote. 
Because of these differences from the West African pattern, PRC 
involvement in Central Africa will be examined here not in the order 
in which diplomatic relations were established, but geographically, 
from south to north. The design which emerges appears to sub-
stantiate a 1964 description of PRC strategy by a defecting PRC 
diplomat, Tung Chi-p'ing, who told a New York press conference that 
Peking "does not care about Burundi. What they really care about is 
the Congo (Leopoldville) [Zaire]. Mao Tse-tung has said that if 'we 
can conquer the Congo, we will be in a position to conquer the whole 
of Africa.'"! Though the statement attributed to Mao is unverifi-
able and the word "conquer" may exaggerate whatever he may have said 
in Chinese, the credibility of Tung's charge is enhanced by abundant 
evidence that Peking took a ve~ early and intense interest in Zaire, 
and exploited Burundi in pursuing that interest. 
Zaire 
At the time of independence, few parts of Africa were as rich in 
resources or as unprepared for self-government as the Belgian Congo, 
renamed Zaire in 1971 after being called "Congo (Leopoldville)" in· 
1960-1966 and "Congo (Kinshasa)" in 1966-1971 to distinguish it from 
adjacent "Congo (Brazzaville)." In black Africa, Zaire is the second 
largest (after the Sudan) and third most populous nation (after Ni-
geria and Ethiopia), and it was the only one of the seventeen black 
170 
African countries gaining independence in 1960 that collapsed immedi-
ately into bloody civil war among its own people, accompanied by mas-
sacres of Europeans. 
The Lurnurnba Phase, 1958-1960 
Peking's involvement in Zaire's problems began in December, 
1958, at the All-African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana. Yang 
Shuo, the PRC representative at the AAPSO in Cairo, attended the 
Accra meeting as an observer, and established contact with some key 
figures in various African nationalist movements, including Patrice 
Lumumba, founder of the Mouvement National Congolais in Zaire. 2 
PRC ties with Lumumba were strengthened at the Second Afro-Asian 
People's Solidarity Conference, April 11-15, 1960, in Conakry, 
Guinea, which elected an AAPSO executive committee including PRC 
delegate Liao Cheng-chi, Lumumba, and Kenya's Oginga Odinga. 3 Both 
Lumumba and Odinga later played significant roles in relations be-
tween their countries and Peking. 
On June 30, 1960, Zaire became independent~ with Lumumba as 
prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president. Both Peking and 
Taipei granted recognition to this government but only Taipei was 1n-
vited to the independence ceremony, and Zaire established relations 
with Taipei on August 10. 4 By that time, Zaire was already falling 
apart. Lumumba, advocating a strongly centralized government, was 
soon in disagreement with Kasavubu, who favored a federal system with 
some autonomy for the provinces. An even looser confederation was 
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advocated by Moise Tshombe, prime minister of the rich copper pro-
vince of Katanga (now Shaba). On July 5, Zairean troops mutinied, 
and Belgian forces began efforts to re-establish control. On July 
11, Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for assistance, and on the 
same day Tshombe announced the secession of Katanga, accusing the 
Lumumba government of leaning toward the Communists. The UN Se-
curity Council on July 14 authorized the immediate dispatch of a UN 
military force and called on Belgium to withdraw its troops. The 
first UN soldiers arrived in Leopoldville on July 15, but Lumumba 
had already appealed to the Soviet Union for direct shipments of 
arms, military technicians, and advisors. 
Despite growing PRC hostility toward the Soviet Union, Lumumba's 
successful appeal for direct Soviet aid, and his government's ties 
5 
with Taipei, Peking continued to support him in official statements. 
On September 5, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and five of his 
cabinet ministers, charging that under Lumumba's premiership "the 
country has been slipping slowly but surely toward dictatorship and 
. t t• 1 . 6 ~n erna ~ona Commun~sm." Two days later, in a two hour speech, 
Lumumba denied being a Cornmunist. 7 
On September 8, Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's vice premier, asked 
Peking for aid "to pennit the Government of the Republic of the Congo 
to assure the dangerously menaced integrity of its territory." 
Gizenga reportedly asked for Chinese troops, muni"ttions, helicopters, 
food, and money. Within four days, Peking placed 1 million pounds 
"at the disposal" of the Lumumba-Gizenga govequnent, but declined to 
8 send troops. On September 14, the Zairean army chief of staff, 
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Colonel Joseph Mobutu, seized control of the government, and ordered 
Soviet and Czech diplomats and technicians out of the country. When 
Lumumba tried to flee to Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in northeastern 
Zaire in November, 1960, he was arrested by Zairean troops but Gizenga 
and other Lumumbists reached 
government there on November 
The Gizenga Phase, 1960-1961 
Stanleyville and set up a pro-Lumumba 
9 
30, 1960. 
This made a total of three governments in the chaos-stricken 
country--the central government under Kasavubu and Mobutu in 
Leopoldville, a Katangan government under Tshombe in Elisabethville 
(now Lubumbashi), and the Lumumbist government under Gizenga in 
Stanleyville. The Kasavubu-Mobutu regime was recognized by the 
United Nations as the sole legal government of the Congo, despite 
sharp disagreement among African nations, while Tshombe was supported 
by Belgium, and Gizenga by the Communist states, including the PRC. 
When Lumumba's death was announced on February 13, 1961, Peking de-
nounced his murder as a "sanguinary, towering crime committed by the 
imperalist bloc headed by the United States of America and its 
10 agents." 
Four days later, the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper 
Jen-min jih-pao called on "the world's people" to: 
••• close ranks, resolutely oppose imperialist 
aggression in the Congo, actively support the j~st 
struggle of the legitimate Gizenga government in 
the Congo and the Congolese people for upholding 
national independence and the unification of their 
country.ll 
On February 19, 1961, PRC Foreign Minister Chen I sent a cable to 
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Gizenga, prem1er of the Stanleyville government, declaring that "the 
Chinese Government has decided to reaffirm its position of recognizing 
the Government led by your Excellency as the sole legal Government of 
the Republic of the Congo and is ready to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with your country and exchange diplomatic representatives of the 
rank of ambassador." 12 
By using the word "reaffirm," Peking said in effect that Gi-
zenga's government in Stanleyville was the legitimate continuation 
of the Leopoldville government the PRC had unilaterally recognized 1n 
1960. This time, Peking's overtures were reciprocated. A joint com-
munique by the PRC and Gizenga governments was signed on February 20, 
1961, and Gizenga's regime opened an embassy in Peking on April 12. 
Chang T'ung, a senior colonel of the Chinese army, was appointed PRC 
charge d'affaires, and arrived in Stanleyville on July 31, 1961. 13 
For a while, Peking hoped that Gizenga could win his fight against the 
central government. However, at the end of August, Moscow officially 
switched its recognition to the central government, followed by all 
the East European countries that had relations with the Stanleyville 
government. 
Having lost most of his diplomatic support and being threatened 
with military defeat, Gizenga was forced to reconcile with the central 
government, announcing on August 5, 1961, that the Lumumbi~?t r.egime in 
Stanleyville was "dissolved." The PRC Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement on September 18, reluctantly conceding that: 
• • • in view of the fact that the lawful Congolese 
government led by acting Premier Gizenga has an-
nounced its own termination, while the Leopoldville 
government maintains so-called diplomatic relations 
with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan, which ab-
solutely has no right to represent China, the Chinese 
Government has decided to withdraw the Chinese Em-
bassy in the Congo and declares with much regret that 
diplomatic relations between China and the Congo.have 
to be temporarily suspended~l4 
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Thus, Peking ended its diplomatic relations with the Gizenga govern-
ment less than two months after opening its embassy in Stanleyville. 
The Mulele-Gbenye Phase, 1962-1965 
However, neither the Lumumbists nor Peking had abandoned hope. 
Gizenga returned to Leopoldville in January, 1962, and was jailed 
for two and a half years, but other former Lumumba supporters re-
mained at large, and began organizing new rebellions. Pierre Mulele, 
minister of education in the original Lumumba government of 1960, had 
helped Gizenga establish the Stanleyville government, and shortly 
afterwards was sent to Cairo as Gizenga's representative. From Cairo 
he went to China in 1962 to receive military training, and became one 
. f . 1 t" . 15 of the most prominent Chinese-tra1ned A r1can revo u 1onar1es. 
Meanwhile, Christophe Gbenye, former minister of interior in the 
Lumumba government, and his lieutenant, Gaston Soumialot, had taken re-
fuge across the Congo River from Leopoldville in Brazzaville, capital 
of the "other Congo." There Gbenye established a Zairean "National 
Liberation Committee." Mulele returned to Zaire from China late in 
1963, and began a new Lumumbist rebellion in his home area, Kwilu 
province in southwestern Zaire, east of Leopoldville. 16 Mulele's 
forces were supposedly under> the "general guidance" of Gbenye's Braz-
zaville committee. On January 28, 1964, Peking's official Jen-min 
jih-pao praised the Kwilu rebellion in words that linked a theme of 
vengeance with the famous "spark" image used by both Lenin and Mao: 
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his ten-country African tour, gave the Somali government agift of $3 
million as a budget subsidy. 28 
After attending the Tokyo World Bank Conference and visiting 
Peking, Somali Finance Minister Awil Haji AbdulJahi told reporters 
in an interview in October, 1964, that the PRC had agreed to help 
Somalia complete the Gelib-Sahlambut road, to build a textile factory 
"producing fifteen kinds of goods," and to start a state rice farm. 29 
In early 1965, when drought struck Somalia, Peking donated 1,200 tons 
of rice and 438 cases of drugs and medical equipment for relief of 
f . . t" 30 am1.ne v1.c 1.ms. Somali President Osman visited the PRC in July, 
1965, and was v~elcomed by hundreds of thousands of people "with the 
beating of drums and cymbals, folk dances, and thunderous applause and 
' ovations." . At a banquet given for Osman, PRC chairman Liu Shao-ch' i 
illustrated the Marxist use of history by asserting that "the friend-
ship between the Chinese and Somali peoples can be traced back a 
31 thousand years." . Osman, for his part, claimed superhuman powers of 
telepathy, declaring that "the PRC government truly reflects the will 
f "11" . h" 1 32 o 700 m1 1on C 1.nese peop e." Osman was received by Mao and 
signed a joint communique pledging "firm support for the national 
liberation movements of peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America." 33 
Despite these displays of amity, there were some strains on Sino-
Somali relations, Besides the formal relations with the Somali govern-
ment, Peking also had close contacts with some opposition leaders, such 
as Haji Mohamm~d Hussein, leader of the Greater Somalia League, who 
had been expelled from the ruling League of Somali Youth, and Abdulaziz 
Nur Hersi, former Secretary-General of the Somali Democratic Union but 
~16 
expelled from that party. With Peking's financial support, Hersi or-
ganized the Socialist and Revolutionary Workers' Party and the pro-
Chinese Association of Journalists and Men of Letters, which had ties 
with the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Peking, and 
started a pro-Chinese magazine, Pcnsec Nouvelle, under the super-
vision of an attache of the PRC embassy. Peking even donated 
$250,000 worth of printing equipment. 34 
The Somali government was, of course, not unaware of the re-
lationship between the PRC and Somali dissidents, and in March, 1963, 
the PHC embassy complained that the Somali government newsletter had 
35 refused to print materials supplied by the PRC news agency NCNA. 
Somali reserve was suggested also by Prime Minister Shermanke's 
statement in February, 1964 (shortly after Chou En-lai's promise of 
a $3 million budget subsidy) that "Communism has no part" in Somalia 
36 and "is against the principles of the Somali people." There were 
also reports of competition from the Russians, who provided $60 mil-
lion in aid to Somalia and offered to train an expanded Somali army 
37 of 20,000 men. After 1965, PRC aid to Somalia declined. Of a 
total of $1,073 million committed by the PRC to Africa between 1956 
38 
and 1369, Somalia received only about 2.1 percent. 
In June, 1970, a year after the PRC's Cultural Hevolution ended, 
a Somali economic delegation led by Brigadier-General Mohamed 
Ainanshe, vice-president of the Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council, 
visited Peking and signed an economic and technical cooperation 
protocol by which Peking agreed to expand the experimental rlce and 
tobacco farm in Johar, built with the Chipese aid in early 1967, and 
b "ld . tt d t h f t . . 1" 39 to ul clgare e an rna c ac orles ln Soma la. In November, 
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four PRC technicians arrived in Mogadishu to survey the 2000-km Balat 
. d 40 Wen-Bosaso-Harge1sa roa . 
In January, 1971, the PRC government and Chinese Red Cross Society 
donated 1 million yuan (3 million Somali shillings) worth of medical 
d f d 1 . f d ht . . 1" 41 an oo . supp 1es or roug v1ct1ms 1n Soma 1a. Peking granted 
Somalia an interest-free loan of $110 million to support the country's 
new three-year development plan. Projects covered by this loan in-
42 
c]uded a 1045-mile highway linking Belet Wein, Garowa, and Burao. 
This project appears to be second only to the Tanzam railway in magni-
tude among PRC undertakings in Africa. By 1973 about 550 Chinese 
technicians had participated in the survey, and about 60 percent of the 
construction equipment had arrived in Somalia. 43 
A contract for construction of a new hospital with 300 beds was 
44 
also signed between Somalia and the PHC on May 8, 1972.. The con-
45 
struction of the cigarette and match factory began in late May. In 
late August an agreement under which the PRC was to build in Somalia 
. . d . d. h 46 a stadium with capac1ty of 30,000 was also s1gne 1n Moga 1s u. Con-
47 
structionof the Belet Wein-Garowa-Burao highway began in Jul.y, 1973. 
In February, 1974, an irrigation project near Hargeisa, undertaken by 
the PRC in 1969 at a cost of 85 million Somali shillings, was com-
48 pleted. The Chinese-aided cigarette and match factory went into 
operation on October 20, the eve of the fifth anniversary of the So-
. 1 . 49 mall revo ut1on. Between 1959 and 1974, Somali has received loans 
of $133 million from the PRC, or 7.1 percent of Peking's total commit-
mcnt to Africa during this period. As of 1974, Somalia was the third 
largest recipient of Chinese aid in Africa, second only to Tanzania and 
b . 50 Zam 1.a. 
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In February, 1975, a shipload of 4,038 tons of sorghum and seven 
tons of medicine donated by the PRC Red Cross Society arrived in 
Mogadishu for drought-stricken Somalia. In March, twenly-fivc more 
boxes of Chinese medicine donated by the PHC government arrived by 
51 
a:~ r. During 1976, Somalia remained one of the major recipients of 
. 'd 52 Pek1ng's a1 • On its part, Somilia continuously voted for the PRC 
in the General Assembly since 1961. The PRC-Sudan relations became 
closer after 1977 when the Somali-Ethiopian border war erupted. While 
Moscow supported Ethiopia, Peking was on the side of Somalia. 
Tanzania 
Tanganyika 
The former British trust terri tory of Tanganyika became inde-
pendent on December 10, 1961. Huang Hua, then PRC ambassador to 
Ghana, attended the independence ceremony 1n Dar es Salaam, capital 
of Tanganyika, and met Prime Minister Julius Nyerere, who agreed to 
establish diplomatic relations, partly to conciliate radicals such 
as Zuberi Mtemvu, leader of the extremist Tanganyika African National 
1 h d t t . th b th d k. 53 Congress, w o a con ac s w1 o- Moscow an Pe 1ng. Peking 
appointed Ho Ying, then Director of the PRC Foreign Ministry's West 
Asian and African Affairs Department as its first ambassador to 
Tanganyika. Ho arrived in Dar es Salaam on March 31, launching a 
relationship which proved to be most advantageous to Peking. 
On November 30, 1962, a six-member Chine?e cultural and goodwill 
delegation led .by Chu Kuang, vice chairman of the PRC Commission for 
• I : 
·cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, arrived in Dares Salaam, 
stayed two weeks, and signed an agreement for exchange of students, 
artists, publications, and other cultural materials. 54 
Zanzibar 
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The former British protectorate of Zanzibar, known as the island 
of cloves, became independent on December 10, 1963, despite growing 
discord between the ruling Arab minority and the 80 percent majority 
of Africans. Peking granted immediate recognition, and Ho Ying, PRC 
Ambassador to Tanganyika and Uganda, was among the guests at the in-
dependence ceremonies. On December 11, he and Zanzibar's External 
Affairs Minister Ali Muhsin signed a joint communique establishing 
diplomatic relations. Later, Ho Ying also became the first Chinese 
ambassador to Zanzibar. A euphoric editorial in Peking's JMJP con-
eluded that "the friendship between the two peoples will become closer 
55 than ever and be eternally as fragrant as the clove." 
On January 12, 1964, only a month after independence, a bloody 
coup overthrew the Zanzibar government and drove the Arab Sultan 
. h' . b f . 56 Seyy1d Jams 1d b1n A dulla rom the 1sland. It was widely held that 
the coup was engineered by Abdul Rahman Mohamed, known as "Babu," the 
half-Arab leader of the leftist Umma party, although he was in Dar es 
Salaam when the coup occurred. 
The coup brought a leftist reg1me to power in Zanzibar. Abeid 
Karume, an almost illiterate former boatman and leader of the Afro-
Shirazi party, became president of the new government, with Babu as 
f . . . t 57 ore1gn m1n1s er. Peking granted recognition to the new Zanzibar 
government on January 17, the first country to do so, followed by Mos-
58 cow a day later. African correspondents quoted some young 
---- ------------
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Zanzibaris who participated in the coup as speaking openly about having 
been trained in China and Cuba. It was widely believed, through not 
proven, that Peking was behind the coup. 59 
At any rate, the PRC welcomed the new situation in Zanzibar be-
cause of the power now held by the Peking-trained Babu, which con-
siderably enhanced Peking's opportunities for penetrating East Africa. 
Babu had worked as a NCNA correspondent in Zanzibar and had visited 
Peking on several occas1ons. On January 19, a week after the coup, 
Babu, now foreign minister, said in an interview with the NCNA that 
"the victory of the Zanzibar revolution is only a step in the revolu-
tion in Africa, Asia, and Latin America . . • the Zanzibar people must 
send greetings to Chairman Mao Tse-tung because they learned a lot from 
his 
60 February Peking gave Zanzibar $500,000 to words." On 20, ease 
its post-coup economic situation. 
61 
Tanzania 
On April 26, 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were joined as the 
United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, renamed the United Republic 
of Tanzania on October 29. 62 Tanganyikan President Nyerere became the 
president of the united republic and Zanzibar President Karume the 
first vice-president, while the original vice-president of Tanganyika, 
Hashidi Mfaume Kawawa, became second vice-president. The union between 
tiny Zanzibar and Tanganyika was a loose one with Zanzibar and Tanga-
nyika still controlled separately by Karume and Nyerere. There were 
sharp contrasts between the two: Nyerere was intellectual, honest, 
and moderate; Karume, illiterate, unscrupuloqs, !Uld tyrannical. 
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Babu soon fell out with Karume but subsequently became Tanzania's 
Minister for Commerce and Cooperatives and moved to the mainland. 63 
With 13abu away from the island, Peking's influence there was tempo-
rar:i ly surpassed by that of the Soviet Union and East Germany, but its 
warm relations with the Karume regime continued and Peking kept sending 
aid and technicians to Zanzibar. In June, the PRC granted Zanzibar an 
interest-free loan of 5 million pounds ( $14 million) in the form of 
equipment and technical assistance. 64 
While Peking kept good relations with Zanzibar, its relations 
with Tanganyika progressed even more rapidly. Second vice-president 
Kawawa led a seven-member government delegation, including "Peking's 
65 
man" Babu, to visit China, June 10 to 19, 1964. Though not pub-
licized by the Chinese, an agreement on economic and technical coopera-
tion signed during kawa's visit provided an interest-free loan of 10 
66 million pounds ($28 million) and a gift of one million pounds. Dur-
ing 1964, Peking provided aid of $45.5 million to the United Republic 
of Tanzania (both Tanganyika and Zanzibar), 40 percent of the total of 
$115.1 million committed by Peking to Africa in 1964. 67 
On July 11, 1964, Ho Ying, Peking's Ambassador in Dar es Salaam, 
was formally appointed ambassador to Tanzania, while the Chinese em-
bassy in Zanzibar was downgraded to consulate. Though the change was 
a mere diplomatic formality, it did symbolize Peking's decision to use 
Dar es Salaam as a major base for intensified diplomatic operations in 
East Africa. A new aspect of this was revealed when President Nyerere 
announced on August 31 that Tanzania had accepted a PRC offer of mili-
tary aid, including weapons and military instructors to give six 
months' training to the Tanzanian army. 68 Thus, in 1964, Tanzania 
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became the first African country to have an official Chinese military 
mission to train its army (as distinguished from the clandestine train-
ing of guerrilla forces discussed in numerous sections in earlier 
chapters.) 
Ho Ying was considered one of Peking's three top diplomats in 
Africa in the 1960s (the others being Chen Chia-kang in Cairo, Huang 
69 
Hua in Ghana). While ambassador to Tanganyika, Ho negotiated the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Uganda and Zanzibar and was 
later concurrently accredited to both countries. Speaking no English, 
Ho relied heavily on Kao Liang, a NCNA correspondent who had been ex-
peJled from several countries in both Asia and Africa, in making con-
tacts with East African politicians. His energy soon made Ho one of 
the most active heads of mission in Dar es Salaam, frequently publi-
cized in local newspapers. A British reporter once described him as 
"China's most valuable agent" 1n East Africa, "whose American 1imou-
sine is probably the largest and flashiest car anywhere in East 
f . 70 A r1ca." 
By a January, 1965, agreement Peking was to provide 3.6 million 
pounds to finance three projects in Tanzania, including a 2.5 million-
pound textile mill to be named after Mao. 71 In February, Babu led a 
Tanzanian trade delegation to Peking. China agreed to buy from Tan-
zania 80,000 bags of cotton, about a quarter of her total cotton pro-
duction, as well as sisal, tobacco, cloves, and copra; while Tanzania 
would import Chinese textiles, building materials, hardware, bi-
. . . 72 
cycles, sew1ng mach1nes, and stationary. 
Sino-Tanzanian relations reached a new peak when President and 
Mrs. Nyerere, with a sixteen-member retinue, visited China from 
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February 16 to 23, 1965. On February 20, a Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of 
Friendship was signed by Nyerere and Liu Shao-ch'i. A PRC-Tanzania 
joint communique expressed support for all the "national liberation" 
movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as support for the 
. f 73 second Afro-As1an con erence. The communique made no reference to 
the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty, which the PRC was then vigorously at-
tacking--but which Nyerere had lavishly praised in a 1963 message to 
u.s. President Kennedy, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev, and British Prime 
. . t "11 74 M.1n1s er Macm1 an. 
Nyerere's attitude toward the PRC appears to have been a mixture 
of admiration and suspicion. In February, 1963, speaking at the 
Third Conference of the AAPSO, held in Moshi, Tanzania, Nyerere had 
declared: "I wish I could honestly say that the second scramble for 
Africa is going to be a scramble only between.the capitalist powers." 
·He accused the socialist countries, in their quest for power and in-
fluence in the undeveloped world, of committing the same crimes as the 
75 
old capitalist powers. Chou En-lai had been scheduled to visit 
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda during his 1963-1964 African tour, but 
cancelled these stops because of army mutinies just after the bloody 
Zanzibar revolution in January, 1964. Chou paid a dela;yed visit to 
Tanzania from June 4 to 8, 1965. Speaking at a mass rally in Dar es 
Salaam on June 5, Chou repeated remarks he made during his first 
African tour: 
An exceedingly favorable situation for revolution pre-
vails today not only in Africa hut also in Asia and Latin 
America. The national liberation movement in Africa, 
converging with that in Asia and Latin America, has be-
come a mighty torrent pounding with great momentum at the 
foundation of the rule of imperialism, colonialism, and 
ncocoloniaHsm. The revolutionary storms of' these areas 
are vividly described in Chairman Mao Tse-tung's famous 
verses, 'The four seas·are seething, clouds lowering, and 
waters ragin~; the five continents are rocked by storm 
and thunder.' 6 
While admiring the frugality of the Chinese people and the courage 
and endurance shown by Chinese Communists during the "Long March" in 
1934-1935 and admitting that there were many things the Tanzanian 
people should learn from the Chinese, President Nerere nevertheless 
reminded the PRC premier: 
While we use every possible weapon against our poverty, 
we have at the same time to guard the sovereignty and 
the integrity of our united republic against any who 
wish to take advantage of our current need in order to 
get control over us. Happily we shall enter into agree-
ments and contracts for trade and economic assistance 
with friendly peoples and nations from all parts of the 
globe. But, from no quarter shall we accept direction 
or neocolonialism, and at no time shall we lower our 
guard against the subversion of our government or our 
people. Neither our principles, our country, nor our 
freedom to determine our own future are for sale.77 
Near the height of the Cultural Revolution, Nyerere paid a second 
visit to the PRC, June 18 to 22, 1968. PRC objections to the 1963 nu-
clear test-ban treaty, not mentioned in the communique from Nyerere's 
1965 visit, became a major topic in his 1968 visit--evidently because 
Nyerere had changed his position on the treaty. At a banquet in honor 
of Nyerere, Chou En-lai attacked the Unite~ States and the Soviet 
Union for pushing the treaty, calling this "a~other big conspiracy and 
swindle they have engineered against the people of all countries." 
Chou praised Tanzania because it ''has emphatically exposed the neo-
1 . . . f h. d 1 t 1 d . t 78 co on1al1st nature o t 1s treaty an reso u e y oppose 1 ." At 
this point, the ambassadors from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Mongolia, East Germany, Poland, and Bulgarja walked out of 
th t . 79 · c rcccp l_on. 
In response to Chou's reference to Tanzania's opposition to the 
treaty, Nyerere then commented: 
We have opposed this treaty not because we want to re-
serve our right to make, or receive, nuclear weapons. 
We have neither the ability nor the wish to do so. We 
have opposed it because it is an unequal treaty, which 
cannot even contribute to the cause of peace . . . For 
the time being we [Tanzania and the PRC] happen to hold 
similar views on this particular matter. Of course 
this does not mean that China and Tanzania will always 
adopt the same policies, and will always have the same 
priorities of action. China is an Asian power; we are 
a part of Africa . . . My colleagues and I have not 
come to China to ask China to place a protective nu-
clear umbrella over Tanzania. [If] I had come to ask 
China to declare Tanzania to be her nuclear protecto-
rate, the people of Tanzania would ha~e eyery right to 
denounce me as a lackey of nuclear neo'-colonialism. 80 
Similarly, in a May, 1969, interview with Aoence France Presse, 
Nyerere said,· "Tanzanians are obstinate people, and if People's 
China plans to take us in hand, it must reali~e that it will come 
to regret it."81 
Such remarks obviously implied lingering doubts about Peking's 
intentions; Nyerere's pPestige in Africa enabled him to speak more 
franldy than others. Convinced that retaining Nyerere' s friendship 
was essential to long-term PRC influence in East Africa, Peking was 
alert to opportunities to aid his government. When Tanzania broke 
diplomatic relations Nith Great Britain in December, 1965, blaming 
the British for Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, 
the British suspended a $21 million development loan to Tanzania. 
Peking came to the rescue in June, 1966, offering an interest-free 
loan of two million pounds ($5.6 million) and a grant of 1 million 
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pounds ($2.8 million). 82 Barely a month later, Tanzania and the PRC 
agreed to form a new shipping line with an initial capital of 1. 5 mi 1-
lion pounds and two 10,000-ton vessels. The intial capital would be 
supplied entirely by the PRC, half as an outright grant, half as an 
interest-free loan representing Tanzania's share. 83 
During 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC was 
offering aid to ten African countries which also received Soviet aid. 
Chinese aid was greater than Soviet aid in four countries--Tanzania, 
Congo, Kenya, and Zambia--and larger than American aid in Tanzania and 
84 Congo. Not surprisingly, public opinion polls showed the percentage 
of Tam:anians having a favorable impression of the PRC rose from 28 
percent in 1964 to 79 percent in 1966. 85 
When PRC ambassadors were again sent out after the Cultural Revo-
lution ended, Tanzania was one of the first three posts in Africa to 
receive one (Chung Hsi-tung, appointed on June 12, 1969). In December, 
1969, new military barracks built with the PRC aid in Nachingwea were 
86 
handed over to the Tanzanian government. More important, PRC mili-
tary experts took over the training of the Tanzanian armed forces in 
January, 1970, after Nyerere decided not to renew an earlier agree-
. h d f' h t . . 87 ment wlt Cana a or sue ralnlng. A new national stadium built by 
88 
the Chinese in Zanzibar was also completed in early January. Con-
struction of a naval base with PRC aid began ln May, and a Chinese-
aided farm implements factory opened in June at Ubungo in Dar es 
89 Salaam. 
In July, 1970, a hospital built by the Chinese ln Mkoani on Pemba 
(Zanzibar's smaller island) was put into operation, and a vaccine 
plant to manufacture vaccines against smallpox and tuberculosis) built 
90 with the Chinese aid at Mabibo near Dar es Salaam, was completed. 
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Jn September, forty-six Chinese doctors and assistants arrived in Dar 
es Salaam to serve in fourteen medical stations overthe country; 
91 Nyerere sent a message of gratitude to Mao Tse-tung. The most costly 
project of all, construction of the Zambia-Tanzania railway, began in 
late O~to6er, 1970; details of this will be discussed in Chapter VII 
under Zambia. 
The Chinese-built naval base was completed and handed over to the 
Tanzanian government in December, 1971. 92 Between May 5 and 20, 1972, 
a Tanzanian military delegation visited the PRC, but no details of the 
mission were made public. 93 On December 10, 1973, eighteen Chinese 
94 
medical experts arrived in Zanzibar to work there for two years. In 
January, 1974, a new sugar factory built with Chinese aid in Zanzibar 
was inaugurated. At the opening ceremony, Tanzania's First Vice-
President Aboud Jumbe, who succeeded Karume as the real ruler of Zanzi-
bar after the latter's assassination in early April, 1972, expressed 
95 
his "hearty thanks" to the PRC government. 
On March 24, 1974, President Nyerere arrived in Peking for his 
third visit to the PRC in ten years. At a banquet given in his honor 
by Chou En-lai, Nyerere praised the devotion and hard-working spirit of 
the Chinese, and said that PRC financial and technical assistance in 
constructing the Tanzam railway showed "the world what friendship and 
96 
revolutionary solidarity really meant." During Nyerere's visit, Pe-
king granted Dar es Salaam a new interest-free loan of 525 million 
shillings ($75 million) to be disbursed in five years, for completing 
existing projects, exploiting the coal mine in Tukuyu and iron ore 1n 
. 1" h . 97 Chunya, and building a 250-km ra1lway to . 1nk t e two po1nts. 
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Between 1959 and 1974, Tanzania received more aid from Peking than 
any other African country--loans of $331 million, constitution 17.6 
percent of the total PRC commitment to Africa. 98 Aid continued in· 
1975 and 1976, with a new sugar refinery and cigarette factory, and 
fourteen students from Zanzibar (ten men, four women) sent to the PRC 
for two years of medical training. 99 However, completion of the costly 
Tanzam railway will probably cause a decline in Tanzania's share of 
future PRC aid to Africa. Between October, 1975, and September, 1976, 
Peking financed construction of a military and political academy at 
Munduli in Arusha, enabling Tanzania to train all its military officers 
100 and pary cadres there instead of sending them abroad. However, Tan-
zania denied reports in May, 1974, that it had offered Peking the 
privilege of building military bases and stationing PRC naval forces 
. . 101 1n Tanzanla. 
Uganda 
The former British protectorate of Uganda became independent on 
October 9, 1962. d . . "t" 102 The PHC grante 1mmed1ate recogn1 1on. Ho Ying, 
then Peking's ambassador to Tanganyika, visited Kampala, capital of 
Uganda, talked with Prime Minister Milton Obote, and signed a joint 
. h. . 1 . 1 t. 103 communique on October 18, establ1s 1ng d1p omat1c re a-lons. Two 
months later, Peking opened an embassy in Kampala, under a charge 
d'affaires, but in April, 1963, made HoYing concurrently ambassador 
to Uganda. Ho was replaced by a resident ambas9ador, Chen Chih-fang, 
a year later. 
However, PRC trade with Uganda had started 1n 1957. PRC imports 
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of Ugandan cotton rose to $5 million in 1960, and $11 million in 1963, 
making China Uganda's largest customer (more than a quarter of total 
104 
cotton production). Since production was rising in the 1960s, in-
creased Chinese purchases undoubtedly benefjted the Ugandan economy and 
influenced relations with the PRC. Peking also had pre-independence 
contacts with Ugandan nationalists, beginning early in 1958 through the 
AAPSO secretariat in Cairo. Peking's initial preference was for Joseph 
William Kiwanuka, chairman of the Uganda National Congress party (UNC), 
who visited China and was supported by Peking for membership on the 
executive board of the All-African People's Solidarity Council. 105 
However, Kiwanuka never committed himself clearly to either Peking or 
Moscow, and his UNC declined after defection of several leaders, includ-
ing Milton Obote, who formed the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and be-
came the first prime minister of independent Uganda. Kiwanuka, as a 
. . 1 f' . 1 f d d . th . 106 pol1t1ca Lgure, s1mp y a e away. 1n e re-group1ng. 
Peking's connection with Kiwanuka may have been one reason why re-
lations with the Obote government were slow to develop. For more than 
two years after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1962, Pe-
king' s c·ontacts with Uganda were correct but not conspicuously cordial. 
On October 18, 1964, two days after the PRC's first atomic test, Prime 
Minister Obote commented: 
This is a fact that I cannot welcome. It means that China 
has now joined what is called the Atomic Club, and this is 
a dangerous club to work with. It is a club whose members 
are not united and whose only intention is to show one an-
other and to the rest of the world that they have this 
dangerous weapon to hold one another to ransom, and force 
their influence on such other countries that possess no 
atomic weapons.l07 
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Sino-Ugandan relations improved after Uganda sent a goodwill mission 
headed by William Kalema, Minister for Works and Communications, to 
visit Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, India, China, and .Japan in April, 
1965. While in Peking, Kalema obtained for Uganda an interest-free 
loan of 4.3 million pounds ($12.04 million) and a gift of 1.07 million 
pounds ($2.99 million) to help the country's five-year development 
108 
plan. 
Obote himself visited the PRC from July 11 to 16, 1965, and 
signed a joint communique with Chou En-lai in Canton on July 16, con-
demning "the armed aggression in ••. the Congo Leopoldville," and 
pledging support for "the national independence struggle of the 
peoples of Mozambique, Angola, the so-called 'Portuguese Guinea, 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, southwest Africa, French Somali-
land, Equatorial Guinea, and the other African countries still under 
colonial rule." 109 
PRC relations with Uganda suffered a setback when Obote was over-
thrown by the unpredictable Idi Amin, Ugandan army commander, on .Janu-
ary 25, 1971, while Obote was in Singapore. Obote found refuge in 
Tanzania, a fact which strained Uganda relations not only with Tanzania 
but also with the PRC because of its close ties with Tanzania. In 
August, 1971, Amin accused Peking of aiding an invasion of Uganda from 
Tanzania, and claimed that a Chinese coloniel had been killed in the 
b d f . ht" 110 or er 1g 1ng. Yet only three months later, Amin's search for 
international respectability led him to invite Mao Tse-tung to attend 
111 
a January, 1972, celebration of the first anniversary of Amin's coup. 
Mab had left China only twice in his life (both times, to visit Moscow) 
and of course had no intention of coming to Uganda. 
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But Amin persisted, reportedly sending messages to both Mao and 
Nixon congratulating them on their "historic and successful conversa-
t . I b 112 1ons' 1n Fe ruary, 1972. In November, 1972, he sent telegrams to 
Mobutu of Zaire and Tombalbaye of Chad, congratulating them on estab-
1 . h. d. 1 . t. . 113 1s 1ng 1p oma 1c relat1ons with Peking. During a meeting with PRC 
ambassador Ku Pu-hai on December 27, Arnin formally invited Peking to 
send a "high-powered Chinese delegation, made up of military and eco-
nomic experts" to Uganda to acquire a better understanding of the 
114 country. 
Although Peking has sent no delegation fitting Arnin's specifica-
tions, it did help Ugandn in 1973 and 1974 with sever-al projects in 
agriculture and small-scale industry. 115 The cost of these projects 
was apparently covered by the $15 million interest-free loan granted 
by Peking to Obote in 1965. No subsequent PRC loan to Uganda has 
been announced, and Uganda was not on the PRC African aid list during 
1976. 
Amin's subsequent public references to Peking have been as con-
tradictory and unpredictable as his statements on other matters. Al-
though he himself had on several occasions accused Peking of arming 
Tanzanian forces to attack Uganda, he referred to such charges in 
August, 1974, as "rumors" and "hopeless propaganda," and told 
Ugandan provincial and district leaders that Peking was "the best 
friend of the people of Uganda."116 Four months later, in an inter-
view with Mrs.Naamin Falaschi, wife of the Italian ambassador to 
Uganda, Amin charged that Tanzania, Zambi~, and Sudan planned to 1n-
vade Uganda "with the help of Chinese fighter planes," though perhaps 
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he meanL "Chinese-made planes" instead of "planes flown by Chinese 
.. 1 117 p 1 .ots." . 
As chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at the OAU 
summit meeting in Kampala in July, 1975, Amin said he was worried by 
the mutual antagonism between Moscow and Peking, and would "ask the UN 
. t" t d th . b t t "t th . t . d h" 118 organ1za 1on o o e1r es o un1 e e Sov1e Un1on an C 1na." 
When fighting between opposing Angolan liberation forces intensified in 
1975 and Soviet involvement became evident, Amin, as OAU chairman, 
threatened to break off relations with Moscow if it did not stop med-
dling in the Angolan internal conflict. 119 On November 12, he sent 
messages to the heads of state of the United States, the PRC, and 
120 Great Bri.tain protesting Moscow's interference in Angola. Five days 
later, the PRC ambassador delivered a special message from Mao to Amin, 
in which Mao said that "the Chinese Government resolutely supports and 
highly appreciates" Amin's stand in "opposing the interference of the 
. . . l d f . . 121 Sov1et Un1on 1n Ango an an A r1can 1ssues." Although the Kampala 
radio asserted in November, 1975, that Mao had invited Amin to visit 
. h b . h . "t 122 Ch1na, there as een no sue v1s1 . 
Kenya 
The former British colony and protectorate of Kenya became inde-
pendenL on December 12, 1963, after an unusually long and bi.tter war 
with the British. The dominant leaders in Kenya,then were Jomo Kenyatta 
and Oginga Odinga. Peking's closest ties were with Odinga, since Ken-
yatta was imprisoned by the British from 1953 to 1961, but PRC propa-
123 
ganda repeatedly demanded Kenyatta's release. Odinga visited Peking 
·in August, 1960, and Chou En-lai sent Odinga a message in February, 
- ----------
1961, reaffirming Chinese support of demands for the release of Ken~ 
124 
yatta. Kenyatta had already been elected president of the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) party, and after his release from de-
tention in August, 1961, became the inevitable choice as independent 
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Kenya's first prime minister. Peking recognized the Kenyatta govern-
ment on December 8, 1963, four days before independence, and sent PRC 
Foreign Minister Chen I to the December 12 independence ceremony in 
. b" 125 Na:tro l, Chen conferred with both Kenyatta and Odinga, now Kenya's 
Minister for Home Affairs. On December 14, Chou En-lai and Kenyatta 
exchanges messages formally establishing diplomatic relations between 
th t t . 126 e wo· coun rles. In February, 1964, Liu Shao-ch'i appointed Wang 
Yu-tien as Peking's ambassador to Kenya; Wang arrived in Nairobi on 
April 18. 
As already mentioned, Chou En-lai's scheduled visits to Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Kenya during his 1963-1964 African trip, were cancelled when 
army mutinies occurred simultaneously in all three countries. In May, 
1964, Odinga led a Kenyan government delegation to China, and obtained 
an interest-free loan of nearly 5.5 pounds ($15.4 million) for develop-
mcnt of Kenya's economy, and a grant of one million pounds ($2.8 mil-
lion). Speaking in Kisumu, his hometown, in late May after his visit. 
to China, Odinga advised Kenyans to follow the Chinese example, and 
asserted that "ten years ago, China was poor, but because the people 
accepted villagization and woFked hard in groups, China is now one of 
the richest countries in the world. 11128 
From 1964 on, Odinga's political ideology became more radical and 
his Communist leanings more 
' 129 
apparent. The result was a growing es-
trangement between Odinga and Ke:rwatta, and a concomitant deterioration 
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m Kenyatta's relations with Peking. In December, 1964, in a re-
shuffling of his government, Kenyatta appointed Odinga vice-president 
but reduced his power, and used another politician from Odinga's Luo 
tribe, the young but energetic Tom Mboya, to offset Odinga's influence 
130 in the government and the KANU. Like most African countries, Kenya 
had relations with both Eastern and Western blocs, but President Ken-
yatta was one of the ,African leaders most suspicious of Communist in-
tentions in Africa. He became disaffected with the Communists, par-
ticularly the Chinese, because of their interference in Kenya's 
internal politics. 
In March, 1965, a mysterious quarterly magazine, Revolution in 
Africa, circulated in some African countries. The magazine, believed 
to have been published in Tirana, Albania, applied the label "im-
perialist stooges" to Kenyatta, President Nyerere of Tanzania, Presi-
dent Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda, and 
Prime Minister Hastings Banda of Malawi. Albania was then Peking's 
only European ally, and rumors circulated that the magazine article 
was inspired by Colonel Kan Mai, the PRC charge d'affaires 1n Congo 
(Brazzaville), although Peking was then on good terms with at least 
some of those named, notably Nyerere and Obote (both of whom visited 
l . . .1 65) 131 Pe nng 1n 9 • PRC embassies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia is-
sued statements denouncing the article as an "imperialist forgery" 
d . d t d . f . 1 t• 132 es1gne o un ermJ.ne PRC-A r1can re a 1ons. The Kenyan Ministry 
of Internal Security and Defense banned circulation of the publica-
tion in Kenya on April 7, 1965. 133 
Whether Ken:yatta believed the rumors about a Chinese connection 
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with the Revolution in Africa affair 1s not known, but he was cer-
tainly troubled when Kenyan security forces in mid-May, 1965, inter-
ccptcd and seized eleven truckloads (some accounts say forty) of 
Chinese-made weapons being smuggled from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
through Kenya to Uganda without the permission of the Kenyan govern-
ment. In a speech on June 1, Kenyatta said that although it was 
natural for Kenyans to detest Western imperialism and to associate 
the word "imperialism" with the West: 
It is naive to think that there is no danger of im-
perialism from the East. In world power politics, the 
East has as niuch design upon us as the West, and it 
would like us to serve their own interests. This is 
why we reject Communism. It is in fact the reason why 
we have chosen for ourselves the policy of nonalignment 
and African socialism. To us, Comnunism is as bad as 
imperialism • • • It is a sad mistake to think that you 
can get more food, more hospitals, or schools by crying 
'Communism. tl34 
Four days later, Chou En-lai stated at a mass rally in Dar es 
Salaam that nan exceedingly favorable situation for revolution pre-
vails today in Africa." Commehting on Chou's remarks, a spokesman 
for the Kenyan government said in Nairobi on June 6: 
It is ·not clear to. the Kenya Government what type or 
what form of revolution he had in mind. But the 
Kenya Government wishes it to be lmmm. that Kenya 
intends to avert all revolutions irrespective of their 
origin or whether they come frorri inside or are in-
fluenced from outside.l35 
Kenyan Finance Minister James Gichuru, speaking to the parliament 
on June 11, condemned Chou's statement even more explicitly: 
The other day Chou En-lai said the whole of Africa 
is ready for revolution, but against whom, I must 
ask? The only thing China knows is to send arms 
under disguise through our country • • • There are 
Chinese agencies in this country, and the time has 
come for us to challenge thcm.l36 
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On July 22 Kenya Government expelled Wang Teh-ming, a NCNA corres-
pondent stationed 1n Nairobi, on the grounds that "his presence 1n 
Kenya is contrary to the interests of national security."· Wang was 
ordered to leave the country in twenty-four hours. Despite a protest 
by the PHC embassy in Nairobi that the charge against him was "ground-
less," the Kenya Government probably had very valid reasons to expel 
Wang Teh-ming. A Korean War veteran with the rank of major, Wang ar-
rived in Nairobi as a NCNA correspondent in early 1964, traveled all 
over the country, and made close contacts with leftist members of 
the KANU. As reported by the Nairobi Daily Nation, Wang "had been mov-
ing around the country sometimes in suspicious circumstances." He was 
also reportedly involved in an abortive attempt by twenty-seven leftist 
KANU members to take over the KANU headquarters 1n Nairobi in early 
137 
July. 
Sino-Kenyan relations worsened further when the Kenyan parliament, . 
on March 1, 1966, unanimously adopted a resolution calling for sever-
ance of diplomatic relations with Peking because "a number of coups 
d'etat, crises, and assassinations have already taken place in some 
African states" since "the destructive statement made by Chinese Prime 
Minister Chou En-lai in Cairo [sic] last year that Africa is ripe for 
1 . 138 revo ut1on." Between March 10 and 16, eleven journalists and diplo-
mats from Communist countries, including two·chinese Embassy personnel, 
were expelled from Kenya. The Chinese Embassy handed a note to the 
Kenyan government on March 17, attacking the parliament's resolution as 
"a premeditated scheme to poison the normal relations between the two 
countries."139 On March 31, Peking's JMJP published an article entitled 
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"Where do Kenyan Authorities Want to Lead Sino-Kenyan Relations?" The 
article criticized the Kenyan resolution for linking Chou's remarks 
with military coups in some African countries: 
It is common knowledge that u.s.-led imperialism is 
launching .frantic counterattacks against independent 
African states. Imperialism, colonialism, and neo-
colonialism have been responsible to a greater or 
lesser extent for the recent reactionary military 
coups south of the Sahara. It is preposterous and 
ridiculous for the Kenyan authorities to attempt to 
blame China for what the imperialists have done.l40 
By April, 1966, while relations between Peking and Nairobi were 
deteriorating, rivalry between the right-wing led by President Kenyatta 
and left-wing led by Vice-President Odinga within the ruling KANU 
also intensified. Odinga resigned the vice-presidency of Kenya on 
April 14, and thus Peking lost its most important Kenyan spokesman 
at a time when it needed one most. Odinga issued a bitter statement 
accusing conservative leaders in the KANU of becoming the tools of 
former colonialists and leading the country in the wrong direction. 141 
On May 26, 1967, speaking during debate in the Kenyan parliament 
on activities on the u.s. Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Mboya, 
Minister of Economic Development and Planning, and heir apparent to 
Kenyatta, declared that since the developing "countries were constantly 
exposed to danger and intrigue from the great powers, "not only the 
Americans but also the Russians, British, Chinese, and French have to 
142 be watched." This rather minor criticism drew from Li Chieh, the 
PRC charge d'affaires in Nairobi, a very unwise overreaction. In a 
letter to a Nairobi newspaper, Ll violently attacked Mboya, calling him 
a "lackey of the imperialists." Infuriated by this Chinese insult to 
his protege, Kenyatta on June 29 orderep Li Chieh to leave the country 
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within forty-eight hours. Kenya also recalled its ambassador in Peking, 
and in retaliation, Peking expelled the Kenyan charge d'affaires, S.M. 
th f k . 143 Mae a, rom Pe 1ng. 
During the second half of the 1960s, the PRC's relations with 
Kenya considerably deteriorated because of Peking's support of Odinga. 
Relations between the two countries further worsened during the Cultural 
Revolution. 144 Mao's works were banned in Kenya. The PRC apparently 
reopened its embassy in Nairobi in late 1969 or early 1970, but as late 
as August, 1975, Kenya would say only that it was "seriously consider-
ing reopening its embassy in Peking." 145 
Trade, however, continued. The PRC signed a contract in March, 
146 1970, to buy 500,000 sterling pounds worth of cotton from Kenya. 
This purchase reportedly alleviated Kenya's cotton surplus, and there-
fore improved relations between the two countries. 147 At the non-
aligned summit conference in Lusaka, Zambia, in September, 1970, Kenya's 
Vice President Daniel Arp Moi advocated the admission of Peking to the 
. t d t. 148 Un1 e Na 1ons. On November 17, three days before the issue of 
"China's representation" was to be voted on 1n the General Assembly, 
Kenya's Foreign Minister Dr. Njoroge Mungai spoke at a luncheon in 
honor of Peking's delegation to the Tanzam railway inauguration cere-
monies, and said that "Kenya would like to strengthen further its al-
ready existing relationship with People's China and ..• fully sup-
ports China's admission into the U.N." 149 
In March, 1971, the PRC Red Cross Society donated 576,000 shil~ 
lings for Kenya's drought-stricken areas, and promised to give food and 
medical supplies worth 2,300,000 shillings for relief. 150 Relations 
with Peking have further improved since 1972, as the PRC increased its 
import of cotton, sisal, pyrethrum and other raw materials from 
151 
Kenya. However, Kenya has received no PRC loans since the one 
granted to Odinga in 1964. 
Ethiopia 
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Among the SlX East African countries, this ancient empire was the 
last to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. During the Korean 
War, Ethiopia sent 5,000 troops to fight the Communist Chinese and 
North Koreans under the UN flag. Although both Ethiopia and the PRC 
attended the Bandung Conference in 1955, Ethiopia recognized neither 
the PRC nor the ROC until November 24, 1970, when it at last estab-
lished diplomatic relations with Peking. In addition to his mistrust 
of revolutionary Communism, Emperor Haile Selassie had obvious objec-
tions to PRC aid to Somalia, with which Ethiopia had a border dispute, 
and to Eritrean secessionists fighting a protracted guerrilla war ln-
side Ethiopia. 
During the 1950s, Ethiopia received agric~ltural assistance from 
the HOC, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, and supported the 
HOC in the United Nations until 1959, when it abstained on the China 
issue. A Nationalist Chinese source states that Peking sent 150 tech-
nlclans to Ethiopia ln September, 1959, and granted a loan, but this 
cannot be confirmed from other sources. 152 
The verified early contacts between Ethiopia and the PRC include 
a three-week visit to China in September, 1961, by an Ethiopian cul-
tural delegation, at the invitation of the PRC Commission on Cultural 
Relations with F.oreign Countries, and a February, 1962, PRC-Ethiopian 
agreement to exchange journalists. Under this agreement, NCNA sent a 
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husband and wife team to Ethiopia as correspondents (Li I-chen and 
Chen Chung-ying). Curiously, the ROC's official Central News Agency 
(CNA), also opened an office in Addis Ababa in March,· 1965. Thus, for 
a time, there were both Communist and Nationalist Chinese news agency 
offices 1n Ethiopia, despite that country's lack of diplomatic rela-
tions with either China. 153 The two initial NCNA correspondents were 
expelled from Ethiopia in March, 1968, for unknown reasons, but were 
replaced. Beyond this, nothing constructive was achieved by Peking, and· 
relations with Ethiopia were strained in the next several years as Pe-
king involved itself in the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute and the 
Eritrean secessionist movement. 
Somalia was then the most radical country in East Africa, ruled by 
a strongly socialist-oriented regime which claimed French Somaliland 
(Djibouti), northern Kenya, and three sections of Ethiopia--Ogaden, 
Hodh, and Eritrea. In fighting between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 
Ogaden and Hodh regions in 1963 and 1964, Peking gave limited support 
to 50,000 Somali guerrilla tribesmen who were making raids into Ethi-
. 154 op1a. 
Peking intervened more explicitly in the Eritrean secessionist 
movement. Eritrea, a former Italian colony, became an autonomous re-
gion within the Ethiopian Empire in December, 1950, in accordance with 
a UN recommendation. However, the Ethiopian government annulled 
Eritrea's autonomy in 1962 and made it a prov1nce. The Eritreans, 
ethnically and religiously closer to the Islamic Somalis and Sudanese 
then to the Christian Ethiopians, started a guerrilla war against the 
Ethiopian government, and formed a separatist movement calling itself 
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), based in Sudan. The ELF demanded 
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independence for Eritrea. Ethiopia would not concede this since it 
would have deprived Ethiopia of its only access to the sea (except 
through French Djibouti), including ports on the Red Sea which handled 
t f th . . f. . d 155 70 percen o E lOpla's orelgn tra e. 
The ELF received support from both Arab and African countries, in-
eluding Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Somalia, and Sudan, as well 
as from the PRC and Cuba. According to Wolday Kahisay, a former ELF 
division commander who surrendered to Ethiopian authorities in Novem-
ber, 1967, Peking supplied uniforms to the Eritrean guerrillas and 
t . d "1" t 1 d . h. 156 ·ralne ELF ml l ary ea ers ln C lna. Since early 1970, Peking has 
reportedly provided the ELF with military supplies, sent via southern 
157 Yemen. 
Despite its aid to enemies of Ethiopia, the PRC evidently would 
have liked to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Emperor 
Haile Selassie was one of the few senior African statesmen respected by 
most African countries, and his prestige increased significantly after 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in a summit 
meeting at the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, which has since become 
the OAU's permanent headquarters. Regardless of its limitations, the 
OAU has been the most important inter-African organization yet created, 
and Chou En-lai was careful to include Ethiopia on the itinerary of his 
1963-1964 African tour. He visited Ethiopia from January 30 to February 
1, 1964. 158 
At a banquet glven for Chou, Haile Selassie told the Chinese pre-
mier that Ethiopia strongly supported the nuclear test-ban treaty and 
159 
he felt disappoifited that the PRC had refused to sign the accord. 
However, he agreed to a joint communique saying that "the legitimate 
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rights of the People's Hcpublic of China 1n the United Nations must be 
reinstated," and that measures should be taken to strengthen PRC-
Ethiopian relations, "including the normalization of relations between 
the two Governments in the near future." Haile Selassie agreed to visit 
the PRC "after relations between the two countries have been normal~ 
. d ,160 
lZe , No mention of the Eritrean issue appeared in the emperor's 
speech or in the joint communique, though it was believed that the sub-
ject must have been discussed by Haile Selassie in his private talks 
with Chou. 
In November, 1964, Peking held a month-long trade exhibition in 
Addis Ababa, and later the PIW Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe visited the 
Ethiopian capital, gave a royal performance, and performed in several 
Ethiopian cities, donating all proceeds to the Ethiopian government for 
charitable use. 161 
However, these initiatives did not lead to establishment of dip-
lomatic relations with Ethiopia. A major reason for their failure was 
Chou En-lai's statement at Dares Salaam in June, 1965, about "an ex-
ceedingly favorable situation for revolution in Africa." Kenya's dis-
pleasure over this remark has already been noted. In fact, there were 
reports that on hearing of Chou's statement, Kenyatta refused to allow 
his plane to stop at Nairobi for refueling. When Chou came to Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopian Prime Minister Tsahafe Taezas Aklilou habte-Wold re-
fused to meet him, according to the Nationalist Chinese correspondent 
stationed there, who reported that after "waiting in the airport for 
forty minutes and drinking a cup of coffee," Chou left for Cairo and 
k . 162 Pe 1ng. By November of that year (1965), China was plunging into 
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its Cultural Revolution, and for the next five years, there was little 
effort by the PRC to establish relations with Ethiopia. 
After the Cultural Revolution was terminated in 1969, the revolu-
tionary radicalism exemplified by Chou En-lai's 1965 speech at Dares 
Salaam was muted in PRC foreign policy, and though the rhetoric re-
mained harsh, the policy took on a more pragmatic realism. More than 
a year later, Yang Shou-cheng, the PRC ambassador to Sudan, went to 
Addis Ababa for talks with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Ketema 
Yil'ru. On November 24, 1970, the two signed a joint communique es-
tablishing diplomatic relations between the PRC and Ethiopia. ~thiopia 
affirmed that the PRC "is the sole legal Government representing the 
163 
entire Chinese people." . 
Though the PRC made no public commitment to end its involvement 
with the ELF, the joint communique did repeat the PRC's "five princi-
ples," including non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries. An ELF spokesman, Omar Jaber, said 1n Beirut a year later 
(November 2, 1971) that the PRC had previously "supposed us as a part 
of the international revolution," but no longer did so, and "this state 
of affairs is part of the policy carried out by China with a v1ew to 
. . . . 1 1 t. 164 cxpand1ng 1ts 1nternat1ona re a 1ons." Despite an ROC report that 
as of mid-1972 Peking continued aid to the ELF, there have been few 
other indic~tions of direct PRC involvement in Eritrea after late 1971. 
In corroboration of this situation is Emperor Haile Selassie's 
cordial statement during his state visit to Peking from October 5 to 11, 
1971. Speaking at a banquet given by Tung Pi-wu, acting chairman of 
the PRC, and Chou En-lai on October 6, Haile Selassie said: 
Never in mode~ history has a nation successfully made 
such a_determ1ned and massive effort as the new China 
t~ a?h1eve progress for so many millions of people 
w1th1n such_a sho~t span of time. We, in Ethiopia, have 
?e.en follow1ng th1s remarkable achievement with great 
1nterest.l65 
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The Emperor also made the most flattering comment an African head of 
state is known.to have made about Mao: 
Chairman. ~rao' s outstanding achievements in organizing 
and lcad1ng one-fourth of the human race have earned 
him an unassailable place not only in the history of 
your nation ?ut also in world history. The depth and 
scope of Cha1rman Mao's thoughts have achieved for him 
a place of honour among the great thinkers, His 
examples shall live to inspire many generations to 
come.l66 . 
In such a warm atmosphere, Peking signed trade, economic, and 
technical cooperation agreements with Ethiopia on October ~. and 
granted Ethiopia an interest-free long-term loan of 230 million 
167 Ethiopian dollars ($84 million) for economic development. Later 
Peking sent several Chinese teams to Ethiopia to help implement 
several development projects. In February, 1973, another economic 
and technical cooperation agreement on rural development was signed, 
and air service between Addis Ababa and Shanghai (later extended to 
Peking) began at the same time. 168 
As in Burundi but much later and for les-s obvious reasons, Peking 
showed in its dealings with Haile Selassie how f~r it would go in mak-
ing ideological concessions to an archaic and backward monarchy in 
order to achieve diplomatic goals. The PRC's new relationship with 
Ethiopia did not at first seem to be altered by the February, 1974, 
military revolt, or the subsequent deposition of the emperor (Septem-
' . 
ber 12, 1974) and his death in captivity (August 27, 1975). 
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In March, 1974, a forty-man engineering team from the PRC arrived 
in Addis Ababa to survey a proposed 300-km road linking Wereta, Debre 
Tabore and Weldia, to be financed and built by the Chinese under the 
1971 economic and technical cooperation agreement. 169 In August, 1975, 
the PRC Red Cross Society donated five tons of powdered~milk for famine 
relief in Ethiopia. The PRC government donated 100,000 quintals of 
Grain and promised to send a seven-member medical team to work in 
170 
drought-affected areas. During 1976, PRC technicians worked on 
well-digging and other water projects. Ethiopia also received military 
aid from Peking, though no details were announced. 171 
However, Peking's relations with the new military regime in 
Addis Ababa began to deteriorate in 1977 because of the Ethiopian-
Somali border conflict. While the Soviet Union and Cuba actively sup-
ported Eth-iopia with weapons and even forces, PRC statements appeared 
to support Somalia. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PRC AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Southern Africa: An Overview 
Peking's diplomatic offensive in Africa began (after the 1955 
Bandung conference), and the Sino-Soviet split emerged, before any 
of the countries of southern Africa, except the Union (later Repub-
lic) of South Africa, achieved independence. 1 Moreover, southern 
Africa was the region where large-scale colonialism survived longest, 
and where white-black controversies became most bitter. For these 
reasons, the pattern of PRC involvement in southern African affairs 
was quite unlike the patterns in other regions of Africa. 
Zambia was the only southern African nation to establish diplo-
matic relations with Peking before the start of the PRC Cultural 
Revolution, and it was in Zambia and neighboring Tanzania that Peking 
undertook its largest aid project in Africa, the Zamtan or Tanzam 
railway. With this exception, Peking's policy in southern Africa 
concentrated on support for rebel movements against black governments 
unfriendly to the PRC (Madagascar and Malawi), colonial governments 
(Angola and Mozambique), or white governments (Rhodesia and South 
Africa). The sequence of discussion in this chapter 1s therefore: 
Zambia, Madagascar, Malawi, the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, South 
·Africa, and the smaller countries. 
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Figure 6. Map of Southern Africa 
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Table XVTfi lists Lhe thirteen independent nations of southern 
Africa in order of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC; the 
horizontal lines of dashes separate four categories: those recognizing 
the PRC before and since the Cultural Revolution, those still recog-
nizing the ROC today, and those having relations with neither China. 
Since the last two categories include more than half the countries in-
valved, the entire list is rearranged in Table XIX in order of inde-
pendence; the horizontal lines of dashes here separate the periods be-
fore, during, and after the Cultural Revolution. 
Zambia: General 
The British colony of Northern Rhodesia became the independent Re-
public of Zambia on October 24, 1964. On October 21 both PRC Chairman 
Liu Shao-ch'i and Premier Chou En-lai sent messages of greeting to 
Kenneth Kaunda, first president of Zambia, and Foreign Minister Chen I 
informed Zambia of Peking's decision to recognize the new republic. 2 
llo Ying, the PHC ambassador to Tanzania, had visited Zambia in June, 
and returned for the independence celebrations. On October 25, President 
I 
Kaunda announced recognition of Peking; diplomatic relations were estab-
3 llshed on October 29. The PRC embassy in Lusaka was opened in late 
November. Ch'in Li-chen was named first PRC ambassador on February 12, 
1965, and arrived in Lusaka in mid-March, to begin an extremely warm 
d . 1 . t. 4 1p omat1c connec 1on. 
The new Sino-Zambian relations developed rapidly. In August, 1965, 
a Zamb:ian government delegation led by Agriculture Minister E.H.K. 
Mudenda visited China, followed a year later by Justin Chimba, Zamhjan 
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Chimba was received by both Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai. Two weeks 
later, Zambian Vice President Reuben Chitandika Kamanga led another 
delegation to Peking for a four-day visit, was received by Mao, and 
signed an agreement on cultural cooperation with Peking. 5 
Kaunda himself visited Peking in June, 1967, despite intensifica-
tion of the Cultural Revolutiori. Arriving in Peking on June 21, Kaunda 
and his entourage were given "a rousing welcome" by "hundreds of thou-
sands of people from all walks of life." At a welcome ceremony at the 
airport, Chinese Red Guards presented the Zambian president with a copy 
of the little red book, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung. 6 At a 
banquet g1ven by Chou En-lai in his honor, Kaunda congratulated Chinese 
leaders on their successful explosion of a hydrogen bomb on June 17, 
calling Lhis "a great achievement for a great nation," bound to usher 
1n a completely new era in which China would play a great role. 7 On 
.June 22 China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement 
to provide a 6 million pounds (U.S. $16.8 million) interest-free loan 
for Zambia's four-year National Development Plan. 8 
Because of its strategic location, bordering eight African coun-
tries and territories (Angola, Zaire, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, 
llhodcsia, Botswana, and South-West Africa), Zambia occupied an ex-
tremely important position m Peking's political, military, and propa-
ganda strategy in Africa. To compete with South African broadcasts, 
the PRC promised to give Zambia three powerful radio transmitters in 
November, 1970, though they did not arrive until early 1972. 9 
Beginning in late 1968, Peking is reported to have helped set up 
at least seven permanent bases within Zambia for training guerrillas 
£'rom Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and South 
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f . 10 A r1ca. By the end of the 1960s, Zambia had become one of Peking's 
strongest supporters in Africa. Kaunda continuously supported PRC 
membership in the United Nations, and in September, 1972, Zambian 
Vice President M. M. Chona led another goodwill mission to China. 
When Hhodesia closed the Rhodesian-Zambian border in May, 1973, in re-
taliation against Lusaka's supporl of black guerrillas attacking Rho-
desia from Zambia, Peking offered a grant of U.S. $10 million and 
fifty-seven trucks to help Zambia re-route its trade.ll 
Kaunda paid a second visit to Peking in February, 1974, and ex-
pressed his gratitude to PRC leaders for building the Tanzam Railway 
and for aid during the Rhodesian-Zambian border crisis, declaring that 
the Chinese were among Zambia's best friends. 12 During Kaunda's second 
visit, Peking agreed to provide an interest-free loan of U.S. $33 
million, repayable over thirty years with a ten-year grace period, to 
help Zambia improve the Serenjc-Samfya road and undertake other tech-
nical and agricultural projects. 13 On June 8, 1975, Zambia and the 
PHC signed a 3 million kwacha (U.S. $21.5 million) loan agreement for 
14 
the Kaoma-Lusaka road, built by the Chinese under the 1967 agreement. 
During 1976, Zambia also received technical assistance from Peking in 
. . d h . t 15 m1n1ng an ot er proJeC .s. Far surpassing all of these, however, was 
the railway from Zambia to Tanzania, built with Chinese aid from 1970 
to 1976. 
The Zamtan or Tanzam Railway 
Before 1900, Cecil Rhodes, the British colonist and empire 
builder in southern Africa, conceived the idea of a Cape-to-Cairo 
railway to strengthen British dominance on the continent. This dream 
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was never realized, partly because of German acquisition of Tanganyika, 
midway along the proposed route. Discovery of rich copper deposits in 
both Zaire (then the Belgian Congo) and Zambia (then British Northern 
Rhodesia) resulted in development of Zambia's trading routes to the 
16 
west and south, rather than to the east. The pattern of decoloniza-
tion in Africa created a new situation, with political and racial dis-
agmeements between Zambia and its southern and western neighbors in the 
1960s and beyond. As a landlocked country, Zambia needed alternate 
routes for its trade. 
Even before independence, Kaunda and his United National Inde-
pendence Party ( UNIP) were committed to the idea of building a railway 
between Zambia and Tanzania. As a pan-Africanist, Kaunda wanted to 
end Zambia's econom1c dependence on the white regimes of Rhodesia and 
South Africa and also to have closer relations with militant East Afri-
can countries, such as Tanzania and Uganda. Kaunda's enthusiasm was 
shared equally by Tanzanian President Nyerere. 
A Tanzam railway would reduce Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia and 
South Africa and therefore enable Zambia to join the boycott against 
both without fearing retaliation. It would also create jobs in Zambia, 
promote industrial and business sites along the railway, attract more 
Zambians to previously backward areas, and increase trade as well as 
political contacts with Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. 
As far as Tanzania was concerned, the railroad could stimulate eco-
nom-ic development in southern Tanzania, by attracting more Tanzanians 
to the southern part of the country to exploit the agricultural po-
tentiality of the area. It would also increase Dar es Salaam's sea 
port profits, and could be used to transport weapons and other aid to 
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various African "liberation" organizations based in Tanzania and Zam-
b . 17 1a. 
In October, 1964, following an African summit meeting in Dar es 
Salaam, Kaunda and Nyerere jointly announced their intention to build 
the railway. Shortly afterwards, appeals for loans were made to the 
World Bank, the United States, Britain, West Germany, .Japan, Russia, 
and the African Development Bank, but none was willing to finance the 
. t 18 prOJeC . The Western powers were reluctant to aid the railway be-
cause of the unfavorable report issued by the World Bank in 1964, 
judging the project economically unfeasible. The World Bank report 
estimated that the railway would cost 75 to 150 million pounds and, 
considering the economic conditions in Tanzania and Zambia, the rail-
way would operate at a loss until 1999. Instead the World Bank recom-
19 
mended construction of a tarred truck road. The Western powers may 
also have opposed the Tanzam railway because they did not want to con-
. f . 20 tribute to cuttLng South Afr1ca off from central and eastern A r1ca. 
Peking, on the other hand, began to show interest in the project. 
In early 1965, the PRC announced that it was willing to provide 60 
million pounds to build the railway. During his visit to Peking in 
February, 1965, Nyerere of Tanzania formally asked for Chinese help on 
the project. Chinese leaders responded favorably by increasing their 
21 
offer to 100 million pounds, without going into details of the plan. 
When Chou En-lai visited Dar es Salaam in June, 1965, the Tanzam rail-
way was on the agenda for discussion with Nyerere, and thereafter 
22 
Peking's involvement in the project became more clea.r and open. 
However, Zambia's Kaunda appeared reluctant to accept Peking's offer 
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and was stilJ looking for Western help. When this did not come, Kaunda 
visited Peking in .June, L967, changed his attitude, and was ready to 
accept the Chinese offer. 
An initial agmeement on construction of the Tanzam Railway was 
signed between China, Tanzania, and Zambia in Peking on September 5, 
1967, with the amount of the loan and all other technical details to 
be disussed later. 23 By mid-1968, Zambia's Finance Minister E.H.K. 
Mudenda indicated that "Africa is no longer prepared to consider Western 
24 
proposals." In ,June, 1968, one hundred and ninety Chinese technicians 
arrived in Tanzania and immedi_ately started surveying the route. An-
25 
other 170 arrived in Zambia in late October. 
Final agreement on the Tanzam Railway was reached in Peking on 
July 12, 1970, when representatives of the three countries sighed three 
1 . 26 protoco s and m1nutes. According to the loan agreement, Peking was 
to grant Tanzania and Zambia an interest-free loan of 2886 million 
kwacha (U.S. $402 million), repayable over thirty years starting in 
1983. Thus Peking formally committed itself, financially and tech-
nically, to construction of the 1860 km (more than 1115 miles) Tanzam 
nailway, the largest single PHC aid project ever undertaken 1n Africa. 
Western reaction was a mixture of surprise and misgivings. Consider-
i ng Pclci ng' s limited financial and technical resources, and urgent do-
mestic requirements, many Western observers doubted Peking's ability 
to complete the project. 
Groundbreaking ceremonies for the railway were officially held at 
Dar es Salaam and at Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, the two ends of the pro-
jected railroad! on October 26 and 28, 1970, respectively. Nyerere 
and Kaunda attended both ceremonies, as did a PRC delegation led by 
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Fang Yi, minister of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign 
Countries, and Kuo Lu, vice-minister of Communications. 27 Thus form-
ally began the construction of the railway, whose 1860 km length would 
be divided about equally betw:een the two countries (about 976 km 1n 
Tanzania, 884 km in Zambia). 
Why would Pek:in1~ undertake such a difficult and costly pr?ject, 
diverting resources from its own development? Peking evidently saw 
major advantages outweighing the cost: an excellent opportunity to 
penetrate East Africa and thus spread the Maoist form of Communism, a 
chance to exploit the mineral resources of both Tanzania and Zambia, 
closer contacts with various "liberation" movements in southern Africa 
and a market for Chinese goods in Tanzania and Zambia. (Both countries 
were obligated to import Chinese goods in order to repay the loans.) 
It was not sucprising that the Tanzam Railway was described by Western 
d LL f . h • • h • f • 28 powers an Sou r1 A.r1ca as "C 1 na' s TroJan orsc 1n A ·r1ca." 
About 30,000 Chinese and 20,000 Africans participated in con-
struction of the railway. Stories of mutual assistance between Chinese 
and African workers were regularly publicized by PRC news media. 29 A 
Chinese Communist newspaper in Shanghai, Ta kung pao, even used the 
railway to claim supernatural powers for Mao's "little red book," as-
serting that when Chinese suvryors on the railway route were attacked 
by wild animals or surrounded by lions, they would read Mao's quotations 
and by "applying his principles" they could usually drive the animals 
. 30 
away with thc1r bare hands. 
Construction was completed 1n late 1975, at a total cost well 
over U.S. $500 million, with 147 stations, 300 bridges, and 23 tunnels, 
31 
and was described by a United Nations expert as "first-rate hardware." 
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The railway was officially opened on October 23, 1975, the eve of the 
eleventh anniversary of Zambia's independence, at a grand ceremony at 
the Kapiri Mposhi station in Zambia, by Kaunda and Tanzanian Prime 
.. t h"d" 32 M1n1s er Ras 1 1 Kawawa. The PRC officially handed over the rail-
. . 33 
way to Tanzan1a and Zamb1a on July 14, 1976. 
Madagascar 
M~dagascar, the world's fourth largest island and a former French 
colony, became autonomous as the Republic of Malagasy in 1958, achieved 
independence on June 26, 1960, and was renamed the Democratic HepubLic 
of Madagascar on December 30, 1975. Initially the most pro-French of 
the Francophone African countries, Madagascar also had the largest 
Chinese community in Africa, about 10,000 in 1961 (approximately one-
fifth of the Chinese living in Africa) and an equal number of inhabit-
f . d . d . . 34 ants o m1xe S1no-Ma agascan or1g1n. Most of these Chinese were im-
migrant laborers who went to Madagascar in 1869 and later to build the 
Tananarive-East Coast railroad. Because of its strategic location just 
off the African coast and its large Chinese community, independent 
Madagascar immediately became an object of competition between Peking 
and Taipei. 
On the eve of independence, Chou En-lai sent a message to Presi-
dent Philibert Tsiranana on June 25, 1960, saying that Peking "has de-
cided to recognize the Malagasy Republic" and Chou hoped that the 
recognition "will lead to the development of friendly relations be-
35 tween China and Malagasy." Being a loyal follower of Charles De 
Gaulle, who was then still a strong supporter of Nationalist China, 
Tsiranana instead invited the ROC to Lhe iridep~ndencc celebrations. 
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Taipei appointed Chou Shu-Kai, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Cornmis::-;ion, as spcei·aJ envoy for the occasion. Taipei's consulate-
general at Tananarive, capital of Madagascar, was raised to the rank of 
embassy and Chiang Un-k'ai, the former consul-general, was appointed 
the first ROC ambassador. Tsiranana became one of Taipei's staunchest 
supporters in Africa; his visit to Taiwan in April, 1962, was the first 
by an African head of state. Madagascar became one of the most im-
portant African recipients of agricultural aid from the ROC. 
Because of his early close relations with the then anti-Communist 
French Socialist Party, Tsiranana was one of the very few African 
statesmen who foresaw the dangers presented by Communists, especially 
. f . 36 those from Peklng, ln A rlca. His fear of Peking was strengthened 
by the presence of a sizable Chinese community in Madagascar. 
Tsiranana's suspicion of the Chinese Communists was so deep-rooted that 
even when Paris r>ecognized Peking in 1964 he refused to follow. It was 
mainly because of his influence that the inter-Francophone African or-
ganization, Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), and its successor, the 
Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), took a more or less 
pro-Taipei stand during the 1960s. Madagascar was among the African 
UN members which voted against Peking's admission even in 1971. Until 
his ouster from power in May, 1972, President Tsiranana was one of Pe-
king's bitterest enemles in Africa, never hesitant to speak out against 
the PRC. 37 
On May ]8, 1972, after five days of rioting by students, Tsiranana 
was forced to transfer power to the army chief of staff, Major General 
. d . . 38 Gabriel Hamanantsoa, endlng Ma agascar's pro-Talpel era. In late 
September, on his way to Moscow, Madagascar's new foreign minister, 
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L i.cutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka, stopped at Dar es Salaam and 
met with PRC Ambassador Li Yao-wen. In late October and early Novem-
ber, Ratsiraka paid a two-week official visit to China and North Korea, 
signing a joint communique in Peking on November 6, 1972, to establish 
39 
diplomatic relations with the PRC. After publication of two insult-
ing "open letters" addressed to the ROC ambassador by La Basy Vava, a 
left-wing newspaper, Nationalist China severed relations with Mada-
40 
gascar on November 15. Anti-Chinese riots erupted in Tamatave. Some 
Chinese, burned out of home and business, were compelled to leave. About 
2,000 Chinese reportedly left Madagascar after the departure of the Na-
. l" t h" b d 41 t1ona Js- C 1nese am assa or. 
In January, 1973, Peking granted Madagascar an interest-free loan 
of 2,000 million CFA francs, to buy out South African interests in 
Madagascar hotel projects. The PRC also supplied Malagasy with 50,000 
tons of rice (10,000 tons as a gift, the rest at a low price). 42 On 
January 18, 1974, trade, economic, and technical cooperation agreements 
were signed in Peking. Peking agreed to aid Madagascar's economic de-
velopmcnt with material, technical assistance as well as special 
interest-free loans. 43 In mid-1975, according to the agreement, Peking 
provided an interest-free loan of 250 million frances (over U.S. $60 
million), repayable from 1990, to build a sugar factory, improve ana-
tiona} match factory, create an experimental station for rice and 
d d . 44 vegetables, and buy necessary goo s an equ1pment. 
In mid-1976, Ratsiraka, now president of the new "Democratic Re-
public of Madagascar," arraived in Peking for an official visit and 
was welcomed at the airport by the new Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng 
. . . t . h. h 45 and Fore1.gn M1n1s er · C 1ao Kuan- ua. Immediately after Ratsiraka's 
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visit, Peking sent a survey team to begin studies for the projected 
150 km road linking the Madagascar capital with Tamatave port on the 
east coast, and, at the same time, started implementing other projects 
46 
provLded in the economic and technical cooperation agreement. Thus, 
withLn four years after the ouster of Tsiranana, the former strongly 
anti-Peking Madagascar became one of Peking's friends in Africa. 
Malawi 
Nyasalan.d, a former British protectorate, became independent on 
July 6, 1964, and changed its name to Malawi (meaning "flaming water," 
47 
after the sunrise on Lake Nyasa). In the late 1950s when Nyasaland 
was still a British protectorate, Peking expressed support for the 
Nyasaland independence movement led by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 
father of Nyasaland nationalism and president of the Nyasaland African 
Congress. When Banda was imprisoned in Southern Rhod.esia for thirteen 
months by British authorities, the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Com-
mittcc (CAASC) issued a statement on March 24, 1959, demanding his im-
mediate release. 48 
When Nyasaland achieved internal self-government in early 1963, 
Peking's Jen-min jen-pao published an article heartily congratulating 
"the people of Nyasaland on this preliminary victory won in their 
f . 1 . d d 49 struggle or nat1ona 1n epen ence." Three weeks before independence 
in July, 1964, Dr. Banda received Ilo Ying, Peking's ambassador to 
Tanzania, and had a "friendly talk wi.th him." 50 Though he had no :m-
l.cnlion of' recognizing either Peking or Taipei, Banda invited both to 
Lhc i ndcpcndcnce ceremonies on .July 6. Peking declined the invitation, 
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but sent messages to Banda saying that: the PHC "has decided to rccog-
. !ll 
n 1 zc JV!a I aw 1 • " 
However, on .July 6, Peking's official Jen-min j i.h-pao published 
an editorial deploring the Malawian government's "two-Chinas" attitude: 
"It is obviously due to the influence exercised by U.S. and British im-
pcrialism that the Malawi Government should propose to recognize two 
Chinas and try to create a two Chinas situation at the independence 
cclebrations.•• 52 On the other hand, Taipei accepted the invitation 
and appointed Yang Hsi-k'un, vice foreign minister, as special envoy. 53 
After a 1964 Ugandan report that Banda might recognize Peking, the 
PRC attempted to encourage him by offering Malawi an interest-free loan 
f $ . 11" 54 o U.S. 50 m1. 1on. However, Banda declined the offer, much to the 
displeasure of some members in his cabinet. Six minister, including 
Foreign Minister Kanyama Chiume and Education Minister Henry Chipem-
here, either were dismissed or resigned; some fled to neighboring 
55 
Tanzania to form an anti-Banda force with PRC support. 
Having failed to entice Banda, Peking turned to supporting Ma-
lawian dissidents 1n Tanzania, and trained Malawian guerrillas, hoping 
to overthrow Banda's government through subversion. Enraged by this, 
Banda became one of Peking's bitterest critics in Africa. In 1965 and 
1966 Banda and Malawian news media openly attacked the PRC on many oc-
casions. On July 2, 1965, after returning from the Commonwealth Con-
ferencc in London, Banda expressed his suspicion of Peking's 
intentions in Africa, saying: "She just uses you, and when you arc no 
56 
longer useful she ditches you." In early .January, 1966, Dr. Banda 
told American journalists 1.n an interview that assassins trained by 
57 
Peking attempted to kill him and loyal members of his government. 
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On December 16, 1966, commenting on the Vietnam problem in the Malawian 
parliament, Banda declared that "it is not the Americans but the North 
Vietnamese and Chinese who stand in the way of peace. 1158 
To counter Peking's hostility, Banda took measures to establish 
relations with Nationalist China. Taipei signed a technical coopera-
tion agreement with Malawi on December 3, 1965, to help Malawi's agri-
cultural development. 59 Malawi accorded de jure recognition to the 
ROC on July 12, 1966. On August 4, 1967, Banda arrived in Taipei for 
an eight-day state visit at the invitation of President Chiang Kai-shek. 
In a joint communique, both leaders agreed that Chinese Communism was a 
source of "subversion and unrest in Asia, Africa, and other parts of 
60 the world." Malawi's policy did not change after the 1971 United Na-
tions recognition of Peking. Seven years later, Banda was still 
president of Malawi, and Malawi continued to recognize Taipei and to 
receive agricultural aid from the ROC, though surrounded by militant 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique, all having close relations with Pe-
king. 
PRC Relations with Portugal 
In dealing with the black governments of Madagascar and Malawi, 
Peking had always to consider possible repercussions in its relations 
with other independent black governments in Africa. Entirely different 
considerations were involved in its policy towards colonial and whjte 
governments in southern Africa. Before turning to the Portuguese 
colonies of;Mozambique and Angola, it is useful to consider Peking's 
relations with Portugal itself. These were complicated by the fact 
that one of Portugal's oldest and smallest colonies is located in 
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China: Macao, consisting of a peninsula near Canton, and two small 
islands, with a total area of only six square miles (sixteen sq. km). 
The opportunism of Peking's foreign policy was never more openly 
displayed than in regard to Macao. Despite Portuguese refusal to rec-
ognize the PRC until a quarter century after its creation, despite 
Peking's constant denunciation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, and 
despite the utter indefensibility of Macao, this small territory and 
its 95 percent Chinese population (276,000) have remained under 
Portuguese administration--even after Portugal tried to return it to 
the PHC. The principal reason is that Peking has profited greatly (and 
. 61 
in hard currencies) from international trade through Macao. Since 
the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union has enjoyed taunting Peking 
about its Macao policy. When the PRC accused Khrushchev of cowardice 
in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the United States, Khrushchev 
sarcastically reminded Peking of its continued toleration of Portuguese 
and British colonies (Macao and Hong Kong) within its own territory. 62 
In 1966, during the Cultural Revolution, Moscow charged the PRC with 
using Macao and Hong Kong not only for financial profit but also for 
"political contacts with imperialist 
. . 63 
countr1es." 
Pch. i_ng' s complacency about Portuguese Macao did not apply to 
Portuguese colonies in Africa, as will be discussed below. The April 
25, 1974, military coup in Portugal soon changed Portuguese policy not 
only towards it African colonies but also toward Peking. Dr. Antonio 
de Almeida Santos, the Portuguese Minister for Inter-Territorial Co-
ordination, declared in a speech in Macao on October 14, 1974, that, 
although the Portuguese enclave of Macao could not exist without 
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China's consent, Peking had until then expressed no desire to change 
64 
Macao's status. On January 6, 1975, the Portuguese government rec-
ognized Peking as "the only legitimate representative of the Chinese 
people" and stated that it considered Taiwan "an integral part of 
China." A month later, Lisbon severed diplomatic relations with Taipei 
1 ' 11 . . h. f 65 and expel ed a pro-Talpel C lnese rom Macao. Between 1975 and 
1977 there were several Western reports that the Portuguese military 
government had on several occasions offered to return Macao to China, 
66 
but the proposals were always turned down by the PRC. 
The first of the Portuguese African colonies to achieve independ-
I 
ence was Guinea-Bissau, on September 10, 1974. All the rest achieved 
independence within a few months after Portugal's January 6, 1975, 
recognition of Peking: Mozambique on June 25, 1975, the Cape Verde 
Islands on July 5, Sao Tome e Principe on July 12, and Angola on No-
vernber 11. 
Angola 
Since Portugal and the PRC did not have diplomatic relations un-
til a few months before the Portuguese colonies in southern Africa be-
carne independent, Peking had for years vehemently denounced Portuguese 
rule ln Africa, and supported African rebel movements against Portugal. 
The PRC became the first Communist power to broadcast to Portuguese 
ifrica when Radio Peking began beaming a Portuguese program to Angola 
in September, 1960, four months before the Angolan uprising began 
(February, 1961). By mid-1961 Hadio Peking broadcast seven hours a 
week in Portuguese to Angola and was joined by Radio Moscow in August 
r. h 67 o t c same year. 
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However, between 1960 and 1963, the formative years of the Angolan 
liberation movement, Peking did not commit> itself seriously to either 
of the principal rebel groups, the Moscow-backed People's Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, and the newer 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden 
68 Roberto. Both were active in Leopoldville, Zaire, in 1962, but Pe-
king was then aiding Zairean rebels against the Leopoldville government 
and thus not in a position to make contacts with Angolan leaders in the 
Zaircan capital. An opportunity for the FNLA's Roberto to make contacts 
with the PRC embassy 1n Algiers came in early 1963 when Algdria's Ben 
Bella allowed both MPLA and FNLA to open offices in Algiers. In De-
ccmber, 1963, Roberto met PRC Foreign Minister Chen I in Nairobi at 
Kenya's independence ceremony. Chen I reportedly offered to supply 
FNLA "all the aid that it needs." 69 Roberto accepted the offer and 
shortly afterwards FNLA guerrillas were sent to China for training; 
1 . d . h b h. . 70 some were ater tra1ne 1n G ana y C 1nese 1nstructors. 
The FNLA's influence declined after early 1964 because of leader-
ship disputes and fr:iction with rapidly changing governments in Zaire. 
When a t.hird major Angolan rebel group, the National Union for Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), was formed 1n March, 1966, by former 
FNLA leader Jonas Savimbi, Peking switched its support from FNLA to 
lfNITA. 71 PHC aid to UNITA, never large, soon declined because of 
China's preoccupation with its own Cultural Revolution, although token 
shipments of weapons and medical supplies continued to be sent to Pe-
king to Savimbi's forces through African countries friendly to the PRC. 
During the years of China's inactivity (1966-1969), the three Angolan 
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groups became bitter rivals; one report said the MPLA forces had prob-
72 ably killed more UNITA guerrillas than Portuguese. 
Jn the L970s, after the Cultural Hevo1ution, the PHC re-entered 
the Angolan competition. Heal izing that it could hot change MPLA's 
strong pro-Moscow position despite the fact that Neto visited the PRC 
in July, 1971, Peking gradually resumed support of Roberto's FNLA while 
decreasing its support for UNITA, which became a lesser partner of the 
FNLA. China's pro-FNLA position became more apparent in 1973 after a 
visit to Peking by President Mobutu of Zaire, a strong supporter of 
Roberto. In December, 1973, Roberto himself visited Peking and signed 
a military aid agreement, by which Peking sent twenty military experts 
to Zaire to train FNLA guerrillas. By August, 1974, 105 more Chinese 
. t t d t f h" d 1 . d 73 tns rue· ors an 450 ons o ·· C 1 nese-ma e arms a so arr1 ve · • Mean-
while, Soviet aid poured into Angola for the MPLA. 
The April 25, 1974, military coup in Lisbon brought to power in 
Portugal a military government which promptly announced that it would 
allow all five Portuguese colonies in Africa t~ become independent be-
fore the end of 1975. In January, 1975, the Portuguese agreed that 
Angola would officially become independent on November 11, 1975, and 
before then, a transitional coalition government would be formed 1n-
eluding the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. 
Unfortunately the war in Angola was far from over. It entered a 
final and more bloody phase, changing from a liberation war to a civil 
war between MPLA's "People's Republic of Angola" supported by the 
Soviet Union and its satellite Cuba, and an FNLA-UNITA coalition rather 
74 
weakly supported,by the PRC and Western powers. With full military 
support from Moscow and 14,000 Cuban soliders, Neto's MPLA gained the 
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upper hand over the FNLA-UNITA coalition by the end of February, 1976. 
The victory of the Moscow-backed MPLA in Angola was undoubtedly 
a serious blow not only to the United States but also to the PRC. To 
Peking, one of Moscow's major competitors in Africa, the collapse of the 
FNLA-UNITA coalition caused both short-range and long-range disadvant-
ages. It not only temporarily curtailed Peking's influence in southern 
Africa, but in the long run could also prevent the PRC from playing a 
decisive role in a future conflict between black Africa and white South 
Africa, which Peking has advocated, planned, and invested in since the 
early 1960s. Peking's bitter reaction to Soviet dominance in Angola 
was amply revealed in PRC statements, editorials, and commentaries pub-
lished by Jen-min jih-pao and NCNA in late 1975 and early 1976. 75 
Although one report lists Angola among the African nations receiving 
aid from Peking during 1976, no details were given, and no announcement 
has been made of establishment of diplomatic relations between the Neto 
76 
government and the PRC. 
Mozambique 
The independence movement in Portugal's second largest African 
colony, Mozambique, began later than that in Angola but encountered 
fewer difficulties and achieved its goal five months before Angola. 
When the Angolan rebellion began in February, 1961, conditions in Mo-
zambique were still calm. A major reason was that Mozambique was then 
much less accessible than Angola to outside intervention. All the 
countries bordering on Mozambique (Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, 
and South Africa) were then under European or white African rule. 
Tanzania achieved independence in December, 1961, but did not become 
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radical until 1965. 
In 1961, three Mozambican nationalist organizations emerged in 
exile: the Democratic National Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), the 
Mozambique African Nationalist Union (MANU), and the African Union of 
Independent Mozambique (UNIMI). All had their headquarters in Dar es 
Salaam, capital of Tanzania. Pressed by Tanzanian President Nyerere 
to unite, the three organizations merged in June, 1962, to form the 
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), electing Dr. Eduardo 
Chivambo Mondlane, who was favored by Nyerere, as president in Septem-
ber. However, from the outset, FRELIMO was plagued by factional 
rivalry, assassinations, and defections. 
FRELIMO launched its armed liberation struggle inside Mozambique 
in late September, 1964, with a very small force (250 men). 77 Between 
late 1962 and early 1965, a series of expulsions and reorganizations 
took place within FHELIMO. Some prominent leaders broke away from the 
party, and in mid-1965 organized the Hevolutionary Committee of Mo-
. ( ) . k b. 78 zamb·t que COHEMO 1n Lusa a, Zam 1a. 
Although FRELIMO president Mondlane was American-educated, married 
a white American woman, and received financial support from some Ameri-
can churches and humanitarian organizations, most of the military equip-
ment used by his forces came from Moscow, and he was generally 
considered pro-Soviet. His two right-hand men--Marcelino dos Santos, 
a well-known leftist poet and FRELIMO's secretary for external rela-
tions, and Samora Machel, commander-in-chief of PRELIMO's guerrilla 
forces--were both devoted Marxists with pro-Moscow inclinations. 
Thus, when'the rival COHEMO appeared in mid-1965, Peking im-
mediately favored it, without ever totally refraining from supporting 
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FRELIMO as well. From the outset, COREMO took an openly pro-Peking and 
anti-Moscow stand. One COREMO leader was quoted as saying that "the 
Russian methods are wrong--they were partly afraid of the peasants, and 
crushed and collectivized them. The Chinese had to build a National 
Liberation Army of solid peasant support [in China]; they taught us we had 
to utilize thirty million Africans in southern Africa." 79 Another 
COREMO leader, Manuel Mahluza, was quoted by Peking's NCNA in 1966 as 
having mastered s orne of the PRC' s favorite j organ: ''By arming our-
selves with Chairman Mao's great thesis on people's war, we can defeat 
the Portuguese colonialists who are nothing but paper tigers."80 
China was said to be the only country supplying arms and equlpment 
to COHEMO. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) did not recognize 
COHEMO, and forbade it to open a headquarters in Dar es Salaam. By the 
early 1970s, COREMO had lost momentum and gradually withered away. At 
that point, Peking appeared to be in the same difficulty as in Angola, 
having backed a weaker faction, but by 1973 the PHC had successfully 
shifted its allegiance and became FHELIMO's leading supporter. 81 
Despite FHELIMO's often-exaggerated battle success claims, the 
Mozambican war was not as ferocious as the one then going on ln Angola, 
and attracted much less attention world-wide. FRF.LIMO's war efforts 
were considerably weakened by factional struggles between pro-Moscow 
and pro-Peking clements within the party, accompanied with mysterious 
assassinations of several of its top-ranking leaders. On February 3, 
1969, Mondlane himself was killed in Dar es Salaam when he opened a 
package delivered to him that contained a bomb. It was widely believed 
that the Portuguese secret police were responsible, but the Portuguese 
denied the charge and instead blamed the Communist Chinese for the 
. t" 82 assass1na 10n. 
The death of Mondlane brought the intense power struggle within 
FRELIMO into the open. Supported by Mondlane's widow, Samora Machel 
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emerged as the new leader. Under Machel, FRELIMO maintained close re-
lations with the PRC. Since 1971 Peking had increased its military 
support to FHELIMO and had stepped up its training of Mozambican 
guerrilla fighters 1n Tanzahia. 83 
Machel led FRELIMO delegations on visits to China in August, 1971, 
d . . b 1 f th b f . d d 84 an aga1n 1n Fe ruary, 975, a ew mon s e ore 1n epen ence. Es-
pecially on the second visit, he received a royal welcome from PRC 
leaders. Speaking at a banquet in his honor, Machel praised Peking 
more explicitly than ever: 
Ever since the beginning of our struggle, the People's 
Hepublic of China has stood in the vanguard of the 
magnificent movement supporting us. Educated by Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung and carrying forward the i nterna ti on-
alist tradition of the Communist Party of China, the 
Chinese Government and people have always been and 
constitute now a great and reliable strategic rear 
area Cor our fight and an invincible base supporting 
the struggle of the oppressed peoples • • • We have 
come here to study and learn from your revolutionary 
experience of building the people's power and recon-
structing a country ruined by feudal pillage and lhe 
wars of aggression launched by the reactionaries and 
imperialists.85 
After the April, 1974, military coup in Lisbon, the new Portuguese 
government and FRELIMO negotiated a September 7, 1974, agreement promis-
ing independence to Mozambique 1n 1975. A transitional government of 
Portuguese and Mozambicans was set up on September 20. Despite several 
bloody incidents in September and October, the transfer of power in 
Mozambique was smoother than in Angola, and Mozambique achieved full 
independence on June 25, 1975. 86 
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Peking sent a delegation to the independdnce celebrations, and 
donated 30,000 tons of wheat to the Mozambique people. 87 Shortly 
afterwards, China granted Mozambique an interest-free loan of U.S. $56 
million, to be repaid only after 1990. In September, Peking sent a 
medical mission to Mozambique to survey Mozambique's health service, 
and in November agreed to send about thirty medical experts to work in 
Mozambique's health services. 88 
Mozambique's position in the Sino-Soviet rivalry was not clear 
following independence. Both Moscow and Peking found Machel more 
neutral than they wished, despite his avowed devotion to Marxism. 89 
Chinese Nationalist sources reported that ~bout 5,000 of the 6,000 
Chinese living in Mozambique at the time of independence had left by 
mid-1976, mostly for Portugal or Brazi1. 90 Since Peking is not known 
to have objected, it may be assumed that these were anti-Communists. 
Whatever the degree of Peking's success in Mozambique, it appeared 
substantially greater than in Angola. Machel's government estab-
lished diplomatic relations with the PRC on the day of independence, 
and additional PRC medical aid was sent to Mozambique during 1976. 91 
Although a 1962 report described Mozambique's arable but untilled land 
(nearly a third of the country) as perhaps the best in Africa for rice 
cultivation, no PRC agricultural aid has yet been announced. 92 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
On November 11, 1965, Hhodesia--known to Africans as Zimbabwe and 
to others as Southern Rhodesia until Northern Rhodesia changed its name 
to Zambia--became the only British colony in Africa to declare its ln-
dependence unilaterally, without British consent. There are, of course, 
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numerous colonial territories which have proclaimed thdir independence 
unilaterally and been recognized by other nations without awaiting the 
consent of the colonial power. Examples include Vietnam from China in 
939, the United States from England in 1776, and several black African 
states in recent years. The international outcry over Rhodesia's "UDI" 
(unilateral declaration of independence) did not in fact have much to do 
with its unilateral character; the real issue was racial, a white gov-
ernment over a predominantly black population. 
The PRC's first comment, on November 14, 1965, was couched 1n 
typical Peking invective: the Rhodesian UDI was "a wild attack on the 
93 
Zimbabwe people and a grave threat to all the African peoples." On 
the same day, Peking's Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial entitled 
"The Just Struggle of the Zimbabwe People Will Surely Win," declaring 
that the real intention behind the UDI by the white settlers in 
Southern Rhodesia was: 
. to cloak their bloodthirsty rule with sham inde-
pendence, thus giving a legal figleaf to this barbarous 
rule, so that they may maintain Southern Rhodesia as 
their 'paradise' where they can continue to rule su-
preme . . . The independence of southern Rhodesia can 
only be won by the unremitting struggle of the Zimbabwe 
people. Africa belongs to the Africans. The minority 
rule of the white settlers must be overthrown. All 
imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist forces must 
be liquidated. No force on earth can prevent the Afri-
cans from taking their destines into their own hands. 
Final victory certainly belongs to the Zimbabwe people 
so long as they strengthen their unity and persist in 
their struggle.94 
During the 1960s there were two major nationalist organizations 
in Rhodesia: the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). ZAPU was founded in December, 
1961, by Joshua Nkomo. After the Rhodesian government banned ZAPU 
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1n September, 1962, Nkomo traveled extensively 1n Africa and opened 
ZAPU offices in the capitals of Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, 
d . . 95 an Br1ta1n. Dissatisfied with Nkomo's indecisiveness and fondness 
for foreign travel, a group of high-ranking ZAPU leaders led by Reverend 
Ndabaningi Sithole rebelled against Nkomo's leadership. On August 8, 
96 1963, the dissidents formed the rival ZANU in Dar es Salaam. Though 
ZANU was more militant than ZAPU, their political goals were initially 
the same~ Both were banned by Rhodesian authorities, and Sithole was 
jailed. 
In their international orientation, ZAPU followed the Moscow line; 
ZANU was regarded as pro-Peking, and was among the five southern Afri-
can nationalist organizations supported by Peking during the l960s. 97 
In April, 1966, five months after Ian Smith's UDI, ZANU launched full-
scale guerrilla war from its Zambian bases. This displeased the ZAPU 
leaders, who denounced the attack as an "irresponsible" action pro-
k db h . t . t "th" 98 vo e y "pro-C 1nese ex rem1s s" w1 1n ZANU. However, unwilling to 
be left behind, ZAPU started its own guerrilla war in Rhodesia in 
August, 1967. 
After Zambian President Kaunda warned ZAPU and ZANU that they 
must "choose between coming together or forfeiting Zambia's readiness 
to accommodate them," the two were merged in 1971 as the Front for the 
Liberat i.on of Zambabwe ( FHOLIZI), but this proved ineffectual and some 
1 d f b h t . f d' t '. . 99 ea crs o ot par 1es re use o JOln. In the Peking-Moscow com-
petition within the Zimbabwe liberation movement, China seemed 
tentatively to occupy the better position since it had played a primary 
role in training guerrillas for ZANU, which is militarily stronger than 
the Moscow-backed ZAPU. However, the long-term advantage may lie with 
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the Soviet Union, because it can supply Cuban troops and more sophisti-
catcd weapons, and can be expected to press the Zimbabwe leaders to re-
d k . . fl 100 uce Pe 1ng's 1n uence. 
Peking has also had to cope with widespread charges that the PRC 
has continued to trade with Rhodesia while vehemently denouncing the 
Rhodesian white government as "racist" and avowing its firm support of 
the Zimbabwe liberation movement. PRC denials of any trade relations 
whatsoever with either South Africa or Rhodesia were disproved by con-
firmed Western reports. During the PRC food shortage in the early 
1960s, Peking bought large quantities of maize from both South Africa 
d h d . 101 an H o es1a. The British Sunday Times reported on October 1, 1967, 
that Peking had bought 60,000 tons of chrome ore from the Smith regime 
tn mid-August, one-fifth of Rhodesia's chrome production. 102 
In November, 1968, both the British Sunday Telegraph and South 
Africa's Rand Daily Mail reported that the PRC was continuously buy-
ing Rhodesian chrome through the Mozambican port of Beira, having it 
shipped in Portuguese vessel~ to conceal PRC involvement. Similar re-
ports were substantiated by the Observer in 1970. 103 In November, 
1974, another British publication reported that the PRC was buying 
Rhodesian chrome and lithium needed in the manufacture of rockets. The 
minerals were transported in oil drums from the Mozambican ports of 
Lourenco Marques and Beira to Macao and Hong Kong, then taken by road 
h . lOll into C 1na. 
As expected, the Soviets repeatedly used these Western reports 
in their propaganda to discredit Mao's regime in Africa as well as in 
China. The Soviets accused Peking of hypocrisy and double-dealing by 
claiming to give firm support to African liberation movements while 
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at the same time maintaining secret trade relations with the "African 
people's most vicious enemies, the racist authorities of South Africa 
d h d . . 105 an H o es1a." 
Stung by such accusations, a PRC External Trade Ministry spokesman 
issued a statement on September 1, 1970, denying any PHC links with 
South Africa or Rhodesia, and denouncing all the reports as "imperial-
ist machinations mounted to sow dissension and sabotage friendship be-
tween China and Africa states." Noting that the PRC had never had dip-
lomatic relations with either Pretoria or Salisbury, he insisted that 
Peking had long since cut off all direct or indirect economic and 
trading relations with them. 106 
After Peking became a UN member, PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei 
solemnly declared in a letter addressed to the secretary-general of the 
Unjted Nations on January 27, 1972: 
In order to support the just struggle of the people of 
Zimbabwe, the Chinese Government has always refrained 
from having any diplomatic contacts with the Rhodesia 
white racist regime and long ago severed all economic 
and trade relations with it, direct or indirect.l07 
On March 3, 1972, Peking's official Jen-min jih-pao published an article 
entitled "Curious Rumour, Vile Slander," accusing the Soviets of fabri-
eating rumors of Sino-Rhodesian trade deals in order "to misrepresent 
China's consistent stand on the Rhodesia question, poison the friendly 
relations between China and African countries and undermine the friend-
108 
ship between the Chinese and African people." 
South Africa/Azania 
The Union of South Africa, independent Slnce 1910, established 
diplomatic relations with the ROC ln 1931 and has maintained them ever 
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since. The balance of political power within the ruling white minority 
began to shift from those of British descent to those of Dutch (Boer or 
Afrikaner) descent around 1914, and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party has 
dominated South African politics since 1948, a year before the PRC was 
established. The Union was converted into the Republic South Africa on 
May 31, 1961, the fifty-first anniversary of independence. African na-
tionalists call it Azania. 
Preferring the name "Afrikaner" to the older "Boer" because it 
specified that whites born in Africa were as African as the black Afri-
cans, the Afrikaner government adopted a policy of stringent racial 
segregation called "apartheid" (apartness) which became a major target 
of internal and external attack when black nationalism emerged in the 
1960s. 
The two major African nationalist organizations in South Africa 
were both formed before 1960. The African National Congress (ANC), 
Africa's oldest nationalist organization, was founded in 1912. 109 The 
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was organized in 1959 by a group of ANC 
dissidents led by Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who accused the ANC of 
collaboration with the whites. Beginning on March 21, 1960, the PAC 
challenged the "pass laws" requiring all black Southern Africans to 
carry identity cards at all times. Unwilling to be left behind, the 
t d . "1 . h l llO ANC star e a s1m1 ar campa1gn on Marc 3 . The result was the 
terrible "Sharpeville Massacre" in which white police killed sixty-nine 
f . d . . d l 111 b k d f h. unarmed A r1cans an lnJure 80 more. So u we an many o 1s 
qidep were arrested; both ANC and PAC were outlawed by South African 
authorities in early April. Some leaders of the two organizations es-
1 
caped abroad or went underground. 
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Like all other liberation movements 1n southern Africa, the one 1n 
South Africa soon became involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Both 
Moscow and Peking regarded South Africa as a major battleground between 
Eastern communism and Western capitalism. While the Soviets saw the 
confrontation as based on ideological and economic conflicts, Peking saw 
it as a racial war with Moscow in the "white racist" camp with Peking 
leading the "colored people." At first, Peking tried to maintain 
friendly relations with both ANC and PAC. However, the ANC, strongly 
influenced by the Moscow-oriented South African Communist Party (SACP), 
gradually took a pro-Moscow stand, while the PAC, which originally op-
posed cooperation with Communists, fell into the pro-Peking group. 112 
Despite general acknowledgment that Peking was behind the PAC, 
there were few data to show the extent of Chinese support. PAC's own 
reports stated that two PAC missions had visited Peking, each receiv-
ing $20,000 from the PRc. 113 Various reports confirmed that PAC 
guerrillas had been trained in China, Tanzania, and Zambia by Chinese 
instructors. 114 But South Africa was much stronger and less vulnerable 
to such subversion than the Portuguese colonies or Hhodesia, and both 
Peking and Moscow appeared to put higher priority on activities else-
where in Africa. Nevertheless, the South African government took 
Pek i.ng' s involvement very seriously. Prime Minister Vorster said 1n 
a May, 1971, interview: 
The greatest single threat to Africa is that the Com-
munist Chinese have established a bridgehead in Tanzania 
and the possibility that they might, through the con-
struction of the Tanzam Railway, inf~ltrate farther into 
the heart of Africa and establish themselves in a perma-
nent basis in Tanzania and Zambia.ll5 
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Speaking at Graaff Heinet in the Cape Province on November 27, 
1971, South Africa's Defense Minister P. W. Botha declared that "Com-
munist forces, mainly the Communist Chinese, are behind the terrorist 
activities on the northern borders of South Africa." 116 Botha's state-
ment was reaffirmdd in April, 1974, by the chief of the South African 
Army: "The terrorist threat to the country's borders is intimately 
1 t d t h . t" "t" . b f . 117 re a e o C 1nese ac lVl 1es 1n some lack A r1can states." Ap-
pearing on a U.S. nationwide television program, "Firing Line," on April 
21, 1974, Prime Minister Vorster again emphasized that "the scourge of 
terrorism 1n South Africa will continue as long as Communist China and 
. t . d h t . 118 RussJa ra1n an arm t e error1sts." 
Although Moscow appears to have g1ven more and better aid to 
southern African liberation organizations than Peking, the government 
of South Africa has regarded Meking as the more dangerous of the two, 
and expressed grave concern over Peking's expansion in southern Africa 
in general and its increasing influence in Tanzania and Zambia in par-
t . 1 119 lCU ar. This anxiety probably was a factor in South Africa's de-
cision to strengthen relations with Taipei, which resulted in raising 
South Africa's consulate-general 1n Taipei to the rank of embassy in 
"1 1 120 late Apr L , 976. 
Accusations that Peking, while vilifying the South African govern-
ment, cor1Linued to trade with it parallel those described earlier under 
Rhodesia. Despite an oi"ficial statement by the New China News Agency 
in JuJy, 1960, that the PHC had cut "all economic and trade ties with 
African colonial authorities," sufficient evidence proved the con-
trary. Both Western and African reports, some issued by Pretoria, in-
dicated that Peking continued trade with South Africa during the 1960s 
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and into the 1970s. Official South African figures showed that Peking 
bought U.S. $15.75 million worth of maize and wool from South Africa 
during 1962, and the figure tripled in 1963. 121 The Peking-Pretoria 
trade was given wide publicity by Western and African newspapers, as 
well as by Soviet propaganda, which used it to discredit Peking in 
Africa. 
To repair its tarnished image in Africa, the PRC issued an offic-
cial statement through NCNA on July 15, 1963, reiterating that "the PHC 
Government will in the future continue to have no economi"c and trade 
ties, direct or indirect, with the South African authorities.•,l 22 The 
essence of this statement was repeated in December, 1963, through the 
PRC embassy in Guinea, and through the PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade 
in 1970. 123 
Southwest Africa/Namibia 
Peking's interest in South Africa extends also to the large ter-
d tory administered by South Africa under the name of Southwest Africa, 
called Namibia by Africans and (since 1968) by the United Nations 
General Assembly. The juridical status of this territory is less clear 
than that of any other part of Africa except the former Spanish Sahara, 
. . t. 11 1 124 h 434 "1 1 but lt lS ln some sense s l a co ony. T e square ml e enc ave 
of Walvis Bay has been legally part of South Africa since 1910, but the 
rest of the territory was assighed to South Africa in 1921 by the League 
of Nations as a mandated territory. After the demise of the League, 
South Africa proposed in 1946 that Southwest Africa be incorporated 
into South Africa. The United Nations wanted it converted into a trust 
territory, eventually to be independent. The two have been in 
125 dJsagrccmcnt ever since, though South Africa rema1ns in control. 
The black nationalist movement in Southwest Africa included two 
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principal organizations. The Southwest Africa National Union (SWANU) 
was founded in May, 1959, and under Jariretundu Kozonguizi established 
close ties with Communist countries, especially the PRC. The rival 
Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed in 1960. 126 
Because of its reluctance to cooperate with the African Liberation 
Committee of the Organization for Africans Unity (OAU), SWANU gradually 
lost OAU support; this considerably reduced its momentum and strength. 
At the Havana Tricontinental Conference in January, 1966, Kozonguizi 
,joined with other pro-Peking delegates in denouncing "Soviet-American 
11 . d th . f f 1 . t 12 7 co us1on un er e gu1se o peace u coex1s ence." Kozonguizi's 
fiery words brought him into conflict with the majority of SWANU's Ex-
ternal Council, and in July he resigned the presidency of SWANU. At 
the APPSO council meeting at Nicosia, Cyprus, in February, 1967, SWANU 
was expelled through maneuvers by pro-Moscow African delegations. 
Since the early 1970s, SWANU, suffering from internal discord, 
international rejection, and suppression by South African authorities, 
has ceased to be a major organization. SWAPO is now recognized by 
both the United Nations and the OAU as the only representative movement 
of black Southwest Africans. Some authors do not even mention SWANU in 
describing the Southwest African situation. 128 
Peking, finding that it had (as in Angola and Mozambique) backed 
the wrong faction, tried hard to improve its relations with SWAPO. 
SWAPO leaders reacted rather favorably, needing to broaden their 
sources of support. The independence of Angola in late 1975 provided 
SWAPO with a base from which :it could carry guerrilla war into 
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Southwest Africa. But Angola's pro-Soviet government and lack of dip-
lomatic relations with Peking put the USSR ln a better position than 
the PRC to exert influence over SWAPO. South Africa agreed in 1975 to 
negotiate the granting of independence in 1978, but continued to dis-
agree with the United Nations over SWAPO participation. 
Botswana. 
The former British protectorate of Bechuanaland achieved its inde-
pqndence on September 30, 1966, as the Republic of Botswana. The PRC 
had shown interest in Bechuanaland as early as July 28, 1963, when 
Radio Peking broadcast a statement attributed to Bechuanaland leaders, 
saylng that "the struggle between the colonialists and the colonial 
people is a life and death struggle. Only through a revolutionary 
struggle by the mass of the people can we achieve our aim--the inde-
129 
pendence and the liberation of Bechuanaland." However, independence 
was achieved by peaceful means, rather than by violent revolution as 
. . d b k" 130 enVlSJone y Pe lng. 
In Botswana, Peking supported the small but violently revolution-
ary Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP), also known as the Bechuanaland 
Popular Party, led by K. T. Motsete. Another Bechuanaland People's 
Party, led by Philip G. Matante, also had contacts with the PRC; 
t . . t d k. . b 1 131 Ma ante VlSl e Pe lng ln Novem er, 966. But the preindependence 
general election of March, 1965, was won by the Democratic Party of 
Seretse Khama, a moderate tribal chief, who became the first p~esident 
of Botsawna. 
Surrounded by Rhodesia, South Africa, and Southwest Africa, Bots-
wana was politically and economically dependent on Rhodesia and South 
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Africa, particularly the latter. It therefore could not afford to fol-
low the militant African countries on issues such as sanctions against 
Rhodesia and South Africa or the China-issue vote 1n the United Nations. 
Botswana established diplomatic relations with Taipei on December 
30, 1966, and a ROC embassy was soon opened at Gaberones, capital of 
Botswana. Shortly afterwards Taipei sent a twelve-member agricultural 
132 team to Botswana to help the country's agricultural development. 
In mid-July, 1968, Botswana's Vice President Q.K.J. Masire visited Tai-
wan and assured ROC leaders that Botswana would remain "firm in its 
policy of supporting the Republic of China's rightful position in the 
•t d t. 133 Unl e Na lons." On September 10, an agricultural technical co-
operation agreement between the two countries was signed at Gaberones, 
under which Taipei was to send another agricultural demonstration team 
t t 134 o Bo swana. In September, 1969, during his tour of twenty-five 
African countries, Yang Hsi-K'un visited Botswana and awarded President 
Khama the "Special Cordon of the Order of Propitious Clouds" in appre-
ciation of Khama's contribution to friendship between the two coun-
. 135 trles. 
After 1970, however, the increasing attacks of African national-
ists on Hhodesia and South Africa led Botswana to try to reduce its 
economic and political dependence on these countries, and seek alterna-
tive connections with Zambia, which was strongly pro-Peking. 136 Thus 
when the china issue was voted on in the General Assembly in October, 
1971, Botswana followed the African majority in voting for Peking's · 
admi_ssion. The beginning of construction of the U.S.-aided Botswana-
Zambia highway in late 1972 pulled Botswana further away from South 
Africa's influence and drew it into that of Zambia. 137 
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On March 25, 1974, Botswana recognized the PRC as "the only legiti-
mate government of China," and asked ROC representatives to leave the 
138 
country. Taipei severed diplomatic ties with Gaberones on April 5 
d "thd "t . lt 1 d t t" t f" t 139 an Wl rew 1 s agr1cu ·ura emons ra 1on earns rom Bo swana. 
Peking and Gaberones signed a joint communjquc on January 6, 1975, 
raising diplomatic relations between the two countries to the ambas-
sadorial level. 140 Botswana President Seretse Khama arrived in Peking 
on July 26, 1976, for a state visit, and an economic and technical co-
. 141 
operation agreement was signed between the two countries. However, 
as of late 1976, there were no announcements of PRC aid to Botswana. 
The Enclave Nations 
In v1ew of the hostility between South Africa and the PRC, it is 
not surprising that none of the four nations which are enclaves within 
South Africa has diplomatic relations with Peking. All are in varying 
degrees economically and politically dependent on South Africa, and 
this is unlikely to change without a revolution in South Africa itself. 
Lesotho 
Basutoland, a former British protectorate, gained its independence 
on October 4, 1966, and became the kingdom of Lesotho. The real po-
] it.~cal power rests in the hands of its prime minister, Chief Leabua 
.Jonathan, f"ounder of the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP), and a 
cousin of Paramount Chief (King) Moshoeqhoe II. Because of its land-
locked location and natural poverty, Lesotho's econom1c and political 
d 1 h f . 142 survival depen complete y on Sout A r1ca. Thus, Lesotho has fol-
lowed a pro-Western foreign policy and shunned any contact with 
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Communist. countries. This anti-Commun.ist inclination _is strengthened 
hy Lhc fact thal about 70 percent of Lesotho's population is Christian, 
and the churches play a political role second only to that of the cen-
143 
traJ government. 
When Lesotho achieved its independence, Taipei appointed Yang Hsi-
k'un as special envoy to the independence celebrations. While ln 
Lesotho, Yang signed a joint communique with Prime Minister Jonathan to 
establish diplomatic relations between Taipei and Maseru, the capital 
of Lesotho. Lesotho became an important recipient of ROC agricultural 
aid in Africa, while Peking began supporting political dissidents. 
In Lesotho Peking financially supported the opposition Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle, who has been praised by Pe-
1411 king as a "great leader." Peking tried to promote a "united front" 
between the BCP and the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL), formed by 
exiled members of the South African Communist Party (SACP). This ef-
fort was unsuccessful because of Soviet dominance of the SACP, which in 
turn controlled the CPL. In 1964, the Central Committee of the CPL is-
sued a statement denouncing the "deviation" created by Peking within 
145 
the international Communist movement. Neither the BCP nor the CPL 
has much chance of gaining political power in the foreseeable future. 
After Lesotho's Foreign Minister J.R.L. Kotsokoane visited Peking 
1n May, 1975, at the invitation of PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, 
there was speculation that Lesotho might seek diplomatic ties with Pe-
king.146 However, as of 1978 this has not happened. 
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Swazi land 
SwazLland, another former British protectorate, became an independ-
ent kingdom on September 6, 1968, and established diplomatic relations 
with Taipei on the same day. Swaziland had sent agricultural trainees 
to attend the "Seminar for African Agriculturalists" in Taiwan as early 
as 1965. 147 Like Lesotho, Swaziland also has close political relations 
with and depends economically on South Africa. 148 
Transkei 
The other enclave nations in South Africa have not established re-· 
lations with either China, or with any other government except that of 
South Africa, which created them under its "Bantustan" policy. This 
involves granting independence to the nine major Bantu tribes within 
South Africa, as a means of reducing the black-white imbalance in the 
population of South Africa itself. Tribesmen who work outside the tribal 
territories (many have never lived there at all) are to lose South 
African citizenship and acquire citizenship in their respective Bantus-
tan. The presumption is that they will continue to work (and often 
reside) in South Africa, but will no longer be citizens of South Africa. 
The policy has been denounced by most other nations as a subterfuge in 
which independence is no more than a legal fiction. 
Transkei was the first Bantustan. South Africa granted independence 
on October 26, 1976, under Chief K. Matanzima, to this homeland of 3.4 
d l f h f . . . t . b 149 million Xhosas, secon argest o Sout A rlca's nlne maJor rl es. 
To lend credibility to Transkei's independence, South African Prime 
Minister Vorster announced that the independent Bantu states were free 
------
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to establish diplomatic relations with any government 1n the world, 1n-
l d . k" d 150 c u 1ng Pe 1ng an Moscow. 
This statement was widely criticized by South African whites, as 
inviting Communist penetration of southern Africa, but the PRC denounced 
Transkei's independence as a South African fraud against the world. 
NCNA declared that "Transkei will . . • be nothing but a supplier of 
cheap labour for the South African white racists, and the Transkei 
151 
authorities, their recruiting agents." There has been no indication 
that Transkei will seck diplomatic relations with either China, although 
the ROC foreign ministry congratulated the Transkei people and said that 
Taipei was willing to "cooperate" with Transkei. 152 
Bophuthatswana 
South Africa granted independence on December 6, 1977, to a second 
Bantustan, called Bophuthatswana, with a population dominated (68 per-
) f th . b 153 cent by Bantus o e Tswana tr1 e. The response by other coun-
tries has been the same as towards Transkei, and there are no indica-
tions that Bophuthatswana has sought diplomatic relations with either 
China. 
Comoros 
Three of the four Comoro Islands (between Africa and Madagascar) 
unilaterally ddclared their independence from France on July 6, 1975. 154 
The first government was overthrown by a coup on August 3. The Re-
public of the Comoros was admitted to the United Nations on November 
12, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on November 13, 
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I .-r: 
I <)7 r: ,) ,) . ,_) . On May 3l., 1976, a Comoro govcr'nmcnt delegation led by Salim 
Ilimidi, minister of internal affairs, arrived in Peking for a visit, 
and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement on June 
10. 156 A Cornaro trade delegation visited Peking ln late September, 
1976. 157 No details of PRC aid to the Comoros have been announced. 158 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ROC POLICY IN AFRICA 
Like their cousins on the mainland, the people of Nationalist 
China had little contact with Africa before the 1960s. The ROC de-
veloped an African policy in response to two related phenomena--the 
mushrooming of independent African countries in 1960 and the PRC's in-
tensified diplomatic offensive in Africa. 
An i_nv:itation to attend Cameroon's independence ceremony on Janu-
ary, 1960, gave Taipei the opportunity to send its first official good-
will mission to Africa, led by Yang Chi-tseng, then ROC minister of 
economic affairs. Among the members of this delegation was Yang Hsi-
k'un, later to become the chief architect of Taipei's African policy. 
After participating in the Cameroon independence ceremony, the delega-
tion went on to visit Nigeria, Togo, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Tunisia, Somalia, and Ethiopia. 1 Of the ten African countries visited 
by the ROC delegation, all but the last three were in West Africa, where 
Peking began its diplomatic offensive. 
The ROC goodwill mission was sharply attacked by PRC propaganda. 
On February 8 Jen-min jih-pao published a lengthy observer's commentary 
denouncing the visit in the intemperate language and stock epithets 
that were to become familiar to Africans: 
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Recently, a so-called 'Chinese delegation' led by Yang 
Chi-tserg, a Chiang Kai-shek element, made a stealthy 
visit to a number of countries in West Africa, includ-
ing Guinea, with which China [the PRC] has just formed 
diplomatic relations. The Chiang Kai-shek clique and 
its master, the United States, had a clear purpose in 
this. They kno~ that, in the face of the growing 
friendship between the peoples of China and Africa, it 
would not be easy for them to achieve their purpose by 
taking open disruptive measures. That is the reason 
that they are trying to take advantage of the desire 
of the newly independent African countries for friend-
ship with all countries and the fact that the Chiang Kai-
shek clique still illegally occupies China's seat in the 
United Nations, to make the newly independent African 
countries form relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique. 
By so doing, the Chiang Kai-shek clique and its master, 
the United States, want to create a situation of •two 
Chinas' or prevent these newly independent African 
countries from establishing and maintaining normal re-
lations with China and block the contacts and coopera-
tion between the 650 million Chinese people and the 200 
million African people.2 
Goals 
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This article not only disclosed Peking's apprehensions about ROC 
diplomacy in Africa, but also showed that both Peking and Taipei 
realized that African votes would play a vital role in the "Chinese 
representation" controversy in the United Nations. In other words, 
one goal of the African policies of both Taipei and Peking was control 
of the Chinese seat in the United Nations: Taipei hoping to retain it, 
Peking hoping to acquire it. 
Both governments also had economic goals in Africa. The newly in-
dependent countries of Africa, rather suddenly left on their own, were 
all underdeveloped and in urgent need of both aid and trade. Their 
rapidly growing population, estimated at about 273 million in Africa as 
a whole in 1960, about 352 million in 1970, appeared to offer a rich 
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market for outsiders, including both Chinas. Many also possessed re-
sources that might supply import needs of the ROC and PRC. 
Beyond these parallel interests in the United Nations and in trade, 
Taipei and Peking had very different goals in Africa, Taipei was con-
cerned with acquainting Af'Picans with the nattiPe of Communism, es-
pecially in China. While this could help win African votes for Taipei 
in the United Nations, it was a goal not to be discarded even if the 
United Nations seat were lost. Unlike Peking, Taipei had no wish to 
lead the Africans to a particular ideology or political system, but 
only to warn them away from Communism, for reasons that were essen-
tially altruistic. This basic, permanent goal and some of the ROC 
ideas for achieving it, were succinctly expressed on August 13, 1960, 
by Yang Hsi-k'un, then Director of the West Asian Department of the ROC 
. . . t 3 Fore1gn M1n1s ry: 
Politically, while nationalism is roaring over Africa 
and it [Africa] is very vulnerable to the penetration 
of Communists, we offer our most painful experience 
from the aggression of international Communists and our 
most valuable experience in fighting them. We want to 
tell [Africans] about our experience so that our African 
friends can escape what we have suffered. Economically, 
Taiwan in the past decade has advanced from a backward 
agricultural economy to an industrial society. Our 
achievements and experience provide a good example for 
the new African nations in their economic development. 
We would like to share this experience sincerely with 
African friends.4 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
Some considerations affecting the Peking-Taipei competition in 
Africa are implicit in comparisons of their size, as shown in Table XX. 
The PHC is about 266 times as large as the ROC (Taiwan), with fifty to 
sixty times as many people. The difference in natural resources is of 
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similar magnitude. The PHC, ranking first in the world in population 
and second only to the Soviet Union in area, is of course much larger 
than any African nation, and has a population more than double that of 
the entire African continent. The HOC has a smaller area than all but 
ten African nations: Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibou~i, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gambia, Lesotho, Hwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, and Swaziland. 
HOC population is larger than that of every sub-Saharan African nation 
except Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zaire, but much smallar 
than that of any former colonial power (except Portugal), and extremely 
small by comparison with the PHC, the United States, or the Soviet 
Union. 
Taipei's advantages in the African competition, included, first, 
its smallness • 
. t 5 or anx1e y. 
The HOC did not frighten Africans, or arouse suspicion 
Second, by refraining from subversive activity, Taipei 
could claim that it had no imperialistic or expansionist intentions in 
I 
Africa. Third, though both Peking and Taipei claimed great achieve-
mcnts in agrarian reform~ Taipei was far ahead in modernizing 
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agriculture, thanks to financial and technical support g1ven by the 
United States. Moreover, the ROC "land to the tiller" slogan was cer-
tainly more appealing to Africans than the PRC's collectivized state 
farms. Fourth, despite its basic principle of anti-Communism, Taipei 
never emphasized, as Peking did, any cold war ideological preference m 
its dealings with African countries. It was therefore possible for 
Taipei to base its African aid program totally on local needs and the 
economic condition of the recipients. 6 
Unfortunately, as later events proved, these four advantages were 
often offset by handicaps. First, smallness had adverse as well as fa-
vorable implications. It was difficult for the ROC to impress Africans, 
who were awed by the PRC's huge area and population. 7 Second, because 
of its limited manpower and resources, the HOC was unable to offer as 
much aid as the PRC could. Shortage of aid funds was one of the main 
reasons why many African countries which recieved aid from Taipei dur-
Lng the 1960s turned to Peking in the 1970s. Third, as a UN member, 
the ROC felt obliged to carry out its diplomatic activities through 
conventional methods, while the PRC was never hesitant to use un-
scrupulous and clandestine means whenever necessary. 
Tactics 
Seven major categories of PRC undertakings in Africa were listed 
1n Chapter II: (1) negotiations for diplomatic recognition and es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations, (2) participation in multi-
national conferences, (3) negotiation of bilateral treaties and 
agreements, (1) ·information and propaganda, (5) exchange of visits, 
(6) student scholarships, and (7) covert activities. The ROC made 
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little or no use of covert methods in Africa, and only minimal use of 
propaganda. Nor did it participate in Afro-Asian conferences. Since 
these were dominated by countries hostile to Taipei, invitations went 
always to Peking. The other four tactics listed for Peking were used 
also by Taipei, but will be discussed here in somewhat different se-
quence. 
Establishing Diplomatic Relations 
Although countries recognizing the ROC did not always vote for it 
ln the United Nations, Taipei did of course make a substantial effort 
to win recognition from African countries, and was relatively success-
ful in the 1960s in West, Central, and Southern Africa, as shown in 
Table XXI (see also Tables VI and VII, and Figure 2, in Chapter II). 
The peak came in 1969, when there were forty-two independent nations 
in Africa, of which twenty-two had diplomatic relations with Taipei, 
thirteen with Peking, and seven with neither. But after Gambia es-
tablished relations with Taipei in November, 1968, and Senegal re-
sumed relations in July, 1969, there were to be no more additions to 
the HOC list, only losses, as country after country in the 1970s turned 
to Peking instead. Details of these developments are presented in 
Chapter IX. 
Bilateral Agreements 
Like Peking, Taipei also effectively used bilateral agreements in 
winning friends in Africa. Between 1957 and 1975, the ROC signed bi-
lateral agreements with twenty-six African countries (see Table XXII). 














1960. B. 5 
1960. 8.11 
1950. 8. 1 
1960. 8.13 
1962. 7. 1 
1950. B. 7 
1960. 8. 3 
1961. 4.27 
1964. 7. 6 
1966.10. 4 
1955. 9.30 
1968. 9. 6 
:t955. 2.18 
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*Senegal, Benin, and the CAR broke relations with the ROC during 1965-1968, 1964-1966, and 1964-1967, respectively, then 
res~~ed relations. 
NOTE: No nation in East Africa ever established diplomatic relations with ROC. 
Source: I-nan-piao (ROC). 
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TABLE XXII 
HOC AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN NATIONS 
Economic & 
Friendship Cultural Trade Technical 











Ivory Coast 1971 1962 
Liberia 1937 1963 1965 
Senegal 1963 
Sierra Leone 1964 
Togo 1964 
Upper Volta 1971 1964 
CENTRAL 
Central African 
Hcpublic 1970 1964 
Chad 1964 







Lesotho 1969 1968 
Madagascar 1962 1963 1967 
Malawi 1965 
South Africa 1975* 
Swazilnnd 1969 
*Two agreements, one on maize, one on general trade. 
Source: Tiao-yueh chi-pion (ROC), vols. 1-5. 
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ROC and African nations were economic and technical cooperation agree-
ments (with twenty-four countries, including two (Ghana and Tunisia] 
which had no diplomatic relations with Taupei). Next came trade agree-
ments (with eight countries, including Morocco, which then had rela-
tions with neither China but later recognized Peking). 
A friendship treaty with Liberia had been signed much earlier 
(1937), but in the period of this study, the ROC signed friendship 
treaties with only two African countries--Lesotho and Madagascar, and 
cultural agmeements with Cameroon and Liberia. Most of these ROC-
African agreements were signed during a visit to Taiwan by the head of 
the African country or a government delegation. A few were signed by 
HOC ambassadors with the host African governments. 
Visits To and From Taiwan 
The architect of Taipei's "personal diplomacy" in Africa was Yang 
Hsi-k'un, later called "Mr. Africa" because of his wide knowledge of 
African affairs. Born in Kiangsu province in 1912, Yang studied at 
Chinese and American universities, including Columbia University. From 
1948 to 1959 he represented «the ROC in the UN Trusteeship Counsil, and 
visited Africa in 1952 and 1955 as a member of the UN Visiting Mission 
to West Africa Trust Territories. He was recalled at the end of 1959 
to become director of West Asian Department of the ROC Foreign Ministry, 
which was then also in charge of African affairs. Before he returned 
home, Taipei appointed Yang a member of the 1960 goodwill mission to 
Cameroon's independence ceremonies. This was his first direct contact 
with African leaders. In 1964 Yang became Administrative Vice-Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and concurrently Director of the Department of 
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African Affairs. In 1968 he was promoted to vice-minister 1n charge of 
political affairs (first vice-minister). 
Taipei's "personal diplomacy" toward Africa concentrated on send-
ing HOC government leaders and official delegations to African coun-
tries and inviting African leaders and delegations to visit Taiwan. 
From the first goodwill mission to Africa in early 1960, until mid-
1971, eighty-seven ROC delegations consisting of 325 members visited 
Africa, approximately eight a year, and 881 invited Africans visited 
. . 8 
Ta1wan. Between 1962 and 1976 ten African heads of state or govern-
ments visited Taiwan, some more than once, as listed in Table XXIII. 
There were also visits to the ROC by the vice presidents of Togo, Li-
beria, and Botswana, and the queen of Lesotho. Sometimes Taipei also 
received visiting government officials or delegations from African 
countries which maintained diplomatic ties with Peking, .such as Kenya. 
Like Peking, Taipei attracted more delegations from Africa than 
it sent to Africa, and it did not reciprocate state visits. Neither 
President Chiang Kai-shek nor the successive prime ministers of the 
HOC ever visited Africa. There were, however, some ROC delegations at 
the Cabinet level. In July, 1963, five months before PRC Premier Chou 
En-lai's fifty-four day tour of ten African nations, ROC Foreign Minis-
ter Shcn Chang-huan and four other officials made a six-week trip to 
si.xtccn African countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory 
Coast, Niger, Togo, Liberia, Benin, Chad, CAR, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, 
9 
Zaire, Rwanda, and Madagascar. Of these, all except Ivory Coast and 
Niger had already established relations with Taipei, and during his 
visit, Shen signed joint communiques establishing relations with Ivory 
d . 10 Coast an N1ger. With the addition of Sierra Leone later in the 
After U.S. imperialism and its followers murdered Lumumba, 
smothered the Congolese independence, and swallowed the 
Congo, they clinked their glasses in 'congratulation' 
... How could they know that their 'throne' is built 
upon the volcano of the Congolese people's indignation? 
Blood debts must be paid back in blood. Now a people's 
armed struggle has broken out in the Congo. The un-
yielding people have arisen again . . . Although these 
patriots in the Kwilu Region, east of Leopoldville, are 
armed with nothing better than bows and arrows, spears, 
and machetes, yet they have dared to fight the puppet 
troops equipped and commanded by the U.S. imperialists 
and have expanded their area of operations. The co-
lonialists can hardly conceal their fears. If a spark 
is kindled; who can tell that it will not start a 
prairie fire?l7 
Especially after the Congo (Brazzaville) government recognized 
Peking on February 22, 1964, Chinese weapons were smuggled through 
the Congo, presumably by Gbenye's committee, for use by Mulele's 
guerrillas in Kwilu. Although the Soviet Union still recognized the 
Leopoldville government and had not suppo:r:'ted Mulele's revolt, there 
appears to have been some feeling in Brazzaville that the Russians 
might change their policy if not alienated by a rebel involvement 
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with China. A Mulele document captured by Zairean central government 
forces attempted to explain to Gbenye's Brazzaville committee Mulele's 
reason for accepting PRC aid: 
We have done evevything to get our Russian comrades to 
help us, but they have never comprehended our diffi-
culties. That is the reason Comrade Mulele left for 
China. China gave him a course to enter a military 
school. After having pursued the course, the Chinese 
friends gave him some material (arms and munitions 
and certain materials to make plastic bombs). We do 
not wish to offend our Russian friends, but we judge 
it best to address ourselves to China. It is because 
we do not have confidence in the Russians; China has 
aided Mulele.l8. 
An Indian newspaper reported that Mulele had received 200 round-
trip airplane tickets from the PRC for sending his cadres to China to 
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. 19 
be trained. In March, Zaire government released a document cap-
tured from Mulele's guerrillas, showing that Mulele not only received 
aid from Peking but based his "Jeunesse Movement" on the guerrilla 
20 
ideology and tactics of Mao Tse-tung. However, the revolt in the 
Kwilu region lasted only a few months and was crushed by forces of the 
central government. Mulele himself escaped to sanctuary in Brazza-
ville. 
By early 1964, Gbenye and Soumialot had left Brazzaville to re-
enter Zaire, launching attacks on government forces in northern 
Katanga and in Kivu province along the Burundi border. In May, the 
prem1er of Kivu province accused the PRC of leading the rebellion. 
Tshombe, who not only had made peace with the central government but 
became its prime minister in July, 1964, claimed that he had "absolute 
proof of Communist China's interference in the rebellion affecting the 
21 
eastern Congo." 
On August 1, Tshombe displayed to all ambassadors accredited to 
Leopoldville captured documents and arms as proof of PRC support of 
the rebels. He said that he also had evidence that Peking had paid 
$80,000 into the rebels' bank account in Brazzaville through the PRC 
22 embassy there. In. a note to UN Secretary-General U Thant on August 
20, Tshombc complained that Peking was exploibng the situation to 
"maintain a.permanent centre of subversion on Congolese soil." Ac-
cusing Peking of coordinating subversive activities in Zaire by send-
ing supplies and men, Tshombe asked U Thant to assist in curbing the 
infiltration of Zaire by agents and rebels from Burundi and Congo 
(Brazzaville). However, U Thant took no action. 23 
Other rebels calling themselves "Simbas" (lions) captured 
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Stanleyville on August 5, 1964, and a month later Gbenye arrived 1 n 
Stanleyville to proclaim creation of a "People's Republic of the Congo" 
with himself as prime minister, Soumia]ot as dcf--n."'" · · t " ·~--- m:tnts cr. This new 
Stanleyvi 11c government published its own newspaper, The Martyr, and 
the Gbenye reg_i_me was said to be "very favorably accepted by a large 
part of the population," and regarded jn many African capitals as the 
"first purely African government to be installed in the Congo since 
24 the fall of Lumumba." 
Peking was encouraged by these developments, and though denying 
all the charges of Chinese aid to the rebels, appears to have supported 
Gbenye more actively than ever before. 25 On November 28, Mao himself 
made his first public statement about a specific African country. 
Congolese people, you are not alone in your just strug-
gle. All the Chinese people are with you. All people 
throughout the 'world who oppose imperialism are with you. 
U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries 
are paper tigers. The struggle of _the Chinese people has 
proved this. The struggle of the Vietnamese people is 
proving it. The struggle of the Congolese people will 
surely prove this too. By strengthening national unity 
and persevering in protracted struggle, the Congolese 
people will certainly be victorious, and u.s. imperial-
ism will certainly be defeated.26 
However, PRC plans for helping Gbenye suffered a severe setback 
only two months later, when Burundi (for reasons discussed below) 
broke diplomatic relations with the PRC and expelled all Chinese on 
forty-eight hours' notice. Moreover, Gbenye's holding of 1,200 
European and American hostages enabled the Zaire government to obtain 
outside help. Tshombe authorized Belgium and the United States to 
rescue the hostages. USAF planes airlifted Belgian paratroopers to 
stanleyville on November 24. Aided by the Zaire national army, the 
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Belgians took Stanleyville on the same day and Gbenye's rebel govern-
• 
27 
ment fell. However, most of the rebel leaders--Gbenye, Soumialot, 
and General Nicolas Olenga--escaped to Sudan. Sporadic fighting be-
tween the rebels and government forces went on until May, 1965, when 
mercenaries captured the last rebel base of Buta, thus formally ending 
the revolt in eastern Zaire. 28 
Zaire Under Mobutu 
This also effectively ended PRC hopes for a pro-Peking government 
1n Zaire. President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Tshombe in Oc-
tober, 1965, and was himself ousted on November 24 by the Zairean army 
commander, Joseph Mobutu (who renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko 1n 1972). 
Peking made no attempt at reconciliation with the Leopoldville govern-
ment, and instead charged that Mobutu was "one of the murderers of the 
Congolese national hero Patrice Lumumba, and . . . is a notorious run-
. f h . . 1. t 29 n1ng dog o t e 1mper1a 1s s." Remembering Peking's long support of 
Lumumba, Gizenga, Mulele, and Gbenye, the Mobutu government indeed 
30 
proved to be strongly hostile to the PRC. Even after U.S. President 
Nixon visited Peking in February, 1972, Zaire Radio Kinshasa declared: 
The Zairean people cannot easily forget the flagrant 
interference by People's China in their internal af-
fairs during the dark and tragic period of rebellion 
Ln their country. As long as the Chinese authorities 
fail to give every proof of a radical and absolute 
change of their attitude towards us, there will never 
be any question of our recognizing the People's Re-
public of China.31 
Nine months later, the Zairean attitude changed. On November 19, 
1972, Chiao Kuan-hua, the PRC's vice-foreign minister, and Inonga 
Loklngol'ome, the Zairean deputy commissioner of state for foreign 
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affairs, signed a joint communique 1n Paris, agreeing to "realize the 
normalization of relations between the two countries as from November 
24, 1972, and to exchange diplomatic representatives at the ambassa-
dorial level. 1132 
Between January 10 and 20, 1973, Mobutu visited Peking at the 
PRC's invitation. He talked with Mao, and later said that Mao had ad-
mitted "with brutal frankness" that he had spent a loL of money and 
33 arms trying to overthrow the Zairean government. During Mobutu's 
visit, the PRC and Zaire signed an economic and technical cooperation 
agreement and a trade agreement (January 14), under which Peking 
granted Kinshasa an interest-free loan of 5 billion Belgian francs 
($100 million) with an "unprecedented" moratorium period. 34 This was 
one of the largest loans received by any African country from Peking. 
After Mobutu's visit, nineteen PRC experts in agriculture, hor-
ticulture, and agricultural mechanization arrived in Kinshasa in early 
April to establish experimental stations. By August, more than one 
d . 1 ' 1 k' . 35 hundre PRC agr1cu tura experts were wor 1ng 1n Za1re. In early No-
vember, a delegation from the Chinese Mechanical Industry and Electri-
cal Institute toured Zaire to study sites for an agricultural equipment 
36 assembly plant. In late November, 1973, ten Chinese doctors, includ-
. . h . 1 'b b 37 two women, arr1ved to work 1n t e hosp1ta at K1 am u. In April, 
1974, agreements on cooperation in agriculture, maritime navigation, 
medicine, and banking were signed between Peking and Kinshasa, but no 
38 details of the agreements were announced. An air transport agreement 
39 was signed in Peking on May 31. Also in May, a second team of thir-
. k . . 40 teen Chinese doctors arr1ved to wor 1n Za1re. 
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Kinshasa Radio ~eported in November, 1974, that the PRC would 
i 
build a stadium with a capacity of more than 80,000 in Kinshasa.. 41 In 
mid-December, Mobutu led a sixty-five member dcJcgation to pay his 
vi::;d, to the PHC. H: was announc,,d in SepL,~mhcr, 1975, that the I'HC 
wou]d build a machine-tool f'actory ami a sugar rcfjnery i_n Zaire. 
Construction of the (::hinesc-aided People's Palace in Kinshasa began ln 
November, 1975. 42 D~ring 1976, Zaire received more medical aid from 
k . 43 Pe 1ng. Thus, within a short period of four years, Zaire; Peking's 
bitterest enemy 1n Central Africa, became a major recipient of PRC aid. 
Soviet support for renewed rebellions 1n the rich Shaba province 
(formerly Katanga) in 1977, and again 1n early 1978 (involving in-
curs1ons by Zairean exiles from Soviet-dominated Angola) can be ex-
i 
pectcd to strengtheni Zaire's new tics with Peking. 
Burundi and Rwanda 
The small Belgian trust territo~ of Ruanda-Urundi on the eastern 
edge of Zaire had a Unified Belgian administration but two hereditary 
African kings (mwami), one in the north, one in the south. Both areas 
had for centuries had a similar tribal division with an aristocratic 
ruling minority of Tutsis'(also called Tussis, Batusis, Watusis, or 
watutsis) of 10 percent to 15 percent, and a subservient peasant ma-
jority of Hutus (also called Bahutus) of 85 percent to 90 percent. 
The northern king, Mwami Kigeri V, was overthrown by a bloody Hutu re-
volt in 1959, and about half the Tutsi population fled into exile. A 
United Nations referendum on September 18, 1961, confirmed the aboli-
tion of the monarchy in the north, which became the independent Republic 
of Rwanda on July 1, 1962. 
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The southern king, Mwami MwambuLsa IV, was rnor>t~ poru]ar and tribal 
rc:lations were somewhat bcLtcr 1n Lhc south, which became the indcpcnd-
end Kingdom of Burundi on July 1, 1962. 44 Since independence, the do-
mestic politics of both Rwanda and Burundi have been dominated by 
tribal conflicts, and their foreign policies have been deeply af-
fected by the same factor. The Hutu peasant republic of Rwanda 
banned Communism, recognized the ROC, and followed a pro-Western 
foreign policy. The autocratic Tutsi kingdom of Burundi accused Bel-
gium of supporting the 1959 Hutu rebellion in Rwanda and encouraging 
Hutu rebellion in Burundi; it developed friendly relations with the 
PRC and other Communist countries. Both Rwanda and Burundi have been 
plagued since independence by continuing Hutu-Tutsi conflicts involv-
ing refugees or exiles, and approaching genocide. 
Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Burundi became the sore spot in Rwanda-
Burundi relations. Centered around their deposed king, the exiles 
I 
organized guerrilla raiding forces called Inyenzi ("cockroaches," be-
cause they work at n~ght) to invade Rwanda and attempt to restore the 
Tutsi monarchy there~ As early as 1962, Rwanda accused Burundi of 
permitting and aiding Tutsi attacks across the border; Burundi Prime 
45 
Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe strongly denied the charges. 
This turbulent $ituation in Rwanda and Burundi coincided with the 
various Lumumbist rebellions in Zaire, and attracted Peking's attention 
in its search for access to Zaire. Though professing to oppose aris-
tocratic leisure cla~ses such as the Tutsis and to favor the liberation 
of oppressed working classes such as the Hutus, Peking opportunistic-
ally elected tq establish close relations not with the peasant 
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republic of Rwanda but with the autocratic kingdom of Burundi. The 
reason was simply that Peking had little interest -in either country 
for itself, but needed one of them as an avenue for aid to rebels in 
Zaire. Both countries border on Zaire's Kivu province, from which 
men or supplies could be moved north to Stanleyville or south to 
Katanga, the main areas of rebellion in Zaire's long civil war. But 
Rwanda was anti-Communist, Burundi anti-Western, and it did not re-
quire much effort on the part of the Chinese to turn Burundi into 
Peking's base to support Zairean guerrillas. 
In Burundi, as in Zaire, the United States and Belgium were the 
two major targets of Peking's propaganda. On July 10, 1962, nine 
days after Rwanda and Burundi became independent, Kao Liang, a NCNA 
correspondent and the leading figure in Peking's infiltration of 
central and east Africa, sent a dispatch from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 
accusing both the United States and Belgium of "again inciting the two 
peoples, Bahutu and Batutsi, and the two newly independent countries 
46 to fight each other." 
Although Burundi Prime Minister Andre Muhirwa said in July, 1962, 
that Burundi intended "to have relations with only one China, that is, 
the People's Republic of China," formal diplomatic relations were not 
established until the end of 1963. 47 The Burundi government actually 
invited both Peking and Taipei to its delayed independence ceremonies 
in late September, 1962. Ho Ying, then Peking's ambassador to Tan-
zania, journeyed to Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, for the ceremony 
but left on finding that an ROC representative was also there. Ho 
issued a statem~~t charging a U.S. plot to create "two Chinas," but 
. . . t . t" 48 portray1ng the Burund1 government as merely an 1nnocen v1c 1m. 
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In March, 1963, Burundi's Queen Therese Kanyonga visited Peking at 
the inv i tab on of' the PRC National Women's Federation and the Chinese 
People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. Flattered by the grandiose re-
ception accorded her, the Queen said she would henceforward regard the 
h . h . 49 C lnese as er own "couslns." Immediately after the Queen's visit, 
NCNA sent Kao Liang from Dar-es-Salaam to Bujumbura to establish the 
first contacts with Burundi leaders. Through bribery and other un-
scrupulous methods, Kao Liang soon controlled some members of the 
Burundi government and of the Mwami's court. 5° Kao's efficient work 
led Burundi to establish diplomatic relations with Peking on December 
21, 1963. 
Peking's first ambassador, Liu Yu-feng, arrived in Bujumbura on 
June l. With vast resources at his disposal, and an able and un-
scrupulous charge d'affaires, Chiang Yen, who as consul in Djarkarta 
had been once arrested by Indonesian authorities for subversive ac-
tivities, Liu was able to find willing accomplices within Burundi. 
Within a few months, Burundi became one of the most important bases 
of Chinese infiltration in Africa. Despite Burundi's smallness and 
lack of Chinese residents, the PRC embassy staff quickly became extra-
ordinarily large; the ambassador admitted expansion from eight to 
twenty, and the actual figure was reported to be forty-five. In Bu-
jumbura, the Chinese also made close contacts with Gaston Soumialot, 
defense minister of the Gbenye rebel government in Zaire, whom they 
put up at PRC expense at a Bujumbura hotel, as well as with the de-
posed Tutsi king of Rwanda, .Kigeri V. 
In Burundi, the Chinese Communists were pursuing a two-fold ob-
jective: to support the Zaire guerrillas and to overthrow the 
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anti-Peking republican government in Rwanda by using thousands of Tutsi 
I Inycnz i] guerrillas 1 iving as refugees in Burundi. In order to fa-
ci lil.alc lhc revolt in eastern Zaire, four training camps were set up 
in Burundi, at Rwi.gi, Musinga, Kirundo, and Murore, where Chinese in-
structors trained Zairean rebels, and provided them generously with 
money, arms and food supplies. PRC Charge d'Affaires Chiang Yen became 
52 
1n effect quartermaster general of the Gbenye forces. 
To train the Inyenzi guerrillas for action in Rwanda, the Chinese 
set up a training camp for 10,000 Tutsi refugees at Murore in Burundi. 
Chinese-trained Tutsis worked as instructors. Arms were shipped by 
Chinese ships to Dar-es-Salaam and transferred overland through Tan-
zania, Uganda, and Burundi for division between the Zairean and In-
. ' 53 
yenz1 guerr1llas. 
Everything went smoothly for the Chinese in Burundi until May, 
1964, when a young Chinese embassy staff member in Bujumbura defected 
to the West. On May 26, Tung Chi-p'ing, a 24-year old assistant cul-
tural attache who had arrived in Bujumbura the day before, took refuge 
in the U.S. Embassy, bringing with him a 72-page document on PRC ac-
tivities in Africa. Tung's defection and his subsequent revelations 
created a considerable stir 1n black Africa, especially in Burundi. 
He presented concrete evidence of PRC bribery of corrupt African 
politicians, such as Malian Minister of Information Gologo, and PRC 
exploi tat:ion of African news media and propaganda agencies through 
b 'b 54 r1 ery. 
Extremely embarrassed by Tung's defection, Peking avoided dis-
cussing his charges and simply claimed that he had been kidnapped by 
lhe U.S. J<:mbassy. 55 Despite Tung's revelations, Chinese influence 
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continued to grow i.n Burundi, at the expense of both Belgians and 
Americans. In early January, 1965, a large quantity of buried Chinese 
arms and ammunitions were discovered in Bujumbura and Kitega. 56 These 
weapons were presumably to be distributed to Tutsi refugees from 
Rwanda and to followers of Burundi's pro-Peking Prime Minister Albin 
Nyamoya, a Tutsi. Fearing that militant Tutsis might provoke a Hutu 
uprising that could destroy the Burundi monarchy as the Rwandan monarchy 
had been overthrown in 1959, the Burundi king dismissed Nyamoya on 
January 11, and replaced him with the former conservative Prime Minis-
ter Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu considered to be anti-Chinese. However, 
four days lat:er, Ngendandumwe was assassinated by a Hwanda refugee, 
Gonzalve Muyenzi, who was an accountant at the American Embassy· in Bu-
jumbura but later admitted receiving money from PRC agents. 
The Mwami immediately had most of the pro-Chinese leaders ar-
rested, including former Prime Minister Nyamoya, and dissolved the 
pro-Peking "Workers' Federation" and the "Rwagasore National 
Youth." 57 On January 25 the Mwami appointed Joseph Bamina, a 
prominent Hutu leader, as prime minister. Four days later, the 
Burundi government suspended relations with Peking, encircled the 
PRC embassy with troops, and ordered all Chinese Embassy personnel 
58 
to leave the country within two days. 
tion: 
In a public address, Prime Minister Bamina explained his ac-
[Chinese] interference in the internal politics of 
Burundi obliged the Government of Burundi to suspend 
diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Re-
public. In fact, their support and their encourage-
ment were always made in one direction only and 
risked compromising not only our feelings of unity 
and esprit de corps between the Barundi [sic] them-
selves but also the relations between Burundi and 
neighboring countries.59 
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On January 30, the PRC Embassy delivered a note to Burundi. Foreign Min-
lstcr Marc Maniraki.za protesting the unilateral suspension of diplomatic 
relations. Peking acceded to the Burundi demand that the entire staf'f 
of the Chinese Embassy be withdrawn from Burundi, but expressed hope 
60 that relations could be resumed in the future. Next day, the PRC 
Foreign Ministry formally issued a statement criticizing the action of 
the Burundi government: 
China has never interfered in the internal affairs of 
the Kingdom of Burundi ••• Evidently, the Burundi 
authorities have taken this action as a result of sub-
mission to the pressure of the U.S. and Belgian im-
perialists who have always been hostile to China-Burundi 
friendship and who have from the outset tried to under-
mine it by every conceivable means ••• The Chinese 
Government has every reason to ask the Burundi author-
ities to revoke their demand for the withdrawal of the 
Chinese Embassy in Burundi, because this demand is ut-
terly groundless and unjustifiable, because it goes 
against the aspirations of the broad sections of the 
patriotic people in Burundi and against the elementary 
principles governing international relations. However, 
we have refrained from doing so, but followed a dif-
ferent course, that is, we have acceded to the demand 
of the Burundi authorities and will soon withdraw our 
Embassy • • • We believe that when we have followed 
this course, the Royal Government and people of Burundi 
will be able to discern more clearly who are their 
friends and who their foes. At any time when the Royal 
Government of Burundi wishes to have the relations be-
tween our two countries resumed, the Chinese Government 
will give it sympathetic consideration. 6l 
On February 2, Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial charging 
that the United states and Belgium had sabotaged Sino-Burundi re-
lations: 
This is an extremely grave case of the Royal Government 
of Burundi unilaterally undermining the relations be-
tween the two countries ••• The activities of the 
Chinese Embassy have always been correct, open and 
above board, and irreproachable ••• An AFP dis-
patch said on 30 January thaL the assassin had con-
fessed that he was an 'accounLin~ clerk' of Lhc U.S. 
embassy and that he received a considerable sum after 
he had carried out the assassination .•• In engi-
neering this political murder, u.s. imperialism 
evidently wants to sow discord among the nationali-
ties in Burundi and to whip up an anti-·China campaign. 
It is now clear enough for the whole world to see what 
sinister, malicious and despicable means u.s. imper-
ialism is capable of employing • • • We firmly be-
lieve that the interests of China and Burundi are one, 
that the relations of friendship and cooperation be-
tween the two countries must eventually be restored 
and grow, and that the friendship between our two 
peoples decidedly cannot be undermined by any forces 
in the world. The conspiracy of the u.s. and Belgian 
imperialists is destined to go bankrupt.62 
Chinese Ambassador Liu Yu-feng and his staff left Bujumbura 
by special plane on February 2, 1965, thus ending the first phase 
of Peking's active infiltration 1n this tiny central African 
country. For a while Taipei tried to fill the vacuum left by 
Peking. In late August, Yang Hsi-k'un, the ROC deputy Foreign 
Minister, visited Bujumbura during his routine annual African trip. 
Yang was received by the Mwami and gave him a message from ROC 
President Chiang Kai-shek. The Mwami and Yang agreed that closer 
and more regular contacts should be established between Bujumbura 
d . . 63 an Ta1pe1. However, these plans were soon aborted by another 
drastic change of the political situation in Burundi. 
On the night of October 18-19, 1965, a group of Hutu gendarmes 
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staged an unsuccessful coup against the Mwami. This led to a mass exe-
cut ion of Hutu army officers and political leaders, including former 
Prime Minister Bamina, who had resigned under pressure from the Mwami 
in September. A new tribal conflict was touched off, and Burundi 
plunged into political instability. 
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On July 8, 1966, the Burundi king was deposed by his nineteen-
year old son, who was crowned Mwami Ntari V on September 1 but was 
himself deposed on November 29 by his Tutsi prime minister, Michel 
. b 64 M1com ero. Meanwhile, a reconciliation between Burundi, Rwanda, 
and Zaire had been achieved at a conference in Kinshasa in late August. 
Burundi's Foreign Minister Pie Masumbuku ~nnounced at Kinshasa that 
Burundi would resume diplomatic relations with the Peking government 
and support its admission to the United Nations. 65 Since young Mwami 
Ntari V was said to oppose Micombero's policy of rapprochement with 
Peking, the king's ouster seemed to remove the only obstacle. But 1n 
fact, the new Republic of Burundi under Micombero ·did not restore dip-
lomatic relations with Peking until five years after the 1966 an-
nouncement. The most likely reason is that early restoration of re-
lations would have antagonized Mobutu of Zaire, and jeopardized the 
reconciliation between Zaire and Burundi. 
By late 1971, however, majority support for Peking 1n the United 
Nations was emerging. Burundi had continued voting for Peking despite 
the 1965 rupture, and resumed diplomatic relations less than two weeks 
before the final United Nations vote. On October 13, 1971, the PRC and 
Burundi ambassadors to Tanzania, Chung Hsi-tung and Protais Mangona, 
signed a joint communique in Dar es Salaam restoring diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries. 66 
In January, 1972, a Burundi delegation led by Artemon Simbanaiye, 
minister of foreign affairs, cooperation and planning, visited Peking 
67 
and signed trade and economic and technical cooperation agreements. 
Peking granted Burundi an interest-free loan of $20 million to be dis-
bursed between 1972 and 1976, repayable over ten years with a ten-year 
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t . . d 68 mora ortum pcrJo • A Burundi. trade delegatlon visited the PHC in Oc-
tobcr, 197~, hut as of' late 1976, there were no reports of' projects 
69 undertaken under the PHC loan. 
Rwanda, which had been a major target of Peking's subversion in 
Burundi, was also ready to recognize the PRC by late 1971. Belgium 
established diplomatic relations with Peking on October 26; 1971, the 
day of the final United Nations vote on "China's representation." 
Rwanda had remained on good terms with Belgium, and the change in Bel-
gian policy appears to have been the principal reason for a change in 
Rwanda's policy. The PRC ambassador to Tanzania Chung Hsi-tung, came 
to Kigali, capital of Rwanda, on November 4, 1971, and after eight days 
of negotiation, signed a joint communique with D. Gashonga, Rwanda's 
minister of coordination of economic, technical and financial affairs 
of the presidency, establishing diplomatic relations between Rwanda and 
the PRc. 70 
Under an economic and technical cooperation agreement signed on 
May 13, 1972, in Kigali, the PRC granted Rwanda an interest-free loan 
f $ '11' 71 0 22 ml lOD. Between June 21 and 24, 1972, a Rwanda trade dele-
. . . . h h 72 gation vis1ted Pek1ng and s1gned a trade agreement w1t t e PRC. 
Chinese aid in rice cultivation and in constructing both a sugar re-
finery and a road linking Rwanda and Tanzania was promised on June 6, 
1973; PRC technicians and road equipment arrived in Rwanda in Decem-
73 ber. 
Meanwhile, both Burundi and Rwanda were exper1enc1ng serious do-
mestic disturbances. Micombero's execution of the former Burundi king 
on April 1, 1972, touched off a comple~ tribal war that proved to be 
even bloodier than the 1963 war in Hwanda. Hutu exiles returned to 
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Burundi from Rwanda and other nearby countries, and during 1972 and 
1973 there were mass killings on both sides: more than 100,000 Hutus 
and "tens of thousands" of Tutsis in Burundi.were slaughtered, in 
something approaching mutual genocide. Although Peking's earlier ex-
ploitation of Tutsi-Hutu animosities in both Burundi and Rwanda was 
at least partly responsible for the later carnage, the PRC has not 
been charged with direct involvement in the 1972-1973 fighting. 74 
Military coups overthrew the Rwanda government on July 5, 1973, and 
the Burundi government on November 1, 1976, but both countries have 
maintained relations with Peking. 
Central African Republic (CAR) 
Like former Belgian Zaire and Rwanda, the three former French 
colonies in Central Africa--the CAR, Chad, and Niger--all recognized 
Taipei soon after they achieved independence, and only the CAR broke 
with Taipei before 1972. The French colony of Oubangui-Chari 
(Ubangi-Shari) became the independent Central African Republic on 
August 13, 1960. Both Peking and Taipei quickly granted recognition 
to the CAR, but only the ROC was invited to the independence cere-
75 mony. However, formal diplomatic relations with Taipei were not 
established until April 13, 1962. 
Landlocked and with few natural resources, the CAR did not of-
fer much attraction for foreign capital investment. Except for 
French aid and a small amount from the United States, the poor 
country could not find much outside help. The deteriorating economic 
situation made the CAR receptive to Peking's diplomatic advances. 
On hearing from the PRC ambassador in Congo (Brazzaville), Chou 
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Chiu-yeh, that Peking might be willing to mitigate the CAR's transport 
and communication problems, CAR President David Dacko sent a three-man 
friendship mission, led by Ferdinand Bassamoungou, president of the 
I 
Economic and Social Council, to Peking in August, 1964. 
Bassamoungou and Tseng Yung-chuan, PRC Vice Foreign Minister, 
agreed on August 27 to establish diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, but withheld formal announcement until a PRC good will 
mission led by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Lu Hsu-chang visited 
76 Bangui, the CAR capital, in September. There Lu and President 
Dacko also signed agreements on trade, cultural cooperation, and 
economic and technical cooperation. 77 
On October 3, 1964, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper 
Jen-min jih-pao's editorial on these events seemed less interested in 
the CAR itself than in the impending ouster of ROC diplomats from the 
CAR. 78 The CAR Foreign Ministry officially notified the ROC charge 
d'affaires in Bangui on 
had recognized the PRC 
79 the Chinese people. 
October 7 that as of reptember 29, the CAR 
! 
I 
as the sole legal government representing all 
The ROC government announced on November 5 
that it had severed diplomatic relations with the CAR and withdrawn 
80 its embassy and a handicraft demonstration team. 
In mid-1965, Meng Ying, the first PRC ambassador to Bangui, 
signed an agreement under which the PRC made a small long-term 
interest-free loan of 1,000 million francs CFA ($4 million) to the 
CAR, half in cash and half in industrial equipment. 81 President 
Dacko evidently had misgivings about Peking's intentions. He told 
a visiting PRC parliamentary mission in April, 1965, that it would 
be as impossible to transport CAR ideology to China as it would be 
lo try to apply Chinese politics in the CAR. 82 
This remark had a strange parallel in Chinese Communist Party 
history, which can hardly have been forgotten by Dacko's 1965 audience. 
Forty-two years before, Soviet representative Adolf Joffe had signed a 
joint manifesto with China's Sun Yat-sen, agreeing that conditions in 
China made it impossible to extend Communism or the Soviet system to 
h . 83 C .1na. This Soviet effort to allay Chinese apprehensions in 1923 
was not echoed by the Chinese Communists dealing with the CAR in 1965. 
Instead, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei visited Bangui in June, 
and attempted to persuade CAR leaders to join with Peking in opposing 
the participation of the USSR and Zaire in the Peking-sponsored second 
Bandung Conference s~heduled to meet in Algiers. Such action would have 
involved the CAR in ~he bitter Sino-Soviet dispute, and the CAR re-
jected Peking's request. 
84 
In the early morning of New Year's Day, 1966, President Dacko was 
overthrown by a military coup led by his cousin, Colonel Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa, chief of staff of the CAR Army. Five days later, Bokassa an-
nounccd that diplomatic relations with Peking had been severed following 
discovery on January 5 of a cache of Chinese weapons and documents in-
dicating that pro-Chinese elements in the CAR had intended, with Pe-
king's aid, to overthrow the Dacko government. Bokassa asserted that 
his own coup had saved Dacko's life because "sooner or later he would 
. . d b h h. t . t 85 have been el1m1nate y t e pro-C 1nese ex rem1s s." Bokassa ordered 
the Chinese Embassy staff to leave the CAR within forty-eight hours; by 
January 8, thirty-one Chinese, including diplomats, technical experts, 
- . 86 
and NCNA correspondents had left Bangm. 
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A PRC government statement charged the Bokassa government with an 
"unreasonable act ... [that] runs counter to the desire of the entire 
87 people of its country." As expected, the ROC government welcomed 
this move taken by Bokassa. Chung-yang jih-pao [Central daily news], 
the organ of the ROC ruling Kuomintang party, in a January 8 editorial, 
interpreted the recent moves by Benin and the CAR to break relations 
with the Pe~ing regime as signs of an anti-Communist trend in Africa 
because "far-sighted African statesmen have gradually realized the the 
objective of what Chou [En-lai] called 'unconditional aid' is to seize 
th . t . 88 e1r coun r1es." 
Although ROC Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un paid a goodwill 
visit to the CAR in August, 1966, diplomatic relations between the ROC 
and CAR were not formally restored until May, 1968. President Bokassa 
visited Taipei in October, 1970, and the CAR received ROC agricultural 
aid. Bangui's relations with Taipei were rather unstable, but con-
tinued until August 20, 1976, when the CAR again established relations 
wHh Peking, the last country in Central Africa to do so. 
Chad 
Even the short-lived success of PRC overtures to the CAR in 
1964-1965 was not repeated in the other former French colonies of 
Central Africa, Chad and Niger. Both these countries were quickly 
recognized by both Peking and Taipei, but both chose to establish re-
lations with Taipei. Chad became independent on August 11, 1960, one 
week after Niger, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC 
89 on January 13, 1962. Taipei's aid program in Africa was necessarily 
smaller than Peking's, but Chad received technical and agricultural 
90 aid, and a $3 million loan, from the ROC. Despite reports that 
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Peking once supported the Chad National Union, a violent revolution-
ary group opposed to N'Garta Tombalbaye's pro-French government, Chad 
was too isolated to be reached from the main centers of PRC subversive 
activities in west and central Africa. Peking made little effort to 
compete in Chad until after the Cultural Revolution. 
When a cholera epidemic broke out in Chad in June, 1971, the 
C d t d d f . 91 PR ona e 200,000 oses o vacclne. Like a similar 1973 dona-
tion of measles vaccine to Upper Volta (mentioned ln Chapter IV), 
this humanitarian gesture helped to soften Chad's policy toward 
Peking. Later the same month, when the eighth conference of African 
heads of state met in Addis Ababa, the PRC Ambassador to Ethiopia, 
Yu Pei-wen, had a long talk with Chad's President Tombalbaye. Never-
theless, in the final 1971 United Nations vote on the China issue, 
Chad still voted against Peking's admission, and did not recognize 
Peking until November 28, 1972. President Tombalbaye said his govern-
ment had decided to establish diplomatic relations with Peking "be-
cause we could not ignore a people [sic] with more than 800 million 
inhabitants."92 
A>Chad dEflegation led by Abdoulaye Djonouma, minister of ter-, 
ritorial development and housing, visited Peking and signed trade and 
economic and technical cooperation agreements on September 20, 1973; 
93 
the PRC granted Chad a loan of $50 million for rural development. 
In May, 1974, a group of PRC experts completed a preliminary study qn 
construction of a bridge over the Chari River for the Chadian govern-
ment.94 In late July, the PRC Red Cross donated pharmaceutical 
supplies to Chad, including another 200,000 doses of anti-cholera 
vaccine. 95 As of late 1976, Chad was still on Peking's aid list. 
Niger 
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The former French colony of Niger had reasons of its own for 
hostility to Peking. In 1959, the autonomous government of Niger 
under President Hamani Diori had outlawed the antigovernment Sawaba 
party led by Diori's arch-rival Djibo Bakary. Bakary fled the coun-
try, and tried to organize support in nearby Ghana (which established 
relations with Peking in July, 1960) and in Mali (which opened rela-
tions with Peking in October, 1960). At the April, 1960, second AAPSO 
conference in Guinea (which had recognized Peking in 1959), PRC 
representatives made contact with Bakary of Niger, and reportedly gave 
him more than $1 million for use in overthrowing the Diori govern-
ment.96 
When Niger became independent on August 3, 1960, both Peking and 
Taipei quickly recognized the new nation, but Niger invited only Taipei 
to send representatives to the independence ceremony. 97 Diplomatic re-
lations with Taipei were not established until July 22, 1963, but 
Peking's ties with Bakary made it certain that Diori would not recog-
nize Peking. PRC support of Bakary was intensified in 1961 and 1962, 
when a small group of his adherents received military training at 
Nanking, China, according to the testimony of one of its commanders 
when captured in 1964. 98 Later PRC training of Niger rebels was 
carried out in the camps in Ghana mentioned in Chapter IV. Although 
Bakary's force was estimated at orlly 150, he ordered a series of un-
successful attacks in Niger in September, 1964. Early in 1965, there 
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was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Diori, and 
testimony given by captured rebels and the failed assassin indicate 
substantial PRC involvement in both the revolt and the assassination 
. 99 
attempt. 
Diori told a press conference in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, on Feb-
ruary 3, 1965, that "the attack by commandos of the opposition 
Sawaba party was organized, financed, and led by Communist China and 
the weapons used were bought with Chinese money deposited in banks 
100 at Brussels, Geneva, and Accra." It was therefore not surprising 
that France's recognition of Peking in 1964 did not impress Niger. 
Diori told a Niamey newspaper in August, 1965, that Peking was 1n-
filtrating Africa through economic penetration and subversion, 1n-
eluding nine subversive attacks on Niger: 
You will easily understand that after being so attacked 
we are not prepared to establish relations with the PRC. 
We have expressed to the French Government how embarras-
sing and distressing its recognition of the PRC Govern-
ment is for countries like ours, which are exposed to 
Chinese Government subversion.lOl 
In an address to the nation on October 11, 1965, following his 
re-election, President Diori reaffirmed that while Niger would im-
prove its relations with certain countries of the Eastern bloc, it 
could not establish relations with the PRC, "which gives ideological 
and military training to nationals of other countries, and assists 
• • h • t • I 102 them financially to create subvers1on 1n t e1r coun r1es. 1 This 
was almost as adamant as a similar statement a month earlier by Ivory 
Coast President Houphouet-Boigny (see Chapter IV). 
Niger became one of the principal recipients of ROC agricultural 
aid in Africa. Diori visited Taipei in 1969 to attend the October 10 
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national day celebrations, and ROC Vice Foreign Ministery Yang Hsi-
k'un visited Niger several times during his annual African tours. Good 
relations with Taipei continued until Diori was overthrown by a mili-
tary coup on April 15, 1974, two and a half years after Peking was ad-
mitted to the United Nations. 
A delegation led by Major Sani Sound Sido, vice-president of 
Niger's supreme military council, visited the PRC and, in a joint com-
munique on July 20, the two countries agreed to establish diplomatic 
1 t . 103 re a 1ons. An economic and technical cooperation agreement, signed 
the same day, granted Niger an interest-free loan of 12 billion CFA 
francs (about $52.6 million), to finance cement works, a sugar agro-
104 industrial complex, a fruit plant, and a farm implement factory. 
In 1975, the PRC agreed to send a medical team to work in Niger. 105 
During 1976, Niger was still receiving aid from Peking. 
FOOTNOTES 
. 1Quoted in Free China Weekly, I, 24 (August 9, 1964), p. 3. Tung 
Chi-p'ing arrived in the capital of Burundi on May 25, 1964, as PRC 
assistant cultural attache, and sought asylum in the U.S. embassy 
there one day later. The statement quoted here (from an August, 
1964, press conference in New York) was amplified in an article by 
Tung Chi-p'ing as told to Quentin Reynolds, "Red China," Look, 28, 24 
(December 1, 1964), p. 21: "Before I was sent to Burundi-:-r-had 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PRC AND EAST AFRICA 
Though Peking began its African diplomatic offensive from the west 
coast, it was in East Africa, comprising Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, that Peking achieved the most remarkable 
results. This Chinese success can be explained in several ways. First, 
the PRC was attractive to East African elites as a developmental model. 
The transformation of China under Communist rule from a poor and back-
ward country to a self-sufficient one, potentially a superpower, within 
a short span of time had been generally admired by such West African 
leaders as Guinea's Toure, Ghana's Nkrumah, and Mali's Keita. But it 
was in East Africa that the Chinese model was taken most seriously as 
one worth imitating. 
Second, Peking's early exper1ence 1n West Africa and lessons 
learned 1n Central Africa made the PRC more adroit and discreet in 
1 
dealing with East African leaders. Third, the British colonies 1n 
East Africa gained independence later than those in West Africa, a~d 
later than the French colonies in West and Central Africa. This fact, 
together with a Soviet decision to give most of its aid to Egypt, gave 
Peking more opportunity to establish pre-independence contacts with 
East African leaders and to claim that it was helping them more than 
the USSR, althqugh Peking's involvement in the actual drive for inde-
. . l 2 pendence was m1n1ma . 
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A striking measure of Peking's success in East Africa is that 
this is the only African region where no country ever recognized 
Taipei. Five of its six principal countries recognized Peking soon 
after achieving independence. Only Ethiopia, whose independence 
pre-dated the existence of the PRC, delayed establishing relations 
with Peking until after the Cultural Revolution. The newest and 
smallest country of East Africa, Djibouti, did not gain independence 
until 1977; since no report of official contact with Peking has yet 
appeared, Djibouti is not discussed here. PRC relations with the 
other East African countries are discussed in order of their estab-
lishing diplomatic relations with Peking, as shown in Table XVII. 
The horizontal line of dashes separates the periods before and after 
the Cultural Revolution. Since no East African country broke re-
lations with the PRC, the final column in Tables XV and XVI has no 
counterpart here. 
Sudan 
After half a century under joint British-Egyptian rule, Sudan at-
tained independence on New Year's Day, 1956. Although ruled by Arabs 
and therefore more closely tied to the Middle East than to black Africa 
Sudan is included here because its blacks (comprising 35 percent of the 
total Sudanese population) are the majority in southern Sudan, and ra-
cial discord between southern blacks and northern Arabs has been a ma-
jor factor in Sudan's internal politics. 
Peking recognized the Sudan promptly in early 1956, but the sudan 
did not reciprocate until three years later, after a military coup 












Figure 5. Map of East Africa 
TABLE XVII 
EAST AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS 
IndeEendence DiElomatic Relations with PRC Diplomatic Relations 
Date Order Order Date Country With ROC 
1956.1.1 2 1 1958.12.1 Sudan never 
1960.7.1 3 2 1960.12.16 Somalia never 
1961.12.14 4 3 1961.12.9 Tanzania never 
1962.10.9 5 4 1962.10.18 Uganda never 
1963.12.12 6 5 1963.12.14 Kenya never 
'''1941.5.5 1 6 1970.11.24 Ethiopia never 
1977.6.27 7 ? Djibouti never 
*Date of the return of Emperor Haile Selassie to the Ethiopian capital, on the fifth an-
niversary of its fall to Italian forces who were ousted by the British 1n 1941. 
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recognition to Peking on November 30, 1958, two weeks after the coup, 
and diplomatic relations were formally established on December 1, 
3 
1958. Trade relations between the PRC and the Sudan had existed since 
1956, and the volume increased significantly after 1959. By 1964 Pe-
king was the sixth largest purchaser of Sudanese cotton, after West 
4 Germany, India, Great Britain, Italy and Japan. 
After establishment of relations, the Sudan consistently advo-
cated the PRC's admission into the United Nations. 5 Chou En-lai 
visitedKhartoumon his 1963-1964 tour of ten African countries and the 
Sudanese President Abboud paid a reciprocal visit to the PRC from May 
16 to 20, 1964. But no friendship treaty or aid agreement was signed, 
and the joint communique by Abboud and Liu Shao-ch'i, chairman of the 
PRC, contained nothing but platitudes. 6 The reason for this is that 
the Sudan had economic ties with the Western powers and growing ties 
with the Soviet Union. Abboud had visited Moscow in July, 1961, and 
received an "open credit" of 20 mill~on roubles (8 million pounds), to 
be repaid in twelve years at 2Yz percent interest. 7 Leonid I. Brezhnev, 
then President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, paid a return 
visit to the Sudan in November, and signed an agreement for Soviet 
economic and technical assistance to the Sudan on nume~ous industrial 
projects, as well as a three-year trade agreement. On several import-
ant international issues, such as peaceful coexistence and disarmament, 
the Sudan regarded Moscow's attitude as more reasonable than Peking's 
. . . 8 
hard-l1ne position. 
The PHC's position with Sudan improved after General Gaafar 
Nimcri came to power through a military coup in May, 1969. A Sudan-
f'HC 
9 trade protocol was signed 111 Khartoum on May 21, 1970. A 
~.iucbncsc Friendship Delcga~ion Jed by Nimeri arrived in Peking in 
early August, signed economic, tcchn:icaJ,educational, and cultural 
cooperation agreements, and Peking granted Khartoum an interest-
free loan of $42 million to finance a fertilizer plant, textile, 
d f t . d . t d d' t t' 10 sugar, an paper ac orles, roa proJeC .s, an a ra lO s a lon. 
In June, 1971, the PHC also agreed to finance and build a 1000-km 
d f d . t d 'f 11 roa rom Men 1 o Ge arl • 
Between July 19 and 22, 1971, an anti-Nimeri coup backed by 
Moscow failed and many of those involved, including Abdel Khalik 
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Mahgoub, secretary-general of the Sudan Communist Party, and several 
other members of the party's central committee, were executed by 
Nimeri's military government. The abortive coup led to an open break 
between the Sudan and the Soviet Union and further strengthened Sudan-
1 t . 12 PRC re a lons. In early August, the Sudanese vice-president and 
defense minister Major-General Khalid Hassan Abbas and two other min-
isters visited Peking "to strengthen relations between Sudan and the 
PRC," though no details were announced. 13 Another economic and tech-
nical cooperation agreement signed on August 24, 1971, provided Sudan 
a $40 million loan for constructing bridges, roads, a textile factory, 
and an international conference hall. 14 
In December, 1971, Abbas led another delegation to the PRC, and 
it was reported in mid-April that a military agreement was signed 
under which the Sudanese armed forces would "benefit from the ex-
pertise of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in various fields of 
t . . 15 ralnlng." On May 25, Chinese-made weapons, including fighter-
bombers and tanks, appeared for the first time in the military parade 
2]3 
16 held in Khartoum to mark the anniversary of the 1969 coup. Mean-
while, in March, 1972, PRC engineers and technicians arrived in 
Sudan and began work on the Medni-Gedarif road. 
On March 6, 1973, President Nimeri himself laid the founda-
tion stone for a 507-meter bridge over the Blue Nile which was to be 
built by 400 Chinese technicians. It was also reported that three 
17 more bridges were planned. . Between 1970 and 1974 Sudan received 
loans of $82 million from Peking, constituting 4.4 percent of Peking•s 
total commitment to Africa between 1959 and 1974. 18 During 1976, 
Sudan remained one of the major recipients of PRC aid in Africa. 19 
Somalia 
The Democratic.Republic of Somalia came into being on July 1, 
1960, by merger of the former British Somaliland and former Italian 
Somalia. Both Peking and Taipei recognized the new republic upon its 
0 1 d 20 1ncepcn encc. 
Taipei had contacts with Italian Somalia before its independence. 
In mid-February, 1960, a ROC goodwill mission led by Yang Hsi-k•un 
visited Mogadishu, the capital of Italian Somalia. In May, Haji Farah 
Omar, the Somali Minister of Industry and Commerce, led a four-man 
delegation which paid a return visit to Taipei and attended the in-
21 
auguration of President Chiang Kai-shek~ Taipei sent a special 
delegation led by Yu Chun-chi, ROC Ambassador to Italy, to Mogadishu 
to attend the Somali independence celebrations on July 1. President 
Chiang also cabled a congratulatory message to the new Somalian 
President Aden Abdullah Osman. All signs indicated that Mogadishu 
would establish diplomatic relations with Taipei. 
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However, for unknown reasons, diplomatic relations with Taipei 
never materialized. Instead, Mogadishu established relations with 
. 22 
Peking on December 16, 1960. In June, 1961:, Peking appointed Chang 
Yueh, one of its top Arabic and Islamic experts, as first PRC am-
bassador to Somalia. 
With the largest and most ornate embassy in Mogadishu and a 
staff of nearly forty, Chang Yueh began his business in Somalia ef-
ficicntly. The embassy staff toured the country and established 
close relations with Somali politicians (including opposition leaders) 
through cash payments, sometimes into secret accounts in Swiss 
23 banks. Of the 400 scholarships given by Communist China to Afri-
cans in 1962, half went to Somalia. In January, 1963, during a 
visit to Somalia by a Chinese cultural and goodwill delegation, a cul-
t 1 t . t . d 24 -ura coopera 1on agreemen was s1gne • 
In May, 1963, a Somalian delegation led by Minister of Informa-· 
tion Ali Mohamed Hirave arrived in Peking and negotiated economic, 
technical, trade, and payments agreements. The PRC was to export to 
Somalia textiles, metal products, machinery, tea, and other items, 1n 
exchange for oil seeds, cereals, frankincense, myrrh, skins, and 
· 1 f. 1· 25 m1nera s rom Soma 1a. 
When Somali Prime Minister Shermarke visited the Pl1C in August, 
1963, according to a NCNA report, "more than 400,000 Peking people, 
braving heavy rain, lined the main thoroughfare to give [him] a tre-
26 mendous welcome." Shermarke met with Jllao and Liu Shao-ch' i, and 
obtained an interest-free loan of $22 million. 27 In February, 1964, 
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year, nineteen of the thirty-three independent nations of Africa had 
diplomatic relations with Taipei, only ten with Peking; four (Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia) recognized neither China. 
Between March and July, 1964, Minister of Economic Affairs Yang 
Chi-tseng,who had visited Cameroon 1n January, 1960, led another dele-
gation to fourteen African nations: Cameroon, Zaire, Gabon, Togo, 
Libya, Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
11 
Senegal, Rwanda, and Madagascar. After meeting with eleven presi-
dents or heads of government and three vice-presidents, Yang returned 
home to report that seven ROC agricultural missions then working 1n 
Africa were "winning an immense number of friends for free China 1n the 
. [ f . ] t. 12 emerg1ng A r1can na 1ons." 
The most recent tour to Africa to high-ranking ROC political 
leaders was made in October, 1976, by Vice-Premier Hsu Ching-chung, 
who visited Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa. 13 But of all the ROC 
officials who visited Africa, no one spent more time there or covered 
more of the continent than "Mr. Africa," Yang Hsi-k'un. After he be-
came director of the ROC West Asian Department in 1959, he made an an-
nual tour to Africa part of his routine duty. Sometimes he made two 
trips to Africa in one year. Since his first contact with the continent 
in 1952 as a member of the UN Trusteeship Council, by 1977 he had 
visited Africa more than thirty times, most recently in August, 1977. 14 
Yang spent most of his diplomatic career of over three decades in 
dealing with African affairs. No other Chinese diplomat, from Taipei 
or Peking, had greater influence on various African political leaders 
than he once did because of his personal friendships with them. Re-
ferring to his friendship with Yang, a president of Togo once said: 
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"when I met him, I was fairly unknown." 15 Under Yang's guidance, 
"personal Jiplomacy" strengthened hy agricultural and technical aid 
heLped Lhc HOC achieve considerable success in its counter-offensive 
against PRC penetration of Africa during the 1960s. However, Taipei's 
effort in exchanging cultural missions with Africa was negligible. 
During the 1960s, the ROC sent to Africa only one cultural mission of 
any consequence. A forty-member Chinese Goodwill and Cultural Mission 
made a hundred-day tour of fifteen African countries in 1964: Chad, CAR, 
Libya, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, Ni-
. . b t ' d d . t . 16 l ger1a, N1ger, Ga on, ,Ivory Coas , Ma agascar, an Maur1 an1a. Trave -
i.ng 70,000 miles, this mission gave fifty-five Chinese opera and dance 
performances, and prsented seventy-eight cultural exhibits, seen by 
I 
"1]" f" '17 three mt .. 1on A r1cans. 
Propaganda 
The ROC made a serious mistake by overlooking propaganda toward 
Africa. Though the ROC government set up a branch office of the Govern-
ment Information Office in its embassy 1n the Congo in 1961 "to streng-
then Taipei's public relations with African countries and improve their 
understanding of Nationalist China," this was hardly a major undertak-
tng, and even it ended three years later when Congo recognized Pckjng. 18 
In 1965 Peking's propaganda offensive in Africa was supported by 
NCNA branch of'fices in at least twenty African countries, though it had 
diplomatic relations with only seventeen of them. 19 On the other hand, 
Taipei, which then had relations with fourteen African nations, chose 
to open the first African office of its Central News Agency (CNA) in 
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Ethiopia, which recognized neither China. 
Compared with Peking's massive and often exaggerated propaganda in 
Africa, Taipei's efforts were so meager that even African visitors to 
Taiwan remarked to ROC officials that the Nationalist Chinese "put out 
20 
too little propaganda about their success.'' ROC African policymakcrs, 
such as Yang Ilsi-k'un, were no doubt well aware of this shortcoming; a 
lack of funds is the most likely explanation for it. 
Agricultural and Technical 
Assistance: Overview 
Conversely, the ROC's most effective instrument in Africa during 
the 1960s was its agricultural and technical assistance program in var-
ious countries. A major stimulus to this program was the abrupt shift, 
unfavorable to Taipei, in voting on the "China issue" in the United Na-
tions in 1960, as discussed in Chapter X. Among sixteen new African 
members of the United Nations in that year, Taipei was unable to win a 
single vote even though it had already established diplomatic relations 
with six of them, including Senegal, which actually voted against 
Taipei. This made ROC leaders realize that establishing diplomatic 
relations with an African country did not guarantee its support in the 
I 
United Nations. More. was needed to win African support. The United 
States, also worried by Taipei's weakening position in the United Na-
tions, also urged the ROC government to take new steps to win African 
21 
support. 
Considering the similarities in climate between Taiwan and most 
African countries, the ROC felt that the valuable experience gained 
by Nationalist China from the rapid and successful agricultural 
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development in Taiwan Slnce 1949 could be of great help to Africans. 
This belief was confirmed by Chinese agricultural specialists sent to 
Arrica on survey missions and by African leaders and experts visiting 
Taiwan. Thus, it was decided that ROC technical assistance to Africa 
22 would concentrate on agriculture. This was enthusiastically endorsed 
by the United States, which later was to play an important role in fi-
. th 23 nanclng e program. 
"Operation Vanguard" 
Origin and Administration 
Between late 1960 and early 1961 there was a series of meetings in-
volving officials of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Council for United States Aid, Sino-American Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), and the Taiwan Provincial 
Government's Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The ROC delega-
tion to the United Nations suggested calling the project "Operation 
Safari," but in January, 1961, it was given the name "Hsien-feng-an" 
or "Operation Vanguard," an English name proposed by Yang Hsi-k'un, 
the major architect of the aid project. 24 At the same time an Execu-
tivc Committee for "Operation Vanguard" was jointly formed by the 
above-mentioned government organs. The Committee, with Yang as its 
coordinator, was made responsible for implementing "Operation Vanguard" 
in Africa. Thus, in October, 1961, when Taipei sent its first agri-
cultural mission to Liberia, an important new phase of the ROC diplo-
matic offensive against the PRC in Africa formally began. 
"Operation Vanguard" proceeded rather rapidly and soon grew 
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beyond the administrative capacity of its initial executive commi_ttce. 
To cope with the rapid development and to facilitate the cooperation 
between its components, the Executive Committee was expanded and renamed 
the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee on April 18, 1962. 25 
Technical Cooperation: 
Main Stages 
In "Operation Vanguard," the ROC government took the following 
steps: (1) sending agricultural specialists to various African coun-
tries on fact-finding missions to determine the most effective way to 
assist each country; (2) dispatching agricultural and other technical 
teams to various African countries to help their agricultural develop-
ment in the field they needed most; (3) invitjng responsible officials 
and agricultural personnel of African countries to Taiwan to observe 
ROC economic activity, particularly in agriculture; (4) offering 
scholarships to friendly African countries for sendgng agricultural 
technicians to seminars in Taiwan for practical training. 26 
Propaganda Aspects 
"Operation Vanguard" was also supposed to strengthen friendship 
and improve mutual understanding between Nationalist China and various 
African countries by (1) establishing news agencies or branch offices 
of the ROC Government Information Office at strategic locations in 
Africa; (2) increasing book, magazine and audi-visual propaganda toward 
Africa; (3) sending acrobatic and other art delegations to visit Africa; 
and (4) inviting leaders from African countries to visit Taiwan. 27 
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However, only the last method was appropriately utilized; the first 
three were more or less neglected. Propaganda was the weakest link of 
the whole "Operation Vanguard" project. 
Project Selection Criteria 
In its agricultural and technical aid program to African coun-
tries, the Nationalist Chinese government used the following criteria 
in project selection: (l) feasibility: whether the project was within 
ROC means and capacity; (2) urgency: whether the project was urgently 
needed by the recipient country; (3) interest: whether both the govern-
ment and people of the recipient country were interested in the project 
and ready to work closely with Chinese experts for the project. 28 
Agricultural Demonstration 
Teams 
Though including several categories, Taipei's technical aid to 
Africa was dominated by agricultural demonstration teams. The idea of 
sending such teams to African countries was conceived by Yang Hsi-k'un 
under a slogan which suggested they might be more effective than con-
ventional diplomats: "Let the diplomats go to the countryside; let the 
agricultural experts go abroad" [wai-chiao hsia-hsiang, nung-yeh tsu-
29 yang]. Between 1961 and 1970, Nationalist China sent agricultural 
demonstration teams to twenty-two African countries (see Table XXIV). 
Each team usually started with between ten and twenty members, depend-
ing on the Slze of the project undertaken in each country. In most 
30 cases, the team was later enlarged. The largest team was the one 
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ROC AGRICULTURAL DEMONSTRATION 
TEAMS IN AFRICA 
Date of Estab1i:;hmcnt1 Date of l~i thdrawa1 2 
November· 28, 1961 February 23, 1977 
March 4, 1962 April 12, 19693 
March 10, 1963 January 19, 1973 
~larch 15, 1963 Still remains 
October 23, 1963 March 30, 1974 
January 30, 1964 May 13, 1972 
April 29, 1964 May, 19734 
June 15, 1964 August 20, 1971 
July 27, 1964 July 29, 1974 
November 7, 1964 April 3, 1971 
April 15, 1965 October 23, 1973 
April 17, 1965 December 27, 1972 
August 6, 1965 October 4, 1972 
December 24, 1965 Still remains 
June 11, 1966 December 28, 1974 
August 12, 1966 December, 19725 
December 20, 1966 December 15, 1972 
February 1, 1968 April 5, 1974 
November 1, 1968 May, 19726 
November 13, 1968 August 23, 1976 
January 24, 1969 still remains 
September 23, 1969 still remains 
Sources: llsien-feng-an, Table I; Sino-African Technical Cooperation, 
Attachment IV, Table A-1 (p. 71), 
1The date of establishment refers to the date in which the mission ar-
rived in the host country. 
2The date of withdrawal refers to the date in which diplomatic relations 
bet1~ecn Nationalist China and the host country were severed, except 
in:cascs of Libya, Senegal, Zaire, and Ghana. 
3Thc agricultural mission to Libya was withdrawn because the project was 
completed. 
4raipci broke relations wiLh Senegal on April 12, 1972, but did not with-
draw its mission until ~lay, 1973. 
5rhough ,Taipei did not brc::Jl\ relations with Zaire until J~uary 30, 
1973, the team was recalled in Dccemb<.:r·, 1972, after Kinshasa es-
tablished diplomatic relations with Pcl\ing in late November. 
6Nat:i.onallst China sent an agricultural team to Gh:ma after the latter 
broke relations with Peking. T::1ipei wi thdrcw the team after Ghana 
resumed relations 1~i th Peking. 
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Lhc size of each team fluctuated, the exact number of Chinese tech-
nicians who served in Africa between 1961 and 1977 is hard to determine. 
A conservative estimate would put it around nine hundred. If ROC tech-
nlclans serving 1n other related fields are added the total could reach 
31 at least a thousand. 
Each ROC agricultural demonstration team was charged to achieve 
the following objectives in the host country: (1) to demonstrate to 
farmers :improved techniques in the cultivation of rice and other crops; 
(2) to help them establish farmers' organizations to consolidate farm 
management and stimulate dissemination of agricultural knowledge; and 
(3) to pave the way for development of the rural economy through farm 
extension projects and set a general pattern to guide the host country 
32 1n carrylng on the development alone. 
Generally spcal<ing, the task of each demonstration team was exe-
cuted in five stages: (1) Land reclamation: areas selected for de-
velopment, whether jungles, mounds, swamps, or wasteland, were turned 
into arable farms. Most preparation at this stage was done by hand to 
minimize the dependence on machinery (see Table XXV). (2) Experimenta-
tion: crop varieties, time of planting, and farming methods most suit-
able to the local environment were selected empirically. (3) Demon-
stration: local farmers were shown by Chinese technicians how to 
cultivate the selected crops with Chinese techniques and tools. (4) 
Trai.ning: local farmers were encouraged to work in the field with the 
Chinese team members to learn the farming techniques and to gain self-
confidence, (5) Extension: the Chinese team expanded the demonstra-
tion farm and set up sub-demonstration farms or stations in various 


























































































RICE VARIETIES USED BY THE ROC IN AFRICA 
Good Hicc Varieties 
IR--8 
Taichung Native 1 
IH4--2 
Tainan 1 
Ta inan 3 






Taiehung Native 1 
Taiehung llsien 2 






Taiehung Native 1 













I Kung Pao 
Taichung Native 1 
Tainan 5 
Chianung 242 
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Source: Sino-African Tcchni real Cnnpr:rat.ion, p. 15 (data to June, 1971). 
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and drainage systems were constructed where necessary (see Table XXVII). 
Special attention was given to pest and disease control. The Chinese 
teams also helped African farmers to organize cooperatives in order to 
. d"t• d k t" f "l"t" 33 lmprove ere l an mar e lng acl l les. 
Financing of "Operation 
Vanguard" 
Initially most of the aid projects were financed solely by the ROC 
government. As the program expanded, the cost also increased consider-
ably. By the late 1960s, it cost Taipei U.S. $7 million a year, and ln 
1969 alone, African missions and training programs cost Taipei U.S. 
$10 million dollars. However, beginning in 1968, the United States, 
impressed by the Nationalist Chinese accomp~_ishments in Africa, pro-
vidcd most of the necessary money through sale of U.S. agricultural 
34 
surp]us in Taiwan under the PL 480 program. 
Achievements of the 
Demonstration Teams 
With this relatively small budget, it is fair to say that ROC 
agrLcultural and technical missions did a great job in Africa. Between 
1961 and 1974, ROC agricultural missions working in Africa reclaimed 
10,842.82 hectares with 71 1 881 farm families. The Chinese mis~ions 
a"Jso trained 42,182 farmers and extension cadres (sec Table XXVIII) and 
constructed 3,434,800 meters of irrigation canals and drainage 
d . h 35 1Lc cs. 
Most of the HOC agricultural de~onstration teams achieved their 






















IRRIGATION FACILITIES SET UP BY THE ROC 
IN AFRICA 
Irrigation Drainage Pumping 
Canal Ditch Station 
(m) (m) (unit) 
47,306 79,700 3 
1,614 430 4 
54,247 22,220 6 
6,350 12,080 16 
95,713 15,368 74 
10,557 7,346 4 
439,552 246,582 
2,466 1,318 
28,645 21,905 3 
10,324 12,995 1 
52,703 35,184 3 
102,884 23,234 20 
152,010 103,516 
21,124 15,613 15 
4,296 4,046 
48,200 32,207 8 
13,900 8,500 
28,,885 34,494 10 
1,124,952 676,867 172 




























ROC AGRICULTURAL TRAINING IN AFRICA 
Number of Trainees 
Country Ordinary Farmers Extension Cadres Total 
Benin 900 38 938 
Botswana 185 27 212 
CAR 104 80 184 
Chad 343 102 445 
Gabon 84 53 137 
Gambia 5,392 141 5,533 
Ghana 43 26 69 
Ivory Coast 18,287 1.050 19,337 
Lesotho 10 2 12 
Liberia 731 23 754 
Madagascar 
Malawi 478 404 882 
.Niger 1,723 85 1,808 
Rwanda 3,483 182 3,665 
Senegal 2,861 325 3,186 
Swaziland 20 20 
Togo 1,200 153 1,353 
Upper Volta 2,160 9 2,169 
Zaire 1,292 186 1,478 
Total 39,296 2,886 42,182 
Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 22 (data to June, 
1971) . 
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In almost every Africari country with a ROC agricultural mission, the 
average rice yield was increased several times. In Togo, the increase 
35 
reportedly reached nearly 2,000 percent. In Zaire, where only a few 
varieties of vegetables were grown before the arrival of ROC agricul-
tural technicians, by 1969 fifty-three different vegetables were 
produced, while the rice yield had tripled. 37 In Botswana, the 
Chinese farm experts introduced canteloupes, which the people of 
Botswana called "Chinese apples." It was reported that "Chinese apples" 
were prescribed as the first course in all Botswana state banquets 
38 thereafter. 
The African Response 
Patient and hard-working, the Nationalist Chinese agricultural 
technicians won friendship and admiration in almost every African host 
country, from presidents down to ordinary people. President Houphouet-
Boigny of the Ivory Coast praised the ROC contribution to Africa: 
"People used to think that the quality of Africa's soil is very poor 
and infertile. However, with the assistance of Republic of China's 
agricultural team, three crops of rice can be harvested annually. 
Then, we realized that we were but sleeping on a treasure mountain."39 
President Banda of Malawi said: "The work of the Chinese agricultural 
team is laid in front of everybody's eyes. I only hope that farmers 
from all over Africa will strive to learn from them the new farming 
d . . 40 methods an technlques." Prime Minister Makhosini of Swaziland put 
it even more lyrically, telling ROC Ambassador Lo Ming-yuan: "There 
was a magic blanket in Thousand and One Nights. Now, the agricultural 
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team from the Republic of China also gave us a green blanket which will 
bring us. abundant wealth."41 
ROC agricultural technicians were so trusted by local Africans in 
the host country that they often found themselves requested to perform 
duties beyond their capacity. In Liberia, some Africans would go to 
Chinese farm technicians instead of medical doctors when they became 
il1. 42 In Niger, two cabinet ministers, competing for- legal rights to 
a certain field and water sources, both asked the chief of the Chinese 
team to be their arbitrator. 43 
Touching and heart-warming stories about the friendship between 
Chinese team members and local Africans could be found in almost every 
African country where an agricultural team was stationed. 44 These 
farm experts from Taiwan enjoyed almost unprecedented prestige in the 
host countries, and the accomplishments of this small group of Chinese 
played a major role in winning African votes for the ROC each year in 
the United Nations during the 1960s. 
The Human Cost to ROC 
Personnel 
In making these contributions to Afric~ and to their own country, 
Chinese agricultural experts paid a heavy and sometimes tragic price. 
They had to leave their families behind and live for usually more than 
two years in a remote, unfamiliar land where the living standard was 
much lower than in Taiwan. Working in uncomfortable conditions, some 
mission members fell victims of malaria and other diseases, treatment 
of which was often delayed because of lack of medicine and equipment. 
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The reckless driving of an African driver killed two of the top ROC 
agricultural specialists in an accident in Togo in December, 1963, and 
. 45 
permanently paralyzed a third. 
In Chad, Lu Cheng-wu, deputy chief of the ROC agricultural mission, 
died of acute hepatitis in late July, 1969, after being away from his 
wife and children for two years. 46 Lee Ta, who led the first Chinese 
agricultural mission to the Gambia in April, 1966, died of illness, 
probably induced by exhaustion, in the Gambia in November, 1969. After 
his death, a bronze statue was erected in his memory at Bathurst, 
capital of the Gambia. During his visit to Taiwan in October, 1972, 
the Gambian President Jawara awarded Lee the posthumous Order of Of-
ficer of the Republic of the Gambia, and praised the contributions Lee 
and.his fellow team members had made to the Gambia: "Lee died because 
47 
he worked too hard." Never before had so many Chinese owed so much 
of their diplomatic victory to so small a group of their fellow country-
men. In addition to the twenty-two agricultural demonstration teams, 
the ROC also sent sixteen other technical missions between 1963 and 
1973 to ten African countries. These covered veterinary medicine, 
fishing, handicrafts, distilling, sugar refinery, edible-oil plants, 
farm machinery-making, and highway engineering (see Table XXIX). 
African Seminars 1n Taiwan 
Besides agricultural and technical missions, another important 
arm of "Operation Vanguard" was a series of fifteen "Seminars for 
African Agriculturalists" held in Taiwan between 1962 and 1974. Since 
Africa was handicapped most by an acute shortage of experienced and 
well-trained technicians in all fields, the ROC in 1962 established 
TABLE XXIX 
ROC NON-AGRICULTURAL TECHNICAL MISSIONS 
TO AFRICA 
Name of Team & Country Date Established 
1. Veterinary Mission to August 21, 1963 
Ethiopia 
2. Fishery Mission to December 9, 1963 
Cameroon 
3. Handicraft Mission to August 14, 1964 
Central Afr•ican Republic 
4. Handicraft Mission to January 1, 1965 
Rwanda 
·5. Distillery Mission to April 30, 1965 
Rwanda 
6. Veterinary Mission to June 19, 1967 
Chad 
7. Seed Multiplication & April 2, 1968 
Supply Center to 
Ivory Coast 
B. Sugar Hefinery Mission August, 1968 
to Rwanda 
9. Peanut oil Plant Mission August, 1968 
to Chad 
10. Bamboo Handicraft Mission April 14, 1969 
to Madagascar 
11. Highway Engineering December 13, 1970 
Mission to Central 
African Republic 
12. Veterinary Mission to December 15, 1972 
Liberia 
13. Handicraft Mission to 
Swaziland 
14. Handicraft Mission to 
Ivory Coast 
15. Farm Machinery Factory 
Mission to Niger 
16. Sugar Production Mission 
to Liberia 
March 10, 1973 
October 2, 1973 
October 15, 1973 
Dec~nber 18, 1973 
Date Withdrawn 
December, 1970 
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Sources: llsien-feng-an and Sino-African Technical Cooperation, pp. 59-70. 
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these seminars to train agricultural technicians for friendly African 
countries. All expenses were paid by the ROC. Trainees from various 
African countries attended a four to eight month agricultural seminar 
1n Taiwan to learn cultivation techniques and get on-the-job training. 
The first such seminar was held from March 31 to October 15, 1962, 
with twenty-five participants from eleven African countries. Since 
trainees came from both English-speaking and French-speaking countries, 
they were divided into English and French classes, each with its own 
resident translator-counselor. 48 During the first three seminars the 
trainees and their counselors stayed in hotels, but in 1964 a Training 
Center of the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee was con-
structed in Tainan. In the fourth seminar, all classes were given at 
this center, where trainees also lived and had their meals. In 1965 
a new Sino-African Technical Cooperation Building was built in Taipei, 
and the headquarters of the fifth and all subsequent seminars was in 
Taipei, closer to the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee, 
overseer of the whole training project. 49 
The fact that the participants came from many countries with 
different and someti~es antagonistic religious and political back-
grounds caused some problems, such as in assigning room and prepar-
. 1 50 1ng mea s. Sometimes, unexp~cted personal problems arose which , 
. 11 t th . d . d ff h t . . 51 emot1ona y upse e tra1nees an 1n turne ··a ected t e ra1n1ng. 
Generally speaking the African trainees were well-treated during their 
stay in Taiwan. The accommodations in the newly constructed Sino-
African Technical Cooperation Building in Taipei occupied by the 
African trainees were much more comfortable than the living quarters 
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of the Chinese agricultural demonstration team members who were under 
training simultaneously. Each African trainee had a private room; the 
52 
Chinese slept four to six 1n one room. 
The training program. of each seminar had three main phases: (1) 
Orientation: to help trainees acquire a general understanding of 
Nationalist China's political organizations, economy, culture, and 
customs. (2) Training courses, the longest and most important phase 
of the project: Trainees were taught in classrooms and trained in the 
field in all rice and upland crop cultivation techniques; the currie-
ulum included the selection of seeds, land preparation, rotational 
irrigation, pest control, cultivation of upland rice, vegetables, and 
sugar cane, use and maintenance of power tillers, water and soil con-
servation, seed grading and improvement, irrigation installation, 
farm demonstration and extension. 53 (3) Observation tours: when the 
major training courses were over, participants were given an oppor-
tunity to make "study tours to various rural districts to observe farm 
t . d th k f t . t" 54 opera 1ons an e war o peasan organ1za 1ons." 
At the end of each seminar, general discussions were held to 
evaluate the training program. Hours allocated to each phase of the 
training are indicated for the fifteenth (last) seminar in Table XXX. 
Each seminar officially ended with a graduation ceremony, at which each 
participant who had completed the training received a certificate from 
the HOC government. 
Between March, 1962, and July, 1974, fifteen of these sem1nars 
were held in Taiwan (see Table XXXI). During this period, 714 African 
trainees from thirty countries attended the seminars (see Table XXXII). 
Among these.714 participants, sixty-four were from seven African 
Orientation (4 days): 
TABLE XXX 
THAINING PHOGHAM OF THE HOC 
FIFTEENTH SEMINAR 
Orientation on gcncPal situation of Sino-African technical cooperation, various re-
construction es tabU shments and people's living and custom in the Hepublic of Chinn. 
Training coul'scs (17 weeks): 
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Classroom Field Dis- Obser- Percent-
Courses Lectures Practice cuss ion vat ion Total age 
Tours 
1. Or'icntation 12 12 2.4 
2 •. Paddy Hicc 49 19 68 13.4 
3. .Upland nice 6 4 10 2.0 
4. Corn 8 4 12 2.4 
5, Soybean 9 4 13 2.6 
6. Sweet Potatoes 9 4 13 2.6 
7. Sorghum 6 4 10 2.0 
8. SugaP Cane 9 4 13 2.6 
9. Fruit Cultures 8" 6 14 2.7 
10. Vegetables 34 14 48 9.5 
11. Varietal Improvement 29 29 5.7 
12. Plant Protection 20 4 24 4.7 
13. Soil & Fertilhcrs 20 10 30 5.9 
14. Irrigation & Drainage 18 7 25 4.9 
15. Farm Machinery 26 26 5.1 
16. Farmers' Organization 12 6 18 3.5 
17. Agricultural Extension 8 2 10 2.0 
18. Marketing of Agricultural 11 4 15 2,9 
Products 
19. Agricultural Credit 3 2 5 1.0 
20. Farm Management 10 10 2.0 
21. Report on Agl'icultural 6 6 1.2 
status in Africa 
22. Observation tours 94 94 18.5 
23. General Discussions 2 2 0.4 
Total 281 124 8 94 507 
Percentage 55.4 24,5 1.6 18.5 100.0 
------ - - - -· - - - - ---- -- -- - - - - -- -
~I Observation tours: 
(a) Visiting economic establishments. 
(b) Visiting rural communities. 
(c) Touring scenic spots in the Hepublic of China. 
Final evaluation 1: general discussion: 
(a) On training program of this seminar. 
(b) On agricultural estabUshment jn the Hepublic of China. 
(c) On Sino-African Technical Cooperation. 
Source: Secretariat, Committee of International Technical Cooperation, Hcpublic of 
China, Jntcr·national Technical Cooper:1bon (Taipei, 1974), pp. 6-7. 
348 
TABLE XXXI 
ROC SEMINARS FOR AFRICAN 
AGRICULTURALISTS 
Number of Participants 
Main French- English- Number of 
Sessions Period Subjeet(s) · speaking speaking Total Countries 
I Mar. 31-0et. 15, 1962 Rice culture 23 2 25 11 
Upland crops 
II Feb. 15-July 15, 1963 Rice culture 31 18 49 19 
JII Aug. 15, 1963- Upland crops 25 19 44 21 
Jan. 11, 1964 
IV Mar. 16-Nov. 14, 1964 Rice culture 31 19 50 17 
Upland crops 
v Feb. 20-July 15, 1965 Rice culture 18 29 47 17 
Upland crops 
VI Aug. 21, 1965- Rice culture 26 18 44 16 
Jan. 5, 1966 Upland crops 
VII Feb. 5-June 24, 1966 Rice culture 26 20 46 15 
Upland crops 
VIII Feb. 20-July 7, 1967 Rice culture 31 17 48 17 
Up-land crops 
IX Feb. 10-July 30, 1968 Rice <.:ulture 32 21 53 17 
Upland crops 
X Feb. 24-Aug. 21, 1969 Rice culture 32 23 55 20 
Upland crops 
XI Feb. 23-July 29, 1970 Rice culture 41 22 63 21 
Upland crops 
XII Feb. 10-July 14, 1971 Rice culture 38 20 58 19 
Upland crops 
XIII Mar. 10-July 26, 1972 Rice culture 39 19 58 19 
Upland crops 
XIV Mar. 7-July 18, 1973 Rice culture 21 .19 40 12 
Upland crops 
XV Mar. 6-July 4, 1974 Rice culture 12 22 34 8 
Upland crops 
Total 426 288 714 
Source: International Technical Coo~;eration, Table III-A (p. 4). 
TABLE XXXII 
AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS IN ROC AGRICULTURAL SEMINARS 
S e s s i o n s 
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countries which had no diplomatic relations with Taipei: Ethiopia (7), 
Ghana (9), Kenya (34), Rhodesia (8), Somalia (2), Tanzania (2), and 
Zambia (2). Five of these seven countries (Ghana, Kenya, Somalia, 
Tanzania, arid Zambia) actually had diplomatic relations with Peking. 
Although the ROC did not restrict participation to citizens of 
countries recognizing Taipei, recognition was a factor in African ac-
ceptance. For instance, Zambia immediately stopped sending partici-
pants after it established diplomatic relations with Peking in late 
1964. Ghana started sending participants in 1969 after breaking rela-
tions with Peking (1966), but stopped participation after resuming re-
lations with Peking in 1972. 55 Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania all dis-
continued participation at the seminars when they developed closer 
relations with Peking. 
Though the program of training African agricultural technicians 
in Taiwan was terminated in 1974 after the fifteenth seminar, the 
project was successful. The seminars not only gave African partici-
pants an opportunity to learn agricultural techniques from the Na-
tionalist Chinese, but also enabled them to study together, to know 
and appreciate each other. This contributed in a small way to African 
unity, which has been so often preached by the Africans themselves. 
The chief deficiency in the seminar program was in the selection 
of participants. Although the ROC government asked that all partici-
pants be graduates from an agricultural school "with at least two years 
of actual farming experience" and in good health, these criteria were 
not always met. African governments often sent officials from their de-
partment of agriculture or personnel with political connections rather 
than genuine farmers, as if the trip were for pleasure on a beautiful 
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island rather than for serious practical training. Some participants 
were 1n poor health or not within the optimum age range (the oldest 
. 56 
participant was 55, the youngest 17). 
By the 1970s most African countries recognized Peking rather than 
Taipei. The ROC seminar program for African agricultural technicians 
was terminated in 1974 after the fifteenth session, ending one of Na-
tionalist China's most impressive and successful aid projects. There-
after Taipei still carried out some training programs for Africans, but 
only on an individual basis and on a limited scale. As of late 1977, 
there were still four ROC agricultural missions in Africa (Ivory Coast, 
Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and three technical missions (a seed 
multiplication and supply center mission and a handicraft mission in 
the Ivory Coast, a handicraft mission 1n Swaziland). 
Trade With Africa 
As can be seen from comparison of Table XXXIII with Table VIII 1n 
Chapter II, ROC trade with Africa has always been much smaller than 
PRC trade with Africa, both absolutely and in proportion to total ROC 
or PRC foreign trade. On the other hand, it has been less affected by 
recent political changes that might be expected. In the 1950s, the 
ROC had trade relations with Morocco, South Africa, Egypt, and British 
East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika), the first two being the major 
trading partners of the ROC in Africa. Taiwan generally neglected 
Africa as a market in the 1950s, because of the weak purchasing power 
of the few independent countries there, the dominance of the market by 
57 



































































Balance Total Value African Trade 
of ROC- Total of ROC's as % of ROC 
Africa Trade Value Foreign Trade .Total Foreign Trade 
+2.7 5.3 426.4 1.2 
+4.9 7.3 542.4 1.3 
+2.4 5.2 571.9 0.9 
+2.1 7.9 700.3 1.1 
+7.0 24.2 879.9 2.7 
+9.1 21.9 1051.1 2.1 
+14.7 24.9 1185.3 2.1 
+13.5 29.5 1522.6 1.9 
+11.4 31.2 1867.7 1.7 
+26.0 43.4 2315.4 1.9 
+49.0 71.4 3090.0 2.3 
+44.3 85.7 4126.0 2.1 
+20.9 118.1 5429.7 2.2 
+48.8 159.0 8164.7 1.9 
Sources: 1960-1969 figures were taken from Kuo-chi mao-i-chu, ching-chipu (Bureau of International Trade, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, ROC], comp., Shih-nien lai tui-wai mao-i fa-chan kai-kuang [The general survey of the 
development of foreign trade in the past decade], Taipei, 1970, pp. 39-42. The 1970-1971 figures are from 
Ta~-wan sheng chin-ch'u-k'ou shang-yeh tung-yeh kung-hui lien-ho-hui [The united association of Taiw~~ 
imports and exports associations], comp., Fei-chou shih-chang kai-kuan [A general survey of the African 
market], Taipei, 1972, p. 130; China Yearbook (1971-1972), pp. 249-250; China Yearbook (1972-1973), p. 262. 
The 1972-1973 figures are from China Yearbook (1974), p. 205. 
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As Taipei intensified its diplomatic offensive in Africa after 
1960, attention was also given to trade. While the two-way trade be-
tween the ROC and Africa developed rather unevenly between 1960 and 
1963, it tripled in 1964, reaching a total of U.S. $24.2 million, in 
comparison with only U.S. $7.9 million dollars in 1963. It dropped to 
U.S. $21.9 million dollars in 1965 but picked up again in 1966 and the 
increasing trend continued through 1973. 58 
Between 1966 and 1969 the total value of Taiwan-Africa trade in-
creased continuously but slowly (U.S. $24.9 million in 1966, $29.5 
million in 1967, $31.2 million in 1968, and $43.4 million in 1969), but 
rose much faster 1n the 1970s. Six of the nine trade agreements signed 
between Nationalist China and African countries since 1957, were signed 
between 1970 and 1975 (see Table XXII). The total value of Taiwan-
Africa trade reached U.S. $71.4 million in 1970, $85.7 million in 1971, 
$118.1 million in 1972, and $159 million in 1973. This consistent in-
crease indicated that Taipei's withdrawal from the United Nations 1n 
late 1971 and the subsequent severance of diplomatic relations with 
most African countries did not affect its trade relations with Africa. 
Both Peking and Taipei have been willing to trade with African coun-
tries regardless of political ties or lack of them. 
Between 1960 and 1973 the balance of ROC-Africa trade was consist-
ently in favor of Taipei. In 1960 the ROC reaped a profit of U.S. $2.7 
million dollars from trading with Africa; a decade later the profit 
reached U.S. $49 million (see Table XXXIII). Despite the increasing 
volume, however, African trade has never comprised more than 2.7 per-
cent of the ROC's total foreign trade. During the 1970s, Taipei did 
lose some former trading partners in Africa, or at least some of the 
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trade vol~e, because of the rupture of diplomatic relations. These 
losses were offset by the rapid increase of trade with South Africa. 
Like Peking, Taipei has traded with South Africa since the 1950s, but 
unlike Peking, has not denied this trade or that with Portuguese 
Africa and Rhodesia. 59 In 1970 about 40 percent of the ROC's African 
trade was with Southern Africa, with South Africa being the leading 
partner, and the Taiwan-South Africa trade increased even more in the 
mid-l970s. While this partially compensated for the loss of business 
by the ROC in other parts of the continent, Taipei's profit from Afri-
can trade probably declined since its imports from South Africa exceeded 
its exports. 
ROC government and private enterprises agreed that Africa was one 
of the few markets (along with the Middle East, Australia, and South-
east Asia) with developing potential for the ROc. 60 Unfortunately, 
ROC efforts to explore and develop new overseas markets were often 
offset by inadequate control over the quality of exported products. 
Unscrupulous merchants often exploited loopholes in the trade code~ to 
export goods of poor quality, thus damaging Taiwan's trade reputation. 
The ROC government's lax inspection system was mainly responsible for 
this problem. 
FOOTNOTES 
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5Francois Gharbonnier, "Slowdown in Africa," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, XXXVII, 13 (September 27, 1962), p. 585; Ansprenger, p. 10; 
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Ansprenger, p. 15; Sino-African Technical Cooperation, pp. 42-43. 
57 Munro, p. 11. 
58official statistics of Taiwan-Africa trade after 1973 were un-
available to this author. However, ROC trade with South Africa alone 
reached a total of more than U.S. $50 million dollars in 1974. In 
1975 it climbed to U.S. $140 million. The figure in 1976 was esti-
mated at U.S. $200 million. See Industry of Free China, XXXV, 1 
(January, 1976), tables 36 and 38 (pp. 147, 158). 
59 See "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 2. 
60 See Wu Yun-chung, "K'ai-t'uo Fei-chou hsin-shih-ch'ang" [To 
open new African market], part five of a series on how to expand 
overseas markets, in Chung-yang jih-pao, May 23, 1975, p. 2; and Sun 
Yun-suan [ROC minister of economic affairs], "Wo-kuo mao-i chien-tu 
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chan-wang" [The prospect of the Republic of China's foreign trade], 
ibid., February 15, 1976, p. 3. For a detailed and country-by-country 
study of potential markets for Taiwan's goods in Africa, see Tai-wan 
sheng chin-ch'u k'ou shang-yeh tung-yeh kung-hui lien-ho-hui [The 
united association of Taiwan imports and exports associations], comp. 
Fei-chou shih-ch'ang kai-kuan [General survey of the African market], 
Taipei, 1972. This is probably the best and most detailed study of 
the African market yet published in Nationalist China. After a general 
survey of the market situation in each African country, the book indi-
cated the potential market for certain goods made in Taiwan. In most 
cases; a list of names and addresses of trade agencies in each country 
was also provided. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE ROC AND WEST, CENTRAL, AND SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
Although, as noted in Chapter VIII, the ROC has had trade and 
other contacts with some African countries that did not recognize 
Taipei, diplomatic relations are generally prerequisite to systematic 
contacts, and set limits for a government's foreign undertakings. By 
that criterion, it is clear that ROC opportunity for influence in 
Africa has always been limited. Only twenty-five of Africa's present 
fifty-one independent nations have ever had diplomatic relations with 
the ROC, and they account for a little over one-third of Africa's 
total population. The lack of diplomatic relations closed large sec-
tjons of Africa to most ROC activities. These included all of East 
Africa, most of North Africa (after 1955), and large parts of West and 
Southern Africa (see Figure 7 and Table XXXIV). The SlX nations that 
still recognize the ROC in 1978 account for nine percent of the conti-
nent's population, twelve percent of its area. 
This chapter surveys relations between the ROC and individual 
countries in Africa, grouped regionally as in the previous surveys of 
PRC relations, and in the same sequence: West Africa, Central Africa, 
East Africa, and Southern Africa. There is little to report for East 
Africa since none of the countries there ever recognized Taipei. 
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Region Number 
North Africa 2 
West Africa 12 
Central Africa 5 
East Africa 0 
Southern Africa 6 
Total 25 
'''Based on 1976 estimates. 
TABLE XXXIV 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF AFRICAN NATIONS 
WHICH RECOGNIZED THE ROC 
Population* Area 
Percentage Square Percentage 
of Nations Population of Total Miles of Total 
of 5 40,584,540 4~.4 1,066,224 46.5 
of 20 36,324,501 29.6 1,296,912 55.3 
of 6 41,000,589 91.9 2,141,218 90.2 
of 7 0 0.0 0 o.o 
of 13 38,293,290 63.1 979,197 51.1 
of 51 156,202,920 39.3 5,482,551 49.5 
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During the 1960s West Africa was the area where Taipei made its 
greatest efforts to compete with Peking. Though the PRC and ROC be-
gan their diplomatic offensives in West Africa in the early 1960s al-
most simultaneously, it was the smaller China that was welcomed by most 
of the newly emerging countries 1n this part of the continent. Of West 
Africa's present twenty countries, three achieved independence before 
1960, eleven during 1960, two others in 1961 and 1965, respectively, 
and the last four in the 1970s. Of the sixteen that were independent 
in 1969, twelve had recognized Taipei, three had recognized Peking 
(Guinea, Ghana, Mali) and Nigeria, the largest, recognized nejther (see 
Table XXXV). Taipei's impressive record in West Africa 1n the 1960s 
can be attributed in considerable part to the fact that nine of the 
twelve countries recognizing Taipei were former French colonies 
(Cameroon, Togo, Congo, Senegal, Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta, Benin, 
and Ivory Coast), still under the influence of France, which then 
recognized the ROC. 
Liberia 
A treaty of amity between the ROC and Liberia was signed in Paris 
on December 11, 1937, by Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, then Chinese ambas-
sador to France, and Baron de Bogaerde, Liberian minister to France. 1 
This was China's first treaty with an African country, but diplomatic 
relations were not established until nearly twenty years later. An 
official ROC publication dates formal relations with Liberia from 
2 August 19, 1957. Relations were raised from ministerial to 
TABLE XXXV 
THE ROC AND WEST AFRICA 
Diplomatic Relations with the ROC First Opened 
.. 
Independent Established Country Suspended Relations With 
PRC 
1847. 7.26 1957. 8.19 Liberia 1977. 2.22 
1960~ 1. 1 1960. 2.19 Cameroon 1971. 3.26 
1960. 4.27 1960. 4.27 Togo 1972. 9.19 
1960. 8.15 1960. 9.10 Congo 1964. 2.22 
1960. 8.20 1960. 9.23 Senegal 1964-1968 1971.12. 7 
1960.11.28 1960.11.28 Mauritania 1965. 7.22 
1960. 8.17 1960.12. 9 Gabon 1974. 4.20 
1960. 8. 5 1961.12.14 Upper Volta 1973. 9.15 
1960. 8. 1 1962. 1.18 Benin 1964-1966 1964.11.12 
1960. 8. 7 1963. 7.20 Ivory Coast never 
1961. 4.27 1963. 9.28 Sierra Leone 1971. 7.29 
1965. 2.18 1968.11.12 Gambia 1974.12.14 
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ambassadorial level on February 25, 1960. In August, 1960, an ROC trade 
delegation visited Liberia during a tour of seven African countries and 
Lebanon, and was followed by an agricultural delegation from Taipei 1n 
November. In March, 1961., a Liberian goodwill delegation led by S. A. 
Tolbert, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, visited Taiwan to re-
quest help in Liberia's agricultural development. A two-year technical 
cooperation agreement was signed between the ROC and Liberia in Monrovia 
on October 13, 1961. In November, 1961, the ROC began its African aid 
program by sending a fourteen-member team (led by Tsou Mei) to help Li-
beria improve the cultivation of rice and vegetables. 
This first ROC agricultural demonstration chose Gbedin, 1n eastern 
Liberia about 190 miles from the capital, as the area for experimenta-
tion. Originally swamp land, Gbedin was once opened up by an American 
experiment group for raising rice, but the plan failed because Li-
berian farmers refused to use large farm machinery. 3 The Chinese team 
set up an experimental farm in Gbedin to teach Chinese methods of grow-
ing rice and vegetables, as well as use of fertilizers, irrigation, and 
techniques of insect and disease control. The work done by the Chinese 
team proved to be very successful. While the average Liberian farm pro-
duced only 500 kilograms of rice per hectare, the first harvest of rice 
at the Chinese demonstration farm reached an average of 4,500 kilograms 
4 
per hectare. When the initial agreement expired in late 1963, Liberia 
asked Taipei to renew it and expand the categories of assistance. The 
agreement was renewed in 1963, 1965, and 1967, and 1n June, 1970, ex-
5 tended to four years. The impressive results achieved by the ROC agri-
cultural team led other African countries to ask Taipei for aid. 
Additional ROC teams were sent to Libya in 1962, to Benin and the 
Ivory Coast in 1963, and later to many other African countries. 
368 
The number of ROC agricultural technicians in Liberia increased 
from fifteen ih 1961 to twenty-two in 1965, to forty-six in 1967, and 
to sixty-eight in early 1975. 6 Between 1963 and 1974 a total of forty-
two Liberian trainees graduated from the various "Seminars for the 
African Agriculturalists" held in Taiwan. On February 14, 1973, Taipei 
signed another technical cooperation agreement with Liberia, and sent 
a three-member veterinary team to work in Liberia for two years. This 
agreement was renewed in 1976 for two more years, and the team was en-
larged to five members. 7 In late 1973 Nationalist China helped Liberia 
to build a sugar plant and arranged one year of training in Taiwan for 
twenty-five Liberian sugar technicians. 8 
Officials of the two nations exchanged frequent visits. Between 
1954 and 1971 Liberia continuously supported Taipei in the United Na-
tions, but established diplomatic relations with Peking on February 22, 
1977, after an exchange of goodwill visits. Taipei broke relations with 
Monrovia the next day, ending a cordial relationship for two decades. 
Cameroon 
When Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960, Taipei sent 
a government delegation led by Yang Chi-tseng, minister of economic 
affairs, to attend the independence ceremony at Yaounde, capital of 
Cameroon, and the two countries officially established diplomatic re-
lations on February 19. 9 A general agreement on economic and technical 
cooperation was signed in Taipei on September 29, 1962, under which the 
ROC was to help Cameroon's econo(Jlic development. 10 
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A year later a protocol on fishing cooperation was signed, and 
Taipei sent sixty-seven fishermen and two 550-ton fishing vessels to 
t . c . f' h 11 ra1n ameroon1an 1s ermen. Implementing the 1962 agreement, the 
ROC sent a twelve-man agricultural demonstratiort team in late October, 
196~ to work for two years in Cameroon. 12 Satisfied with the work of 
the team, Cameroon asked Taipei to extend the stay of the team and 
to expand its service. By 1967 there were thirty-four ROC agricul-
tural technicians working in Cameroon. 
Despite receiving agricultural aid from Taipei continuously 
since 1964, Cameroon only half-heartedly supported the ROC in the 
United Nations. Though never voting against Taipei, Cameroon ab-
stained in many votes on the China issue. Following the visit of a 
PRC good-will mission, Cameroon announced on April 2, 1971, that it 
had decided to recognize Peking. Taipei severed relations the next 
13 day and withdrew its agricultural teams from Cameroon. Cameroon 
was one of the twenty-six African countries that voted for Peking's 
admission to the United Nations in October, 1971. 
When Togo became independent on April 27, 1960, the ROC was in-
vited to the independence celebrations, and diplomatic relations were 
established on the same day. In December, 1963, the ROC sent four 
specialists to study the potential for rice cultivation in Togo: 
Prof. Chin Cheng, Dr. Tseng Chun-fu, Tsou Mei, and Yu Yin-piao. 
Tsou and Yu were then the heads of the ROC agricultural teams in Li-
beria and Benin, respectively. On December 7 a car accident claimed 
the lives of Prof. Chin and Dr. Tseng, and permanently paralyzed 
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Tsou Mei. Y Y. . ff d 1 . . . . 14 u 1n-p1ao su ere on y m1nor 1nJur1es. This was the 
most tragic cost of the ROC's African aid program. 
On August 12, 1964, the ROC and Togo signed a technical coopera- · 
tion agreement in agriculture at Lome, capital of Togo. Taipei was 
to send nine experts to help Togo's rice cultivation. 15 The Chinese 
team arrived in Togo in August, 1965, began work immediately, and in 
early January, 1966, held a ceremony to celebrate Togo's first good 
harvest. Among the five hundred guests attending the ceremony were 
the Togolese president, cabinet ministers, the chief of general staff, 
and members of the diplomatic corps. 16 
The Sino-Togolese agricultural cooperation agreement was re-
newed twice (1968, 1970}. By late 1969 there were thirty-eight 
Chinese agricultural experts working in _Togo.17 However, Togo es-
tablished diplomatic relations with Peking on.september 26, 1972. 
Taipei closed its embassy on October 4 and withdrew its agricultural 
. . 18 m1SS10n. 
Congo 
Though Taipei established diplomatic relations with this former 
French colony on September 10, 1960, less than a month after it 
achieved independence, relations between the two countries lasted 
only four years. Conservative and anti-Peking Congolese President 
Youlou was forced to resign on August 15, 1963, the third independence 
anniversary of the country, after a bloody demonstration instigated by 
left-wing trade unions. When France recognized Peking on January 27, 
1964, the new Congo regime under Alphonse Massamba-Debat followed 
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suit by establishing diplomatic relations with Peking on February 22. 
Taipei severed relations with Brazzaville on April 17. 19 Congo under 
Massamba-Debat and subsequently Marien Ngouabi grew more radical dur-
ing the next decade and became one of Peking's closest allies in 
Africa. 
Senegal 
Originally Senegal and former French Sudan formed the Mali 
Federation on June 20, 1960. Due to personal rivalry and incompati-
bility between Senegal's Leopold Senghor and French Sudan's Modibo 
Keita, Senegal seceded from the federation two months later and be-
came the Republic of Senegal; French Sudan became the Republic of Mali. 
Taipei had established diplomatic relations with the Mali Federation 
on June 20, but the new Republic of Mali switched its ties to Peking 
on October 27, while Senegal established relations with Taipei on 
September 23, 1960. 
Senegal provided an early test of the one policy on which Taipei 
and Peking agreed: that no nation could have diplomatic relations 
with both Chinas. Senegal granted recognition to the PRC on March 14, 
1961, without breaking relations with the ROC. 20 Peking refused to 
establish diplomatic relations on that basis. Taipei, though dis-
pleased with Senegal's action, did not break relations. Instead, the 
ROC signed a technical cooperation agreement with Senegal on September 
13, 1963, and sent a twelve-man agricultural demonstration team from 
Taiwan in April, 1964. 21 
During 1964, relations between Taipei and Dakar were broken off 
in circumstances that remain cloudy. The RO~ charge d'affairs in 
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Dakar, Chen Hou-jou, was declared persona non grata on September 5, 
reportedly for inviting a Senegalese Foreign Ministry press officer, 
Babacar Dias, to make a private visit to Taiwan despite objections by 
Senegal's Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam. Thiam told the press that 
"to say that this is a question of personality is to put the interpre-
tation on it given by Formosa [the ROC]; for us there is more to it 
than that." Other sources indicated that Chen was accused of "cor-
rupting Senegalese officials" and interfering in Senegal's internal 
affairs. President Senghor was reportedly out of the country during 
these developments. On November 8, the ROC severed relations with 
1 d 1 d •t b . k 22 Senega , an c ose l s em assy ln Da ar. 
But Senghor was reported to be very anxious for the ROC agricul-
tural team to remain in Senegal. Rather surprisingly, the ROC not 
only permitted this, but enlarged the team to sixteen members and re-
newed its stay every two years after 1965. 23 Chinese agricultural 
experts achieved spectacular success in raising Senegal's rice yield. 
The previous record had been 500 kilograms per hectare; the Chinese 
boosted this to 6,000 kilograms in August, 1965. 24 However, diplomatic 
relations between the ROC and Senegal were not resumed until July, 
1969, and lasted only two and a half years after that. 
Senegal voted for Peking's admission in the United Nations in 
October, 1971, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 
December 7. Taipei did not close its embassy at Dakar until April 
12, 1972, and then only at Senegal!s request. Even then, Taipei's 
l ~ 
forty-three agricultural technicians remained in Senegal another full 
!I 
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25 year, to May, 1973. Senegal evidently appreciated ROC aid, but 
increasing pressure from its pro-Peking neighbors (Mali, Mauritania, 
Guinea) forced it to change sides. 
Mauritania 
Mauritania became independent on November 28, 1960, and es-
tablished diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. 
Mauritania soon became involved in a political battle between the 
ROC and the Soviet Union. Most new African nations were admitted to 
the United Nations quickly and without controversy, soon after achiev-
ing independence, but Mauritania had to wait almost a year. Before 
1961, Taipei had persistently blocked admission of the Soviet satel-
lite Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. At the 16th UN General 
Assembly meeting in 1961, the Soviet Union again sponsored Outer 
Mongolia's membership and indicated that it would veto the admission 
of Mauritania if Taipei again blocked Outer Mongolia. 
Eleven UAM states which sponsored Mauritania's membership 
(Benin, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, 
Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta) told the ROC that if it provoked a 
Soviet veto of Mauritania by blocking Outer Mongolia, they would vote 
for Peking on the "Chinese representation" issue. 26 Taipei was forced 
to compromise; both Mauritania and Outer Mongolia joined the United 
Nations in 1961. 
Despite this sacrifice made by the ROC, no ROC ambassador was 
sent to Mauritania, and relations between the two countries were 
never close. However, Mauritania was the first country visited by 
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ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan during his 1963 trip to sixteen 
African countries, and in February, 1965, Mauritania accepted an offer 
of assistance made by ROC Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un on a 
visit to Nouakchott. In June, Taipei sent a technical cooperation mis-
sion to Mauritania and at last appointed an ambassador. 27 However, 
less than a month later, Mauritania suddenly changed its attitude. 
Peking's ambassador to Tunisia, Yao Nien, visited Nouakchott from July 
16 to 19, and Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Peking 
on July 22. 28 Taipei broke diplomatic ties with Nouakchott on Septem-
ber 11, 1965. 
Gabon 
Gabon became independent on August 17, 1960, and established dip-
lomatic ties with Taipei on December 9. Relations were raised to am-
bassadorial level in May, 1965. During February and March, 1962, a 
ROC agricultural mission toured Gabon to study the potential for rice 
1 0 to . 29 cu t1va 1on. An agricultural cooperation agreement between the two 
countries was signed in Taipei on January 19, 1963, under which the 
ROC sent a twelve-man agricultural demonstration team in October to 
teach Gabonese farmers Chinese methods of cultivating rice under 1r-
0 to 30 r1.ga- .Lon. The agreement was renewed 1n 1966, 1969, and 1972, and 
31 the team was also expanded. By mid-1969 there were thirty-nine 
agricultural experts from Taiwan working in Gabon. The number in-
creased to forty-two by early 1972, working in nine agricultural tech-
nieal stations. The achievements of the Chinese team were "close to 
miraculous," to use the words of Jean Engone, Gabon's finance 
minister, who visited Taiwan in September, 1964, with rice harvests 
averaging 6,000 kilograms per hectare. Vegetables produced by the 
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Chinese were also valued by the Gabonese, who had usually imported 
vegetables from France by air. 32 
Besides cultivating rice and vegetables, the Chinese team also 
helped the Gabonese to improve their fishing catch. Jean Remy Ayoune, 
Gabonese minister.for external affairs, who visited Taiwan in April, 
1969, praised the Chinese team for its training of Gabonese fisher-
33 men. On November 8, 1973, Taiwan also signed an agreement to 
help Gabon build a sugar plant and train Gabonese technicians to 
"t 34 manage 1 • However, the agreement was never implemented, since 
diplomatic relations between the two countries were soon terminated; 
Libreville granted Peking de jure recognition on March 5, 1974. 
Taipei closed its embassy on March 30 and withdrew its agricultural 
35 team. Peking officially established ~iplomatic relations with 
Gabon on April 20. 
Upper Volta 
Upper Volta achieved its independence on August 5, 1960, but 
did not establish diplomatic relations with the ROC until December 
14, 1961. From July 17 to 20, 1963, ROC Foreign Minister Shen 
Chang-huan visited Ouagadougou, capital of Upper Volta, to confer 
ROC decorations on President Maurice Yameogo and Foreign Minister 
Lompolo Kone, and to receive Upper Volta's second highest decoration 
36 from President Yameogo. A joint communique on July 20 indicated 
plans for cooperation, particularly in agriculture. 37 
On May 25, 1964, during his second visit to Africa, Yang Chi-
tseng, ROC minister of economic affairs, signed an agricultural 
technical cooperation pact with Upper Volta, under which Taipei sent 
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a twelve-member agricultural team in April, 1965. 38 This was subse-
quently renewed and expanded several times. As in many other African 
countries, the Chinese team achieved great success in Upper Volta, 
with an average yield of 6600 kilograms of rice per hectare. An Upper 
Volta official described the Chinese achievement as "fantastic and 
admirable," and President Sangoule Lamizala, who replaced Yameogo 
after a coup, was also "very much satisfied" with the work of the 
Ch . t hn. . 39 1nese ec 1c1ans. 
On September 13, 1971, during Yang Hsi-kun's visit to Upper Volta, 
Taipei signed a most favored nation trade agreement with Ouagadougou to 
. b t th t t . 40 1ncrease commerce e ween e wo coun r1es. In November, 1972, by 
another agreement the ROC granted Upper Volta 50 million CFA francs 
f t t . f . .11 41 or cons rue 1on o a r1ce m1 • However, just before the project 
was to begin, Upper Volta established diplomatic relations with 
Peking on September 15, 1973. Taipei broke off relations with 
Ouagadougou on October 23 and withdrew its forty-two agricultural 
42 
technicians from Upper Volta. 
Benin 
When Benin became independent on August 1, 1960, under the name 
of Dahomey, Taipei appointed Chen Hsiung-fei, its charge d'affaires 
at Paris, as special envoy to the independence celebrations. Benin 
established diplomatic relations with the ROC on January 18, 1962. 
A technical cooperation agreement was signed between the two govern-
ments at Porto Novo on February 4, 1963, resulting in the dispatch of 
a twelve-man agrlcultural mission from Taiwan in March. 43 From Oc-
tober 7 to 12, 1963, President and Madam Maga paid a state visit 
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to Taiwan and received a warm welcome from President and Madam Chiang 
Kai-shek. A joint communique promised further cooperation between the 
t t . 44 wo coun r1es. However, relations were very unsteady because of 
Benin's extreme political instability (see Table XXXVI). 45 
Benin had six coups d'etat in nine years. On November 12, 1964, 
a year after the first coup, the new government allowed Peking to es-
tablish an embassy in Cotonou (opened in December), while Taipei still 
had one there. This curious situation continued until April 6, 1965, 
46 when Taipei broke relations with Benin and withdrew its embassy. 
Seven months later, two coups in quick succession brought a pro-Taipei 
government back to power in Benin, and the China policy was again re-
versed. Benin terminated its ties with Peking on January 3, 1966, and 
resumed relations with Taipei on April 21. Nine days earlier, on April 
12, Taipei had renewed its agricultural cooperation agreement, and a 
47 new·Roc agricultural team arrived in Cotonou in early May. 
The Chinese, who at first lived on "dry bread, sardines, and 
water," set a good example through self-discipline and hard work which 
48 won the respect of Benin's farmers. By mid-1969 there were forty-
one ROC agricultural technicians working in Benin. 49 But after three 
more coups, a Marxist government reverted to the 1964 pro-Peking policy, 
reviving diplomatic relations with Peking on December 29, 1972. Taipei 
apparently was not immediately informed, since an ROC official source 
dates the change from January 10, 1973. Taipei severed relations with 
Benin on January 14, and withdrew its agricultural team. 50 
Ivory Coast 
When the Ivory Coast achieved independence on August 7, 1960, the 
TABLE XXXVI 
CHINA POLICY CHANGES IN BENIN 
Diplomatic Relations Diplomatic Relations 
with the ROC with the PRC 
Date Event Established Severed Established Severed 
1960. 8. 1 Independence 
1962. 1.18 Pro-Taipei policy 1962. 1. 18 
1963.10.28 First coup d'etat 
1964.11.12 Pro-Peking policy 1964. 4. 8 1964.11.12 
l965.ll.29 Second coup d'etat 
1965.12.22 Third coup d'etat 
1966. 4.21 Pro-Taipei policy 1966. 4.21 1966.1.3 
1967.12.17 Fourth coup d'etat 
1969.12.10 Fifth coup d'etat 
1972.10.26 Sixth coup d'etat 
1972.12.29 Pro-Peking policy 1973. 1.19 1972.12.29 
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ROC sent Chen Hsiung-fei, its minister to Paris, as special envoy to 
the independence ceremonies at Abidjan, capital of the new republic. 
Though Taipei granted immediate recognition to the Ivory Coast, of-
fj cia1 diplomat:i c relations were not established until July 20, 1963, 
during HOC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan's visit to Abidjan. 51 
Taipei's relations with Abidjan were to be among the most long-lasting 
and most fruitful with any African country. Ten months earlier, on 
September 22, 1962, Taipei had signed a technical cooperation agreement 
with Abidjan, and sent a fourteen-man agricultural demonstration team 
to the Ivory Coast in March, 1963. 52 This agreement was renewed August, 
1967, expanding the ROC agricultural demonstration and cadre-training 
mission to the Ivory Coast to a total of 160 people, the largest ever 
sent by Taipei to an African country. The agreement was renewed in 
1969, 1971, and 1974. In addition, Taipei established a "Seed Multi-
plication and Supply Center" in the Ivory Coast in April, 1968. 53 
Besides agriculture, Taipei's cooperation with Abidjan also in-
eluded trade and handicrafts. On August 31, 1971, during his annual 
visit to Africa, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a trade agreement at Abidjan 
providing for reciprocal and preferential treatment between the two 
t . 54 coun r1es. The Ivory Coast also requested ROC aid in tapping its 
forest and bamboo resources. An ROC team of handicraft experts ar-
rived in Ivory Coast in October, 1973, and on April 10, 1974, the two 
countries signed a technical cooperation agreement at Abidjan, for ROC 
assistance to the Ivory Coast in developing a handicraft industry. 55 
When a French official offered similar aid, President Houphouet-Boigny 
asked him to vi'sit the Chinese team; after seeing its work, the French 
56 
official withdrew his offer as unnecessary. 
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Ivory Coast became one of Taipei's closest allies in Africa. 
President IIouphouet-Boigny, acclaimed by the HOC as the "leader of 
leaders" in Africa, is one of the very few senior African statesmen 
who has persistently warned Africans of the danger presented to Africa 
by Communism, especially the Peking variety. Under his leadership, 
the Ivory Coast continuously supported Taipei in th~ United Nations 
between 1961-1971. As of 1978, the Ivory Coast was the only West 
African country that still recognized Taipei instead of Peking. 
Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone became independent on April 27, 1961, but did not 
establish diplomatic relations with the ROC until September 28, 1963. 
Taipei signed a technical cooperation agreement with Sierra Leone on 
March 30, 1964, under which an eleven-man farm team was sent in June 
. 57 
to help Sierra Leone's agricultural development. Working in a 
swampy area south of Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, the Chinese 
team reaped its first rice harvest in late October, three months after 
sowing; local rice had required a growing period of six months. 
Furthermore, the Chinese were able to double Sierra Leone's rice out-
58 .. 
put from 2,000 to 4~000 pounds per acre. Ac9ord1ng to the Nation-
alist Chinese themselves, Freetown's attitude toward Taipei was at 
first skeptical; because of the hard work of the Chinese team, Sierra 
59 
Leone's attitude gradually changed. 
A new technical cooperation agreement between the ROC and Sierra 
Leone was signed in Taipei on July 26, 1965, providing for u.s. $2 
60 
million in agricultural aid from Taipei in the next five years. 
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Banja Tejan-sie, speaker of the Sierra Leone parliament, said on Oc-
tober 18, 1965, during his visit to Taiwan, that Sierra Leone "will 
give 100 per cent support tn the Republic of China when the so-called 
Chinese presentation problem comes up on the floor of the United Na-
tions for debate." 61 But less than a month later, when the UN General 
Assembly again voted on the "China issue" Sierra Leone voted for Peking, 
t . . 62 no Ta1pe1. 
It was only after Lhe visit to Taipei by Prime Minister Siaka 
Stevens i_n May, 1969, that Sierra Leone began to take a definite pro-
Taipei stand in the United Nations. It voted 1n favor of Taipei on 
the "representation issue" 1n both 1969 and 1970. 63 However, this was 
soon to change. In March, 1971, stevens, by then president of Sierra 
Leone, received Guinean military help in suppressing a military revolt 
in Sierra Leone. Influenced by Guinea, one of Peking's closest allies 
1n West Africa, and attracted by Peking's promise of economic and tech~ 
nical aid, Sierra Leone established diplomatic relations with the PRC 
on July 29, 1971. The ROC broke relations with Sierra Leone on August 
20 and withdrew its agricultural mission. 64 
Gambia 
The Republic of the Gambia, the smallest country in continental 
Africa, became independent on February 18, 1965, but did not estab-
lish relations with either China until late 1968. However, a 
sixteen-member agricultural team from the ROC was sent to Gambia 1n 
June, 1966, and a technical cooperation agreement between Gambia and 
the ROC was signed at Bathurst, capital of G~bia, on August 12, 1966, 
by the HOC ambassador to Upper Volta, Joei Tcheng-kao, and 
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b . A . lt . . t . 65 Gam 1an gr1cu ure M1n1s er A. S. Kanyl. Because the Chinese team 
made "greaL contributions to the increase of rice production" in 
Gambia, Yaya Lang Cessay, the new Gambian minister of agriculture and 
natural resources, went to Taipei 1n May, 1968, to seek extension of 
the team's service. 66 On May 14 the Sino-Gambian technical coopera-
tion agreement was extended for two years and the team was expanded to 
67 twenty-four men. 
On September 27, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a joint communique with 
Gambian Prime Minister Jawara at Bathurst, in which both sides indi-
eated willingness to establish diplomatic relations, with the detailed 
procedures to be discussed by Jawara on a state visit to the ROC from 
68 
November 8 to 12. A joint communique at the end of this visit an-
nounccd the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries on November 12, 1968. 69 After this long-delayed action, the 
ROC stepped up agricultural aid to Gambia, renewing the agreement in 
1970, 1972, and 1974, and expanding the agricultural team to thirty-
five members. Many new farm machines were also shipped to Gambia. 70 
On October 16, 1972, Jawara, now president of Gambia, and Lady 
Jawara arrived in Taipei for an eight-day state visit, and received a 
gold key Lo the city of Taipei as a token qf respect. 71 Nevertheless, 
pressed by Lhe pro-Peking trend prevailing in Africa, Gambia estab-
lished diplomatic relations with the PRC om December 14, 1974, only 
three months after Taipei extended its technical cooperation agreement 
with Bathurst. The ROC broke relations with Gambia on December 28 and 
withdrew its farm technicians. 
By the end,of February, 1977, among the twelve West African 
countries which had at one time or another maintained diplomatic 
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relations with Taipei and received agricultural assistance from Taiwan, 
only the Ivory Coast remained a friend of Taipei. 
Central Africa 
Central Africa was another area where Taipei was more successful 
than Peking during the 1960s and early 1970s. There were six inde-
pendent countries in this part of Africa: Zaire, Chad, the Central 
African Republic, Rwanda, Niger, and Burundi. All except Burundi 
maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC duririg the 1960s, as 
shwon in Table XXXVII. 
TABLE XXXVII 
THE ROC AND CENTRAL AFRICA 
DiElomatic Relatlons Wlth ROC First Opened 
Independent Established Country Suspended Relations with PRC 
1960. 6.30 1960. 8.10 Zaire 1972.11.24 
1960. 8.11 1962. 1.13 Chad 1972.11.28 
1960. 8.13 1962. 4.13 CAR 1964-1967 1974. 9.29 
1962. 7. 1 1962. 7. 1 Rwanda 1971.11.12 
1960. 8. 3 1963. 7.22 Niger 1974. 7.20 
Zaire 
The former Belgian Congo achieved its independence on June 30, 
1960, and became the independent Republic of Congo, later renamed Zaire. 
Due to the influence of Belgium, which then had diplomatic relations 
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with the ROC, Taipei instead of Peking was invited to the independence 
ceremonies at Leopoldville, and diplomatic relations with Taipei were 
established on August 10, 1960. However, during the long ser1es of 
civil wars that followed, Zaire was involved not with the ROC but with 
the PRC, which actively supported such rebels as Gizenga, Mulele, 
Gbenye, and Soumaliot in the first half of the 1960s (see Chapter V). 
Peking came to be regarded by Zaire's central government as one of its 
bitterest enemies. This hostility survived frequent changes of leader-
ship within Zaire in the 1960s. 
On October 13, 1964, during a visit to Taipei by Zaire's Minister 
of Agriculture, Albert Kalonji-Ditunga, a technical cooperation agree-
ment was signed with the ROC. 72 Taipei sent an eleven-member agricul-
tural team to Zaire in August, 1966, to work for two years helping to 
develop rice cultivation. The Chinese agricultural experts succeeded 
in producing rice and vegetables in Zaire and even transplanted 
Taiwanese pineapples into the "white sands" of the Congo. General 
.Joseph Mobutu, Zaire's president since November, 1965, praised the 
Chinese contributions, saying: "The Dutch reclaim land from the sea; 
the Chinese produce rice and vegetables in sandy soil. The Chinese 
agricultural team is made up of people who know only hard work instead 
73 of filing reports." The agricultural pact was renewed on September 
3, 1969, and.the Chinese team increased to thirty-nine by June, 1969. 74 
At the invitation of the ROC President Chiang, President and Madam 
Mobutu made a state visit to Taiwan from April 15 to 21, 1971. In a 
joint communique, the two leaders agreed "to strengthen cooperation 
with special emphasis on the cultivation of rice, maize, cotton, 
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sugarcane, and the establishment of sugar mills" in Zaire, and "to 
establish a joint committee that will meet once a year in Taipei and 
Kinshasa alternatively to discuss cooperation between the two coun-
tries."75 After Mobutu's visit, the ROC actively helped Zaire develop 
the Ruzizi valley in Kivu, the most fertile province, hoping to raise 
cotton, sugar cane, rice,and cattle.76 
Zaire supported the ROC in the United Nations from 1961 on, and 
its pro-Taipei stand became more definite in 1967 after Taipei began 
its agricultural aid. Zaire was one of the fifteen African countries 
voting against Peking's admission to the United Nations in October, 
1971. After that, however, Mobutu's pro-Taipei attitude changed. 
Zaire established diplomatic relations with Peking on November 24, 
1972, and withdrew its embassy from Taipei on December 30. Taipei 
broke off relations with Zaire on January 30, 1973, ninety-two 
agricultural technicians having already been withdrawn in December, 
1972. 77 Zaire was the first Central African country to establish re-
lations with Peking. The loss of Zaire was the most serious setback 
suffered by the ROC in Africa in the early 1970s. 
Chad 
Chad achieved independence on August 11, 1960, but did not es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the ROC until January 13, 1962. 
From August 4 to 1, 1963, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan 
visited Fort Lamy, capital of Chad. Under an agricultural coopera-
tion agreement signed in Taipei on April 7, 1964, the ROC sent a 
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seventeen-man agricultural team to Chad in April, 1965, to help with 
cultivation of rice and sugar cane. 78 On June 19, 1969, a three-
member economic mission from Chad led by Minister of Economic Affairs 
Abdoulaye Lamana arrived in Taipei for a week's visit to seek more 
assistance. In a joint communique on June 26, Taipei promised u.s. 
$3 million in aid to Chad over the next five years, the first credit 
assistance granted by the ROC to a foreign country. 79 A new techni-
cal cooperation agreement was signed in Fort Lamy on January 15, 1966, 
providing for expansion of ROC agricultural assistance, scholarships 
for training young Chadian farmers in Taiwan, and construction of an 
"1 f" d f t t d 15 t f . 80 01 re 1nery an a ac ory o pro uce 0,000 ons o soup a year. 
In June, 1967, Taipei sent a four-member veterinary mission to Chad 
81 
to help its animal husbandry. 
In 1972 the 1964 agricultural pact and the 1966 technical cooper-
ation agreement were incorporated into a new Sino-Chadian economic 
and technical cooperation agreement signed on July 10 in Taipei, further 
increasing ROC agricultural and technical assistance to Chad. Despite 
the considerable aid it had received, Chad deserted Taipei a year after 
the latter lost its U.N. seat to Peking in late 1971. In May, 1971, 
Peking had donated U.S. $2.5 million and 200,000 doses of vaccine to 
82 
help Chad combat a cholera epidemic. Chad voted against the ex-
pulsion of Taipei from the United Nations, but established diplomatic 
relations with Peking on November 28, 1972, four days after Zaire. 
Zaire's switch to Peking evidently influ~nced Chad's decision. Taipei 
severed diplomatic ties with Chad on December 27 and withdrew its agri-
1 . . 83 cultura mlsslon.' 
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Central African Republic 
The Central African Republic achieved independence on August 13, 
1960, but did not establish diplomatic r-elations with Taipei until 
April 13, 1962. During his 1963 tour of Africa, ROC Foreign Minister 
Shen Chang-huan visited Bangui, capital of the CAR, and met with 
President Dacko. On May 19, 1964, a CAR-ROC technical cooperation 
agreement on handicrafts was signed in Bangui. 84 Taipei sent a four-
man handicraft demonstration team to the CAR in August. However, the 
CAR established diplomatic relations with Peking on September 29, 
1964, causing Taipei to close its embassy on November 5 and withdraw 
85 the team. 
On New Year's Day, 1966, Dacko was overthrown by a military coup 
led by his cousin, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, then chief of staff of 
the CAR Army. The new regime under Bokassa broke off relations with 
Peking on January 6 and expelled the PRC embassy staff. Nevertheless, 
diplomatic relations between Bangui and Taipei were not restored un-
til more than two years later, May 6, 1968. A technical cooperation 
agreement between the ROC and the CAR was signed on June 16, 1968, 
during CAR Foreign Minister Jean-Arthur Bandio's visit to Taipei, 
and a sixteen-man ROC agricultural mission was sent to the CAR in No-
vember.86 
At the invitation of President Chiang, Bokassa paid a state visit 
to Taiwan from October 8 to 17, 1970, and the 1968 agreement was re-
87 newed. A trade agreement was also signed to increase the tr~de 
b t th t t . 88 e ween e wo coun r1es. Immediately after Bokassa's visit, 
another team of four ROC agricultur~l experts arrived in Bangui in 
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early November to serve on four state farms, followed a month later 
b . h . . f . ht b 89 y a H1g way Eng1neer1ng Team o e1g mem ers. By the end of 
1970 there were more than forty ROC technicians working in the CAR. 90 
Though the CAR had received considerable aid from the ROC and 
Bokassa had pledged support during his visit to Taiwan just a month 
earlier, when the "Chinese representation" issue was voted on in the 
United Nations in November, 1970, the CAR abstained, much to the dis-
91 may of the ROC government. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between 
Taipei and Bangui lingered on, and the 1970 technical cooperation agree-
ment was renewed in March, 1973, during CAR Foreign Minister Joseph 
Potolot's visit to Taipei. In a joint communique Taipei and Bangui 
even agreed to form a joint committee to meet in Taipei and Bangui 
alternately once a year, to review the progress of technical coopera-
tion between the two countries. 92 But under the influence of French 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Zaire's Mobutu, and a PRC 
promise to build a railroad for the CAR, Bokassa decided to establish 
93 diplomatic ties with the PRC on August 20, 1976. The CAR was the 
last country 1n Central Africa to switch to Peking. Taipei broke re-
lations with Bangui on August 23, and withdrew all its technicians 
94 
from the CAR. 
Rwanda 
Rwanda became independent on July 1, 1962, and established diplo-
1 · "th th ROC th e day A four-member Rwandan matic re atLons Wl e on · e sam . 
government delegation led by Minister of Agriculture and Economic Af-
fairs P. D. Nkezabera visited Taipei from October 9 to 16, 1963, and 
signed an agricultural technical cooperation agreement which r~sulted 
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ln the dispatch of a ten-man ROC agricultural team in late January, 
1964, to work for two years in Rwanda. 95 On July 1, 1964, the second 
anniversary of Rwanda's independence, the Chinese team was able to pre-
sent sheaves of rice to President Gregoire Kayabanda as evidence of 
the best harvest in Rwanda's history. 96 A handicraft technical cooper-
ation pact was signed between the two countries at Kigali, capital of 
Rwanda, on May 26, 1965. 97 
The 1963 agreement was renewed in a new pact signed at Taipei on 
May 28, 1966, by Li Kuo-ting, ROC minister of economic affairs, and 
Thaddee Bagaragaza, Rwanda's minister of international cooperation. 
8y the new agreement, Taipei was to provide U.S. $1.5 million in 
Lechnica1 aid over a five year period to help Rwanda develop 1,000 
hectares of land into rice and sugar cane fields, and build three 
small sugar refineries, a soybean-oil plant, a pottery plant, and an 
. lt 1 t . . t 98 agrlCU ura ralnlng cen er. At a press conference, shortly after 
the signing of the pact, Bagaragaza pledged Rwanda's support to Taipei 
. h •t d t' 99 ln t e Unl e Na lons. Rwanda had abstained on the "Chinese repre-
senation" issue in November, 1965, but in the next five years, kept 
the promise made by Bagaragaza. 
However, pressed by its strongly pro-Peking neighbor Tanzania 
and lured by a PRC promise of aid, Rwanda began to change its policy 
in early 1971, and for the first time voted for Peking's admission in 
the United Nations on October 26, 1971. On November 12 Rwanda of-
ficially established diplomatic relation~ with Peking. Taipei closed 
its embassy on May 13, 1972, and withdrew its forty-seven agricultural 
technicians. Five months after the closing of the ROC embassy, Peking 
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signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Rwanda, to 
. finance the building of a road linking Rwanda with Tanzania, and the 
building of a cement plant. 100 
This former French colony became the independent Republic of Niger 
on August 3, 1960. However, diplomatic relations with the ROC were 
not established until three years later. A Niger delegation led by 
Minister of Rural Economy Yacoube Djibo visited Taipei from November 
6 to 10, 1962, and signed an economic and technical cooperation agree-
ment, but Taipei did not begin agricultural assistance to Niger until 
1 1964. 101 Ju y, A year before that, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-
huan visited Niamey, capital of Niger, and a joint communique was is-
sued on ,July 22, 1963, announcing establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Taipei and Niamey. 102 
In July, 1964, Taipei sent five farm technicians to help Niger 
grow sugar cane; five more left for Niger in late August to help grow 
. 103 
rlce and dry land crops. After two failures, the Chinese team 
reaped its first rice harvest in March, 1965, exceeding 5,000 kilograms 
104 per hectare. In 1966, Taipei promised Niger U.S. $3 million ln 
105 
technical and material assistance over the next five years. By 
mid-1969, ROC farm technicians were able to help the farmers of Niger 
grow vegetables "not only for their own consumption but also for ex-
106 
port" to France. 
Niger President and Madame Hamani Diori arrived in Taipei on Oc-
tober 23, 1969, for a five-day state visit. Speaking at a banquet 
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given .Ln his honor by President Chiang, Diori thanked Chinese leaders 
1' th . . t . . 1 107 or elr assls ance ln agrlcu tural development. 
During his annual trip to Africa in the summer of 1970, Yang Hsi-
k'un signed a trade agreement with Niger at Niamey on August 15. The 
pact provided that the two governments shall grant each other favor-
able treatment in regard to export and import licensing and customs 
duties in order to stimulate trade between the two countries. 108 A 
second protocol to the economic and technical cooperation agreement was 
signed in Taipei on May 22, 1972, by Niger's Minister of Rural Economy 
Morna Kaka; the ROC agreed to continue technical assistance for Niger's 
agricultural development. 109 
During the 1960s, Niger was one of Taipei's strongest supporters 
in Africa, consistently voted for Taipei in the United Nations, and 
was among the fifteen African countries which voted against Peking's 
admission in 1971. However, by late 1973, Niger's stand began to 
change after all its neighbors had either established relations with 
or at least granted recognition to Peking: Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, 
Dahomey, Chad, and Upper Volta had diplomatic ties with Peking, while 
Libya had recognized Peking without establishing official diplomatic 
relations. Niger established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 
July 20, 1974. Taipei closed its embassy at Niamey nine days later 
and withdrew its fifty-three agricultural technicians from Niger. 
East Africa 
East Africa was the only region of Africa in which the ROC's 
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diplomatic efforts to compete with Peking were totally unsuccessful. 
In the 1960s, there were SlX independent countries in East Africa: 
Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. All except 
Ethiopia established diplomatic relations with Peking before the end 
of 1963. Despite the close friendship between the United States and 
both Ethiopia and the ROC during and after World War II, there is no 
evidence that Ethiopia ever established diplomatic relations with the 
ROC. On the other hand, it waited nearly twenty-one years before es-
tablishing relations with the PRC (November 24, 1970). Prior to that, 
Ethiopia had permitted both Peking and Taipei to station news agency 
correspondents in Addis Ababa, but beyond this meager achievement, 
the ROC made no headway in East Africa. 
Southern Africa 
Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese arrived in Southern Africa 
rather late because most colonies in that part of the continent 
achieved their independence relatively late. Of the thirteen coun-
tries in Southern Africa (Republic of South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, 
Comoros, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana), the last five did not become 
independent until the 1970s. Generally speaking, the ROC was more suc-
cessful than the PRC- in Southern Africa during the 1960s. Among the 
eight then independent Southern African countries, Taipei maintained 
diplomatic relations with six (South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland) and Peking with only one (Zambia); 
Rhodesia had diplomatic relations with neither (see Table XXXVIII). 
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TARLE XXXVTIT 
Tllr: HOC AND SOUTHEHN AFRICA 
DiElomatjc Relations with ROC First Opened 
Independent Established Country Relations with PRC 
1910. 5.31 1931 South Africa not yet 
1960. 6.27 1960. 6.27 Madagascar 1972.11. 6 
1964. 7. 6 1966. 7.11 Malawi not yet 
1966.10. 4 1966.10.31 Lesotho not yet 
1966. 9.30 1966.12.30 Botswana 1974. 3.25 
1968. 9. 6 1968. 9. 6 Swaziland not yet 
Republic of South Africa 
A Chinese consulate general was opened in Johannesburg as early 
as 1897, while China was still the Manchu empire and South Africa 
still a British colony. Diplomatic relations between the independent 
Union of South Africa and the Republic of China date from 1931. After 
the division of China in 1949, South Africa continued to recognize the 
ROC government in Taiwan, and consistently voted against Peking's ad-
mission to the United Nations. This policy was not so much pro-Taipei 
as anti-Peking, because of the PRC's harsh criticism of South Africa. 
In the 1960s, relations between Taipei and Pretoria, capital of South 
Africa, were formal rather than close. 
The major reason for this was that as long as the ROC had any 
hope of winning and retaining influence 2n black Africa, it could not 
afford to display friendship for the apartheid white minority regime 
in Pretoria. Conversely, South Africa did not seek friendship with 
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the ROC because that might provoke Peking into more active support of 
South Africa dissident movements. After the 1971 ouster of the ROC 
from the United Nations, both governments had reason to reevaluate the 
earlier policies. Abandoned by most of its black African friends, 
Taipei felt isolated by the PRC in Africa and began to review its re-
lations with South Africa, neglected for so many years. Pretoria, 
feeling intensified pressure from the Communist powers and militant 
Africans and realizing the impossibility of appeasing Peking, de-
cided to improve its relations with Taipei. Out of mutual sympathy 
and practical necessity, the ROC and South Africa were simultaneously 
attracted to each other by having a common enemy, Communist China. 
Though the ROC had continued to maintain a consulate general 1n 
Johannesburg, South Africa did not set up a consulate general in 
Taipei until 1967. An ROC consulate in Cape Town was opened in Janu-
ary, 1973, to aid HOC fishing ships and crews, and local Chinese resi-
llO dents. South Africa has become the ROC's largest trading partner 
in Africa since the early 1970s, and the trade has increased sig-
nificantly. 
The total trade volume between Taipei and Pretoria was only U.S. 
$8 million in 1960, and only $12 million in 1971. By 1975 it had climbed 
to U.S. $140 million, and the estimate for 1976 was U.S. $200 mil-
1 . 111 lOTI. A trade agreement with South Africa was signed on February 
26, 1975, in Taipei, and a maize trade agreement on October 7, 1975, 
providing for the HOC to buy 1.35 million tons of maize from South 
. 112 
Africa between 1976 and 1979. Generally Taipei imported minerals 
(iron, coal, and industrial diamonds) and maize from South Africa 
and exported to it fish, textiles, and chemicals. 113 
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In early March, 1976, Yang Hsi-k'un visited Pretoria and met with 
both President H. Diederichs and Prime Minister Vorster. Diederichs 
and Vorster reaffirmed South Africa's friendship for Nationalist 
Ch . 114 1na. With Pretoria's approval, Yang also visited South-West 
Africa for the first time, met with South-West African tribal delega-
tions then attending a constitutional meeting at Windhoek, and told 
them that the ROC "always supports any nation to achieve their legiti-
115 mate political goals through peaceful means." Taipei and Pretoria 
announced (April 26, 1976) that diplomatic relations between the two 
116 
countries would be raised to ambassadorial level. Improvement in 
diplomatic relations is reported to have substantially improved the 
lot of 8,000 overseas Chinese in South Africa, who like other Asians 
117 had been discriminated against in many ways. Yang Hsi-k'un visited 
Pretoria again in August, 1977. 
Magadascar 
. When Magadascar became independent on June 26, 1960, there was an 
HOC consulate general at Tananarive, capital of Magadascar. Taipei 
established diplomatic relations with the new republic on the same day 
and raised its consulate general to embassy rank. Because of his 
earlier close relations with the French Socialist party, President 
Philibert Tsiranana became one of the most anti-Communist leaders in 
Africa. On April 3, 1962, he became the first African head of state 
to visit Tajwan. A Sino-Magadascar treaty of amity was signed on 
April 4. 118 President Tsiranana later called his visit to Taiwan 
"very rewarding" and indicated that his country had "much to learn 
from Nationalist China in economic development, land reform, and 
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f . 119 modernization o· armed forces." 
In 1963 ROC Foreign Minister Sheri visited Tananarive from August 
24 to 29. Two months later, a Madagascar government delegation led by 
Minister of National Economy Jacques Rabemananjara signed a trade agree-
ment in Taipei on November 11, 1969, to increase trade between the two 
t . 120 coun r1es. From November 12 to 15, 1965, President and Madame 
Tsiranana paid a second visit to Taiwan. 
A Sino~Madagascar agricultural technical cooperation agreement 
was signed on January 9, 1967, at Tananarive, according to which Taipei 
was to send an agricultural demonstration team to work for two years to 
1 d . lt 121 he p Ma agascar's agr1cu ure. Yang Hsi-k'un visited Tananarive and 
signed a technical cooperation agreement on bamboo handicrafts with the 
Madagascar government on August 30, 1968: a three-man bamboo handi-
f d . t f . . . 1 1 122 era t emonstrat1on was sen rom Ta1wan 1n Apr1 , 969. The 
agricultural pact was extended on September 22, 1969, and the bamboo 
handicraft agreement on April 10, 1972. 123 
Madagascar under the leadership of Tsiranana was one of the ROC's 
strongest African supporters in the United Nations between 1961 and 
1971. After Tsiranana was forced to resign in mid-May, 1972, by 
left-wing labor unions and students, the new regime under Major 
General Gabriel Ramanantsoa established diplomatic relations with Pe-
king on November 6, 1972. Taipei closed its embassy at Tananarive on 
December 15 and withdrew all its technicians. 124 
Malawi 
Malawi achieved its independence on July 6, 1964. The ROC ap-
pointed Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un as special envoy to the 
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independence celebrations, but official diplomatic relations were not 
established until two years later. A Sino-Malawian technical co-
operation agreement was signed by Yang and Malawian Prime Minister 
Banda on August 20, 1965, at Zomba, capital of Malawi, with some re-
visions on December 3. 125 The ROC sent a twelve-man agricultural team 
to Malawi for two years to demonstrate paddy rice and vegetable culti-
vation. 
In July, 1966, Malawi became a republic and Banda the first presi-
dent. On July 1 Yang Hsi~k'un led a government delegation to Malawi 
for the second anniversary of independence of the country. President 
Banda received Yang on July 11 and informed him that Malawi had de-
cided to establish official diplomatic relations with Taipei. 126 On 
the same day the first protocol to the Sino-Malawian technical co-
operation agreement was signed by Banda and Yang, expanding Taipei's 
agricultural assistance by twenty additional agricultural techni-
cians.127 As in many other African countries, the Chinese team 
achieved great success 1n increasing Malawi's average rice yield from 
128 
500 pounds to 6,000 pounds per hectare. A second protocol was 
signed on January 22, 1969, to step up aid to Malawi. 129 By June, 1969, 
there were thirty-eight agricultural technicians from Taiwan working 
1 . 130 Ln Ma awl. 
Malawi under Banda consistently supported Taipei in the United 
Nations between 1965 and 1971. During these years, various Malawian 
leaders and government delegations visited Taiwan. President Banda 
"i ·•1 
arrived in Taipei on August 4, 1967, for an eight-day visit. ~-JJ. At 
the end of his visit, Banda signed a joint communique with President 
Chiang on August 11, in which both leaders agreed that the "Communist 
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Chinese regime is the major source of the subversion, turbulence, and 
132 unrest in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world." Banda as-
sured Chiang that Malawi would fully support Nationalist China in 
the United Nations. 
During his 1972 visit to Malawi, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a new 
technical cooperation agreement on May 2, according to which the 
Chinese agricultural mission in Malawi was to complete reclamation of 
t t 1 f 0 f 1 d 0 0 0 d 0 134 a o a area o 2,20 acres o an 1n NsanJe, Llmpasa, an Domasl. 
This agreement was renewed on November 8, 1973, when Yang was on an-
other six-day visit to Malawi, and renewed again in 1975 and 1977. 135 
With technical aid from the ROC for thirteen years, Malawi is now one 
of the largest rice producing countries in Africa, and one of the six 
African countries that still maintains diplomatic relations with 
0 0 136 Tal_peJ. 
Lesotho 
Basutoland became the independent Kingdom of Lesotho on October 
4, 1966, and established diplomatic relations with Nationalist China 
on October 31. Even in 1965, Lesotho had sent trainees to attend the 
"Seminar for the African Agriculturalists" in Taiwan, and in January, 
1966, Basutoland's Minister of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing 
s. R. Letsie paid a week's visit to Taiwan. 137 After establishment of 
diplomatic relations, Lesotho Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan 
visited Taiwan from November 21 to 28, 1966. At the end of his visit, 
Jonathan signed a joint communique agreeing that "international Com-
munism's attempt and ambition to conquer the world is the most serious 
138 
threat to world peace." 
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A technical cooperation agreement was signed between the ROC and 
Lesotho on November 13, 1968, at Maseru, capital of Lesotho, and 
Taipei sent a twelve-man agricultural mission to Lesotho in .January, 
1969. 139 In August, 1969, Prime Minister Jonathan paid a second visit 
to Taiwan, reporting that the Chinese farm team in his country "had 
. 140 
done an excellent job and won the respect" of his people. Before 
leaving Taiwan, Jonathan announced that a treaty of amity would be 
signed between Lesotho and the ROC. This was accomplished on December 
21 at Maseru, the third such treaty between Taipei and African coun-
t . 141 r1es. The 1968 technical cooperation agreement was subsequently 
renewed and expanded in 1972 and 1973. By late 1975 there were twenty-
two agricultural experts from Taiwan working in Lesotho. 
Since 1971 Yang Hsi-k'un has visited Lesotho every year except 
in 1974 and 1975 during which he did not make any trip to Africa. His 
most recent trip to Lesotho was in August, 1977. In May, 1976, Prime 
Minister .Jonathan paid his third visit to the ROC, while the queen of 
142 Lesotho also made a six-day visit to Taiwan in September, 1977. 
Botswana 
Bechuanaland, a former British protectorate, became the inde-
pendent Republic of Botswana on September 30, 1966, and established 
143 diplomatic relations with the ROC on December 30 of the same year. 
In February, 1968, Taipei sent a twelve-member agricultural demonstra-
tion team to Botswana. On .July 15 Botswana Vice-President Q.K.J. Masire 
arrived in Taipei for a nine-day official visit, and said his country 
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was "grateful to the Chinese government for sending an agricultural 
team to Botswana . a significant demonstration of genuine friend-
h . ,144 s lp. Two months later, Yang Hsi-k'un, during his twenty-second 
trip to Africa, signed a technical cooperation agreement with Botswana 
on September 10 at Gaberones, capital of Botswana. According to the 
pact, retroactive to January 1, Taipei was to dispatch another farm 
team of more than ten members to Botswana in the near future. 145 The 
rice cultivation carried out by the Chinese teams in Botswana achieved 
146 
a tremendous success, with a yield of 7,000 pounds of r1ce per acre. 
This impressive achievement prompted Botswana"to request extension of 
the 1968 agreement, which was done on April 28, 1972, by Yang, during 
his twenty-eighth trip to Africa. 147 
However, relations between the ROC and Botswana gradually de-
teriorated after the 1970 UN vote on "Chinese representation," when 
Botswana joined Chad, Togo, Cameroon, the CAR, and Senegal--all then 
receiving ROC agricultural aid--in saying they would no longer try to 
block Peking from the United Nations. 148 In October, 1971, Botswana 
voted for the expulsion of Taipei in order to seat Peking in the 
United Nations; yet diplomatic relations between the ROC and Botswana 
lingered on for two and a half more years. Botswana granted recog-
nition to Peking on March 25, 1974, and asked ROC diplomatic repre-
. t 1 149 sentat1ves o eave. Taipei closed its embassy at Gaberones on 
April 5 and withdrew its agricultural mission and medical personnal 
150 from Botswana. 
Swaziland 
Swaziland, a former British protectorate, became an independent 
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kindgom on September 6, 1968, and established diplomatic relations with 
the ROC on the same day. Yang Hsi-k'un attended the independence 
ceremonies at Mbabane, capital of Swaziland. Friendly contacts be-
tween the two countries had begun much earlier, when several royal 
dignitaries from Swaziland visited Taiwan in 1964 and 1965. 151 The 
ROC signed a technical cooperation agreement with Swaziland on August 
19, 1969, at Mbabane, and dispatched a seventeen-member agricultural 
team to Swaziland in September, to work on rice and vegetable grow-
ing.152 The Sino-Swaziland pact was renewed on May 10, 1972, while 
the agricultural team was increased to twenty-five men. 153 The Chinese 
technicians achieved very successful results in Swaziland, raising up-
land rice yield to between 1,800 and 4,000 pounds per acre, paddy rice 
yield to about 9,000 pounds per acre. In addition, the Chinese also 
helped Swaziland produce vegetables and fruits. In a little more than 
two years after first receiving ROC agricultural assistance, Swaziland, 
though one of the smallest countries in Africa, was able to export food 
h f h t . t 154 to ot er parts o t e con lnen . 
A handicraft technical cooperation agreement was signed between 
the two countries on February 12, 1973, resulting in the dispatch of 
a three-man ROC handicraft demonstration team from Taiwan to Swazi-
155 land in March to help train woodcarvers, stonecarvers, and potters. 
Both the agricultural agreement and the handicraft pact were later re-
newed in 1975. 156 Yang Hsi-k'un has visited Swaziland during every trip 
he made to Africa since 1971, the latest in July, 1977. ROC Vice-
Premier Hsu Ching-chung visited Mbabane in October, 1976, following a 
week's visit to Taipei by Prince Maphevu Dlamini, premiser of Swazi-
157 
land, in August, 1976. Swaziland is one of the six African 
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countries that still maintain diplomatic ties with Taipei. 
In Southern Africa, as in other parts of the continent, the ROC 
was forced to retreat, though not as totally as elsewhere. Of the SlX 
Afr i.can countries s ti 11 recogntz mg Taipei, four at'c in Southern 
Africa. In Africa as a whole, it appears from the analysis above that 
the ROC did as well as could have been expected in its competition 
with the PRC, given the enormous differences ln resources. At the 
peak of its influence, Taipei had diplomatic relations with twenty-
two African countries (in 1969 and 1970) while Peking was recognized 
by only thirteen African countries in 1969 and fifteen in 1970. But 
as soon as Nationalist China's prestige in Africa reached its peak, 
it began to decline. The setback suffered by the ROC after 1970 can 
be attributed to a drastic change ln political atmosphere in Africa 
for reasons beyond Taipei's control. ROC agricultural aid to Afrjcan 
nations achieved impressive results in increased crop yields, but these 
contributions could not outweigh the political considerations which 
made it increasingly difficult even for non-Marxist African govern-
ments to refuse to deal with Peking. 
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CHAPTER X 
AFRICA AND "CHINA" IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
The "China Issue" 
Since its founding in October, 1945, the United Nations has dis-
cussed, and sometimes voted on, many difficult and complicates issues, 
but none proved more difficult to resolve than the so-called "China 
issue," on which the United Nations voted twenty-one times in twenty-
1 two years. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the entire 
series of votes in the context of other events, and then to analyze 
the role of Africa in th6 long dispute. 
Representation, Not Admission 
The Republic of China was one of the founding members of the 
United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council. There probably would not have been a "China issue" in the 
United Nations if the ROC had either won the Chinese civil war or been 
totally defeated. Instead, the ROC lost most of China but retained 
the island of Taiwan and thus survived as a functioning government for 
millions of Chinese, not a powerless government in exile on foreign 
soil. Although this division of China between two governments had 
proximate parallels in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, none of those 
countries had been United Nations members before the division. The 
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partition of China therefore created a unique dilemma: not whether 
"China" should be admitted to the United Nations, but which government 
was entitled to represent China in the United Nations. 
This question was first raised by the PRC six weeks after that 
government was established. At that time, ROC armies were still in 
southern China, and the ROC government had moved back to the World War 
II capital at Chungking deep in the interior; it did not abandon the 
mainland and move to Taiwan until December 8, 1949. But on November 
15, 1949, PRC Premier Chou En-lai cabled UN Secretary General Trygve 
Lie and Carlos Romulo, president of the UN General Assembly, declaring 
that "the remnant reactionary Kuomingtang government is fundamentally 
2 doomed and is no longer qualified to represent the Chinese people." 
Ten days later, at a meeting of the First Committee of the fourth 
session of the General Assembly, representatives from the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia challenged 
the right of the ROC to represent China. Thus began the first debate 
3 
on "Chinese representation" in a UN organ. In reply, ROC chief dele-
gate Dr. Tsiang Tingfu accused the Soviet Union of supporting the 
Chinese Communists during the civil war in China, in violation of the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed by Moscow with 
the ROC in 1945. 4 
On December 29, 1949, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, 
Yakov Malik, demanded the expulsion of the ROC delegation. After a re-
buttal by the ROC delegate, the president of the Security Council ruled 
the matter closed since it was not on the provisional agenda of the 
t . 5 mee 1ng. 
------------
417 
Peking then tried a more direct approach, appointing PRC delega-
tions to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and 
demanding that they be seated in place of the ROC delegations. Mes-
sages to this effect on January 19 and February 8 were followed ln the 
first half of 1950 by similar approaches to other United Nations 
lo agencies, all without success. On June 25, 1950, North Korea armed 
forces invaded South Korea, starting a war that was to complicate the 
"China issue" even more. When the Security Council condemned North 
Korean aggression and called on all member states to assist South 
Korea, the Soviet Union was unable to use its veto because it was still 
boycotting the Security Council over the China issue. 
PRC Aggression Against UN 
Forces in Korea 
On September 14, 1950, just four days after the United Nations 
forces landed at Inchon to begin driving the North Koreans back, India 
asked the General Assembly to transfer the Chinese seat from Taipei to 
Peking. This resolution A/1365 was rejected by thirty-three votes to 
sixteen, with ten abstentions, the first General Assembly vote on the 
issue. 11 Peking's prospects declined even more after its armies 
entered Korea on October 19 and attacked United Nations and South 
Korean forces on all fronts. The Security Council initially tried to 
avoid a wider war by inviting the PRC to send a special representative 
to Security Council meetings. But on November 28, Peking's representa-
tive, Wu Hsiu-chuan, denounced the Council for depriving the PRC of 
its lawful seat as a permanent member. After making similar charges 
in several meetings of the General Assembly's First Committee, Wu and 
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12 the PRC delegation went home on December 19. On February 1, 1951, 
the General Assembly adopted resQlution 498(V) condemning PRC aggres-
sion in Korea. 13 Thus, Peking was officially branded an aggressor by 
the very organization it earnestly wanted to join. On May 18, the 
General Assembly adopted resolution 500(V) recommending an embargo on 
shipment of arms, ammunition, and other war materials of strategic 
14 
value to areas controlled by the PRC and North Korea. The Korean 
War dragged on to a stalemate, ending in a cease-fire agreement on 
July 27, 1953. 
The "Moratorium" Resolutions 
1951-1960 
Despi t'e UN condemnation of Peking as an aggressor against the 
UN itself, the Soviet Union proposed on November 10, 1951, that the 
issue of Chinese representation be included in the agenda of the sixth 
session of the General Assembly. Instead, at its 342nd plenary meet-
ing on November 13, the General Assembly adopted, by thirty-seven to 
eleven votes with four abstentions, a Thai resolution to postpone 
consideration of the Chinese issue. 15 Similar "moratorium" resolu-
tions (proposed by the United states from 1952 on) were adopted each 
year thereafter, at the beginning of each session through 1960. 
From 1951 through 1955, the moratorium resolution was approved by 
at least a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. In 1956 it 
gained only 59 percent of the votes; thereafter, the percentage dropped 
steadily to a low point of 42 percent in 1960, well below a simple rna-
f t 1 b h . 16 jority o ota UN mem ers 1p. The 1960 resolution was adopted only 
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because twenty-three countries abstained, leaving a margin of forty-
two votes in favor, thirty-four opposed. Fourteen of the twenty-
three abstentions were by new African members. 
The "Important Question" Resolution 
1961-1971 
African abstentions in the 1960 vote were a major reason for the 
launching of the ROC's "Operation Vanguard" to win African support by 
giving agricultural and technical aid. The 1960 vote also caused the 
United States and the ROC to change strategy in the 1961 session of the 
General Assembly in order to save the ROC seat. Instead of a mora-
torium resolution, the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy, and 
Japan proposed that the General Assembly treat "Chinese representa-
tion" as an "important question"--that is, one which (under Article 18 
of the UN Charter) required a two-thirds majority for approval. In 
effect, a simple majority could by this procedure require two-thirds 
approval for any transfer of the Chinese seat from Taipei to Peking. 
Conversely, Peking and its supporters were put in the curious position 
of having to argue that Peking's demand for the UN seat was not an "im-
portant question." The General Assembly approved the 1960 five-power 
resolution l668(XVI) on December 15, 1961, by sixty-one votes to 
f . b . 17 thirty- our, w1th seven a stent1ons. 
The moratorium resolutions of 1951-1960 postponed a direct vote 
on the question of replacing Taipei with Peking. The important ques-
tion resolutions of 1961-1971 permitted a direct vote annually on this 
question, but required a two-thirds majority on it. The "important 
question" strategy saved Taipei's UN seat in 1961 and for the next 
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nine years, since votes in favor of seating Peking never reached the 
two-thirds level (not even in 1971). However, votes on the "important 
question" resolutions are less informative than votes on the direct 
question, which posed a simple choice between Taipei and Peking, not 
complicated by any procedural element. The statistics presented here 
are therefore based on the explicit pro-Peking resolutions from 1961 
through 1971, rather than on the "important question" resolutions. 
Table XXXIX shows the total vote each year, in number and in per-
centage. Statistics on African votes are presented later in this 
chapter. 
In the first three years of the "important question" strategy 
(1961-1963), the ROC actually gained ground in the voting on the pro-
Peking resolution. There was no vote in 1964, but the 1965 vote alarmed 
the ROC: for the first time, Peking received as many votes as Taipei 
(see Table XXXIX). Thereafter the ROC intensified its diplomatic ef-
forts, especially in Africa, which had given Peking nearly twice as 
many votes as Taipei in 1965. The tide of pro-Peking votes receded in 
1966, 1967, and 1968, but this probably was due less to ROC efforts 
than to the PHC's preoccupation with its Cultural Revolution. As soon 
as Peking renewed its diplomatic efforts after the Cultural Revolution 
ended 1n mid-1969, the voting trend was again reversed in favor of the 
PRC. In 1970, for the first time, Peking received more votes than 
Taipei, though not a majority (because of twenty-seven abstentions). 
Decision in 1971 
In the 1971 voting, Peking at last received a majority of the 
votes (60 percent). Although not a two-thirds majority, this was 
For 
TABLE XXXIX 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING ON 
THE CHINA ISSUE · 
All Nations: 




Ntimber of Votes 
For For 
Year ROC PRC Abstain~' Total ROC PRC Abstain* 
1950 56 27 17 59 33 16 10 
l951U 62 18 20 60 37 ll 12 
1952 70 12 18 60 42 7 ll 
1953** 73 17 10 60 44 10 6 
1954 72 18 10 60 43 ll 6 
1955 70 20 10 60 42 12 6 
1956 60 30 10 79 47 24 8 
1957 59 33 8 82 48 27 7 
1958 54 35 ll 81 44 28 9 
1959 54 35 ll 82 44 29 9 
1960 42 34 24 99 42 34 23 
1961 46 36 18 104 48 37 19 
1962 51 38 11 110 56 42 12 
1963 51 37 12 111 57 41 13 
1965 40 40 20 117 47 47 23 
1966 47 38 15 121 57 46 18 
1967 48 37 15 122 58 45 19 
1968 46 35 19 126 58 44 24 
1969 44 38 18 126 56 48 22 
1970 39 40 21 127 49 51 27 
1971 27 60 13. 128 35 76 17 
*Including those registered as absent or not voting. 
**No roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953; only totals are available. 
Sources: Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950-1971; and Tou-piao 
chi-lu (ROC). Figures from 1961 through 1971 refer to votes 
on the resolution "to seat the PRC and expel the ROC," rather 
than on the "important question" resolution, because the 
former reveals the true strength of the two Chinas in the 
voting. 
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sufficient to decide the issue, because the "important question" resolu~ 
tion was for the first time defeated, by fifty~nine votes to fifty~five, 
with fifteen abstentions. 18 After the rejection of this resolution, 
and before the vote on the pro~Peking resolution, ROC Foreign Minister 
Chou Shu~kai took the floor on a point of order and made the following 
statement: 
The rejection of draft resolution A/1.632 and Add. 1 
and 2 is a flagrant violation of the Charter, which 
governs the expulsion of Member States. In view of 
the frenzied and irrational manners that have been 
exhibited in this hall, the delegation of the Repub-
lic of China has now decided not to take part in any 
further proceedings of this General Assembly.l9 
On behalf of his government, Chou thanked the countries which had. sup~ 
ported Taipei throughout the years. Then he and the other ROC delegates 
walked out of the General Assembly hall. Without the presence of the 
ROC delegation, the General Assembly then adopted the pro~Peking reso-
lution by seventy-six votes to thirty-five, with seventeen absten-
t t . 20 en 1ons. After the vote, pro~Peking delegates, especially those 
from the African countries, "were in a frenzy of delight~~their arms 
swooping above their heads and jumping up and down in their seats as 
wild applause engulfed the circular chamber." 21 
Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Chou issued an official state~ 
ment declaring that the ROC "has now decided to withdraw from the or-
ganization which it helped establish" twenty-six years before. Chou 
accused those who supported Peking of sacrificing "the lofty principles 
of the Charter on the altar of expedience; ... they will have to 
answer to the judgment of history and posterity."22 
The seating of the PRC delegation on October 26, 1971, ended the 
ROC's relations ~ith the United Nations. On the same day, ROC 
President Chiang Kai-shek, in a lengthy message, told his people: 
We declared that neither the Government of the Republic 
of China nor the Chinese people will ever recognize the 
validity of an illegal resolution adopted by the current 
United Nations session in flagrant violation of the pro-
visions of its own Charter. The destiny of our nation 
is not in the hands of the United Nations. It is square-
ly in our own hands ... The international situation now 
confronting us is marked by danger and pitfalls. Never-
theless, as long as we ourselves are strong, no force 
in all the world can shake us. As long as we ourselves 
are courageous and of undaunted spirit, no force in all 
the world can humiliate us. As long as we ourselves 
persevere in the struggle, the final success will be 
ours. 23 
The Role of Africa, 1950-1971 
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Africa played an important role in the General Assembly decision 
on the "Chinese representation" issue on October 26, 1971. A third 
(34 percent) of Peking's seventy-six votes came from Africa. Ironic-
ally, an even larger proportion (43 percent) of Taipei's thirty-five 
votes came from Africa, but the number was much smaller. Fifteen 
African nations voted for Taipei, twenty-six for Peking, including 
four which still had diplomatic relations with Taipei. without this 
African support, the PRC would not have won in 1971. Since every 
country has an equal voice in the General Assembly, regardless of size 
or population, the steady increase in the number of African nations made 
African votes steadily more important on this and other issues, as 
shown in Table XL. Since African votes were negligible in the period 
of the PRC's isolation before 1955, the fact that Peking received none 
of them made no difference. African votes were about one-tenth of the 
total in 1956-1969, about one-fourth 1n 1960-1961, and thereafter about 
one-third, and thus of major importance to both Chinas. 
African Votes 
as % of 




















Source: Based on Tou-:eiao 
TABLE XL 
IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN VOTES ON 
CHINESE REPRESENTATION 
African Votes African Votes · 
as % of all as % of all 





















••There was no vote. in 1964, no roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953 
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African Abstentions 






















Votes on the China issue by each African country over the entire 
period, 1950-1971, are recorded in Table XLI, which uses two sets of 
three symbols each to indicate whether a country abstained (A), voted 
for Taipei (T), or voted for Peking (P), and also whether it then had 
diplomatic relations with Taipei (t), with Peking (p), or with neither 
(n). The total number of African votes, and the number for Taipei (T) 
or for Peking (P), are shown graphically in Figure 8. The detailed 
voting record is then analyzed statistically in five other tables. 
Table XLII is a statistical summary of "T", "P", and "A" entries 
ln Table XLI--that is, the percentage and number of African countries 
voting for Taipei, voting for Peking, or abstaining. Table XLII shows 
that the ROC received a majority of African votes ln 1950, 1952, 1954, 
1955, 1956, 1962, 1963, and 1969, and a plurality in 1967 and 1968. 
The PRC received a majority of African votes in 1959 and 1971 only, 
but a plurality in 1957, 1958, 1960, 1965, and 1970. 
Table XLIII distributes the African "T", "P", and "A" votes by 
type, subdividing the "T" votes into "Tt" and "Tn" categories, the "P" 
votes into ''Pp," "Pn," and "Pt" categories, and the "A" votes ( ab-
stentions) into "At," "Ap," and "An" categories. From this table, it 
is clear that after 1958, both Taipei and Peking drew most of their 
votes from countries with which they had diplomatic relations. No 
African nation having diplomatic relations with Peking ever voted for 
Taipei, though the reverse was not true in 1960, 1965, 1969, 1970, or 
1971 (see also Table XLVI below). 
Table XLIV provides the opposite correlation, distributing the 
African "t," "p;" and "n" categories of diplomatic relations by voting 
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Figure 8. African Votes on China 




AFRICAN VOTING ON THE CHINA ISSUE: 
SUMMARY OF VOTES 
% of African Votes Number of African Votes 
For For For For 
Year* ROC PRC Abstain Total ROC PRC Abstain 
1950 75 0 25 4 3 0 1 
1952 100 0 0 4 4 0 0 
1954 75 0 25 4 3 0 1 
1955 75 0 25 4 3 0 1 
1956 50 25 25 8 4 2 2 
1957 33 45 22 9 3 4 2 
1958 33 45 22 9 3 4 2 
1959 20 50 30 10 2 5 3 
1960 8 36 56 25 2 9 14 
1961 31 31 38 29 9 9 ll 
1962 52 42 6 33 17 14 2 
1963 52 36 12 33 17 12 4 
1965 27 49 24 37 10 18 9 
1966 44 44 12 39 17 17 5 
1967 49 41 10 39 19 16 4 
1968 49 37 14 41 20 15 6 
1969 51 44 5 41 21 18 2 
1970 42 46 12 41 17 19 5 
1971 37 63 0 41 15 26 0 
Source: Based on Tou-,eiao chi-lu (ROC). 













































AFRICAN VOTING ON THE CHINA ISSUE 
BY DIPLOMATIC STATUS 
Voting by Voting by 
Taipei Peking 
Recognizers Reco~nizers 
No For For No For 
Vote PRC PRC Vote ROC 
1 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 2 
1 0 0 0 2 
1 0 0 0 2 
0 0 1 0 3 
1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 3 0 0 
5 1 6 0 0 
4 0 7 0 1 
1 0 10 0 2 
2 0 10 0 0 
5 1 15 2 1 
2 0 12 2 1 
1 0 12 2 1 
1 0 13 1 0 
0 1 13 1 0 
4 1 14 1 0 

















































categories, the "p" countries into "Pp" and "Ap" categories, and the 
"n" countries into "Tn," "An," and "Pn" categories. This table shows 
that defections--meaning either. an abstention or a vote for the other 
side--were much rarer among countries recognizing Peking than among 
countries recognizing Taipei. The countries failing to vote for the 
China they recognized are identified by year in Tables XLV and XLVI. 
Conclusions About African Voting 
From the last seven tables (XL through XLVI), the following con-
clusions can be drawn. 
(1) Although African nations tend to vote in a bloc on some is-
sues in the United Nations, they did not do so on the issue of Chinese 
representation. In other words, there was never a unified "African 
view" of the China issue, but a sharp though fluctuating division be-
tween pro-Peking and pro-Taipei votes from Africa (see Tables XLI and 
XLII, and Figure 8). 
(2) Very high rates of abstention (see Table XLII ) before 1962, 
and occasionally thereafter, suggest that many African nations resented 
being asked to take sides in a dispute perceived as an internal Chinese 
dispute, or feared the consequences if they did take sides. 
(3) Abstent.ions were nearly always more numerous among African 
countries not having diplomatic relations with either China, than among 
those which recognized either Taipei or Peking (see Table XLIV). 
(4) As might be expected, leftist governments tended both to 
recognize Peking and to vote for Peking in the UN, while anti-
Communist governments usually recognized Taipei and voted for Taipei 







AFRICAN NATIONS RECOGNIZING THE PRC BUT 
NOT VOTING FOR THE PRC 
Abstained 
1966, 1967 
1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 
Benin 1965 
Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-1u (ROC) and I-nan-piao (ROC). 
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TABLE XLVI 
AFRICAN NATIONS RECOGNIZING THE ROC BUT 
NOT VOTING FOR THE ROC 
433 
Country Abstained Voting for Peking 
North Africa 
1950, 1954, 1955 Egypt 































South Africa 1957 
1966, 1970 
1962 






Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC) and I-nan-piao (ROC). 
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recognition and UN vote, not only for these two kinds of governments 
but for all African governments. 
(5) Countries that consistently voted for Peking s1nce estab-
1ish:ing diplomatic relations with the PHC included Egypt, Algeria, 
Guinea, Congo, Mali, Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia. 
Most of these were in North and East Africa (where the ROC had little 
or no influence), and most were strongly pro-Peking. But it is note-
worthy that Kenya continued to vote for Peking even when relations 
were badly strained (1965-1970). 
(6) Some count4ies which regularly voted for Peking abstained 
I 
when relations with the PRC deteriorated, but they never voted for 




(7) Some count~ies having diplomatic relations with Taipei oc-
casionally voted for:Peking--Senegal, Libya, Sierra Leone, Togo, and 
Botswana (see Table XLVI). 
(8) When an African nation which had recognized one China switched 
to recognition of the other, it nearly always changed its UN vote ac-
cordingly. Examples include Congo and CAR in 1964, Mauritania in 1965, 
Benin in 1966, CAR in 1968, and Cameroon and Sierra Leone in 1971 (com-
pare Table XLI with the summary of diplomatic relations in Chapter II, 
Table VI) . 
(9) Some countries having no diplomatic relations with either 
China voted for Peking on many occasions after 1959--notably Nigeria 
and Ethiopia. 
(10) African support for Peking in the General Assembly continu-
ously increased ,from 1956 through 1961, but dropped in 1962 and 1963, 
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presumably because of the Sino-Indian border war and Peking's hardline 
attitude toward the nuclear test-ban treaty. This was particularly 
apparent in the case of Ethiopia, which began voting for Peking ln 
1960 but abstained in 1963. There was no vote in 1964, but the sharp 
r1se in pro-Peking votes in 1965 can be attributed to intense diplo-
matic activities on the part of PRC in Africa (including Chou En-lai's 
fifty-four day tour of ten African countries in 1963-1964) and the es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and Paris in 1964. 
(11) African support for Peking declined steadily in 1966, 1967, 
1968, during the Culfural Revolution but not always because of that. 
Tunisia's abstention, beginning in 1965, seems to have been prolonged 
through 1970 by a di~pute related to the Cultural Revolution (see Chap-
ter III). However, ~hana's abstentions in 1967 and 1968 were due to 
I 
internal factors--th~ overthrow of Nkrumah's pro-Peking government. 
i 
Nigeria voted for Pe~ing in 1966 and 1967 but abstained in 1968, prob-
ably because of Pekihg's involvement in the Nigerian civil war. 
After 1971 
The General Assembly's decision in 1971 ended a twenty-two year 
controversy, and ushered in a new era of international politics which 
saw Peking playing the self-proclaimed role :of leader of the Third 
World, and Taipei trying to break out of political and economic iso-
lation. With its seating in the UN, Peking had achieved the two short-
range goals of its African policy, but the two long-range goals remain. 
Thus, it can be predicted that Africa will remain an important target 
in PRC foreign pqlicy plan. The conflict between the Peking and Moscow 
in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World will probably become more 
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acute in the future. The PHC can be expected to remain active in 
Africa though on a reduced scale. 
One striking example of decline in PRC effort in Africa was Pe-
king's minimal participation in international relief to the six 
Sahelian countries (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper 
Volta) during the terrible drought of 1971-1975~ Mali had been one of 
Peking's closest allies in Africa since 1960, but Mali's Defense 
Minister Kissima Doukara, in charge of famine relief, said in 1974 
that the United States had provided more than sixty percent of the 
foreign aid and almost seventy percent of the food grains supplied to 
M 1 . 24 a 1. A Senegalese official commented that the Communist powers had 
done "almost nothing" and assistance from the oil-rich "Arab countries 
was infinitesimal."2r Numerous reports showed that aid to the 
I 
drought-stricken couttries came almost entirely from Western countries, 
either directly or through contributions to the UN Food and Agricul-
. t• 26 ture Organ1za 1on. The only reports of PRC aid were small donations 
of cholera vaccine t9 Chad in 1971 and 1974, and measles vaccine to 
! 
Upper Volta in 1973, las reported in Chapters IV and V. 
Since ten of the fifteen countries voting for Taipei in 1971 
broke diplomatic rel~tions with the ROC and recognized Peking within 
I 
the next few months Jr years, the 1971 decision tended also to termi-
! 
nate ROC activities 1n Africa outside the six nations which 1n 1978 
I 
still recognize Taip~i. After 1971 the ROC gradually shifted its 
I 
energy and attentionjto strengthening trade relations with the five 
countries still on friendly terms with Taipei. These do not include 
Libya, which technically still maintains diplomatic relations with 
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the ROC. Libya voted for Peking in 1969, 1970, and 1971, and actually 
granted diplomatic recognition to Peking on June 11, 1971--without 
establishing formal diplomatic relations with the PRC or severing re-
lations with the ROC. This curious state of affairs still existed in 
1978. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding nine chapters examined the general policies pursued 
by the PRC (Chapters II and III) and by the ROC (Chapter VIII) in 
Africa, and then the application of these policies, region by region, 
country by country (Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII for the PRC, Chapter 
IX for the ROC), followed by a review of the African aspects of the 
"China issue" in the United Nations (Chapter X). It 1s now time to 
summar1ze evidence concerning the eight questions posed 1n the Intro-
duction (Chapter I). 
Origins of the Competition 
The Peking-Taipei diplomatic competition in Africa since 1960 is 
an extension of the general political, military, and economic competi-
tion between the two Chinese governments. It might be even called a 
second front of the still unfinished Chinese civil war, or a civil war 
fought on foreign soil. The beginning of this competition can be dated 
from the 1955 Bandung Conference, when Peking first showed signs of 
strong interest in Third World leaderhip, but at that time there were 
only five independent countries in all of Africa. Two developments in 
1960 intensified the competition thereafter: marked deterioration of 
relations between Peking and Moscow, and a "rush to independence'' in 
Africa, with seventeen colonies gaining their independence in 1960 
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alone. The first development spurred Peking to greater efforts in 
Africa and elsewhere, which in turn gave Taipei greater incentive to 
compete. The second development provided much more opportunity for 
both Chinas to become involved in African affairs. 
Objectives 1n the Competition 
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In their competition in Africa, both Peking and Taipei had long-
range and short-range goals which they hoped to achieve with the sup-
port of friendly African countries. Peking's first long-range goal in 
Africa was to become principal leader of the Third World, of which 
Africa is a major part, and to replace Moscow as leader and spokesman 
for the socialist countries. A second long;_range goal was to make 
Africa a market for PRC products as well as a source for raw and stra-
tegic materials the PRC must import for its own military and industrial 
development. 
During the 1960s, Peking also had two short-range goals in Africa: 
first, to gain recognition from African countries as the sole legitimate 
government of China and take over the seat held by Taipei in the United 
Nations; and second, to break out of the isolation imposed upon the PRC 
by the United States "containment" policy and later by Soviet policy as 
well, and to link the two "intermediate zones" into a united front led 
by Peking. 
Taipei also had two long-range goals in Africa. The first was to 
warn African countries against the dangers imposed by Communism, es-
pecially Chinese Communism. Second, Taipei (like Peking) also wanted 
trade with Africa. In its diplomatic war with Peking over the world in 
the past three decades and particularly 1n Africa s1nce 1960, Taipei 
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had only one short-range goal: to protect its seat in the United Na-
tions and thus promote the survival of the ROC as a political entity. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
The PRC and ROC are opposites not only in ideology but also in 
size, resources, and United Nations status. These contrasts determined 
their inherent advantages and disadvantages in the African competition, 
and affected the response of African nations to Peking and· Taipei. In 
Africa during the 1960s, Peking enjoyed three advantages 6ver Taipei: 
(1) As the world's largest country in population and second largest in 
area, the PRC could more easily impress Africans as an important power. 
(2) The PRC's much greater resources (though smaller than those of the 
United States and the Soviet Union) enabled it to spend more in Africa. 
(3) Not being a member of the United Nations, Peking was subject to 
fewer international constraints and could better afford to go beyond 
conventional methods in order to achieve some specific results. 
However, the PRC also had disadvantages in Africa: (1) While its 
s1ze impressed all Africans, it also worried many of them, causing them 
to suspect that Peking might have imperialist or neo-colonialist am-
bitions equal to or greater than those of the other superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union. (2) In Africa, Peking faced not 
only the competition from Taipei, but also the much stronger challenge 
of both Moscow and Washington--not one rival but three. 
Taipei had some advantages: (1) Although opposed to Communism, 
the ROC attached no importance to promoting any ideology in Africa, and 
was able to stay away from ideological controversies which often bored 
and antagonized Africans. (2) In Africa, Taipei had only one major 
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designated enemy--Peking; thus, Taipei could concentrate all its re-
sources on achieving its single immediate political aim--thwarb ng 
Peking' H c.: ff'or"l;H to take.: over the UN scat with the support of African 
countries. {3) The ROC was small enough to make plausible its assur-
ances that it had no imperialist ambition in Africa. 
On.the other hand, Taipei's efforts in Africa were often handi-
capped by some adverse factors: {1) With much smaller resources than 
the PRC, the ROC's technical aid to Africa had to be limited both in 
cost and in geographic spread. A shortage of funds also prevented 
Taipei from fully matching or counteracting PRC activities in all 
fields, and especially in propaganda to Africa. {2) As with the PRC, 
size was both helpful and harmful: being small, the ROC stirred up no 
suspicion or fear among African countries, but neither did it command 
much respect. It is undeniable that most Africans have never con-
sidered the ROC an equal of the PRC. (3) Being a member of the United 
Nations (until 1971), Taipei had to be more cautious and discreet than 
Peking in its dealings with African countries, avoiding tactics and 
methods that might be considered improper and thus jeopardize the basic 
objective of protecting its seat in the United Nations with the support 
of African countries. 
Tactics and Scale of Effort 
To exploit their advantages and alleviate their disadvantages, 
both Peking and Taipei used a variety of methods and tactics in the 
effort to win friends in Africa at each other's expense. In practice, 
Peking used both overt and covert tactics. It made contacts with 
African countries through conventional methods: (1) establishing 
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diplomatic relations, (2) attending various Afro-Asian conferences, 
(3) increasing trade, (4) offering economic and technical assistance, 
(5) exchanging visits at high and lower levels, (6) offering education-
al opportunities to African students, and (7) propaganda (radio, broad-
casts, printed materials, motion pictures). 
Besides these conventional methods, Peking also sought to ga1n 
supporters and extend its influence in various African countries through 
covert tactics: (1) bribing influential politicians in Africa, (2) 
supporting pro-Peking members of government having diplomatic relations 
with the PRC, or supporting political dissidents and anti-government 
groups in countries not recognizing Peking, and (3) secretly training 
African guerrillas from anti-Peking countries, either in mainland China 
or 1n a friendly African country, to carry out subversion in their home 
countries. Though these covert actiVities sometimes had adverse reper-
cussions, they were often useful. 
On the other hand, Taipei's African policy relied on overt tactics. 
Like Peking, though usually on a more modest scale, Taipei used diplo-
macy, trade, economic and technical assistance, exchanges of visits, 
and opportunities for educating students in Taiwan. But Taipei's pro-
paganda efforts in Africa were negligible in comparison with Peking's, 
and since the Afro-Asian conferences were usually sponsored by Third 
World countries which took a pro-Peking stand in the Peking-Taipei 
competition, the ROC was never invited. 
Effects of the PRC Cultural Revolution 
The PRC's activities and influence 1n Africa reached a peak in 
1965, when the thirty-eight independent African countries included 
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seventeen r~cognizJng Peking, fourteen rccogni~ing Taipei, and seven 
recognizing neither. By 1969 the figures were dramatically reversed: 
there were forty-two independent African countries, but now only 
thirteen recognized Peking, twenty-two recognized Taipei, and seven 
recognized neither. The principal cause of this dramatic decline in 
Peking's standing 1n Africa was the chaos in China known as the Cultural 
Revolution, which affected almost all aspects of Peking's African policy. 
Diplomacy was de-emphasized by the PRC's recall of all but one of 
its ambassadors, leaving its embassies in the hands of charges 
d'affaires. Peking turned away from the AAPSO conferences, though con-
tinuing lesser Afro-Asian conferences under its own control, such as 
journalists' meetings. The volume of imports from and exports to 
Africa was sharply reduced. Foreign aid declined, and in 1968 and 1969 
there were no PRC loans to African countries. The number of African 
delegations visiting China, and the number of Chinese delegations 
visiting Africa, declined sharply. All foreign students in China 
were sent home. Propaganda was not diminished but became much more 
shrill, self-centered, and heavy-handed, antagonizing some African 
governments. During the Cultural Revolution, diplomatic relations be-
tween the PRC and Benin, Burundi, the CAR, Ghana, and Tunisia were 
broken or suspended; those with Kenya were reduced to fiction by mutual 
withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel without formal severance of rela-
tions. Some of these breaks were precipitated by governmental changes 
in African countries, but the violence and political instability in 
China was at least a contributing factor in all. 
On the other hand, Peking did not entirely forget Afric~ even 
during its domestic nightmare. Negotiations were started for the PRC's 
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largest single African aid project, the Zambia-Tanzania railway, and 
the presidents of those two countries did visit Peking during this es-
sentially isolationist period (as did the president of Mauritania). 
Relations with a few other militant countries, such as Congo, Guinea, 
and Mali, remained good though somewhat subdued. Moreover, when Pe-
king's African offensive resumed in the early 1970s, the rapid improve-
ment in the PRC's position in Africa indicated that the external damage 
caused by the Cultural Revolution was more easily repaired than the 
damage inside China. 
The African Response 
The PRC's domestic quarrels and the Sino-Soviet quarrel tended to 
puzzle and sometimes dismay African leaders, especially when efforts 
. were made to involve them in these disputes. But to Africans, the Peking-
Taipei competition on their continent was probably more welcome than 
annoying. Most African countries, especially those claiming to be non-
aligned, were fully aware that the more intense the competition between 
East and West, or between Peking and Taipei, the better their chances 
were for exploiting and taking advantage of it. Most African political 
leaders, whether socialist or nationalist, shared the view expressed 
very early by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba: 
The fact that Africa today excites the appetites of cer-
tain great powers ... is not a matter for concern. It 
is even a good thing, because it emphasizes the interest 
felt towards Africa and shows the advantage which we must 
derive therefrom • . The most important thing [for 
Africans] is to have a feel for events and know how to 
exploit them.l 
Almost all African countries used self-interest as the sole criterion 
in choosing between pro-Peking and pro-Taipei policies. Even the 
smallest African countries discovered that they could control and 
profit from their choice. 
Peking's Focus: on Taipei or Moscow 
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During the decade of most acute competition between Peking and 
Taipei, 1961 to 1971, the two never had a direct confrontation. The 
diplomatic war between the two opposing Chinese governments was fought 
intensely but rather silently (except in propaganda). Moreover, though 
Taipei designated Peking its sole enemy in the diplomatic war in Africa, 
Peking never regarded Taipei as its major target. Since 1960, Peking's 
principal competitors in Africa, as in the rest of the world, have been 
Moscow and Washington, which Peking accuses of being "revisionist" and 
"imperialists," respectively. However, Peking did not entirely ignore 
the intense activities undertaken by Taipei in Africa, especially in 
agricultural assistan,ce to African countries. Such aid was initiated 
by the ROC in the early 1960s, and later imitated by the PRC. 
Since the United Nations Decision 
With twenty-six African nations supporting Peking in late 1971, 
the long dispute over China's seat in the United Nations ended with 
total vLctory for the PRC: Taipei lost not only China's permanent seat 
in the Security Council but even its membership in the General Assembly. 
This formally ended both the controversy in the United Nations and an 
era in the PRC-ROC competition in Africa. The historic vote in the 
General Assembly on October 26, 1971, changed the outlook and perspec-
tive of both Peking and Taipei, which in turn affected their respective 
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policies toward Africa thereafter. 
With 'its admission to the United Nations, the two short-range goals 
of Peking's African policy--to gain recognition as the sole legitimate 
government of China and to br~ak out of the isolation imposed upon it 
by the United States and the Soviet Union--were achieved. Yet its two 
long-range goals--to become the principal leader of the Third World and 
replace Moscow as leader and spokesman for the socialist countries, and 
to explore Africa as a major market, remain to be achieved. Thus, it 
was rather implausible to suppose, as some Western experts speculated, 
that the importance of Africa in Peking's foreign policy would gradually 
decline in the late 1970s. The PRC might reduce its loans, technical 
assistance, and exchange of visits in Africa because its short-range 
goals have been achieved. But Africa, and the rest of the Third World, 
still play an important role in Peking's long-range goals, which are 
more time-consuming and less visible. No major country can afford to 
overlook Africa. 
As for Taipei, its involuntary withdrawal from the United Nations 
in 1971 was undeniably a serious blow. ·Since then the ROC has been 
forced to retreat not only in Africa but also in many other parts of 
the world. The ROC's long effort to preserve its seat in the UN was 
defeated in 1971. However, its two long-range goals--to warn African 
countries against the danger imposed by Communism and to explore Africa 
as a market--still remain. Since the HOC now has embassies in only six 
African countries (Libya in North Africa, Ivory Coast in West Africa, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and South Africa in Southern Africa), while 
Peking maintains diplomatic relations with forty African countries, 
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Taipei's chances of achieving its first long-range goal remain doubtful 
for lack of adequate contacts. By 1978, the ROC seemed to concentrate 
its efforts on exploring Africa as a market for its goods. 
However, Taipei's intensive activities in Africa during the 1960s, 
particularly in agricultural aid, constituted one of the finest pages 
in Chinese diplomatic history. Though finally unsuccessful due to 
forces beyond its control, the ROC fought gallantly and took defeat 
with dignity. A major, perhaps decisive, turn in the African competi-
tion between Peking and Taipei was taken in 1971. But the issue of 
"Two Chinas" is far from ended. 
FOOTNOTE 
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